bttt
None of those in the picture look all that big.
Why would maneuverability be so important? I would think that raw speed, multiple targeting and standoff capability would be key.
Save your rupees, Inda, buy a few Sturmoviks, Corsairs, Skyraiders, or Warthogs, upgrade the radar, comm, and processing on whatever you’re flying now, and pick up a few gross of RPV Predator types.
The Sovietsky platform is aa tub, fraught with the necessity of having Sovietsky service teams constantly shuttled to Delhi for their nights out on a Brollywood town, amid burps of borscht.
The grippen is actually a STOL MAch 2 machine, cabable of flying off of pastures covered with cow dung or snow, from remote widely dispersed bases.Canada is eyeing these also but the indians hardly need a cold weather 60 below zero functioning aircraft. But whats wrong with a little over design? OTOH, the F-18 gives the 2 engine option for multiple role work over the rather vast oceanic territory which comprise the Indian shore, with very tantalizing avionic packages which have been proven reliable in combat.
Thats the kicker. Of all of the competitors, only the US machines have demonstrated combat reliability. That makes for a likely US winner. The Gripen is probably the best all round air frame for the flexibility needed by India on the ground, and in the air.
I think it will come down to these two, and the F-18 will likley win out because it has dual engines.
The Russian entry is a cranky tub, with great flight and fight characteristics, but the ratio of service time to flight time is extremely high, and they are tubs unfit for India's role as a balancing power between China and Pakistan.
Asia pinglist ping.
This could be interesting. Please keep us updated.
It sounds like a competition between light fighters.
Although the point for debate is what the wild cards are? The Rafale would be a very good platform, as would the Typhoon (particularly later tranches). Problem is cost, the need to wait for upgrades in radar/engine etc, and the fact that the Rafale/Typhoon would basically be at the same tier (and higher once upgrades are through) than India's SU-30MKIs, and thus creating a 'hi-hi' setup instead of hi-lo.
The GRipen is a great plane, and it woud serve the 'lo' low function pretty well while at the same time being quite lethal. Furthermore its upgrades include the AESA upgrade, engine upgrades, and so forth in the Gripen NG. A serious plane that is affordable, packs a lethal punch against anything the Pakistanis may have, and has a lot of cutting edge technologies. It should be the best pick if India was truly serious about a 'lo' fighter with stuff hidden up its sleeves, and it would be the second choice pick if the SuperBug was not included. Although it may win ....who knows.
Thus for now it seems like it is the SB and the MiG35. It would be really shocking if they chose the Typhoon (although that would make the Chinese and Pakistanis cry bl@@dy murder), the Rafale is terrific (and they WOULD have chosen the Mirage-2000 had it not been withdrawn and replaced with the Rafale) but it will most probably not be chosen (although France is one of the best weapons suppliers in the world since they give up to date technology and do not cut you off if you do something that makes the UN go ga-ga), and the F-16 blew its chances the moment the first Viper touched down in Pakistan all those years ago (LM would have to sweeten the deal to the nth degree, which they are probably trying to do ....if I recall correctly one of the LM head honchos mentioned that India might participate in the F-35 JSF program that LM makes). Anyways, maybe LM will get the rights from the United Arab Emirates for the AESA radar used on the UAE Vipers, and a case could be made for the Viper based on the closeness between India and Israel and the great work Israel has done on upgrading their F-16s (the 'Soufa' version). Thus miracles can happen, and the Viper is one of the best 'lo' aircraft around.
Anyways, it will probably be the SuperBug and the MiG. The number of planes will definitely be more than 126. The Gripen would have made the best choice, but it will probably not be selected. Had the Mirage not been withdrawn it would have definitely won.
And anything could happen given the time considerations ....goodness, we may even see F-16s flying in Indian colors, or even Typhoons (although the Viper and Typhoon probabilities are less than those of Craig tapping his foot in a girl's lavatory .....)
BTW, what are your thoughts on the other contenders. Not on the SuperBug and/or MiG, but on the others. Can any of them beat out the SB/MiG combo (not just on merit, since the Typhoon and Rafale easily outclass them, but also considering other factors like politics, costs, integration, the fact that the SU-30MKI is already the 'hi' fighter, and so forth)? Thanks.
i hope the F/A-18's get the nod.
"It's the biggest fighter aircraft deal since the early 1990s," said Boeing's Mark Kronenberg, who runs the company's Asia/Pacific business. DID has offered ongoing coverage of India's planned multi-billion dollar jet fighter buy, from its early days as a contest between Dassault, Saab, and MiG for a 126 plane order to the entry of American competitors and even EADS' Eurofighter. What began as a lightweight fighter competition to replace India's shrinking MiG-21 interceptor fleet appears to have bifurcated into two categories now, and two expense tiers.
That trend got a sharp boost in March 2006, when Press Trust of India (PTI) reported a surprise pullout by the CEO of Dassault on the eve of the RFP. The Mirage 2000v5 will no longer be fielded for the India deal, despite the fact that India already flies 40 Mirage 2000Ds and its senior officials have touted standardization as a plus factor. So, what's going on?
In a word, lots. The participants changed, India's view of its own needs is changing, and the nature of the order may be changing as well – but with the release of the official $10 billion RFP, the competition can begin at last. DID offers an in-depth look at the MRCA competition's changes, the RFP, and the competitors; and also offers an updated timeline regarding competitive moves since this article was published in March 2006…
India's MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft): Changes
The original intent of India's fighter purchase was to replace hundreds of non-upgraded MiG-21s that India will be forced to retire, with a complementary force of 126 aircraft that would fit between India's high end Su-30MKIs and its low-end Tejas LCA lightweight fighter. While plans to develop a "fifth generation fighter" in conjunction with Russia have received a lot of press, they are uncertain at best, address a different requirement, and offer no solution to the immediate problem of shrinking squadron numbers as existing aircraft are forced into retirement.
The IAF currently has 30-32 squadrons worth of serviceable aircraft, depending on which report one reads. This is well below their target of 39 1/2. Worse, their squadron strength is projected to plunge to 27 during the 2012-2017 period. India is a large country, with coverage needs over a wide area (see map of airbases in "Order of Battle") and on several fronts. One of which is Pakistan, whose JF-17 joint fighter program with China has India's attention.
Lightweight multi-role fighters that could make up for declining aircraft numbers with broader and better capabilities would appear to fit that need, and India's initial shortlist followed that template. The Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 were already in service with India in this role, and the JAS-39 Gripen offered a 4th generation aircraft whose costs and profile place it firmly in the lightweight fighter category. These aircraft served as a hedge against the potential failure of the Tejas lightweight Combat Aircraft project, and also offered a more immediate solution to plussing up numbers as existing MiG-21s and MiG-23s/MiG-27s were forced into retirement.
Since those early days, sharply improved relations with the USA have introduced a pair of American planes into the competition, and India's view of its own needs is changing. Official sources told Jane's in February 2006 that RFPs would be issued to France's Dassault (Mirage 2000-5 and Rafale), BAE/Saab (JAS-39 Gripen), EADS/BAE (Eurofighter Typhoon), The American firms Lockheed (F-16 Block 70) and Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet), and Russia's Rosonboronexport (MiG-29OVT with thrust vectoring, aka. MiG-35). That proved to be the case.
India's requirements are also changing. For instance, both Jane's Defence Weekly and Defense Industry Daily have covered India's wish to 'significantly' augment their strike capability and range to deal with out-of-area contingencies. This has delayed the MRCA RFP. Another contributor to these delays has been the need to refine and clarify the new industrial offset rules introduced in 2005, amidst lobbying by American defense firms.
The belief expressed by Jane's Defense in February 2006 that India would increase its initial requirement from 126 multirole combat aircraft (MRCA) to around 180-190 aircraft, with the additional number being considered for acquisition by the Indian Navy, would have been an even bigger change. Reports to other outlets varied, however, and some had India standing firm at 126 aircraft – which the final RFP confirmed.
DID has not seen the RFP, but any naval compatibility requirements would be extremely significant because the current roster of competitors contains only 2 aircraft that qualify for future STOBAR1 carriers like the INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov) and the Vikrant Class (aka. Air Defence Ship), which will reportedly weigh in at 37,500 tonnes with a design that is heavily influenced by Italy's Cavour Class. Those aircraft are the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and Dassault's Rafale-M variant. Additionally, the MiG-35 is related to the MiG-29K naval variant slated for operation on INS Vikramaditya. If Russia wishes to invest in the idea, a carrier-capable MiG-35K may also be doable – if the extra weight of the new fuel tanks doesn't create a problem given the hard impacts of carrier landings.
Recall, however, India's need to replace large numbers of aircraft. Given that both the Rafale and Super Hornet carry flyaway costs in the $55-70 million per plane range, and total program costs significantly higher than that, a naval requirement within the competition almost certainly means a split of the order between these high-expense platforms and a cheaper lightweight fighter contender. A possibility which may come to pass regardless of the Navy's involvement, for example as a smaller F/A-18 E/F order and a large MiG-35 order in order to make up 126 total aircraft. Time will tell.
MMRCA: The RFP, Please…
India's defense procurement process is definitely a game for the patient, and this was no exception. The Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) RFP caps a process that began in 2001, when the IAF sent out its request for information (RFI) for 126 jets. After delays lasting almost 2 years beyond the planned December 2005 issue date, India's Ministry of Defence finally announced a formal Request for Proposal on Aug 28/07.
The RFP announcement estimated the program at 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), at a cost of Rs. 42,000 crores (about $10.24 billion as of the RFP date, or about $81.3 million per fighter). The 211-page document includes clauses for initial purchase, transfer of technology, licensed production, and life-time maintenance support for the aircraft. The vendors have 6 months to submit their proposals.
Selection will involve an exhaustive evaluation process as detailed in the Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) – 2006. First, submitted proposals will be technically evaluated by a professional team to check for compliance with IAF's operational requirements and other RFP conditions. Extensive field trials would be carried out to evaluate the performance. Finally, the commercial proposal of the vendors, short-listed after technical and field evaluations, would be examined and compared.
Under the terms of purchase, the first 18 aircraft will come in a 'fly away' condition, while the remaining 108 will be manufactured under Transfer of Technology. The vendor finally selected would also be required to undertake 50% offset obligations in India, a boost from the usual 30% under India's recently revised procurement rules for purchases over $70 million. The RFP release does add that "Foreign vendors would be provided great flexibility in effecting tie up with Indian partners for this purpose." It also says that:
"The aircraft are likely to be in service for over 40 years. Great care has been taken to ensure that only determinable factors, which do not lend themselves to any subjectivity, are included in the commercial selection model. The selection would be transparent and fair….
It may be recalled that the Defence Minister Shri A K Antony while chairing the Defence Acquisition Council Meeting on June 29, 2007 had outlined three guiding principles for this procurement scheme.
First, the operational requirements of IAF should be fully met. Second, the selection process should be competitive, fair and transparent, so that best value for money is realized. Lastly, Indian defence industries should get an opportunity to grow to global scales."
These days, even American competitions are increasingly finding themselves beset by quasi-legal challenges of evaluation methods, and even of their chosen criteria. Witness the hold-ups created for the CSAR-X helicopter competition, Joint Cargo Aircraft, ITES-2 I.T. contract, et. al. Indian competitions have featured these sorts of post-contract obstacles even more consistently, with the addition of bureaucratic delays and corruption charges thrown into the mix. Time will tell if the objectives of the MoD's RFP are met, or if a process of waiting almost 6 years for an RFP, and then years more for a winner, is only the beginning of the process.
Even as India's existing fighter fleet continues to wear out, and China and Pakistan's fleets continue to grow.
Dassault's Move: Au Revoir, Mirage
One pre-RFP surprise was the withdrawal of the Mirage 2000 from the competition, even though the aircraft has a good record in IAF service. According to India Press Trust, Chacks Edelstenne, CEO of Dassault Aviation, visited the Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh and The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal AK Nangalia on February 21, 2006. He informed his audience that "we are on the verge of closing the Mirage fighter assembly line and want to offer India a quantum jump in technology… Though India has not not floated the Request for Proposals (RFP), we have conveyed to India to supply 40 Rafale multi-mission fighters in single source deal."
In a related move, French engine maker Snecma, which is also bidding for DRDO's joint collaboration project on the Tejas LCA's Kaveri engines, has reportedly offered to mount Indian-made Kaveri engines in Rafale fighters.
Media reports note that India's decision-making speed may have had something to do with the switch, as Dassault sources claimed that it would take at least 3-4 years for a contract to actually be signed with India. Given the pace of the MRCA competition thus far, and India's procurement history, that estimate may be conservative. The word is that the French government thought that it would be too expensive to keep the Mirage factories running during that time without additional export prospects.
Dassault has reportedly assured India that its extensive Mirage repair and servicing facilities set up by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at Bangalore would require only 'limited modification' to accommodate the Rafale, given its commonalities with the Mirage 2000s.
Dassault may be completely up-front about the reasons behind this choice. It may also have decided that the introduction of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, MiG-35, and changing requirements in the RFP make the Mirage a loser anyway, while boosting the Rafale's chance of securing an export order that would be critical to its long-term future.
Whichever way one leans, the withdrawal of the Mirage 2000 from the competition was official and final. The RFP announcement specifically mentions the Rafale instead.
The Competitors: Analysis
Recent changes in India's needs and the contest participants are changing the relative rankings of the contenders. Geopolitical considerations are also intruding, as most of these choices have the potential to improve relations with an important potential ally. As noted above, standardization arguments will also carry weight. India's Air Force currently operates 26 different types of aircraft, and India is not eager to add to its support headaches.
Rather than predict, DID will simply summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the listed competitors. These aircraft also group into two very different categories: single engine lightweight fighters in the $25-40 million flyaway range (F-16 Falcon, JAS-39 Gripen, MiG-35, Mirage 2000-5); and larger dual-engine mid-range fighters in the $55-70 million flyaway range (Eurofighter, F/A-18 Super Hornet, Rafale).
Lightweight Fighters
F-16 Fighting Falcon (Lockheed, USA). Presumably, Lockheed's "Block 70" offering would be an upgraded version of the F-16E Block 60 "Desert Falcon" currently serving with the UAE. Strengths include the widest multi-role capability among lightweight fighters, its AN/APG-80 AESA radar, a wide choice of proven avionics and systems, a long record of proven service so all issues are known, and widespread compatibility with potential allies in Asia and the Middle East who also fly F-16s. The combination of an AESA radar on a less expensive platform is also good news for cruise missile defense efforts, if that's considered a priority.
Yet the Indian Air Force has just never seemed interested in the F-16. Weaknesses include the fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s; the fact it's a new aircraft type so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; and the difficulty Lockheed would have complying with industrial offset provisions given their lack of penetration in India. The RFP delay may have helped Lockheed by allowing it ample time to find arrangements with Indian firms, and there are reports that the USA is pushing this option because of the reassurance factor. While an F-16 E/F Block 60+ would have a number of important advantages over Pakistan F-16 A/Bs and even its new Block 50/52 aircraft, the common type would probably take some of the edge off of the deal from Pakistan's point of view.
JAS-39 Gripen (Saab, Sweden; marketed by Britain's BAE). True fourth generation lightweight fighter, significantly more capable than category competitors like the F-16 and Mirage 2000 though the MiG-35 may give it a run for the money. Other strengths include the fact that it has been designed for exceptional cost of ownership, and can operate from roads instead of runways if necessary. The JAS-39 A-D models' use of a modified F404 engine also indicates that it could be modifiable to use India's Kaveri engine (the Tejas LCA will use F404 engines until Kaveri is ready, if it ever is); but the next-generation model is upgrading to the F414G engine, and is likely to need a corresponding level of engine performance.
The next generation Gripen Demo version Saab is now offering also begins to address the aircraft's range limitations, and the new aircraft would include an AESA radar and other enhancements. Its drawbacks include the fact it's a new aircraft type for the IAF, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed. There's also the low volume of international orders to date, which raises questions about the platform's ability to modernize over the next 30-40 years. Saab usually handles industrial offsets via its automotive group, which could represent either a difficulty or a market opportunity for the company.
Its acceptance also carries no spin-off geopolitical plusses, however, and that last weakness may be the real nail in its competition coffin.
MiG-29OVT, aka. MiG-35 (Rosonboronexport, Russia). This modified MiG-29 includes improved radar and avionics that give it multi-role capability, extra fuel in a new aircraft "spine," and thrust-vectoring engines a la India's SU-30MKIs. Their presence in India also makes compliance with industrial offset requirements easier. Strengths include compatibility with the existing and future MiG-29 fleet, and its ability to carry advanced Russian missiles already in service like the revolutionary AA-11/R-73 Archer and longer range AA-12/R-77 "AMRAAMski."
The MiG-29's biggest weaknesses were short range, engines that produce telltale smoke (very bad in air combat) and lack of true multi-role capability; the MiG-35 fixes them, and may even add an AESA radar of its own if Phazotron-NIIR can have its new Zhuk-MAE ready in time. Technology sharing and co-production is also considered to be a plus; as one Indian officer put it: "Russians have their problems of delayed projects and unreliable spare supply but they give access to everything, unlike the Americans." He's referring to the IAF's not-so-great experience with India's existing MiG-29s, which have had maintenance problems in addition to their other deficits. Secondary weaknesses include legitimate speculation about the future viability of the platform, which has been eclipsed by the SU-30. Although Algeria's $1.8 billion order has helped, some industry observers have forecast that without a win in India, that platform may have a difficult future.
Mirage 2000-5 (Dassault). Withdrawn. Industry analyst Richard Aboulafia points out that the history of global fighter purchases shows strong clustering at the lower-price end of the market; shutting down Mirage 2000 production would shut Dassault out of that niche. A Mirage 2000 entry would have had strengths that included compatibility with Mirage 2000s already in service, which performed very well in the 1999 Kargil skirmishes. An infrastructure already exists for industrial offsets, and its low end price could be raised along with its capabilities by adding equipment developed in the Rafale program.
The Mirage 2000's potential performance similarity to the Tejas LCA project was both its weakness and its strength. One the one hand, that would have made it a good insurance policy if confidence in the Tejas fell. On the other hand, it may not have been seen as adding enough to the force mix if confidence in the Tejas program is high.
Tejas LCA (HAL et. al., India). A lightweight, indigenously-developed fighter aircraft expected to enter service around 2010. Currently in testing using GE's F404 engine, while the accompanying Kaveri jet engine project remains in the R&D stage and has been forced to find foreign design help. The Tejas is not an MRCA competitor – but its development plans, the confidence in its success, its ability to stay under $25 million, the potential for a naval variant, et. al. will have a behind-the-curtains influence on every MRCA decision. See DID's in-depth coverage of the Tejas LCA program for more.
Mid-Range Fighters
Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/BAE, Europe & Britain). A fourth generation aircraft currently optimized for the air-air role through its performance characteristics and what is by all accounts an excellent pilot interface. Reportedly has "supercruise" capability of being able to exceed Mach 1 without using afterburners, though some analysts have cast doubt on how sustainable that is. Some observers believe that aside from the F-22A Raptor, the Eurofighter is the next-best in-service air superiority aircraft world-wide, though the 2007 Indra Dhanush exercise that matched it up against the SU-30MKI makes that a rather debatable claim. Tranche 2 upgrades are giving it more multi-role capability, and India's delay has given those developments more time to mature.
With respect to industrial offsets, BAE already has an order from India for 66 BAE Hawk trainers, 42 of which are being built in India. EADS Airbus might also be able to contribute on that front.
Weaknesses include the aircraft's expense, which may stretch India's budget; the fact it's a new aircraft type for the IAF so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; its lack of an AESA radar; its lack of naval capability; and the non-existent geopolitical benefits of selecting it. Given the Eurofighter's performance and cost range, simply buying more SU-30MKIs would appear to make far more sense.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (Boeing, USA). Highly upgraded version of the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, enlarged and given new engines and avionics. Strengths include its powerful AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which has drawn significant interest from India. This radar could allow Super Hornets to play a unique role in India's fighter fleet as versatile "quarterbacks" (or better yet, "cricket captains") due to their radar's performance and information sharing abilities. Other advantages include carrier capability, a very wide range of integrated weapons, a design that is proven in service and in combat, and complete assurance in its future upgrade spiral given the US Navy's commitment to it. The existence of a dedicated electronic warfare variant as of 2009 in the EA-18G Growler may also be a potent motivator, as long-range strike and carrier strike will increasingly require this unique capability. Last but certainly not least, this choice offers an opportunity to create an early "win" which would strengthen India's new alliance with the USA and prove its new status in the world. After all, when clearance for the aircraft was given, no other nation had even been offered the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.
Since then, of course, close American ally Australia has bought 24 F/A-18F Block IIs in a controversial purchase. The likely Australian deployment of Super Hornets gives the platform an additional selling point in the "allied commonality" department. Boeing's planned $1.5 billion investment in India's aerospace market may help deal with industrial offset issues; the Super Hornet's Boeing connection adds many options in the civil aircraft market as well.
Weaknesses of the Super Hornet platform include the aircraft's expense; given the costs to other customers so far, it seems unlikely that Boeing can deliver 126 F/A-18 E/F Block II aircraft for just $10.2 billion, let alone aircraft plus lifetime support. The Super Hornet also offers poorer aerodynamic performance than the Eurofighter or Rafale due to inherent airframe limitations, and the fact it's a new aircraft type for the IAF, so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed from the ground up.
Rafale (Dassault, France). Advantages include demonstrated carrier capability in the Rafale-M, which could be a very big factor if the RFP includes that as a requirement. The aircraft offers exceptional ordnance capacity for its size, and can have its range extended via conformal fuel tanks (unknown to DID whether this has been tested on the Rafale-M). It also offers superior aerodynamic performance over the F/A-18 family. The Rafale claims "supercruise" capability, but observers are skeptical and it has been challenging to demonstrate this with the Snecma R88-2 engine. Installing the Kaveri engine may be possible, and would give that engine a broader fleet of aircraft that would amortize its costs better – albeit at a likely performance penalty. The Rafale also offers some equipment, maintenance and spares commonalities with existing Mirage 2000 fleet, which would probably increase if the Mirage 2000s were modernized later on.
Weaknesses include the fact that the Rafale has yet to win a single export competition worldwide, the need for additional funds and work to integrate many non-French weapons if one wishes to use them on the Rafale, and its lack of an AESA radar. Rafale's failure to win export competitions means more than a perception of "also-ran" status; as DID noted in an update to our Singapore fighter coverage (the Rafale lost to the F-15SG Strike Eagle), it is already forcing cuts in future Rafale procurement to pay for modernization, a dynamic that could get worse over the next 30 years.
F-35 Joint Stike Fighter (Lockheed-led, multinational). India's Chief Air Marshal recently specificaly noted that the JSF was not in their plans for this buy, a likelihood that DID's analysis had noted earlier due to probable lack of availability before 2015. The August 2007 MRCA RFP confirmed this.
If it were flying today, the F-35B STOVL variant would probably be by far the best fit for India's requirements. The planes would be carrier-capable from all of India's naval air platforms, including smaller carriers the size of INS Viraat (ex-Hermes) or LHD amphibious assault ships, and could use roads and short field runways as well for maximum operational flexibility. F-35 JSFs would sport ultra-advanced systems that include the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, and incredibly advanced sensor systems and electronics that would make it India's most capable reconnaissance asset and even a potential electronic warfare aircraft. Other strengths would include greater stealth than any other competitor, which is critical for both air-air dogfights and strikes on defended targets. The Super Hornet may be able to fill the role of an aerial cricket captain, but the JSF is more like Sachin Tendulkar.
India has been invited to F-35 events. With potential US order numbers dropping, India might even be accepted into the program if they pushed for it. The F-35's killer weakness is timing. Its advanced systems, established industrial partnership structure and program procurement policies could also make it nearly impossible to meet India's industrial offset rules.
bfl
No way we should let them manufacture Super Hornets. We don’t even let Australia do that yet.