Hatfill v. US - DOJ and FBI Statement of Facts (filed Friday)

On Friday, the government filed this statement of the facts in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in a civil rights and Privacy Act lawsuit brought by Dr. Steve Hatfill.

“The anthrax attacks occurred in October 2001. Public officials, prominent members of the media, and ordinary citizens were targeted by this first bio-terrorist attack on American soil. Twenty-two persons were infected with anthrax; five died. At least 17 public buildings were contaminated. The attacks wreaked havoc on the U.S. postal system and disrupted government and commerce, resulting in economic losses estimated to exceed one billion dollars. The attacks spread anxiety throughout the nation – already in a heightened state of alert in the wake of the attacks of September 11 – and left behind a lasting sense of vulnerability to future acts of bioterrorism. Given the unprecedented nature of the attacks, the investigation received intense media attention. Journalists from virtually every news organization pursued the story, sometimes conducting their own worldwide investigation to determine the person or persons responsible for the attacks and the motive behind them.

Testimony has revealed that at least certain members of the media began focusing their attention upon Hatfill in early 2002 because of tips they had received from former colleagues of his who found him to be highly suspicious. Articles about Hatfill thus began to appear in the mainstream press and on internet sites as early as January of 2002, and continued until the first search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, which, in turn, led to even more intense press attention.

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a Professor at the State University of New York, for example, complained in January and February 2002 on the Federation of American Scientists’ (“FAS”) website of the FBI’s apparent lack of progress on the investigation, and described generally the person she believed was the “anthrax perpetrator.” “Analysis of Anthrax Attacks,” Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator (Section IV.6), Defendant’s Appendix , Ex. 1. Rosenberg did not identify Hatfill by name, but described him in sufficient detail: a “Middle-aged American” who “[w]orks for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area” and [w]orked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past” and “[k]nows Bill Patrick and probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him informally.” Id. In his amended complaint, Hatfill states that “Professor Rosenberg’s ‘Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator’ . . . described [him].”

In addition to her postings on the FAS website, Professor Rosenberg also presented a lecture on February 18, 2002 at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, entitled “The Anthrax Attacks and the Control of Bioterrorism.” Ex. 2. During the course of her lecture, Rosenberg stated that she had “draw[n] a likely portrait of the perpetrator as a former Fort Detrick scientist who is now working for a contractor in the Washington, D.C, area[.]” Ex. 3. Rosenberg also commented upon Hatfill’s whereabouts on the date of the attacks, stating that “[h]e had reason for travel to Florida, New Jersey and the United Kingdom” – where the attacks had been and from which the letters had been purportedly sent – that “[h]e grew [the anthrax], probably on a solid medium, and weaponised it at a private location where he had accumulated the equipment and the material.” Id. Rosenberg also stated that the investigation had narrowed to a “common suspect[,]” and that “[t]he FBI has questioned that person more than once[.]” Id. Former White House Spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, immediately responded to Rosenberg’s comments, stating that there were several suspects and the FBI had not narrowed that list down to one. Ex. 4. The FBI also issued a press release, stating that it had “interviewed hundreds of persons, in some instances, more than once. It is not accurate, however, that the FBI has identified a prime suspect in this case.” Id. Rosenberg’s comments and writings were subsequently pursued by The New York Times (“The Times”). In a series of Op-Ed articles published from May through July 2002, Nicholas Kristof, a journalist with The Times, accused Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks. Kristof wrote on May 24, 2002 that the FBI was overlooking the anthrax perpetrator, noting that “experts” (Professor Rosenberg) point “to one middle-aged American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md. His anthrax vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the anthrax attack.” Ex. 5.

Hatfill first noticed the Kristof columns in May 2002. Hatfill Dep. Tran. in Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 6, at 13: 3-6. According to Hatfill, “[w]hen Mr. Kristof’s article appeared, it was the first [time] that [he] realized that [his] name [was] in the public domain with connection with an incident of mass murder.” Id. at 16:15-18. Hatfill has charged that The Times began the “entire conflagration and gave every journalist out there reason to drive this thing beyond any sort of sanity. Mr. Kristof lit the fuse to a barn fire and he repeatedly kept stoking the fire.” Id. at 43:19 - 44:1. In July 2004, Hatfill thus filed suit alleging that these articles libeled him by falsely accusing him of being the anthrax mailer. Complaint, Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807 (E.D.Va.), Ex. 7.

Hatfill alleges in that lawsuit that “Kristof wrote his columns in such a way as to impute guilt for the anthrax letters to [him] in the minds of reasonable readers.” Id. ¶ 12. The articles, Hatfill claimed, which described his “background and work in the field of bio-terrorism, state or imply that [he] was the anthrax mailer.” Id. ¶ 14. Hatfill specifically alleged that statements in Kristof’s articles were false and defamatory, including those that stated that he: (1) “‘unquestionably had the ability to make first-rate anthrax’”; (2) “had the ‘ability’ to send the anthrax”; (3) “had the ‘access’ required to send the anthrax”; (4) “had a ‘motive’ to send the anthrax”; (5) “was one of a ‘handful’ of individuals who had the ‘ability, access and motive to send the anthrax’”; (6) “had access” to an ‘isolated residence’ in the fall of 2001, when the anthrax letters were sent”; (7) “‘gave CIPRO [an antibiotic famously used in the treatment of anthrax infection] to people who visited [the ‘isolated residence’]”; (8) his “anthrax vaccinations were ‘up to date’ as of May 24, 2002”; (9) he “‘failed 3 successive polygraph examinations’ between January 2002 and August 13, 2002”; (10) he “‘was upset at the United States government in the period preceding the attack’”; (11) he “‘was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort Detrick [where Hatfill had concedely worked] surrounded only by blushing germs.’” Id. ¶ 16 (brackets in original). Hatfill alleges in his lawsuit against The Times that “[t]he publication of [Kristof’s] repeated defamation of [him] . . .gave rise to severe notoriety gravely injurious to [him].” Id. ¶ 29. The injury, Hatfill alleged, “was [made] all the more severe given the status and journalistic clout of The Times.” Id. This harm was compounded, Hatfill alleged, by the fact that these articles were “thereafter repeatedly published by a host of print and on-line publications and on the television and radio news” in the following months. Id., ¶ 30.

The case was initially dismissed by the trial court. Hatfill v. The New York Times, No. 04-807, 2004 WL 3023003 (E.D.Va.). That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). Upon remand, the trial court granted The Times summary judgment, finding that Hatfill was a public figure and public official and had failed to present evidence of malice. Hatfill v. The New York Times, 488 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D. Va. 2007). In arriving at that conclusion, the court considered Hatfill’s repeated media interviews before the attacks; the fact that he had “drafted a novel, which he registered with [the] United States Copyright office, describing a scenario in which a terrorist sickens government officials with a biological agent”; and had lectured on the medical effects of chemical and biological agents. Id. at 525.

Although not recited by the district court in The New York Times litigation, Hatfill also talked directly to reporters about his suspected involvement in the attacks. Brian Ross of ABC News, and his producer, Victor Walter, for example, talked separately to Hatfill on two to three occasions as early as January and February 2002, Ross Dep. Tran., Ex. 8, at 263:14 - 270:1, and continued talking to Hatfill until May of that year. Id. Ross also spoke to Hatfill’s friend and mentor, William Patrick, about Hatfill. Id. at 287:9 - 295:12. These meetings were prompted by discussions ABC News had in January 2002 with eight to twelve former colleagues of Hatfill at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”). Id. at 242:7 - 246:14. Hatfill’s former colleagues found him to be “highly suspicious because of a number of things he had done when he worked at [USAMRIID], and this behavior was strange "and unusual and they felt that he was a likely candidate.” Id. at 242: 7-17. These meetings were also prompted by ABC News’s own investigative reporting into Hatfill’s background; the more ABC News learned “the more interested [they] became” in Hatfill. Id. at 264: 14-15.

Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun also spoke to Hatfill in February 2002. Shane also spoke to USAMRIID employees who had worked with Hatfill. Ex. 9. These employees stated that they had been questioned by the FBI and “asked about a former Fort Detrick scientist” – Hatfill – “who returned a few years ago and took discarded biological safety cabinets, used for work with dangerous pathogens.” Id. at 1. These employees claimed that Hatfill “ha[d] expertise on weaponizing anthrax and ha[d] been vaccinated against it[.]” Id. Shane also called one of Hatfill’s former classmates, who was “plagued” by questions from the Baltimore Sun and others within the media regarding Hatfill’s “alleged involvement with the large anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe[.]” Ex. 10. According to Hatfill, this classmate was told by Shane that Hatfill was purportedly responsible for “mailing the anthrax letters and also starting the [anthrax] outbreak in Zimbabwe/ Rhodesia twenty years before.” Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014; see also e-mail to Hatfill fr. DF Andrews, dated Mar. 1, 2002, Ex. 10. Hatfill told Shane in February 2002 that he had been “questioned by the FBI” and that “he considered the questioning to be part of a routine effort to eliminate people with the knowledge to mount [the] attack.” Ex. 9. Hatfill also confirmed for Shane that he had taken an FBI polygraph. Ex. 12, at 2. In March 2002, Hatfill left Shane a frantic telephone message reportedly stating how he had “been [in the bioterrorism] field for a number of years, working until 3 o’clock in the morning, trying to counter this type of weapon of mass destruction” and fearing that his “career [was] over at [that] time.” Ex. 13, at 2. According to Hatfill, Shane later Case 1:03-cv-01793-RBW Document 232-2 Filed 04/11/2008 Page 17 of 73

____ Hatfill did not sue either Shane or Rosenberg, even though Hatfill has stated that Rosenberg “caused” the focus on him. Ex. 14, at 10. Because Hatfill believed that the portrait Rosenberg painted at the February 2002 Princeton conference and in her website postings was so identifying and incriminating, however, Hatfill advised Rosenberg through his lawyers that “before [she] get[s] close to describing him in the future, by name or otherwise, [that she] submit [her] comments for legal vetting before publishing them to anyone.” Ex. 15. There is no evidence that the agency defendants bore any responsibility for the media presence. Information about FBI searches is routinely shared with a variety of state and local law enforcement authorities. Roth Dep. Tran., Ex. 16, at 163:5 -165:21; Garrett Dep. Tran. Ex. 17, at 79: 8-18. ______

compounded Hatfill’s problems by calling his then-employer, Science Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), and accusing Hatfill of being responsible for the anthrax attacks, Ex. 11, at AGD29SJH00014, which, according to Hatfill, cost him his job as a contractor at SAIC. Id. 1

The media frenzy surrounding Hatfill intensified upon the search of his apartment on June 25, 2002, and the search of a refrigerated mini-storage facility in Ocala, Florida on June 26, 2002. Both were witnessed by the media, and the search of his apartment was carried live on national television. In addition to the television coverage, the searches generated a slew of articles about Hatfill throughout the media, one fueling the next. The Associated Press, for example, detailed in an article, dated June 27, 2002, Hatfill’s (1) work as biodefense researcher, including studies he had conducted at SAIC, and the work he had done at the USAMRIID; (2) his educational background; (3) where he had previously lived; and (4) security clearances he had held and the suspension of those clearances. Ex. 18. The Hartford Courant reported these same details, and additional information regarding Hatfill’s purported service in the Rhodesian army. Ex. 19. The next day -- June 28, 2002 -- the Hartford Courant reported details about Hatfill’s background in biological warfare, his vaccinations against anthrax, questioning that purportedly had occurred among Hatfill’s colleagues, his educational background (including the claim that he had attended medical school in Greendale), and lectures that he had given on the process of turning biological agents into easily inhaled powders. Ex. 20. None of this information is attributed to a government source.

In July 2002, after these reports and after the first search of Hatfill’s apartment on June 25, 2002, Hatfill retained Victor Glasberg as his attorney. Glasberg Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 12: 16-19. Glasberg believed that “any number of people in the media [had] overstepped their bounds. . . . prior to July of 2002 .” Id. at 141:1 - 142:6. To counter this information, Hatfill set out on a “public relations offensive” of his own to “turn [the] tide.” Id. at 138: 20-21, 178: 12-13.

Recognizing that Hatfill “continue[d] [to] get[] killed with bad press, national as well as local[,]” Hatfill drafted a statement and Glasberg forwarded that statement in July 2002 to Hatfill’s then-employer at Louisiana State University (“LSU”). Ex. 11, at 1. The statement detailed Hatfill’s background, including his medical training and employment history, and provided details about Hatfill’s involvement in the anthrax investigation, including how he had been interviewed by the FBI and had taken a polygraph examination. Id. at AGD29SJH00002-13. Hatfill’s statement corroborated the conversations that Hatfill reportedly had with Scott Shane of the Baltimore Sun in February 2002, and how that interaction had purportedly cost Hatfill his job at SAIC in March 2002. Id. at AGD29SJH00014.

In his July statement, Hatfill was careful not to blame DOJ or the FBI for his troubles or for any wrongdoing for the information about him that had made its way into the press. He touted the professionalism of the FBI, noting that “[t]he individual FBI agents with whom [he had come] in contact during this entire process are sons and daughters of which America can be justifiably proud. They are fine men and women doing their best to protect this country.” Id. at AGD29SJH00016. Hatfill’s objection lay with the media, whom he labeled as “irresponsible[,]” for trading in “half-truths, innuendo and speculation, making accusations and slanting real world events . . . to gain viewer recognition, sell newspapers, and increase readership and network ratings.” Id.

As the investigation proceeded, however, Glasberg publicly criticized investigators on the date of the second search of Hatfill’s apartment, August 1, 2002, for obtaining a search warrant rather than accepting the offer Glasberg had allegedly made to cooperate. Ex. 22. So angry was Glasberg with investigators that he wrote a letter, dated the same day as the search, to Assistant United States Attorney Kenneth C. Kohl, denouncing the fact that the search had been conducted “pursuant to a search warrant.” Ex. 23. Glasberg forwarded a copy of this letter to Tom Jackman of the Washington Post, and to the Associated Press, the morning of August 1st. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 24, at 265:12 - 266:5; see also Ex. 25 (Glasberg memorandum to file, stating, among other things, that Glasberg showed Jackman Kohl letter on August 1, 2002).

On the day of the search, an FBI spokeswoman at the Bureau’s Washington field office, Debra Weierman, “confirmed that the search was part of the government’s anthrax investigation.” Ex. 25. Weierman added, however, that “she was unable to confirm that [investigators were acting on a search warrant] or to provide any further information about the search.” Id.

The next day – August 2, 2002 – Glasberg faxed the Kohl letter to members of the media. Ex. 26. In the fax transmittal sheet accompanying the Kohl letter, Glasberg also advised the media that: Dr. Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI earlier this year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI. He and his lawyer Tom Carter were told that the results were all favorable and that he was not a suspect in the case. Id. at AGD16SJH03106. Subsequent to the fax transmittal by Glasberg, Weierman confirmed that the search had been conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but only after receiving appropriate authorization from her superiors. Weierman Dep. Tran., Ex. 27, at 93:16 - 94:14.

Hatfill had also accompanied Glasberg for his interview with Jackman the day before to address the “media feeding frenzy.” Ex. 28. Glasberg provided Jackman with the promise of an “[e]xclusive personal statement” from Hatfill and the promise of “[n]o other press contacts pending publication” of the article. Id. Glasberg thus provided Jackman background information about Hatfill, Rosenberg’s statements, and other publications. Ex. 25. Hatfill reportedly complained to the Washington Post in the interview about the media feeding frenzy, and about how his “friends are bombarded” with press inquiries. Ex. 29, at 1. Hatfill also complained about the “[p]hone calls at night. Trespassing. Beating on my door. For the sheer purpose of selling newspapers and television.” Id.

Following this “media frenzy,” not to mention the two searches of Hatfill’s apartment, former Attorney General John Ashcroft was asked on August 6, 2002 (at an event addressing the subject of missing and exploited children) about Hatfill’s involvement in the investigation. Jane Clayson of CBS News asked General Ashcroft about the searches and whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 30, at 2. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person of interest.” General Ashcroft cautioned, however, that he was “not prepared to say any more at [that] time other than the fact that he is an individual of interest.” Id. At the same media event, Matt Lauer of NBC News also asked General Ashcroft whether Hatfill was a “suspect” in the investigation. Ex. 31. General Ashcroft responded that Hatfill was a “person that – that the FBI’s been interested in.” Id. at 2. General Ashcroft cautioned that he was “not prepared to make a . . . comment about whether a person is officially a . . . suspect or not.” Id.

General Ashcroft made the same comments at a news conference in Newark, New Jersey on August 22, 2002, stating that Hatfill was a “person of interest to the Department of Justice, and we continue the investigation.” Ex. 32, at 1. As in his previous statements, General Ashcroft refused to provide further comment. Id. When asked upon deposition why he referred to Hatfill as a “person of interest” in the anthrax investigation in response to these media inquiries, General Ashcroft testified that he did so in an attempt to correct the record presented by the media that he was a “suspect” in the investigation, which he believed served a necessary law enforcement purpose. Ashcroft Dep. Tran., Ex. 33, at 81: 5-12; 103:18; 108: 9-13; 138: 5-7; 125: 18-21; 134:22 - 136:8. Prior to making these statements, General Ashcroft did not review or otherwise consult any investigative record, id. at 128:14 - 129:12, much less any record pertaining to Hatfill.

General Ashcroft’s initial statements on August 6, 2002 were followed, on August 11, 2002, by the first of Hatfill’s two nationally televised press conferences. Ex. 34. During his press conference, Hatfill lashed out at Rosenberg and other journalists and columnists who he believed wrote a series of “defamatory speculation and innuendo about [him].” Id. at 3. In apparent response to the “person of interest” statements, by contrast, he stated that he did “not object to being considered a ‘subject of interest’ because of [his] knowledge and background in the field of biological warfare.” Id. at 4. This was consistent with Hatfill’s statement to ABC News earlier in 2002 in which he stated that “his background and comments made him a logical subject of the investigation.” Ex. 35. As noted, moreover, Glasberg told the media -- almost a week before the first of General Ashcroft’s statements -- that “Hatfill was first contacted by the FBI [earlier that] year, as part of the Bureau’s survey of several dozen scientists working in fields related to biomedical warfare. He was voluntarily debriefed and polygraphed, and voluntarily agreed to have his home, car and other property subjected to a lengthy and comprehensive search by the FBI.” Ex. 26.

Hatfill’s second press conference was held on August 25, 2002. In the flyer publicizing the conference, Hatfill identified himself to the media -- in bold lettering -- as “the ‘person of interest’ at the center of the federal Government’s [anthrax] investigation.” DA, Exhibit 36.

Patrick Clawson joined the Hatfill team in early August 2002 as spokesperson and “fielded hundreds of inquiries from members of the press worldwide regarding Dr. Hatfill[.]” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson believed it best to employ a media strategy that would, in his words, “let it all hang out.” Id. at 50:10. Clawson felt that “permitting maximum sunshine into . . . Hatfill’s existence would do both him and the public the best good.” Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 50:16-18.

“The majority of Clawson’s communications with the press regarding this case have been oral and by telephone and he did not keep a press log or any other regular record of such contacts with the press.” Ex. 12, at 13. Clawson nonetheless admitted upon deposition that he revealed numerous details about Hatfill’s personal and professional background to members of the press (Clawson Dep. Tran., Ex. 37, at 101:9 - 105:21), including Hatfill’s professional expertise (id. at 103:10 - 105:21), use of Cipro (id. at 123:16 - 130:11, 248: 8-13), whereabouts on the days of the attacks (id. at 148:12 - 158:10, 361:15 - 362:3), expertise in working with anthrax (id. at 194:13 - 195:8), former service in the Rhodesian Army (id. at 210:9 - 211:10), and drunk driving arrest (id. at 795: 7-9, 798: 4-6). Clawson also told reporters what had been purportedly removed from Hatfill’s apartment during the two searches of his apartment on June 25, 2002 and August 1, 2002 (including medical books and a jar of bacillus thuringiensis (“BT”)) (id. at 121: 6-12, 131:2 - 131:12, 14:8 - 147:3, 313: 3-10). Clawson also freely relayed to the press that bloodhounds had been presented to Hatfill during the investigation (id. at 200: 15-19); that Hatfill had been the subject of surveillance (id. at 123:12-15, 428: 19-21); that Hatfill had taken polygraphs (id. at 135:16 - 137:17); and that he had submitted to blood tests (id. at 137:18-138:5, 347: 6-10).

In furtherance of Clawson’s “sunshine” policy, Hatfill, Clawson, and Glasberg, together, provided countless on-the-record, on-background (i.e., for use, but not for attribution), and off-the-record (i.e., not for attribution or use) interviews to counter misinformation. Although Hatfill repeatedly claimed upon deposition not to remember what he said during these interviews, he acknowledged in his responses to the Agency Defendants’ interrogatories having such conversations with, in addition to Mr. Jackman, Judith Miller of The New York Times, Jeremy Cherkis of the City Paper, Guy Gugliotta of the Washington Post, David Kestenbaum of National Public Radio, Rick Schmidt of the LA Times, Rob Buchanan of NBC Dateline, Jim Popkin of NBC News, Dee Ann David and Nick Horrock of UPI, Gary Matsumato of Fox TV, Bill Gertz of the Washington Times, and David Tell of the Weekly Standard. Ex. 12, at 3-4. With respect to the Matsumato interview, Glasberg warned Hatfill before the interview that he “should not be quoted, nor should Matsumato say or imply that he spoke with him.” Ex. 38, at 1. Glasberg warned Hatfill that “Matsumato must be willing to go to jail rather than reveal word one of anything [he] says on ‘deep background.’” Id.

All of these disclosures became too much even for Glasberg, who attempted to put a stop to them. In August, when Jackman aired his exclusive interview with Glasberg and Hatfill, Glasberg heralded the success of his public relations strategy noting that “Rosenberg, Shane and Kristof are, [each] of them, in varying stages of sulking, licking their wounds, reacting defensively and changing their tune.” Ex. 39. Slowly Glasberg advised both Hatfill and Glasberg to observe “the rule of COMPLETE SILENCE regarding anything and everything about the case[.]” Ex. 40 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in September 2002, Glasberg ordered Clawson to stand down, noting “[w]hat you know, you know, and you have put virtually all of that into the public record. Fine. That is where we are, and for good or ill we can and will deal with it. But we must put a full stop to any further conveyance of substantive data about ANYTHING from Steve to anyone [but his attorneys].” Ex. 41 (emphasis in original). To no avail. On October 5, 2002, Hatfill and Clawson appeared together at an Accuracy in Media Conference. Hatfill was asked about the reaction of bloodhounds, and stated, I’m not supposed to answer things against . . . but let me tell you something. They brought this good-looking dog in. I mean, this was the best-fed dog I have seen in a long time. They brought him in and he walked around the room. By the way, I could have left at anytime but I volunteered while they were raiding my apartment the second time, I volunteered to talk with them. The dog came around and I petted him. And the dog walked out. So animals like me (laughter). Ex. 42, at 2.

Disclosures from the Hatfill camp to the media continued. For example, between late 2002 and May 8, 2003, Hatfill’s current attorney, Tom Connolly, and CBS News reporter James Stewart had multiple telephone conversations and two lunch meetings. Ex. 43. According to Stewart, Connolly told Stewart that the investigation was focusing on Hatfill, and detailed at great length the FBI’s surveillance of Hatfill. In virtually every one of these conversations, Connolly encouraged Stewart to report on these subjects. Id. at 96.

At the time of the second search of his apartment in August 2002, Hatfill was working as a contract employee at the Louisiana State University (“LSU”) on a program to train first responders in the event of a biological attack. This program was funded by the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) as part of a cooperative agreement. Ex. 44. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, OJP “maintain[ed] managerial oversight and control” of the program. Id. at 2. Following the second search of Hatfill’s apartment on August 1, 2002, Timothy Beres, Acting Director of OJP’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, directed that LSU “cease and desist from utilizing the subject-matter expert and course instructor duties of Steven J. Hatfill on all Department of Justice funded programs.” Ex. 45. LSU, meanwhile, had independently hired Hatfill to serve as Associate Director of its Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. Following the second search, LSU placed Hatfill on administrative leave. Ex. 46. LSU then requested a background check of Hatfill. Ex. 47. During the course of that investigation, the University became concerned that Hatfill had forged a diploma for a Ph.D that he claimed to have received from Rhodes University in South Africa. Hatfill explained to Stephen L. Guillott, Jr., who was the Director of the Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education at LSU, that “[h]e assumed the degree had, in fact been awarded since neither his [thesis advisor] nor Rhodes University advised him to the contrary.” Ex. 48. LSU’s Chancellor, Mark A. Emmert, made “an internal decision to terminate [LSU’s] relationship with Dr. Hatfill quite independent of [the DOJ e-mail] communication.” Ex. 51.

Hatfill has now testified that in fact he created a fraudulent diploma with the assistance of someone he met in a bar who boasted that he could make a fraudulent diploma. Hatfill Dep. Tran., Ex. 49 at 19:20 - 20:12. Glasberg, moreover, has stated under oath that Hatfill’s earlier attempted explanation was untrue. Glasberg, Dep. Tran., Ex. 21, at 314:10 - 317:2. In a nationally televised 60 Minutes episode that aired in March 2007, Connolly confirmed that Hatfill forged the diploma for the Ph.D from Rhodes University. Ex. 50, at 3.

Hatfill claims lost wages and other emotional damages resulting from General Ashcroft’s “person of interest” statements and other for-attribution statements by DOJ and FBI officials. He also seeks to recover for certain other alleged “leaks” by DOJ and FBI officials. Hatfill additionally asserts that the defendants violated the Act by purportedly failing to (1) maintain an accurate accounting of such disclosures, which he asserts is required by section 552a(c) of the Act; (2) establish appropriate safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of the records that were purportedly disclosed, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(10); (3) correct information that was disseminated about him that was inaccurate or incomplete, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(5); and (4) establish adequate rules of conduct, procedures, and penalties for noncompliance, or to train employees in the requirements of the Act, which he asserts is required by section 552a(e)(9). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.”

Now that your girlfriend has punched the clock, it’s time to punch your clock, Dr. Rebel. Let me try to explain things:

Remarkable technologies permitting the formulation and construction of such bacterial spore powders were chiefly - and independently - cultivated in two countries totally distinct from each other: Russia and Denmark. The Danish firms, Niro Atomizer and Chris Hansen, mastered the technologies pertaining to benign germs and later contributed, one way or another, to ongoing efforts made by Iraq (Niro) and the U.S. (Chris Hansen) to achieve the desirable textures of first-class bacterial powders, whether innocent or infective. The ultimate usefulness of Niro Atomizers for preparing bacterial spore powders has been noticed by Iraq in the 1980s, fully adopted for spray drying BT (as stimulant), and rather perfected, in all likelihood, for BA weaponization. Apparently, the U.S. Army, after using for many years self-made BG aerosols as an aerobiological model germ, lately preferred an appreciably upgraded, spray-dried BG spore powder from Chris Hansen, for investigative purposes.

Let me say it again if you are slow on the uptake: Apparently, the US Army, after using for many years self-made BG aerosols as an aerobiological model germ, lately preferred AN APPRECIABLY UPGRADED, spray-dried BG spore powder from Chris Hansen, for investigative purposes. Chris-Hansen is a dairy processor.

The “Dugway simulant” used in the Canadian study WAS MADE AT CHRIS HANSEN for Dugway. It was appreciably upgraded.

Now do you agree with this technical explanation above? A simple “yes” or “no” will do.

I’m going to show Ed that once he’s out of the ring — I don’t want him to get hurt — you are no match for the likes of the tag team of Zack and Pook. (Pook, btw, means “fart” in Russian).

Sure, I agree the Chris-Hansen spray dryer could make a better simulant.

I’m still trying to take the first step in analyzing the spores - namely finding out just exactly what the attack spores had. Was it just silica, just polymerized glass, both? It was definitely something containing silica - and it definitely made the spores fly.

Was it Alibekov anthrax? Maybe.

Was it the same powder described in the Fox email as being almost identical to a powder already made there? Maybe.

Do the FBI consider the spore weaponization to be the most secretly guarded part of the Amerithrax investigation? Well, duh, yes obviously. Mueller was emphatic when he insisted to Lambert that the science be kept completley stovepiped.

We all know that the above is true - but what about the weaponization is the big secret? Obviously you believe it’s because it’s embrarrassing to admit that AQ stole the formula of a classified US bioweapon. But there are other feasible explanations.

Until we can explore these other explanations we still need the basic information. How much silica? What type? Identical to a known process? Who are the at least 6 players in the Fox News email? Will they talk some more?

“Obviously you believe it’s because it’s embarrassing to admit...”

No. You are adopting Ed’s practice of assuming what someone thinks rather than quoting what they have said. As I’ve often noted, First, it is stupid to publicly discuss how to best weaponize anthrax. Reckless even except when you are as confused as Ed. Second, it is extremely poor investigative practice to disclose such signatures of a crime. Third, as Director Mueller has explained, such discussion would allow a terrorist attack to “spoof” detection devices. These considerations were discussed in Lambert’s affidavit to the judge hearing the Hatfill matter. I think you and Ed lack common sense to pursue the subject. You should be submitting your views to scientists privately, not posting in a forum with Ed. The embarrassment I’ve discussed relates to Al-Timimi and relates, for example, to the potential massive civil liability. But such a concern is redundant to and in addition to general principles of fairness that apply (given it has not been charged). The concern also parallels the usual principles of maintaining the confidentiality of an ongoing criminal investigation so that they could maintain effective wiretaps on, for example, Aulaqi (such as they maintained for years).

Having said that, but being bored by seeing you and Ed post the same info back and forth endlessly, I should note that some patents on polymerized glass coatings claims that a coating of dimethyldichlorosilane will aid dispersability. In such a patent no silica is used - only dimethyldichlorosilane. This would lead to coated spores that would have an EDX spectrum similar to that of silica - but chlorine would also be present in the EDX spectrum. I’ve got to admit — I don’t really understand why this would reduce van der Waals forces - but it would likely cause the powder to strongly repel water — and that would certainly help reduce clumping due to “water bridges” between spores. This would explain why some people who examined the spore SEM pictures saw no silica — the spores coated with dimethyldichlorosilane would look fairly normal — until the EDX was examined. Now can you agree with this technical explanation also? I should tell you that Pook was only rough on you earlier hoping to draw Ed into the ring so that I could land a chair on his head.

The FBI was curious what someone was doing wth the Wayback Machine at archive.org.

“Archive.org Defeats FBI’s Demand For User Information”

“Although we don’t know what they were after due to the settlement, a gag order was just released that kept Internet Archive member Brewster Kahle quiet. The FBI had issued a national security letter to them under the Patriot Act. Kahle fought it. Hard. The EFF came to the aid of his lawyers and what resulted was one of the only three times an NSL has been challenged: all three have been rescinded. The FBI agreed to open some of the court files now for it to be public.

Let’s see if they can keep up with searches relating to Jack the Ripper at Old Bailey.

http://www.nytimes.com/idg/IDG_852573C40069388000257442004ECECE.html?ref=technology

“FBI Assistant Director John Miller issued a statement about the case Wednesday. “The information requested in the national security letter was relevant to an ongoing, authorized national security investigation,” he said. “National security letters remain indispensable tools for national security investigations and permit the FBI to gather the basic building blocks for our counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations.”
***
Kahle’s lawyers declined to talk about the nature of the FBI investigation or reveal the identity of the targeted user.

The NSL sent to the Internet Archive asked for a user’s name, address, length of service, e-mail header information and activity logs. The FBI investigation was “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” according to the FBI letter.

The Internet Archive provided the FBI some information that was publicly available on the site, but could not comply with the FBI request because the site does not track user activity or record IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, said Kurt Opsahl, a senior staff attorney with the EFF. The site asks only for an unverified e-mail address when users register.”

Comment: The Wayback Machine is the single most useful investigative tool available to someone with no budget. http://www.archive.org It’s amazing. It lets you see how websites looked years ago. I block my website from being seen as it existed in the past. Ed and TrebleRebel don’t.

For example you can go back in time and view Ed’s website as accessed on particular dates here:
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com

TrebleRebel’s website as archived on past dates is here:
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.anthrax2001.blogspot.com/

But I blocked my website from being viewed. I didn’t know how to do it with software code so I had to threaten to sue them. ;)
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com/

http://web.archive.org/web/20020205060806/http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/

Early on, he posited that there were three mailings — with the third from Indianapolis.

He writes:

“The non-anthrax mailing from Indianapolis could be highly significant, yet it seems to be totally ignored! The threats would be important, the writing would be important, the paper would be important, everything would be important! But virtually nothing has been reported! We can only hope that it’s so important that the FBI has good reasons to keep secret nearly everything about them.”

As to motive, he adopted what then was thought of as the Greenpeace/ Barbara Hatch Rosenberg/ Francis Boyle theory. But he added his own Milwaukee twist.

“6. Who did it?

A Working Theory for who the anthrax terrorist might be:

The terrorist could be someone formerly with the U.S. militarys bioweapons development program, or he knows someone who worked there.

This theory has apparently been common gossip with the Greenpeace movement for some time and around November 28, 2001, was the subject of an article in “Greenpeace Germany” a publication of the environmentalist movement. The Greenpeace article said: ``It seems the attacker ... wanted to force through an increase in the budget for U.S. research on biological weapons.’’

***

The anthrax-terrorist may have sent some “threatening letters” from Indianapolis prior to September 11, in an attempt to wake up various journalists and news organizations.

So, on September 18, 2001, the mentor arranged for a perfect alibi for himself while his disciple used some of the anthrax they had in their possession to send out REAL anthrax letters to the media...”

Now “the mentor” in Ed’s theory was some guy — who is extremely pissed at Ed — who honest to gosh thought anthrax was a virus. His politics are provably nothing remotely like Ed imagines. (He’s not a biologist and never worked decontaminating anthrax as Ed imagined. His field was radio chemistry and nuclear engineering. Battelle does not even work with powderized anthrax in Ohio. (That work is done at Battelle’s Life Sciences facility at Dugway).

Ed sets forth his “Profile”:

“The unidentified anthrax terrorist is most likely part of a team of two people: a “mentor” and a “disciple” (plus, perhaps, an uninvolved child). The “mentor” could be the Milwaukee scientist, since evidence indicates he knew about the Sept. 18 mailing beforehand, but has a perfect alibi proving he didn’t actually participate.”

Oh, brother. There are easier ways to establish an alibi than causing a scene that draws law enforcement attention to you.

More fundamentally, Ed just assume that the guy worked with anthrax or had access to the strain — and he merely assumed the guy’s’ politics. Yet, AS THE WASHINGTON POST EXPLAINED BASED ON THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED UNDER FOIA, BATTELLE DID NOT EVEN HAVE AMES SHIPPED UNTIL MAY/JUNE 2001. This fellow was fired in 1996 and 1999. And thus even if ever he had decontaminated anthrax, which he didn’t — and even if the work needing decontamination was in Ohio, rather than Utah (which it wasn’t), he HAD NOT BEEN AT BATTELLE SINCE 1999.

So Ed’s theory was stillborn from the start.

Mr. Kahle’s declaration in the Internet Archive litigation explains:

“The Archive’s overarching mission is to provide universal access to all knowledge.” Pretty impressive goal!

“To fulfill its mission, the Archive works with national libraries, museums, universities, and the general public to collect and offer free access to materials on the Internet, including texts, audio, moving images, software, and archived web pages in its collections.”

“One of the unique features of the Archive is a service known as the Wayback Machine, which allows people to visit archived versions of websites. The Archive has created and maintained the Wayback Machine by collecting snapshots of billions of public web pages, except those that have opted not to be archived, every two months for the last ten years. Thus the Wayback Machine makes it possible to surf more than 85 billion pages stored in the Internet Archive’s web archive.”

“[A]n individual wishing to view digital materials on the Archive’s website may do so as an ‘anonymous user — that is to say, without logging in.”

A prominent well-regarded anthrax sleuther has had policy disagreements with Mr. Kahle explained in this New York Times article.

“Bitter Debate on Privacy Debate Divides Two Privacy Experts,” New York Times, December 30, 1999
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904E1D61438F933A05751C1A96F958260

The ACLU’s other litigation is titled JOHN DOE vs. ASHCROFT (now MUKASEY). According to the Washington Post, that case involves an “internet consulting business.” “FBI Backs Off From Secret Order for Data After Lawsuit,” Washington Post, United States - 9 hours ago (The two other instances of NSL withdrawals involved a library and an Internet consulting business.)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/07/AR2008050703808.html?hpid=topnews

The District Court’s decision on appeal reads:

“Plaintiffs John Doe, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation initially brought this case in 2004, challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2709, amended by the USA Patriot Act. *** This Court, in a lengthy decision dated September 28, 2004, granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and declared Section 2709 unconstitutional on its face, under the First and Fourth Amendments. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) Considering the implications of its ruling and the importance of the issues involved,” the Court stayed enforcement of its judgment pending appeal.
***
Moreover, often the target of an NSL is not necessarily the main target of an investigation, and an NSL thus serves as a key tool in allowing the FBI to follow leads.
***
Plaintiffs indicate that as a result of the nondisclosure requirement enforced in this case, they have been precluded from fully contributing to the national debate over the government’s use of surveillance tools such as NSLs, perhaps most particularly consequential in inhibiting their ability to speak and inform public discourse on the issue during Congress’ Reauthorization of the Patriot Act.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Doe

Wikipedia explains:

“The name John Doe is generally used as a placeholder name for a male party in a legal action or legal discussion whose true identity is unknown. Male corpses or emergency room patients whose identity is unknown are also known by the name John Doe. A female who is not known is referred to as Jane Doe.

Wikipedia notes that other names for unknown persons include Joe Blow, Joe Schmoe, Joe Sixpack, John Smith, Eddie Punchclock (for blue-collar workers), and Vinnie Boombotz (particularly in New York City)”

Here is how to find out who is snooping on your email (besides your spouse).

“Who is Snooping on my email?”
http://www.computerbytesman.com/privacy/emailsnooping.htm

“With all of the controversy about the news that the NSA has been monitoring, since 9/11, telephone calls and email messages of Americans, some folks might now be wondering if they are being snooped on. Here’s a quick and easy method to see if one’s email messages are being read by someone else.

The steps are:
1 Set up a Hotmail account.
2 Set up a second email account with a non-U.S. provider. (eg. Rediffmail.com)
3 Send messages between the two accounts which might be interesting to the NSA.
4 In each message, include a unique URL to a Web server that you have access to its server logs. This URL should only be known by you and not linked to from any other Web page. The text of the message should encourage an NSA monitor to visit the URL.
5 If the server log file ever shows this URL being accessed, then you know that you are being snooped on. The IP address of the access can also provide clues about who is doing the snooping.
The trick is to make the link enticing enough for someone or something to want to click on it.”

For example, you might use the subject “La Cosa Nostra/ money laundering.”

“Washington D.C. reality meets spy movie paranoia?” March 23, 2007
http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-6170185-7.html

“If I talk, the U.S. government could throw me in jail, says John Doe. Just another guy hearing radio transmissions in his fillings or speaking in code with small six-legged figures from Plant X9-G? Apparently not. Apparently, just an Internet businessman who was ordered to provide client information to the government and refused.”

Today, ‘John Doe’ tells his story in a Washington Post piece. Doe says he’s under a long-term FBI gag order about a national security letter he got.”
***
“Meanwhile, Mr. Doe never gave data to the FBI. The FBI has now withdrawn its NSL asking for Doe’s Internet client data. But Doe is still under gag order, hiding his lawsuit and legal papers from friends and family—to protect the same FBI he’s suing over the gag.”

“My National Security Letter Gag Order,” Washington Post, March 23, 2007; Page A17
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/22/AR2007032201882.html

“Three years ago, I received a national security letter (NSL) in my capacity as the president of a small Internet access and consulting business. The letter ordered me to provide sensitive information about one of my clients. The letter came with a gag provision that prohibited me from telling anyone, including my client, that the FBI was seeking this information.”

“When I meet with my attorneys I cannot tell my girlfriend where I am going or where I have been. I hide any papers related to the case in a place where she will not look. When clients and friends ask me whether I am the one challenging the constitutionality of the NSL statute, I have no choice but to look them in the eye and lie.”

“I found it particularly difficult to be silent about my concerns while Congress was debating the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2005 and early 2006. If I hadn’t been under a gag order, I would have contacted members of Congress to discuss my experiences and to advocate changes in the law.”
___________

“I wish to ask my distinguished colleague, has he one scrap of evidence to add now to the defense he did not give and could not give at that same hearing?”
—Senator Joseph Paine in “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” (1939)

I try to discuss science, but all I get in return is lists of old links and arguments that we should all bow down to experts...

Your problem is that you're not qualified to discuss science. You did not spend 10 years being educated in the sciences. If you had, you might begin to understand that your own everyday view of reality is a completely different world than the reality perceived by objects that are 1 micron in size or less. You cannot imagine what that world looks like or feels like - and you never will.

You endlessly misunderstand words like "cohesive" to mean what they mean in the only world you know - Elmer's glue or suchlike. You ignore the fact that the authors using the phrase "cohesive particles" clearly state in the next sentence that they are referrign to any small particle where van der Waals cohesion dominates.

Here's a clue about reality in another regime:

http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi?story_id=29118

"Operating in a nanoscale environment is sort of like having flypaper everywhere because of the attraction of van der Waals forces," Raman said.

Your problem is that you're not qualified to discuss science.

So, you are incapable of discussing science unless it is with someone who can match your loftly advanced degrees? How very snobbish of you.

The evidence in this thread (and other threads) is that YOU cannot discuss science because it would require you to look at facts which do not agree with your beliefs.

So, instead you just post links and try to make it appear that the articles at those links are proof of what you believe. They're not.

The Aerosol Science article contains an interesting puzzle: Single spores were all be coated by the Dugway process, but tiny clumps of spores were NOT coated, even though they were still in the less-than-5-micron range. The authors of the article say they cannot explain it. They also cannot agree on what force holds the silica to the spores.

I doubt that sending them a bunch of links will help.

All I was suggesting was some discussion of the puzzle.

If the silica WAS stuck to the spores due to van der Waals forces, why wouldn't the silica also stick in exactly the same way to tiny clumps of two or three or ten spores?

Additional silica was added to the powder AFTER the filtering. Why didn't that silica stick to the clumps due to van der Waals forces?

Is static electricity totally out of the question? It could explain everything.

The spores started out as PELLETS of trillions of spores and were broken down by a ball mill. There was a LOT of friction involved. Nothing was done to eliminate the static charge on the surfaces of the spores -- except for the addition of silica to the milling process.

Static electricity in a milling situation would cause the spores to stick together just the way a pair of socks will stick together in a dryer if you don't do anything to prevent static buildup. But, silica somehow either eliminated the static buildup -- OR prevented it from being a problem.

But it wasn't a problem in the clumps. Is it because the clumps fell through the filter first and there wasn't time for a static buildup? Or is it because the very irregular shape of the clumps has some effect on surface static?

I may not be "qualified" to answer these questions, but I feel I'm "quallifed" to ask them. And if I can't understand the answers, I can do some research and study up so I can understand the answers. But it definitely helps if the answers aren't just links to irrelevant web sites.

I apologize if just reading this causes you to lower your scientific standards.

Ed at www.anthraxinvestigation.com

Dr. Rebel,

Now stoop to my level and talk true crime.

Is the NSL CT server case related to anthrax? The Azzam.com website hosted by a CT server had a FAQ explaining “Inside Green Birds” which was part of the code used in the letters. The website linked the charities under investigation in the US (i.e., Al-Timimi’s charity) and had a direct pipeline to Ibn Khattab who endorsed the website and the charities. Khattab, according to DIA document I’ve uploaded produced to Judicial Watch under FOIA, was involved in anthrax planning early on.

In the NSL matter, there is a case that is “related” to the ISP case involving a FOIA request by ACLU to the CIA/DOD re NSLs. Yet a FOIA request by the same requestors to the DOJ is only deemed a “similar” case. See PACER. (Those are legal terms). Therefore, the origin of the interest in the request can be inferred to be DOD/CIA rather than a US-based criminal prosecution as such. Azzam.com involves a London webmaster whose IP in 2001 indicated he was emailing (to our friend Richard of computerbytesman from a London internet cafe. He is currently being extradited from the UK to the US. His website was mirrored by a North Brunswick, NJ man. But the London AQ operative also used a Connecticut ISP named OLM, LLC.

The NSL case involving “John Doe” President of the ISP/internet business was consolidated for the purpose of decision with a case in Hartford, CT involving librarians. Was that the President of OLM, LLC, George D.?

The request corresponds with when the DOJ made their move against the Al Qaeda website Azzam.com. They had allowed it to keep running as they got leads.

USATODAY.com - Friends say N.J. Webmaster no terrorist, Aug 11, 2004
New Brunswick -AP
The affidavit said Ahmad operated a Web site, www.azzam.com, through a Connecticut-based Internet service provider, OLM. Neither Web site could be accessed ...
www.usatoday.com/community/utils/idmap/12436990.story -

http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:6oDJKZL4Ce8J:www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Documents/AHMAD%2520indictment.pdf+Azzam.com+%22Ibn+Khattab%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us
http://www.olm.net/company-info/standard-policies.html
http://www.olm.net/company-info/
http://web.archive.org/web/20040213134140/http://www.olm.net/company-info/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OLM.net
http://www.hostindex.com/interviews/olm_ceo.shtm

“Single spores were all be coated by the Dugway process, but tiny clumps of spores were NOT coated, even though they were still in the less-than-5-micron range.”

There’s a simple explanation to that. You wrongly speculate that the clumps of spores are immune to coating with silica. It’s likely the other way around. If any clumps are found they became clumps BECAUSE the spores were not coated in the first place - uncoated spores, or spores with poor coverage came in contact with each other during later handling - and they clumped up due to van der Waals attraction.

Thus it would be unlikely to observe single uncoated spores - since they would already have clumped.

Also - the pellets of spores you refer to are not the hard “hocky pucks” of spores that would be dried out after a normal centrifuge process. They used a propietray azeotropic distillation process to dry the spores. This leaves a much softer, more crumbly pellet that is easy to ball mill without damaging the spores.

In fact - the entire process they used is identical to the Patrick process that has been talked about and is protected by secret patents. It’s still an old process - and it;s likely there are much more advanced processes availble today. Don’t forget these defense labs only publish what they are comfortable publishing.

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