Anthrax mailings : intelligence experts say Iraq is behind / MSM didn't report

March 1, 2007 Journal of intelligence and Counterintelligence Technical Intelligence in Retrospect: The 2001 Anthrax Letters Powder Authors: Dany Shoham; Stuart M. Jacobsen

Four distinct elements are involved - though possibly taking place unconnectedly with each other, in reality - in the course leading to the anthrax letter attack: the AS supplier; the basic powder technology supplier; the origination of the subsequent powdery bacillus modeling; and the SSP producer. The first three might be completely innocent, according to the following clustering. Namely, the AS supplier (to either Basson, el-Hibri, or another "legitimate" intermediary) was a U.S./British laboratory; the basic powder technology supplier was Denmark's Niro; the origination of the powdery bacillus modeling was USSR/Russia, which preferred BT rather than BG, because the former is a much better simulant for BA spore powder; and the SSP producer - the fourth and cardinal element - was plausibly Iraq, thanks to having obtained and employed the first three elements together, thereby forming a superb integral in Iraq. Alternatively, Soviet or formerly Soviet institutions could constitute the first three elements altogether (or two of them), and al-Qaeda itself could be the intermediary (and the perpetrator, but not the SSP producer).

Notably, and in spite of continuing claims that no solid connections - including the contexts of CBW at-large, as well as the 2001 Twin Towers attack - existed between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the opposite has increasingly and firmly been emerging since the 2003 invasion of Iraq

The Iraqi Bio-weapons program was not at the level of sophistication to produce a powdered form of anthrax. The Iraqi program was at the stage of using live organism in a growth medium this is a thick liquid similar to a gelatin or thick gravy. It is not a dry powder.

The purpose of the tape is to seal the contents inside the envelope keeping the agent in the envelope .

The tape ends matching does not indicate that the letters were made at the same time but by the same individual as yet unknown.

As I have stated the Iraqi’s were not sophisticated enough to have been behind the anthrax attacks.
They lacked the technical capability to produce the anthrax in the form that was used in the attacks.

It takes a great deal of very very specialized technical knowledge to produce the agent in the form that was used . The skill sets & various assets required to produce the anthrax are held by a few folks mostly in the USA ie former army bio-war researchers at Fort Detrick from the 50’s-60’s and folks from the old Soviet Union “Biopreparat” organization also a few in Britain at Porten Down Research establishment.

The anthrax used was the Ames strain, so what. The American Type Culture Institute sends specimens world wide including nations that were on fairly friendly terms with Iraq But the Iraq program was not advanced enough to produce the freeze dried vermiculite clay coated spores that was the form of anthrax used.

Sorry, when the tapes ends match "perfectly" the individual pieces were cut from the same roll. Remember those serrations? As you pull tape off the roll and tear it against the serrations, you leave a mark on each succeeding piece of tape that matches the previous piece of tape. There's enough variation left to right in the process that the probability of 5 or 6 pieces so matching would not be from the same roll that it's not worth discussing.

Going beyond that, it's pretty clear the anthrax attack letters were well designed "anthrax bombs". There may have been a bit of the powder waft out of the wings at the corner, but the greater part simply bled through the paper. The tape was placed as it was to minimize the amount of paper exposed to the outside environment. This would regulate the flow of powder throughout the trip planned for the envelopes.

The powdered anthrax was reported not all from the same batch. That doesn't matter, however, just as long as it was in spore form. A well designed plan of attack would probably MIX powdered anthrax spores from different batches and sources.

There were certainly a sufficiency of former Soviet bio-war scientists available for hire in Iraq and elsewhere during the period before the anthrax attack.

It is foolish to continue debating this issue as if the scientists were unable to catch airplanes to any spot on Earth. They could readily relocate.

Another thing everyone should beware of is the difference between the sort of laboratory really needed for the purpose of preparing anthrax spores in powdered form and the sort of laboratory the scientists said they needed at the budget hearings.

"I’m not buying it .The material in question was the result of a very organized & technologically advanced lab with access to lots of specialized gear & to put it bluntly the Iraqis were not at that stage. From the various accounts not just from the mainstream media types but the technical experts of the current administration they were roughly at the stage of the Japanese Imperial army unit 731 in 1943-45."

Here's a technical expert from the lat two or three administrations:

SEPTEMBER 16, 2005 : (WASHINGTON POST QUOTES DR DAVID KAY ON ANTHRAX TOPIC) "Relying, apparently, on concrete findings, former top U.S. weapons inspector Dr. David Kay said that "the Iraqis had developed new techniques for drying anthrax - techniques that were superior to anything the United States or the old Soviet Union had. That would make the former regime of Saddam Hussein the most sophisticated manufacturer of anthrax in the world." ------- via Washington Post, 16 September 16, 2005 via 'KAY,ISG head: "Saddam's regime was the most sophisticated manufacturer of anthrax in the world",' Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, March 2007

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