Kosovo Muddle

One of the well-known books published after the Kosovo War almost ten years ago was called “Winning Ugly” — and it was written by two analysts who more or less supported the war (Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon at the Brookings Institution). The alleged victory was “ugly” not only because of operational and alliance management questions during the war but also because NATO only sort-of achieved its goals in the war: we chased the Serb military and police out of a part of Serbia, but we had to recognize that Kosovo should remain part of Serbia over the long term — that is, we gave in to a key Serbian war aim. Since then, though, the U.S. has encouraged the UN and the international community to work for Kosovar independence, despite the text of the postwar UN resolution on Kosovo that guarantees Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Going into talks on Kosovo’s “final status,” the U.S. announced that the outcome would include independence before the beginning of the talks — leaving the Kosovars with little incentive to negotiate on any Serb concerns. Not surprisingly, no agreement was reached by the end of the talks in early December. Today, the world is stumbling along towards a unilateral declaration of Kosovar independence that is unliklely to respect any aspect of Serbian interests, which seems quite liklely to lead to foreseeable trouble.

European Union diplomats expect Kosovo to issue a declaration of independence sometime in the first two to three months of 2008. Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain have informally agreed to recognize Kosovo’s independence. If they do that, other European countries will recognize Kosovo, followed by the U.S. and Canada. Ultimately, other former Yugoslav states like Slovenia will do so, as will Turkey. The “order of recognition” is designed to create a political fait accompli so that Serbia and Russia cannot accuse former Yugoslav republics like Croatia and Bosnia, the Balkan state of Albania, and the former colonial power, Turkey, of “dismembering Serbia.” Presumably they would first have to accuse Britain and France of dismembering Serbia. Of course the Russians could simply ignore the diplomats’ plan and say it doesn’t matter what everyone else thinks, Russia and Serbia are against Kosovar independence. Russia and Serbia would not recognize it. It is doubtful that the Russians would start a shooting war over Kosovo, but a “colder peace” throughout Europe could well be the result. In a “colder peace” situation, Russian cooperation on other European economic and security projects would either be impossible or very difficult to obtain. At worst, it might trigger a resumption of the Cold War, with Serbia becoming a client state of the new Russian empire.

December 22, 2007: Russia would only permit European Union peacekeepers in Kosovo if Serbia and the UN Security Council permitted them. What this means in diplomatic terms is not clear – Serbia is against an EU force. Russia has a UN Security Council veto, and is likely the only Security Council member who would veto an EU peacekeeping contingent.

December 19, 2007: The separatist statelet, Transdniester, will try to become a sovereign nation and member of the UN, if Kosovo becomes independent. Transdniester is a predominantly Russian region of Moldova.

When the muzzies in the Parisian suburbs reach critical mass, we owe it to the world to bomb Paris out of existence unless France surrenders the new Muslim territories.

Ditto for our southwest and the hordes of invaders from Mexico.

What’s right is right for everybody.

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