BRITAIN MAY PUSH DEAL WITH REICH (Real Time + 70 Years)

The holiday will not only give Mr. Chamberlain a few days of fly-fishing but also enable him to prepare the next stage of his diplomatic effort toward a four-power settlement in Europe. In particular, Lord Londonderry may prove useful to the prime Minister in helping to revive the Anglo-German conversations begun by Viscount Halifax last November.

Lord Londonderry is probably the only influential Englishman who has direct private access to Field Marshal Hermann Goering and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In the past he has corresponded frequently and frankly with Nazi leaders, and although he was shocked by the German seizure of Austria, he is still convinced that Great Britain must make a “deal” with Germany.

If the Prime Minister wishes to sound out the Germans discreetly on the possibility of an Anglo-German understanding, he can hardly do so more easily than by means of a letter from Lord Londonderry. There is not a particularly close personal friendship between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Londonderry, and Mr. Chamberlain could have found more congenial fishing companions if fishing were all he had in mind.

The outlines of Mr. Chamberlain’s plans remain a mystery for the moment and may still be hidden after he returns to London. It is still difficult to visualize any Anglo-German bargain that would not give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe and would not therefore be bitterly unpopular with a large section of opinion here and in France.

But there can be little doubt that the Prime Minister hopes to resume contact with Germany, perhaps without waiting for the completion of pending Franco-Italian negotiations. In the past few days there has been a sudden revival of talk and hope among those pro-Germans here who helped to arrange Lord Halifax’s mission last Autumn. It would seem that they have had some new encouragement from Mr. Chamberlain or from Lord Halifax now that the shock of the Anschluss had begun to wear off.

The motives behind Mr. Chamberlain’s persistent effort are not at all obscure. The first is the obvious motive of trying to check the worldwide armaments race and stave off war. In the words of Lord Halifax, “if you can relieve tension anywhere you relieve it everywhere.”

The British Conservatives also want to be able to say to the world – if war should come – that they have done everything humanly possible to conciliate and to satisfy the grievances of the “have not” nations. It is felt that some such argument would be useful not only to obtain the support of the British people in war, but also to win favorable opinion in the British Dominions, the United States and other neutral countries that might become Great Britain’s allies.

Finally, there is the desire, ever-present in the minds of the Conservative leaders, to win a general election, perhaps as early as next Autumn or Winter. A series of European pacts on the lines of the Anglo-Italian agreement could be pointed to with pride in an election campaign, and so could the agreements that are confidently expected between Great Britain and Eire and between Great Britain and the United States.

British Conservatives see nothing illogical in following up the pact with Italy by an understanding with Germany. Whatever may be supposed in other countries, Mr. Chamberlain’s chief motive in the Anglo-Italian negotiations was not a desire to break the Berlin-Rome axis. In his speech at the Guildhall on Nov. 10 he spoke of “our relations with the two great powers which are now so closely associated in what is known as the Rome-Berlin axis.”

“It is the sincere desire of His Majesty’s Government,” he continued, “to see those relations established upon a basis of mutual friendship and understanding.” And it was noted at the time that he did not single out Italy but mentioned both the fascist partners in the same breath.

The Anglo-Italian agreement may, of course, alter the character of the Rome-Berlin axis by increasing Italy’s weight in the partnership and reducing Italy’s dependence upon Germany. The restoration of good and friendly relations between London and Rome may remove some of the offensive menace from the relations between Rome and Berlin.

But the Rome-Berlin axis will remain, as will be demonstrated early next month when Chancellor Adolf Hitler visits Premier Benito Mussolini. Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues simply hope to join up the Italo-German and Anglo-French partnerships into some sort of four-power relationship.

Such a process would involve the disappearance of the Franco-Soviet pact, which is anathema to the fascist powers. But the Franco-Soviet alliance has never been popular among British Conservatives, as Premier Edouard Daladier will discover when he visits London next week.

Meanwhile British opinion as reflected in the newspapers is divided along familiar party lines in receiving the Anglo-Italian agreement. The Opposition papers were bitter over recognizing the conquest of Ethiopia and also regarded the agreement on Spain as a “surrender” to Italy.

Mr. Chamberlain, according to the Laborite Daily Herald, “has sealed the betrayal of Ethiopia, has arranged the betrayal of Spain and has struck – as the Italian papers gleefully underline – yet another blow at the League.” The paper adds: “What does he gain in return? In the agreement and all it annexes there is nothing that is worth the paper on which it is written. All he obtains is the friendship of Mussolini – a man who has betrayed friends and causes unhesitatingly whenever it served his purposes or his ambitions.

But the Government papers are well satisfied. The Times regards the treaty as an “auspicious first installment” of Mr. Chamberlain’s European policy. The greatest value of the agreement according to The Times is that it marks the “end of the process of unnatural estrangement between England and Italy and of degeneration in international affairs.”

The Times expresses especial pleasure at the Italian promises concerning Spain, at the recognition of Egypt’s importance and at the provisions made for revision of the treaty’s terms.

“If the new atmosphere of confidence and good-will is not disturbed,” says The Times,” all the remaining problems will be solved and easily solved on the basis of the documents just signed by the two governments. No incompatible material interests divide Great Britain and Italy and the agreement should clear from the way all those minor causes of friction which cease to be dangerous as soon as they cease to be exploited.”

“M. Bonnet has informed Sir Eric Phipps [Britain’s Ambassador] that the Premier and he gladly accept the invitation he conveyed on behalf of the British Government,” the statement says.

Comment here today on the signature of the Anglo-Italian accord indicates that the French Government is preparing to push rapidly for the conclusion of a supplementary agreement between France and Italy and that this will be a chief subject for discussion during M. Daladier’s London visit.

One provision of the Anglo-Italian treaty that has particularly aroused French curiosity is that relating to the non-use of Ethiopian natives as troops outside Ethiopia. It is interesting for its bearing on French national security.

Ever since the World War the French have actively pursued a policy that would facilitate moving large numbers of troops from Morocco, Algeria and even Senegal, Somaliland and French Equatorial Africa to help defend France. African troops served effectively in the World War and French diplomacy would look with alarm upon a move that would tend to commit France like Italy to refrain from using African forces in the event of war.

A great amount of space is devoted in the newspapers tonight to discussion of the speech of President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia in which he announces a desire to come to terms with Germany. An editorial in the Temps approves the spirit that would lead to a peaceful settlement of the Central European problem, but pointedly recalls that the Czechs have definite engagements with France, which should be taken into consideration in any arrangement discussed with Germany.

The agreement on liberty of transit of the Suez Canal is particularly gratifying to Australia, as the canal is so essential a factor in communication with the United Kingdom and European markets.

As Australia is not now a member of the League of Nations Council it is not called upon to make a decision on the recognition of Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia.

The ease with which the negotiations were completed indicated, it is felt, the desire of both parties to re-establish their long-standing traditional friendship.

Seized with the spirit of rejoicing, the editor of The Sunday Pictorial blazoned in bold type on his front page the headline:

He added: “It has happened now for the first time in history . . . a newspaper front-paging the fact there is no bad news today. While millions of people forgot their worries and went out to be happy, Britain and Italy were shaking hands. . . . All Europe welcomed it. The tension of two dangerous years is relieved.”

"The British Conservatives also want to be able to say to the world – if war should come – that they have done everything humanly possible to conciliate and to satisfy the grievances of the “have not” nations.

"It is felt that some such argument would be useful not only to obtain the support of the British people in war, but also to win favorable opinion in the British Dominions, the United States and other neutral countries that might become Great Britain’s allies. "

First, we need to note that every article similar to this one, that you've posted so far, includes a statement along these lines. So, it is a consistent theme.

I am slowly becoming convinced that this idea is absolutely critical to understanding the whole elaborate "Kabuki dance," going on in the years leading up to September 1939.

With perfect 20-20 hindsight, we see now that what Britain and France should have been doing, instead of appeasement, was "push-back," even slapping Hitler around a bit.

Remember, the cost of appeasement was: for over five years, on average nearly a million people a month died world-wide (est. 55 million total) as a result of W.W.II.

Common sense tells us there had to be a better way to control Hitler's aggressive impulses. This quote, I think, suggests possibly why they never did it.

every article similar to this one, that you've posted so far, includes a statement along these lines.

I have also seen at least one other statement along the lines of this one:

I guess staying in power has always trumped doing the right thing for future generations. Of course, this may just be the personal opinion of Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.

I guess staying in power has always trumped doing the right thing for future generations.

After further reflection: There I go again, even after I'd vowed not to be overly judgmental.

This really just illustrates an unavoidable weakness of a free society. To overcome a general tendency to avoid armed conflict between nations, you must have politicians with both the wisdom to see the consequences of inaction and the persuasive power to convince a voting majority of the necessity for action. How often does that happen? Churchill might have taken steps to eliminate Hitler from the scene while there was still time to avoid the big conflagration, but he was not Prime Minister.

And thank God for the free press, but they don't have to get elected (or take responsibility for their opinions).

"Churchill might have taken steps to eliminate Hitler from the scene while there was still time to avoid the big conflagration, but he was not Prime Minister."

I have a wonderful book by Lynne Olson (Baltimore Sun), from 2007: "Troublesome Young Men -- the Rebels who Brought Churchill to Power and Helped Save England."

Turning to page 109, we read about just this time, 70 years ago:

"Churchill, the only other possible leader of the rebels, continued to denounce Chamberlain's failure to confront Hitler, but he [Churchill] was still tarred with a reputation for recklessness and lack of judgment.

"Even if the anti-appeasement backbenchers had been inclined to follow him, he too was absent from Westminster for long periods during the spring and summer of 1938.

"Hard pressed financially, he had retreated a bit from the political fray and closeted himself at Chartwell [his home], writing a succession of magazine pieces, finishing up "Marlborough" [history book], and beginning what became his four-volume work, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples."

So 1938 Britain's serious failure in leadership, sadly, included at least to some degree, Churchill himself.

"So 1938 Britain's serious failure in leadership, sadly, included at least to some degree, Churchill himself."

Or, we might put it this way: during the spring & summer of 1938, Churchill was home writing about history, when he should have been hard at work making it! ;-)

April 21, 1938 Update

It didn't make the newspapers, but on this date Hitler summoned General Keitel to update his plan for taking over Czechoslovakia. Case Green, a plan for a military surprise attack on the country, had been drawn up in June 1937, but Hitler thought current world opinion precluded such a drastic step. Instead he intended to manufacture an "incident," such as the murder of the German Minister in the course of an anti-German demonstration. (I don't think the German Minister got the memo on this phase of the plan.) German forces would then occupy Czechoslovakia "to restore order" before England or France could do anything prevent it. Once accomplished, Hitler thought the European powers would learn to live with it.

This is the background for the diplomatic efforts to keep the peace in Europe: Hitler wants Czechoslovakia. In order to prevent war the European powers must let him have it.

The Germans used the same ploy before attacking Poland. Called it “Operation Canned Goods”. Heydrich ahd SS Maj. Alfred Naujocks fake an attack on the German radio station at Gleiwitz, using SS men [some Polish speaking], in Polish uniforms, w/ Polish ID [courteousy of the Abwehr]. They fired a few gunshots, yelled in Polish over the radio and left. They also left several bodies [concentration camp prisoners] that ‘Gestapo’ Mueller provided, also in Polish uniforms.

It’s only fitting that Chamberlain vacation with Lord Londonberry. Though Londonberry publicly stated that he was not a Nazi sympathizer his actions showed that he was at the very least a Hitler Apologist. His contacts with Goering and his own damning words proved to be his undoing when he was arrested when the war broke out based on a rumor that he was a Nazi spy.

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