Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)

On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.

“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.

Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”

In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.

Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.

Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.

The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.

Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.

Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73

____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______

compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1

The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.

In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.

Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.

In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.

As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).

On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.

The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.

Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.

Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.

General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.

General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.

Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.

Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.

“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).

In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.

All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.

Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.

At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.

Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.

Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”

I didn’t say Jdey was not the mailer. I said the argument was very powerful. I know of no reason not to credit it as the solution. So I’m not the one to give it a robust challenge. Given the FBI issued the BOLO along with two others, Aafia and Jafar the Pilot, associated with anthrax/WMD etc., it looks like Dillon has hit it out of the park and is running around the bases unnoticed. But the USG is so secretive about Jdey that there all sorts of gaps in information about him and his connections.

But let’s turn to Ed’s “bioevangelist” theory given that it all he ever talks about to anyone.

Let’s consider how Ed aka The Fake Detective would have fared with his “bioevangelist theory” in 1915 during WW I. We will merge the Ft. Detrick archives with the annals of the Fake Detective to see what we get.

From Ft. Detrick’s history:

From 1915 through 1918, Germany had a state-sponsored offensive BW program to sabotage suppliers to the Allies directed at draft, cavalry, and military livestock. The biological sabotage program was directed by the German army general staff and implemented despite official German army doctrine prohibiting such activities. Germany’s plans to spread a wheat fungus and contaminate food produced at ‘meat factories’ were dropped. One 1916 German plan never carried out proposed to drop vats of plague cultures from Zeppelins over England.

In April 1915, German-American physician Anton Dilger returned to the United States from Germany with cultures of Burkholderia mallei and Bacillus anthracis. His intent was to infect horses and mules then being shipped from the United States to France and England for use in cavalry and transport. These cultures were propagated and tested for virulence using guinea pigs in the basement of a house (known as ‘Tony’s Lab’) rented by Anton and his brother Carl, in Chevy Chase, Maryland, near Washington, DC. From the summer of 1915 through the fall of 1916, the cultures were used on horses and mules in holding pens in the docks at the ports of Baltimore, Maryland; Newport News, Virginia; Norfolk, Virginia; and New York, New York. Stevedores working for German steamships were recruited and given 2-inch, cork-stoppered glass vials containing the cultures, in which a hollow steel needle had been placed. These stevedores were instructed to wear rubber gloves while jabbing the animals with the needle. These cultures were also spread to the animals by pouring them into the animal feed and drinking water.

From the annals of the Fake Detective.

The Fake Detective is given correspondence between a colleague of the German physician Dilger and Adolf Hitler discussing his plan to infect the horses with anthrax. Hitler’s lawyer had announced that they were going to use anthrax against US targets. The physician himself is in regular contact with Himmler and Goebbels. He writes Himmler about his attendance at horse races and conferences on anthrax. He takes a job at the stables as a veterinary assistant. A film is discovered in Germany in which they test a poison on horses and the film records the horses dropping dead. Lab equipment is found in Germany related to the production of anthrax. The German doctor in Maryland is charged with sedition and sentenced to life plus 70 years. The Fake Detective, however, remains convinced a drunk bowler did it to sound the alarm that the Germans might use bioweapons against livestock and that 95% of all First Graders like to ride ponies.

TrebleRebel remains convinced that the good doctor is using a really long needle.

From Ft. Detrick history -

Smallpox - Aralsk, Kazakhstan, 1971

An outbreak of smallpox occurred as a result of a
field test at a Soviet biological weapons facility in 1971,
largely unknown to the outside world until 2002.
Vozrozhdeniya (Renaissance) Island lies in the Aral
Sea, and belongs jointly to the post-Soviet republics
of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In 1954 a biological
weapons test site (Aralsk-7) was built on this island
and on neighboring Komsomolskiy Island. The Soviet
Ministry of Defense also established a field scientific research
laboratory to conduct biological experiments on
Renaissance Island.

According to Soviet General Pyotr Burgasov, field
testing of 400 g of smallpox caused this outbreak at
Renaissance Island on July 30, 1971. Ten persons contracted
smallpox, and three unvaccinated individuals (a
woman and two children) died from the hemorrhagic
form of the disease.

A massive public health response to the smallpox
cases in Aralsk ensued once the disease was recognized.
In less than 2 weeks, approximately 50,000
residents of Aralsk were vaccinated. Household quarantine
of potentially exposed individuals was enacted,
and hundreds were isolated in a makeshift facility at
the edge of the city. All traffic in and out of the city
was stopped, and approximately 54,000 square feet
of living space and 18 metric tons of household goods
were decontaminated by health officials.

The high ratio of hemorrhagic smallpox cases
in this outbreak, combined with the rate of infectivity and
the testimony of General Pyotr Burgasov (former Soviet
vice-minister of health), has led to the understanding that an
enhanced weaponized strain of smallpox virus was released
from Aralsk-7 in 1971. It may never be known whether the
release was purposeful, but the Lev Berg inadvertently traveled
into the plume of this bioweapons release, initiating the
smallpox outbreak in Aralsk.

Lessons Learned: The Aralsk-7 BW facility had a history
of association with mass deaths of fish, various regional
plague outbreaks, a saiga antelope die-off, and individual
cases of infectious disease among visitors to Renaissance
Island. These events present a timely warning for BW defense
researchers working with biological agents that have
the potential for infecting not only the laboratory workers, but
also their family members and the surrounding community.
The epidemiological lesson learned is that when unusual BT-related
illnesses occur, a laboratory accident or open air testing of
a BW program may have occurred.

From the annals of the Fake Detective:

In 2001, the captured military commander and his senior colleague
say that Ayman Zawahiri is planning on using anthrax against US targets.
The lawyer of his spiritual leader concurs. A senior militant says he met
with those planning the anthrax attacks and says that the motive was
to deter invasion of Afghanistan. Another spokesman says that the
greenlight has been given for the attack by people with access to UK
and US biodefense information. Anthrax is then used after Ayman
Zawahiri kills 3,000 to protest US policies. The letters follow the same
pattern — to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic position —
as earlier letters by the same group.

The CIA Director says the anthrax planning was done in parallel with the
planes attack The FBI Director says as the motive: “Think 9/11. Think Oklahoma City.”

The Fake Detective advertises the book where he argues that 95% chance a
child wrote the letters because his Dad wanted to draw his attention to biological warfare and had a friend who watched Bill O’Reilly.

TrebleRebel thinks that Soviet General Pyotr Burgasov was a bad man.

The Fake Detective asks Soviet General Burgasov whether he thinks the British gave the Indians blankets contaminated with small pox to make coats and he says that there is no principle for coating.

http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com

From Ft. Detrick history -

In late October 1996, 12 clinical laboratory workers at the St. Paul Medical Center in Dallas developed severe acute diarrheal illness. Shigella dysenteriae type 2 was cultured from the stool of eight of these cases. This strain of shigella is uncommon and, before this outbreak, had last been reported as the source of an outbreak in the United States in 1983.

During the subsequent epidemiological investigation, 45 laboratory employees who had worked during the first or third shifts, when the ill employees had worked, were interviewed. The employees stated that an unsigned email sent from a supervisor’s computer invited recipients to take pastries available iin the laboratory break room. The supervisor was away from the office when the email was sent, and the break room could only be accessed using a numeric security code.

An examination of the hospital laboratory storage freezer revealed tampering of reference cultures of dysenteriae type 2.

On August 28, 1997, a laboratory technician who had access to the laboratory culture stocks and a history of purposeful use of biological agents against a boyfriend, was indicted on three charges of tampering with a food product, and accused of infecting 12 coworkers with 2 dysenteriae type 2. She was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison.

From the Annals of the Fake Detective-

Director Mueller in July 2004 announces a drop-dead date of October 1, 2004 to bring a prosecution in Amerithrax that will stand up in court.

In late September 2004, the microbiologist whose desk had been 15 from the leading anthrax scientist and 15 feet from the former deputy commander Bailey is indicted for sedition. (Both had recently consulted for Battelle, world renown for making aerosols, and had a multi-million dollar contract with Ft. Detrick involving Delta Ames supplied by NIH). The Fake Detective does not notice the connection to Director Mueller’s indictment in late September 2004 because he never reads any story having to do with Al Qaeda or its US-based supporters. When he sees the FBI is focused on a microbiologist, a leading anthrax scientist and a former deputy commander of USAMRIID, he does not bother to consider who fits the description.

Al-Timimi is sentenced to life plus 70 years but his conviction is reversed to explore the nature of the electronic interceptions that occurred in 2002. His executive assistant was sentenced to 15 years last Friday for arranging to help buy equipment related to a UAV and have it shipped to Pakistan. Al-Timimi’s lawyer on remand explains that the government has considered his client an “anthrax weapons suspect” and has long known of his close connections to and support Al Qaeda. Ali spoke with Bin Laden’s sheik on September 16, 2001 and September 19, 2001 and urged young men to go and fight jihad. Ali coordinated with the “911 imam” to arrange a letter (in the name of Bin Laden’s sheik) hand-delivered to every member of Congress warning of the dire consequences of invading Iraq.

TrebleRebel starts a correspondence with the jailed lab technician charged with serving tainted muffins.

http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com

Ed’s newest comment-

April 20, 2008-
“The article contains a lot of information about how Dugway evidently produced anthrax bioweapons back during the Cold War. The process described seems to result in spores coated with silica. While it has nothing to do with the anthrax attacks of 2001, I’ll have to figure exactly what is being said in the article and whether or not there is something on this web site about “weaponizing anthrax” that I need to change. “

errata- April 20 should be April 30.

If the floor is open for nominations, I would put a correction in a box explaining that this comment is in error. You wrote:

“December 25, 2005 - The methodology of the conspiracy theorists who believe the attack anthrax spores were coated with silica became a bit more clear during the past week.

When bioweapons experts and microbiologists told them their basic premise was false and that there was no need to coat anthrax spores, the reporters simply went looking for “experts” who would tell them what they wanted to hear. They found “experts” who knew nothing about bioweapons or microbiology or spores. They found “experts” who knew only about coatings - primarily chemical engineers who routinely coat chemical substances. The application of coatings to tiny particles is routine in the manufacturing of medicines. Since chemical engineers know how to coat tiny particles of lactose (or phosphors), for example, the conspiracy theorists and their “experts” just falsely assumed the same technology could be applied to coating spores.

All they had to do was ignore the fact that a spore is a living entity. It is not a chemical substance like lactose. A spore can be killed if it isn’t handled properly.

One reason for coating chemical substances like lactose is because van der Waals forces will cause the tiny lactose particles to bind together if they are not coated. That will make it difficult to use the tiny particles of lactose in nasal and throat sprays.
***

The best example of reporters using this conspiracy theory methodology was in The Washington Post’s October 28, 2002, article “FBI’s Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted”. Instead of talking with people who know about spores, like bioweapons experts or microbiologists, the reporters used as their “experts” 3 chemical engineers, a “pharmaceutical chemist”, a manufacturer of spray dryers and a biologist who openly admitted he knew nothing about coating spores and would need a year and a team of technicians to help him figure out how to do it. ”

You might now note that 3 Dugway authors have explained that Dugway has been doing this for quite some time.

Your comment continued:

“One group, comprised mostly of microbiologists and molecular biologists, argues that this material could have been a do-it-yourself job, made by someone knowledgeable but with run-of-the-mill lab equipment on a modest budget. “

**
“The other faction thinks that the powder mailed to the Senate (widely reported to be more refined than the one mailed to the TV networks in New York) was a diabolical advance in biological weapons technology. This diverse group includes scientists who specialize in biodefense for the Pentagon and other federal agencies, private-sector scientists who make small particles for use in pharmaceutical powders***.”

***
“It’s really a dispute between experts who know all the key facts and non-experts who just imagine what the facts are.”

Actually, not, Ed. The latter faction included Dugway scientists who make anthrax simulants for a living. Your entire argument is inside-out. You were relying on an expert 15 feet from the scientist working with Bin Laden’s sheik who the FBI considered an anthrax weapons suspect. Matsumoto and TrebleRebel, in contrast, were communicating the view of the scientists at Dugway and elsewhere working on simulating the attack anthrax, with the benefit of years of experience of making such simulants in aerosol experiments.

By the way, the FBI sought the health records of the expert in pharmaceutical powders in Raleigh, North Carolina by National Security Letter. He had provided the keys to the flat to the 7/7 bombers in London. He was an expert in polymerization. You might want to note that Al-Timimi’s small DC-based group had a branch in North Carolina. His co-founder of that group was Vice-President of the group here. 100 federal agents came here on the day and minute and simultaneously interviewed 150 people. Ed’s mistake on silica coating is clear. What the FBI suspects, right or wrong, is clear. See October 1, 2004 deadline for indictment and indictment of Al-Timimi in late September 2004. See also recently unsealed filing by Al-Timimi’s counsel explaining the FBI has suspected him as an anthrax weapons suspect.

Ed closes his comment with:

“And that poses a question once asked by comic strip character Dilbert: ‘when did ignorance become a point of view?’”

Ed, you were right that Hatfill didn’t do it. Let that be your legacy and be proud of it. But don’t hesitate in correcting was a core mistake in your argument about silica and coating. To err is human. Correcting mistakes only adds to the quality of your analysis. You might, as a general matter, cut down on the scientific discussion (like discussion of polarity that I’ve snipped from your December 2005 comment) as it is not your field. For matters of science, it is best to rely on treatises such as Ft. Detrick’s new MEDICAL ASPECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. It is unclassified and has a wealth of material.

There was a time (December 13, 2003) when Ed was basically right about silica was used.
http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/Update-History.html

Science/investigative journalist Gary M. wrote:

“When the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) analyzed this alleged additive, it got a signature. According to AFIP, the signature was silica.”

Ed responded:

“Okay. So, we’ve got some kind of substance containing silica oozing out of the spores. NO silica coatings. It appears that the spores were soaked in some silica solution and then spray dried. But, after doing that and under the right conditions, some of the soaking material will ooze out of the spore coatings. That makes a great deal of sense, since the silica would definitely help keep the spores from clogging the nozzle of the spray drier. We’re getting dangerously close to telling people how anthrax was made, but I can also see how most of the silica was removed from the spores during the spraying process, leaving only what had been absorbed into the spores’ natural coatings. Very interesting.”

Gary wrote:

“A large number of government officials and scientists all have stated, on-the-record, that the Senate anthrax powder contained silica. They have never recanted their statements. Nearly two years after AFIP’s elemental analysis of the Daschle powder showed the presence of silica on the anthrax spores, an AFIP spokesman says the institute stands by its findings. A spokesperson at Fort Detrick says USAMRIID does not dispute anything in Preston’s account.”

Ed responds:

“You keep creating a “straw man argument” by implying that someone stated that there was NO silica in the anthrax. Who ever said that? Everyone agrees that there was silica present. The dispute is over the form of the silica. You say it must be a coating on the spores. Others suggest that it could be from natural sources or from some drying process - or from both natural sources and a drying process. From what you write and from what I now know, it definitely looks very likely that it came from some liquid substance used to aid drying the spores via a spray dryer.”

Gary wrote:

“WHY, UNLIKE FORT DETRICK’S GEISBERT AND JAHRLING, DRS. MESELSON AND ALIBEK DIDN’T SEE SILICA NANOPARTICLES ON THE SENATE SPORES
I have no definitive answer for this. I only know that Fort Detrick’s account conflicts with that of Drs. Meselson and Alibek.”

Ed responds:

“The answer seems quite evident now. The silica is there - absorbed inside the spores - in small amounts - and is only visible under the right conditions.”

Ed was correct in the passages above (except the silica was only in the exosporium (the outermost layer). But then came to be wrong when he changed his view.

By personalizing his approach — and by calling scientists like the Dugway scientists “conspiracy theorists” — he allowed his ad hominem style of argument to cause him stray far expert opinion and to engage in extended scientific discussion for which he was not qualified. As Ed explains, “Ignorance Is Not A Point Of View.” Anyone who disagrees with his view that a drunk bowler is responsible for the mailed anthrax is labeled a “conspiracy theorist” or “true believer.” His empty rhetoric belies the fact that Ed doesn’t know what he is talking about and has no training in science and does not take the time to explore alternative hypotheses. He demonstrates what he calls “cognitive rigidity” — wedded to his belief that you should suspect the person with the perfect alibi and that a First Grader wrote the letters.

Let’s return to the “encapsulation” method my consulting military scientist, who worked with the Dugway authors, has discussed.

Let’s start with the first of the GMU patents filed on the subject. Be sure to read the series. A second one, for example, was co-invented by the scientist who inherited Al-Timimi’s telephone number.

On March 14, 2001, former USAMRIID deputy commander Ames researcher Charles L. Bailey and famed Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek filed a patent application for a process to treat cell culture with hydrophobic silicon dioxide so as to permit greater concentration upon drying. Dr. Bailey was in Room 156B of GMU’s Discovery Hall at the Center for Biodefense. Ali Al-Timimi, an associate of radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali, considered to be Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, was a graduate student who worked in the same building.

The website of the Islamic Assembly of North America (”IANA”) contained “Provision of Suicide Operations,” dated June 19, 2001, that stated: “The mujahid [or warrior] must kill himself if he knows this will lead to killing a great number of the enemies or demolishing a center vital to the enemy or its military forces. In this new era, this can be accomplished with the modern means of bombing or bringing down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses.” On August 26, 2001, IANA’s website www.islamway.com published a propaganda statement that encouraged individuals to join arms against the West titled “An Invitation to Jihad,” stating that “[t]he mujahid brothers will accept you with open arms and within a period of two weeks you will be given commando training and will be sent to the frontline.” Whatever the debate on whether nonconventional weapons were forbidden (haram), some of the sheiks whose fatwas were appearing on the IANA website were likely to take a more permissive view.

In mid-December 2001, the US arrested US-based Al Qaeda biochem operative Ali Al-Marri, who had arrived on September 10, 2001 and was nominally a student living in Macomb, Illinois. Al-Marri had lived in Macomb the previous summer and had traveled to New York City to join with UK operative Dhiren Barot to case NYC helicopters and financial institutions. Authorities had learned of calls he made to KSM’s assistant al-Hawsawi from Illinois. The key to the Amerithrax solution possibly hinged on where he had his computer sent after casing NYC locations. He had the imam at the local mosque store the computer in his basement and then ship it to Washington.

In January 2002, an FBI official told the Wall Street Journal, “We’ve done over 300 interviews at places we consider really critical. I can tell you categorically that we’ve given a lot of people shakes, [but] there was nothing to it.” Beginning that month, Ali Al-Timimi was on GMU staff and paid $70,000 a year. Sometime later that year, officials apparently first learned of communications between Al-Timimi and Bin Laden’s spiritual adviser, radical Saudi sheik al-Hawali.

In March 2002, a crude biological weapons site was found in Afghanistan. U.S. forces discovered a site near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar that appeared to be an Al Qaeda biological weapons lab under construction. Zawahiri’s plan, evidenced in the documents found previous in the Fall, was to move the location of the lab every 3 months.

As he described to ABCNEWS, Dr. Alibek and other scientists in March 2002 took lie detector tests. He had to answer questions including “Did you do it?” and “Do you know who did it?” Alibek reports that he passed the test. Although Dr. Alibek offered his services to the FBI Director in a letter, the response was that they already had a large group working on it. In late June 2002, quoting unnamed law enforcement officials, the Associated Press reported that up to 200 polygraph tests had been given to current and former employees of the Battelle Institute and of Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, where scientists have developed a powdered form of anthrax for testing biological defense systems. It was Dugway that provided the simulant used in testing after the 2001 threat letter relating to the detention of the former manager of Bin Laden’s farm in Sudan. Dr. Alibek and Dr. Bailey had both worked for Battelle as consultants.

An intense concern over such leaks continued into the Spring in charity investigations involving a March 2002 of the Saar network. Even the US Attorney working on the investigation and his team were under investigation.

In August 2002, Afghan police found a store of chemicals in a house in Kabul formerly occupied by a Saudi non-governmental organization, the WAFA Humanitarian Organization. Local media reports called it a terrorist laboratory. “Some containers and documents have been found by the police authorities,” a spokesman for international peacekeepers said. One local report said that the discovery included 36 types of chemicals, explosive materials, fuses, laboratory equipment and some “terroristic guide books.” It said the laboratory was found in a residence in the diplomatic area of Kabul in a building that had been used by an Arab national who headed the group prior to 9/11. WAFA was a militant supporter of the Taliban. Documents found in WAFA’s offices in Afghanistan revealed that the charity was intimately involved in assassination plots against U.S. citizens as well as the distribution of “how to” manuals on chemical and biological warfare. U.S. officials have described WAFA as a key component of Bin Laden’s organization.

In 2002, a man named Singh tried to purchase over the internet a wireless video module and a control module for use in an unmanned aerial vehicle (”UAV”). He chose an airborne video system with a camera and transmitter able to transmit video images from a UAV back to a receiver from as far as 15 miles away. The video camera could be used in military reconnaissance and in helping aim artillery and other weaponry across enemy lines. Singh placed his order from England, but the company was unable to confirm Singh’s overseas credit card. Two young men from Northern Virginia, among the group later known as the “Virginia Paintball Defendants,” Chapman and Khan, assisted him in completing the purchases. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later explained, the pair “attended the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia where Ali Timimi, a primary lecturer, spoke of the necessity to engage in violent jihad against the enemies of Islam and the ‘end of time’ battle between Muslims and non-Muslims.” In the summer of 2002, Singh visited Virginia, staying first with one of them and then with the other. Ali Timimi was unindicted co-conspirator number 1 in the Virginia Paintball Case, and was only later identified by Prosecutors (and then separately indicted).

After meeting with “9/11 imam” Anwar Aulaqi to discuss the idea, Ali Timimi drafted a letter from dissident Saudi sheik Hawali dated October 6, 2002 and had it hand delivered it to every member of the US Congress just before their vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq. The letter was from al-Hawali (not Timimi), and warned of the disastrous consequences that would follow an invasion of Iraq.

Rm 154A in George Mason’s Discovery Hall (down from former USAMRIID head Dr. Bailey in Rm 156B) would be Victor Morozov’s room number when he first assumed Timimi’s phone number in 2004 (and before he moved to a newly constructed, adjacent building). Morozov was the co-inventor with Dr. Bailey of the related cell culture process under which the silica was removed from the spore surface. A faculty member who would consult with Ali suggests that it instead was Rm. 154B, in the middle of the office suite.

Later that year, Al-Hakaymah, a long-time colleague of Taha in the Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Egyptian Islamic Group), summarized the Amerithrax investigation. Al-Hakaymah aka Abu Jihad was Al Qaeda’s spymaster. He dedicated the treatise on American intelligence and law enforcement: “To the pious and the hidden who are not known when they come and who are not missed when they disappear — To those whom their God will answer when they pray to Him. To all the eyes that are vigilant late at night to bring victory to this religion.” It was publicized by an EIJ shura member Al-Sibai, who had been detained in London in 1999 and then released, and now was an oft-quoted expert on Zawahiri and his followers. Like Al Zayat, Al Sibai has been openly critical of Al Qaeda and Zawahiri — Al Sibai views Zawahiri’s focus on the Far Enemy as having been disastrous for the Egyptian Islamic groups.

In mid-February 2003, Abdel Rahman’s son, who was on the WMD committee with Egyptian Midhat Mursi, was captured in Quetta, Pakistan. Along with Zawahiri, Abdel Rahman and his two sons have had considerable influence over Bin Laden. He reportedly treated them like sons. In jail in the early 1980s, Zawahiri had caused considerable tension by challenging the blind sheik’s ability to lead a coalition of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Egyptian Islamic Group. Zawahiri and Bin Laden nevertheless are Rahman’s friends. The leaders in charge of Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program thus had a close connection to those imprisoned in connection with the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center. The imprisoned WTC 1993 plotter Ramzi Yousef was KSM’s nephew. KSM claims to have been responsible for the planning of WTC 1993. WTC 1993 mastermind Ramzi Yousef had been the mentor of the new husband, Al-Baluchi, of MIT-graduate Aafia Siddiqui.

Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al-Baluchi) is a cousin of 9/11 plotter Ramzi Yousef and nephew of KSM. In 2000-2001, along with KSM’s assistant Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Al-Baluchi facilitated the hijackers travel in transiting the UAE from Pakistan. He would send them money transfers after they were in the US. US biochem operative Al-Marri was in contact in August, September and October 2001 with Al-Hawsawi, who in August was in UAE and then after 9/11 was back in Pakistan. In 2002-2003, back in Pakistan, al-Baluchi worked with operative Majid Khan, a Maryland resident. He married Aafia Siddiqui shortly before being captured in Pakistan in the Spring of 2003. An Assistant United States Attorney (”AUSA”) would say in the prosecution related to a plot involving Majid Khan that Aafia Siddiqui was willing to participate in an anthrax attack if asked. By reason of her relationship with 9/11 plotter KSM and KSM’s nephew al-Baluchi, Aafia was connected to both al-Hawsawi’s laptop with the anthrax spraydrying documents and Al-Marri.

In a filing unsealed this month, Dr. Ali Al-Timimi’s lawyer wrote: “Al-Timimi “was considered an anthrax weapons suspect.” Dr. Al-Timimi’s counsel summarizes:

“we know Dr. Al-Timimi:

* was interviewed in 1994 by the FBI and Secret Service regarding his ties to the perpetrators of the first World Trade Center bombing;

* was referenced in the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing (”Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”) as one of seventy individuals regarding whom the FBI is conducting full field investigations on a national basis;

* was described to his brother by the FBI within days of the 9-11 attacks as an immediate suspect in the Al Qaeda conspiracy;

* was contacted by the FBI only nine days after 9-11 and asked about the attacks and its perpetrators;

* was considered an anthrax weapons suspect;

[redacted - passage presumptively IMO about Amerithrax investigation]

* was described during his trial by FBI agent John Wyman as having “extensive ties” with the “broader al-Qaeda network”;

* was described in the indictment and superseding indictment as being associated with terrorists seeking harm to the United States;

* was a participant in dozens of international overseas calls to individuals known to have been under suspicion of Al-Qaeda ties like Al-Hawali; and

* was associated with the long investigation of the Virginia Jihad Group.

***

The conversation with Al-Hawali on September 19, 2001 was central to the indictment and raised at trial. Al-Timimi called Dr. Hawali after the dinner with Kwon on September 16, 2001 and just two hours before he met with Kwon and Hassan for the last time on September 19, 2001.

“]911 imam] Anwar Al-Aulaqi goes directly to Dr. Al-Timimi’s state of mind and his role in the alleged conspiracy. The 9-11 Report indicates that Special Agent Ammerman interviewed Al-Aulaqi just before or shortly after his October 2002 visit to Dr. Al-Timimi’s home to discuss the attacks and his efforts to reach out to the U.S. government.”

[IANA head] Bassem Khafagi was questioned about Dr. Al-Timimi before 9-11 in Jordan, purportedly at the behest of American intelligence. [redacted ] He was specifically asked about Dr. Al-Timimi’s connection to Bin Laden prior to Dr. Al-Timimi’s arrest. He was later interviewed by the FBI about Dr. Al-Timimi. Clearly, such early investigations go directly to the allegations of Dr. Al-Timimi’s connections to terrorists and Bin Laden — [redacted]”

The letter by Al-Timimi’s counsel attached as an exhibit is equally meaty. An example of an additional detail is that in March 2002, Dr. Al-Timimi spoke with Dr. Al-Hawali (Bin Laden’s sheik who was the subject of OBL’s “Declaration of War”) about assisting Moussaoui in his defense.

The filing and the letter exhibit each copy the daughter of the lead prosecutor in Amerithrax. That prosecutor has pled the Fifth Amendment concerning all the leaks hyping a “POI” of the other Amerithrax squad, Dr. Steve Hatfill.

In an e-mail obtained by FOX News, scientists at Fort Detrick openly discussed how the anthrax powder they were asked to analyze after the attacks was nearly identical to that made by one of their colleagues.

“Then he said he had to look at a lot of samples that the FBI had prepared ... to duplicate the letter material,” “Then the bombshell. He said that the best duplication of the material was the stuff made by [name redacted]. He said that it was almost exactly the same — his knees got shaky and he sputtered, ‘But I told the General we didn’t make spore powder!’”

FOX News reports:

“The FBI has narrowed its focus to “about four” suspects in the 6 1/2-year investigation of the deadly anthrax attacks of 2001, and at least three of those suspects are linked to the Army’s bioweapons research facility at Fort Detrick in Maryland, FOX News has learned.

Among the pool of suspects are three scientists — a former deputy commander, a leading anthrax scientist and a microbiologist — linked to the research facility, known as USAMRIID.”

It was more than a happy coincidence for Ayman Zawahiri and Mohammed Islambouli that an active supporter of the Taliban and supporter of jihad was a US biodefense insider. Microbiologist Al-Timimi worked in the same building as famed Russian bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek and former USAMRIID Deputy Commander and Acting Commander Charles Bailey, who would come to publish a lot of research with the “Ames strain” of anthrax. Al-Timimi was a current associate and former student of Bin Laden’s spiritual advisor, dissident Saudi Sheik al-Hawali. He would speak along with the blind sheik’s son at charity conferences — the blind sheik’s son served on Al Qaeda’s WMD committee. Al-Timimi’s mentor Bilal Philips was known for recruiting members of the military to jihad. The first week after 9/11, FBI agents questioned Ali Al-Timimi, a microbiology graduate student in a program jointly run by George Mason University and the American Type Culture Collection (”ATCC”). Ali, according to his lawyer, had been questioned by an FBI agent and Secret Service agent in 1994 after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He had a high security clearance for work for the Navy in he late 1990s and in 1996 for two months had worked for the White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card when he was Secretary of Transportation. As time off from his university studies permitted, Ali was an active speaker with a charity Islamic Assembly of North America.

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