Posted on 01/09/2007 11:01:24 AM PST by Tolik
Myths About the US Military
There is often voiced pessimism about our current military, to such a degree that it is termed broken or exhausted. But how true is that?
The traveler to Iraq is struck not by dearth, but opulence—everything imaginable from new SUVs to Eskimo Pies. Internet Service there was far faster than from my home in rural Fresno County.
So far recruitment levels are being met. No one in the military has warned that it is a bad idea to create more brigades of ground troops. Such a caveat about the current proposed expansion we would expect if we could not even meet our present manpower targets.
We have a tripartite military—air, sea, and ground. While the Marines and Army have rough going in Iraq, there have been very few Air Force and Navy material or human losses. Surely our air wings and ships are not “worn out” from patrolling in Iraq. There might be thousands of trashed humvees and worn out Bradleys, but not frigates, F-16s, or carriers. This is not 1943 when the US military was fighting in Sicily, as B-17s fell from the sky, as our merchant marine was under U-boat attack.
After Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, the mantra was that the Army and Marines were not getting their fair share of service in Rumsfeld’ revolution in military affairs that envisioned Special Forces on donkeys zeroing in GPS bombs from 20,000 feet onto clueless Taliban. But suddenly after a little more three years in Iraq, we are supposed to believe that a few thousand insurgents have “ruined” what until 2003 was an underused force? It would be interesting to trace the origins of this pessimism that now appears in the columns of op-ed pages: does it arise from tired and demoralized officers, or anti-war critics eager to see something again like the 1976 American military?
Does Experience Count for Anything?
But more importantly, few have asked more existential questions: are our ground forces better or worse prepared to fight jihadists than they were on September 11? At some point, the millions of hours of experience fighting Islamists from the Hindu Kush to Anbar Province must count for something. William Tecumseh Sherman’s frightening Army of the West that tramped through Washington DC in April 1865 made any Union force of 1861 seem pathetic by comparison—despite he tragic losses of thousands during the war.
Ruined and Then There Is Ruined!
In the past, there have been modern divisions of the American army that have been nearly ruined, but nothing of the sort has transpired in Iraq. Here one thinks of the 6th Marine Division that did the most gruesome fighting on Okinawa and suffered over 8,000 killed or wounded in less than 90 days—nearly half its original combat strength attrited in a single battle.
After 24 hours of fighting in the first day of the Bulge, the US 28th and 106th infantry divisions ceased to exist as effective combat units, with nearly half their soldiers killed, wounded, or captured. The 7th and 2nd infantry divisions that retreated from the Yalu River under attack by hundreds of thousands of Chinese communists were nearly decimated. To say that the American military is ruined after fighting in Iraq is preposterous by both present and past standards of combat losses.
So What’s Wrong?
What then is the problem since we are still fighting in both Afghanistan and Iraq after brilliant victories over the Taliban and Saddam Hussein?
Most obvious is the inability of our conventional forces to translate amazing tactical success in Afghanistan and Iraq into rapid strategic victory, a transition of establishing a stable postbellum government that requires everything from winning hearts and minds to inspired counter-insurgency. These questions about the transition from conventional to asymmetrical warfare always have nagged—why did the armies of Sherman and Grant who crushed nearly half-a-million Confederate soldiers in a little over a year from summer 1864 to spring 1865, not secure Reconstruction in 12 miserable years of failure, in the face of a few thousands Klansmen, and assorted night riders?
In the case of Iraq, when the easier conventional war ceased in victory after a few days, our generals (cf. Tommy Franks) simply retired. Political restrictions (pulling back from first Fallujah or allowing Moqtadar Sadr to be freed from his encirclement) hampered military options and projected a sense of perceived weakness. Too often retired generals simply blamed the present problem in establishing security on “too few troops”, as if Donald Rumsfeld alone had drawn up the plans of the invasion, or that an army that defeated Saddam Hussein in three weeks was inherently unable to squash an insurgency of far fewer combatants. And it is always easier to shoot a uniformed Republican Guard marksman than to pick out a terrorist from his ten brothers and sisters after his bomb attack on a US squad stringing telephone wire or painting schools.
It is now a cliché that there “is no military solution” in Iraq. But, in fact, the political solution—three successful elections and a constitutional government in place—has outpaced the military effort. What we need is a massive clamp-down on militias and terrorists to give the government confidence and public support, and that can’t be accomplished when we do not crush the terrorists, whether inside Iraq or flowing in from Syria and Iran.
The Same Old, Same Old.
Nothing that we see in Iraq is unique by any historical standards. Generals always rue that they have too few combat troops. Go back and read about Dwight D. Eisenhower’s complaints in late 1944, and the controversy over a “broad” and “narrow” front in approaching the Rhine. Patton raged about political constraints that stopped the 3rd Army from taking Prague, and the 1st from targeting Berlin. MacArthur was relieved over his inability to widen the war to target Chinese troop build-ups in Manchuria. Secretary of War Stanton interfered with Sherman’s administration of Savannah, despite the culmination of a brilliant March to the Sea. No need to mention Vietnam and the micromanaging of campaigns from the White House.
In short, the history of American ground operations is that troops are often sent into battle complaining of too few numbers, too many political constraints, and too vague objectives. We know all that is the unfortunate price to be paid in a democracy that reluctantly musters its forces, and has too many would-be military geniuses behind the lines that hamper smooth operations at the front. It has never been an American tradition to say, “There is the enemy, go do what you wish to win,” but rather “There is the enemy, these are the parameters under which you must operate to win.”
So what we do not need now is any more furor over the should’ve/could’ve/would’ve troop levels in 2003. Even when we talk of a “surge” the present disagreement is really over only about 30,000 additional troops in a coalition of nearly 180,000, that, along with Iraq Security Forces, reaches a total force of almost 500,000.
An Existential Question.
Thus the better question is why haven’t a half-million Iraqi and coalition troops been able to defeat at most 20,000-30,000 insurgents, especially when over 11 million Iraqis voted for their own democratic representatives? The answer is that the restrictive rules of engagement, the open borders to Iran and Syria, and the perception of American impotence have all combined to suggest to most Iraqis that the radical beheading/IEDing/kidnapping/assassinating minority within their midst will be running things in their neighborhood once the far larger, more static, far nicer, and far more restrained coalition troops dissolve or leave. People in advance always make the necessary adjustments to popular perceptions.
Avoir de l’audacité, toujours l’audacité, encore une fois l’audacité?
At some point it would be stunning for a US military official to step forward, and assure victory. No more acrimony over what should have, could have or might have been. No more retired generals talking to reporters at midnight “off the record”, or appearing as “unnamed senior military official” in the footnotes of the latest journalistic expose about Iraq. No more complaints about had Paul Bremmer not, had Donald Rumsfeld not, had Tommy Franks not, but rather something instead like: “Here is how we are going to defeat the jihadists”.
Most Americans do not want to hear any more suggestions from the Iraqi Study Group, anymore meae culpae from John Kerry or Hillary Clinton about how they were brainwashed by faulty intelligence, or any more assessments of the war from moralists and geniuses like Donald Trump and Bill Maher.
Instead, we need to hear from the very top echelon of the American military, that despite all the roadblocks put in their way, and the difficulty of the present task (it isn’t easy to secure a democracy in the heart of the ancient caliphate surrounded by Khomeinist Iran, Wahhabist Saudi Arabia, and Baathist Syria), that they will defeat these insurgents—and here’s how they plan to do it.
Somewhere in the US military right now is a Grant, Sherman, Patton, Ridgeway, or Abrams, who has been shouting and we haven’t been listening. Now is the time to let them come forward—as they have always arisen from obscurity in past American wars when their nation’s hour of need has come.
Let me know if you want in or out.
Links: FR Index of his articles: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/keyword?k=victordavishanson
His website: http://victorhanson.com/
NRO archive: http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson-archive.asp
New Link! http://victordavishanson.pajamasmedia.com/
Dr. Hansen really needs to stop confusing the left with facts.
My hero! A lot of what I know comes political and anthropological comes from reading this gentleman's writings. In essence, I'll guess that Mr.Hanson thinks it's cool and proper we go through this public debate re our involvement in the affairs of the ME. He probably says we'll be guided to the proper path through the open exchange of ideas.
/Hanson turned me onto the idea the invention of the stirrup helped catapult Spain to world dominance for a spell of history. That's a staggering thought. A little piece of bent metal and leather straps made conquest possible.
So he says there's a way to win? I never knew
/s
But that is precisely what many liberals here in the DC area, since some general said so. It is preposterous on its face.
Ping.........
“Bob, I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive ... And that goes for your chief of staff, too.”
Ok I read it. :)
Does anyone else think there should be a shift to allowing the Iraqis to clean up their own cities and move our troops out of the cities and along the borders? This would shift the emphasis to killing any and all infiltrators along the border. Rules of engagement should be very loose for border security. Who knows, there might even be an incident with Syria or Iran. Have the Saudis started with the fence?
Bravo, VDH. Someone needs to discuss Iraq in some sort of historical context. The hyperbole has been deafening and totally wrong.
Grant and Sherman would be out of the service for drinking and smoking.
Patton would be kicked out for being insensitive and politically incorrect.
Dunno 'bout Ridgeway, or Abrams, but I bet they'd have had problems that would keep 'em from making general, too.
And, as I show in my book "America's Victories," these kinds of claims about the American military being "broken" pop up in EVERY SINGLE WAR we've had, save perhaps WW II. ALL of our enemies, in every war, thought we were pushovers. Santa Anna promised to be in Washington D.C. in a few weeks after he took over as dictator; the British were supremely confident they would beat us in 1812. There was HUGE opposition to the War of 1812, Mexican War, and Sp-Am War, too.
Just a wild guess but by that time Grant's administration was so crooked it was unbelievable and William "All Indians who are not on reservations are hostile and will remain so until killed off" Sherm was taking his racism out to the Indians? Not to mention the carpetbaggers that had moved in for the quick buck on the backs of Southerners? And why the Southern situation wasn't 'fixed' had more to do with the obstinance of the Radical Republicans than a few roving bands of Klansmen.
And all this somehow equates to military action in another country thousands of miles away and why that situation may not be where some think it should be. You have to hand it to Vic though. At least he's up to the 19th century with his revisionism. I was tiring a bit of his convulted attempts to equate Greek history to Middle Eastern 21st century military tactics.
This game I would stand a chance at beating you at.
This game I would stand a chance at beating you at.
LOL!
You fell into a trap! Ask my daughter about the game and VDH!! LOLOLOL
You're gitin' mail! I'm laughing so hard, tears are coming down! LOLOLOL
I agree with you billbears. Federal agents managed to turn every small farmer into a sharecropper during Reconstruction, and the entire South had their forests cut down. I believe it is studied in military colleges as the worst post-war administration in the history of warfare.
Why can't we look at how modern Muslim leaders control their people? It is quite simple. They get rid of clerics who oppose them. After all, it's religion that drives these idiots, and their religion comes in shades from practical to fanatic.
We need to do as Tunisia does; ban the veil in Iraq and this will bring out the fanatics to be eliminated. There is nothing in the Koran about the veil.
I agree...great post!
"Support Our Troops...Shoot The Media!"
Bumper Sticker/T-Shirt
http://www.cafepress.com/titillatingtees.71418953
Not only are the American people tired of hearing that stuff, but it has to make things harder to keep boradcasting it to our enemies.
Well, how does it feel?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.