End of Dreams, Return of History

RealClearPolitics ^ | July 19, 2007 | Robert Kagan

[gpapa]

The world has become normal again. The years immediately following the end of the Cold War offered a tantalizing glimpse at a new kind of international order, with nations growing together or disappearing altogether, ideological conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling through increasingly free commerce and communications. But that was a mirage, the hopeful anticipation of a liberal, democratic world that wanted to believe the end of the Cold War did not end just one strategic and ideological conflict but all strategic and ideological conflict. People and their leaders longed for "a world transformed." 1 Today the nations of the West still cling to that vision. Evidence to the contrary -- the turn toward autocracy in Russia or the growing military ambitions of China -- is either dismissed as a temporary aberration or denied entirely.

The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remains as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still "unipolar," with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.

[LiberalBassTurds]

Great read bump!

LBT
......

[JasonC]

All true - but what is new is that half of the west is not interested in defending any real west, but only their nonsensical daydream. And if they can't have it, they will at least oppose anyone who tells them so. Leaving the field to those clear sighted enough to have the foggiest idea what is really going on, and not beholden to a by-your-leave from the fantasts.

[secretagent]

What is more, the allied intervention in Kosovo was unlawful, at least according to centuries of international law and the UN Charter. It was undertaken without authorization by the UN Security Council and against a sovereign nation that had committed no act of aggression beyond its borders.

Lt Watada, the Iraq deployment refusee, concurs.

[brigadoon]

A tour de force by Kagan. Brilliant.

[LjubivojeRadosavljevic]

The manuscript is well written.

However, in my view, the author dilutes his manuscript with too many intervening variables.

In short, I’d say that the “tipping point” in the euphoria of the aftermath of Cold War was when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990. In so doing, this gave the rise to Bin Laden et al.

[nathanbedford]

A tour de force indeed. More, Kagan offers up a fresh paradigm through which America's place in the world and its way forward can be judged from a new perspective. For example, I have tended to see our difficulties and relations with Russia and China to be wholly subsidiary to the more pressing matter of the war against Islamist terrorism. But Kagan sees the war against terrorism as part of a war between liberalism and autocracy. Thus, we are confronted with more than a lack of cooperation from Beijing and Moscow on the issue of Iranian nukes, we are confronted with an instinctive and reactive obstructionism by autocrats seeking to keep the world safe for autocracy.

Kagan's paradigm, by placing the war against terrorism in the context of the struggle between autocracy and liberalism, diminishes the relative importance of the war against terrorism but perhaps offers us a more realistic array of tools and goals. Kagan points out, quite correctly, that my neighbors here in Europe reject our conception of the war on terrorism and see much of Islamic truculence to be the inevitable blowback against American imperialism and support for Israel. Since it must be a primary goal of America to maintain Europe as an ally in the war against terrorism, we must find a way to convince the Europeans that the Islamist threat is not a justifiable reaction to American arrogance, but equally a threat to the European liberal vision of world order, as unrealistic as that may be. In other words, the threat must be painted for Europeans in colors that appeal to them.

As against our most pressing enemy, Islamicists, and as against our two greatest potential enemies, Russia and China, Kagan's paradigm in effect says more of the same with respect to the latter two, i.e. let the magic of modernization undermined these autocracies. With respect to terrorism, not surprisingly, Kagan endorses his own policy as we are attempting it in Iraq: encourage democratization. Regrettably, Kagan has no really good answer about what to do when democracy does not seem to be working in a place like Iraq, or even backfires as it has with the Palestinians. Do we really want democracy in Pakistan and Egypt? Kagan assures us that the risk is worth it, I am not so sure.

Finally, one should be aware that, as useful as a new paradigm of this kind might be in presenting the world in a new way to allies such as the Europeans, we should also understand that Kagan is essentially writing a new brief in support of his old ideas. Nevertheless, we gain much from seeing the world from a different axis.

[LjubivojeRadosavljevic]

Well done.

You have provided the most eloquent synopsis that I have read in this forum.

You didn’t even mention Kosovo, I wonder why?

[nathanbedford]

Truth be told, I did not discuss Kosovo because I never understood it. I never undertook to understand it because I never judged it to be significant to the national interest of my country. Judging from your nom de plum, I suspect you could educate me to the contrary.

Thanks for the kind words, Nathan

[Gengis Khan]

“Do we really want democracy in .......”

There in lies your answer. For “us” its hardly about “liberalism” or “autocracy”. Its all about what “WE” want.

Democracy cannot coexist in an Islamic society since as a society it is inherently autocratic. All such democracies are sham democracies.

[CarrotAndStick]

All such democracies are sham democracies.

Or rather, 'Shamocracies'.

;^)

[LjubivojeRadosavljevic]

[”I did not discuss Kosovo because I never understood it.”]

Well, try more diligently. You don’t me (because I’m a Serb), given your prose.

Ahem...Your General Bedford Forrest would except nothing less—would he not?

[neverdem]

BTTT!

[neverdem]

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