Oh wait, wrong Reich.
Posted on 04/18/2008 6:58:28 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
The holiday will not only give Mr. Chamberlain a few days of fly-fishing but also enable him to prepare the next stage of his diplomatic effort toward a four-power settlement in Europe. In particular, Lord Londonderry may prove useful to the prime Minister in helping to revive the Anglo-German conversations begun by Viscount Halifax last November.
Lord Londonderry is probably the only influential Englishman who has direct private access to Field Marshal Hermann Goering and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In the past he has corresponded frequently and frankly with Nazi leaders, and although he was shocked by the German seizure of Austria, he is still convinced that Great Britain must make a “deal” with Germany.
If the Prime Minister wishes to sound out the Germans discreetly on the possibility of an Anglo-German understanding, he can hardly do so more easily than by means of a letter from Lord Londonderry. There is not a particularly close personal friendship between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Londonderry, and Mr. Chamberlain could have found more congenial fishing companions if fishing were all he had in mind.
The outlines of Mr. Chamberlain’s plans remain a mystery for the moment and may still be hidden after he returns to London. It is still difficult to visualize any Anglo-German bargain that would not give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe and would not therefore be bitterly unpopular with a large section of opinion here and in France.
But there can be little doubt that the Prime Minister hopes to resume contact with Germany, perhaps without waiting for the completion of pending Franco-Italian negotiations. In the past few days there has been a sudden revival of talk and hope among those pro-Germans here who helped to arrange Lord Halifax’s mission last Autumn. It would seem that they have had some new encouragement from Mr. Chamberlain or from Lord Halifax now that the shock of the Anschluss had begun to wear off.
The motives behind Mr. Chamberlain’s persistent effort are not at all obscure. The first is the obvious motive of trying to check the worldwide armaments race and stave off war. In the words of Lord Halifax, “if you can relieve tension anywhere you relieve it everywhere.”
The British Conservatives also want to be able to say to the world – if war should come – that they have done everything humanly possible to conciliate and to satisfy the grievances of the “have not” nations. It is felt that some such argument would be useful not only to obtain the support of the British people in war, but also to win favorable opinion in the British Dominions, the United States and other neutral countries that might become Great Britain’s allies.
Finally, there is the desire, ever-present in the minds of the Conservative leaders, to win a general election, perhaps as early as next Autumn or Winter. A series of European pacts on the lines of the Anglo-Italian agreement could be pointed to with pride in an election campaign, and so could the agreements that are confidently expected between Great Britain and Eire and between Great Britain and the United States.
British Conservatives see nothing illogical in following up the pact with Italy by an understanding with Germany. Whatever may be supposed in other countries, Mr. Chamberlain’s chief motive in the Anglo-Italian negotiations was not a desire to break the Berlin-Rome axis. In his speech at the Guildhall on Nov. 10 he spoke of “our relations with the two great powers which are now so closely associated in what is known as the Rome-Berlin axis.”
“It is the sincere desire of His Majesty’s Government,” he continued, “to see those relations established upon a basis of mutual friendship and understanding.” And it was noted at the time that he did not single out Italy but mentioned both the fascist partners in the same breath.
The Anglo-Italian agreement may, of course, alter the character of the Rome-Berlin axis by increasing Italy’s weight in the partnership and reducing Italy’s dependence upon Germany. The restoration of good and friendly relations between London and Rome may remove some of the offensive menace from the relations between Rome and Berlin.
But the Rome-Berlin axis will remain, as will be demonstrated early next month when Chancellor Adolf Hitler visits Premier Benito Mussolini. Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues simply hope to join up the Italo-German and Anglo-French partnerships into some sort of four-power relationship.
Such a process would involve the disappearance of the Franco-Soviet pact, which is anathema to the fascist powers. But the Franco-Soviet alliance has never been popular among British Conservatives, as Premier Edouard Daladier will discover when he visits London next week.
Meanwhile British opinion as reflected in the newspapers is divided along familiar party lines in receiving the Anglo-Italian agreement. The Opposition papers were bitter over recognizing the conquest of Ethiopia and also regarded the agreement on Spain as a “surrender” to Italy.
Mr. Chamberlain, according to the Laborite Daily Herald, “has sealed the betrayal of Ethiopia, has arranged the betrayal of Spain and has struck – as the Italian papers gleefully underline – yet another blow at the League.” The paper adds: “What does he gain in return? In the agreement and all it annexes there is nothing that is worth the paper on which it is written. All he obtains is the friendship of Mussolini – a man who has betrayed friends and causes unhesitatingly whenever it served his purposes or his ambitions.
But the Government papers are well satisfied. The Times regards the treaty as an “auspicious first installment” of Mr. Chamberlain’s European policy. The greatest value of the agreement according to The Times is that it marks the “end of the process of unnatural estrangement between England and Italy and of degeneration in international affairs.”
The Times expresses especial pleasure at the Italian promises concerning Spain, at the recognition of Egypt’s importance and at the provisions made for revision of the treaty’s terms.
“If the new atmosphere of confidence and good-will is not disturbed,” says The Times,” all the remaining problems will be solved and easily solved on the basis of the documents just signed by the two governments. No incompatible material interests divide Great Britain and Italy and the agreement should clear from the way all those minor causes of friction which cease to be dangerous as soon as they cease to be exploited.”
“M. Bonnet has informed Sir Eric Phipps [Britain’s Ambassador] that the Premier and he gladly accept the invitation he conveyed on behalf of the British Government,” the statement says.
Comment here today on the signature of the Anglo-Italian accord indicates that the French Government is preparing to push rapidly for the conclusion of a supplementary agreement between France and Italy and that this will be a chief subject for discussion during M. Daladier’s London visit.
One provision of the Anglo-Italian treaty that has particularly aroused French curiosity is that relating to the non-use of Ethiopian natives as troops outside Ethiopia. It is interesting for its bearing on French national security.
Ever since the World War the French have actively pursued a policy that would facilitate moving large numbers of troops from Morocco, Algeria and even Senegal, Somaliland and French Equatorial Africa to help defend France. African troops served effectively in the World War and French diplomacy would look with alarm upon a move that would tend to commit France like Italy to refrain from using African forces in the event of war.
A great amount of space is devoted in the newspapers tonight to discussion of the speech of President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia in which he announces a desire to come to terms with Germany. An editorial in the Temps approves the spirit that would lead to a peaceful settlement of the Central European problem, but pointedly recalls that the Czechs have definite engagements with France, which should be taken into consideration in any arrangement discussed with Germany.
CANBERRA, Australia, April 17. – Prime Minister Joseph A. Lyons commented today that the Australian Government is convinced that the Anglo-Italian agreement will make a material contribution to the alleviation of tension and a general appeasement in Europe.
The agreement on liberty of transit of the Suez Canal is particularly gratifying to Australia, as the canal is so essential a factor in communication with the United Kingdom and European markets.
As Australia is not now a member of the League of Nations Council it is not called upon to make a decision on the recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia.
The ease with which the negotiations were completed indicated, it is felt, the desire of both parties to re-establish their long-standing traditional friendship.
LONDON, April 17. – Tension of international unrest relieved, the lesser anxieties temporarily forgotten, Britons today threw themselves into the celebration of Easter-tide with the deepest reverence and most carefree gaiety in years.
Seized with the spirit of rejoicing, the editor of The Sunday Pictorial blazoned in bold type on his front page the headline:
“No Bad News!”
He added: “It has happened now for the first time in history . . . a newspaper front-paging the fact there is no bad news today. While millions of people forgot their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The tension of two dangerous years is relieved.”
Tokyo regarded the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian accord as reducing the triple anti-Comintern pact to a German-Japanese agreement against Russia. The Foreign office was represented as seriously concerned since the agreement may affect Britain’s Far Eastern policy. Hope was expressed that it would not last. At Hankow the agreement was welcomed, as it was felt that Japan would be weakened and British opposition to her would be strengthened.
Italians were relieved and overjoyed at the prospect of return of peace to the Mediterranean. This feeling was regarded as a good augury for future Anglo-Italian relations. The press, however, emphasized that there would be no weakening of the Rome-Berlin axis. Early negotiations with France were expected.
Prime Minister Chamberlain arrived in the north of Scotland for his visit to the Marquess of Londonderry, advocate of an accord with Germany. London believed negotiations with Berlin would be pushed.
The press then declared that the Rome-Tokyo axis had proved its value by preventing possible Anglo-American joint action in the Far East at the time of the Panay and Ladybird incidents.
Apart from its power to detain the British fleet in the Mediterranean at moments of tension the Rome-Tokyo axis has no interest for Japan and the conclusion of a Mediterranean entente reduces the tripartite anti-Comintern pact to its original meaning as a German-Japanese agreement against Soviet Russia.
The formula under which the Japanese press will conceal its disappointment has not been announced. Recent trends suggest that Japan will profess satisfaction at the increasing realism of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s foreign policy and express hopes that the British Government will soon acquire a clearer understanding of the Far Eastern situation and modify its attitude accordingly.
Yomiuri, purporting to report the Foreign Office views, although these do not appear in any other paper, says that Anglo-Italian friendship will not last because the fundamental issues between the “have” and the “have not” nations remain unsolved.
This comment professes confidence that Italian-Japanese relations will not be affected, but admits that the agreement causes serious concern to Japan since it may affect Great Britain’s Far Eastern policy.
Moreover it is felt that the Rome-London pact will modify the belligerency of the fascist front powers and in a measure become an entering wedge in the Italo-German axis. Consequently it is believed that Italy and Germany may not support Japan so strongly in the future. In this regard the influential daily Ta Kung Pao remarks:
“The Japanese look upon Italy as more important than German. Now Japan has lost her instrument for harassing Great Britain in Europe.”
Apprehension is expressed in some quarters as the result of the prospective general recognition of the conquest of Ethiopia. It is feared that this may eventually lead to the recognition of Manchukuo. Ta Kung Pao echoes the general sentiment that the League of Nations has received a heavy blow, remarking:
“The Italo-British agreement proves that the League system is bankrupt.”
This feeling is important since all treaties depend for their success more on the spirit in which they are concluded and on a desire to abide by them loyally than on their actual written clauses. It cannot be doubted that all Italians are relieved and overjoyed at the prospect of a return of peace to the troubled Mediterranean.
It is the psychological factors in Anglo-Italian relations that perhaps deserve to greatest attention in any judgment about the true value of the agreement signed yesterday. Italy and Britain for the last two years have been animated by mutual distrust and suspicion more than they have been separated by any fundamental causes of hostility.
The Popolo di Roma this morning exaggerates somewhat when it says that all that has happened between Italy and Britain since the outbreak of the Italo-Ethopian trouble was a mere misunderstanding, but it is nearer the truth than those observers who see no possibility of peace between the old-established imperialism of democratic Britain and the rising imperialism of Fascist Italy. The Anglo-Italian agreement in any case certainly has created an atmosphere that is a prerequisite if relations between Italy and Britain are ever to return to where they were before 1935.
With Chancellor Hitler’s Italian visit imminent, the whole Italian press is careful to emphasize that the re-establishment of harmony between Italy and Britain can in no event mean or imply a weakening of the Rome-Berlin axis. The axis, say all Italian newspapers, is and will continue to be the guiding principle of Italian foreign policy. Italy now finds herself in the position of being on friendly terms not only with the other end of the Rome-Berlin axis but also with the chief European exponent of democracy. Italians declared that this does not necessarily lead to the consequence that Italy will be obliged sooner or later to choose between Britain and Germany, but that the situation should be taken advantage of to bring about improved relations also between Britain and Germany.
The Anglo-Italian agreement is expected to lead to interesting developments in the situation between Italy and France. It is now regarded as certain that France will appoint an Ambassador to Rome immediately after the next League of Nations Council meeting next month and that negotiations for an Italo-French agreement similar to the Anglo-Italian one will be opened not much later. Some more optimistic persons believe the French Charge d’Affaires will approach the Italian Government immediately with an offer to negotiate an understanding.
A point about the Anglo-Italian agreement on which the Italian press lays the greatest emphasis is that Britain, by discussing and concluding the understanding with Italy on a footing of equality, has recognized Italy’s new imperial status more effectually than if she had formally recognized the conquest of Ethiopia. As one paper puts it, Britain has renounced the moral protectorate over Italy that she has always claimed since the Italian wars of independence, and this is a thing that fills all Italians with pride – their feelings are similar to those of a young man coming of age.
Two points in the agreement are clarified by Italian papers today.
The first relates to Annex Six, whereby Italy accepts the principle that Italian East African natives should not be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defense. This means, says the Italian press, that Italy accepts the principle that Ethiopian troops should not be used outside Ethiopia – for instance, in Europe – but that the application of this principle depends on its acceptance by all other powers. Some papers make themselves even plainer by saying that the decision as to whether this principle is to be applied or not now is up to France.
The second point relates to the note Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano delivered to the Earl of Perth, Britain’s Ambassador, undertaking to reduce Italian effectives in Libya. As Libya now forms part of Italian metropolitan territory, Italian papers say, this does not mean that the number of army corps stationed there will be decreased, but only that the forces will be reduced from a war to a peace footing.
Some foreign observers and commentators seem to think that Italy has given up more than she has gained in her agreement with Britain. They point out that Italy has undertaken not to derive any benefit from the policy she has followed in the Spanish civil war, that she has renounced all idea of threatening Egypt from Libya and that she has promised to discontinue any propaganda that might threaten the British Empire’s integrity – all in exchange for merely British recognition of the Ethiopian conquest.
This view is not shared in Italian circles. They say Italy declared from the outset that she was looking for neither political, military nor economic advantages in Spain. The idea that Italy made a sacrifice by undertaking to reduce her effectives in Libya and interrupt anti-British propaganda, it is argued here, is based on the assumption that Italy is preparing to make war on Britain. Since she is not, it is added, these two points of the Anglo-Italian agreement are entirely logical and proper and entail no sacrifice for Italy.
Of particular interest is Annex Three of the agreement, dealing with the position of the two countries in Arabia. Italy and Britain agree not to disturb the status quo, which, it is observed here, consists of the prevalence of Italian influence in Yemen and the prevalence of British interest in Saudi Arabia and a sort of British protectorate over the zones of Arabia lying east and south of the present boundaries of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The two countries agree, moreover, to keep all other powers out of this part of the world, which consequently will henceforth be regarded as a sort of appendage of the Italian and British Empires.
When the present agreement is compared with the so-called gentlemen’s agreement of Jan. 2, 1937 one cannot help being struck by its greater completeness and by the detail with which it goes into all Anglo-Italian questions. The gentlemen’s agreement, apart from some rather vaguely worded generalizations, consisted only in undertakings not to disturb the Mediterranean status quo and a guarantee of free access to and egress from the Mediterranean.
The present agreement instead takes up in detail not only all pending Anglo-Italian questions, but also all questions likely to arise in the future. The thoroughness with which all aspects of Anglo-Italian problems has been examined is evidence of a desire that the present agreement shall serve not as a mere stopgap but as a permanent basis for amicable relations between two powers that are obliged by circumstances and geography to co-exist in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues simply hope to join up the Italo-German and Anglo-French partnerships into some sort of four-power relationship.
If we can just get enough signatures on enough papers we might be able to prevent a general war.
Reply #2 is the view of the historic agreement in Asia.
The press then declared that the Rome-Tokyo axis had proved its value by preventing possible Anglo-American joint action in the Far East at the time of the Panay and Ladybird incidents.
Or maybe it was Japan’s abject apology to the U.S.
Oh wait, wrong Reich.
If Herr Goering gets his way then that will work. He may be a slimy murderer but he sincerely wants peace to enjoy his ill-gotten gains.
But Hitler will push for more expansion and eventual war. I can almost see it.
The headline is wrong. It should read “(Real Time - 70 Years),” because real time is now, and this happened 70 years ago.
Real time + 70 years is April 2078.
Oops me too! Damn, modern politics is confusing.
No offense or anything, but why does this belong in breaking news?
I think it’s fascinating to read back then what the press was saying, and to point out that just like today, even back then they didn’t have a clue.
Well damn, we all came on this thread to read about what will be happening in 2078. Good job someone is on the ball eh?
It obviously happened in 1938. That’s why the error in the headline is so jarring.
It is not in breaking news.
But I thought about it.
He added: “It has happened now for the first time in history . . . a newspaper front-paging the fact there is no bad news today. While millions of people forgot their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The tension of two dangerous years is relieved.”
I think that one thing we may not share over the abyss of years is the profound dread of war these people had. The trenches of World War I were not a distant memory to them. Peace with Italy at the expense of allowing some Italian adventure against the Ethiopians looked like a good plan, and it's hard to gainsay them.
Here are a couple definitions of "Real Time" I googled. The second example implies that every event has its own real time. That means the number of real times is infinite.
When an event is reported as it happens-such as a quick jump in a stock's price or the constantly changing numbers on a market index-you are getting real-time information. ...
www.morganstanleyindividual.com/customerservice/dictionary/Default.asp
time in which reporting of events or recording of events is simultaneous with the event
coris.noaa.gov/glossary/glossary_l_z.html
That is why I try not to be judgmental about their diplomatic efforts. Now it it obvious they were wasting their time, but as you say, they were closer to WWI than we are to Vietnam. We can imagine something worse than WWI because WWII is part of our past. They lacked that perspective.
It's fascinating. It's chilling. I really wish that FReepers could roll with it just a little bit and - please - stop the tedious trench-warfare over nomenclature.
That's a good point and it's easy to find fault with them now. However, it's the Chamberlains of today that bother me. They think that, despite history, war can be avoided with appeasement. Hence, Jimmy Carter meets with Hamas and people are calling for a "dialog" with Iran. Mindless peace activists that prolong suffering.
You just want to grab them by the collar and explain, "There will always be war, there will always be strife. We're the good guys. Get used to it!"
You ought to talk to Jay Leno about a job!
I appreciate this article very much. The "League" is mentioned but was, of course, inept. A tragedy that there was no force for good (a "World Policeman") in 1937. :-(
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