LONDON AND PARIS HOLD ALLIANCE SAVED PEACE (Real Time + 70 Years)

The Czechoslovak crisis has brought a fresh test for the Anglo-French alliance. How London and Paris view the success of their joint efforts to keep the peace is told in the two dispatches below.

And although the Labor opposition not unnaturally contends that credit must also be given to such diverse factors as France’s prompt warning that she would fight to defend Czechoslovakia, uncertainty over Poland’s intentions and the Czechs’ own promptness in stripping for action, the verdict of the German press is probably a surer guide. As during the World War, it has concentrated its bitterest attacks upon “perfidious Albion.”

And despite the fact that British official quarters have been most careful to argue that no nation “won” and that credit for moderation ought to be showered impartially upon Prague and Berlin, the average Briton agrees with the Angriff, at least to this extent: Great Britain stopped Chancellor Adolf Hitler when he was up to some mischief with regard to Czechoslovakia.

And those who believe that Britain and France together are “standing up to the dictators” argue that a courageous policy of peace will yield many more such triumphs. The Nazis, they point out, now indignantly deny that they were moving troops in the direction of Czechoslovakia, just as, when France announced last Summer that she would fight if German troops landed in Morocco, Berlin vociferously proclaimed that such plans existed only in Gallic imagination.

Or, to take a better example, since it is based on Anglo-French cooperation, it was salutary to observe how quickly Italy joined the Mediterranean piracy patrol last Summer and how suddenly “pirate” submarines ceased to operate, once Britain and France had served notice that they would sent out warships to protect their shipping.

With these triumphs in mind, there are some grounds for hoping that Britain and France may put an end to a year of retreats before the dictators. For these the British are chiefly responsible, for the French, who once were in control, now have to follow the lead of London in almost everything. As a result of this British predominance, Mr. Chamberlain’s determination to reach some kind of settlement with both Premier Benito Mussolini and Hitler brought all the graver complications.

A cynic may wonder whether Italy’s sudden row with France over alleged shipments of war materials to the Spanish Loyalists was not a smoke screen for the Czechoslovak “settlement.” And certainly Frances’s capitulation in the Non-Intervention Committee on the issue closing her Pyrenees frontier resulted from pressure by Britain.

But what matters now is whether the rulers of Germany are convinced first, that Britain and France will fight in defense of Czechoslovakia and, secondly, that there is a sufficient will do win in democracies to withstand the horrors of a war, if that should come.

There are grounds for supposing that the Nazi high command was merely taken aback by the unexpected furor when the other nations’ intentions with regard to Czechoslovakia were disclosed. The danger is that, if Germany makes another attempt, it will be with such thoroughness that, as in August of 1914, no power on earth can halt the plunge into the abyss.

Yet even this late, if Britain and France know their own minds and make plain to the world what they will and what they will not fight for, it is possible that both peace and Czechoslovakia can be saved.

For there is certainly no doubt here at least that in Germany preparations had been made for another annexation, which the League of Nations would have been just as powerless to prevent as it proved to be when Austria was occupied. What moral authority the League had had become ineffective.

Some other force had to be put in its place, or rather behind it, and it was with reluctance and after long hesitation that the British accepted that role.

During the London meeting M. Daladier and M. Bonnet found themselves compelled to return again and again to this argument: if you want to preserve peace you must look facts in the face and do something about them.

Last Saturday they had the satisfaction of seeing their advice taken and acted on with energy. Both in Berlin and Prague warning was given with equal firmness that some way or other the Sudeten German issue must be settled peacefully. There was no threat of war by either Britain or France. For the first time, however, there was opposition to the will of the dictatorships cloaked in polite, or almost always polite, diplomatic language. For the moment the will of London and Paris for peace seems to have prevailed. Time has been gained for the effort to be made to settle the Sudeten German issue peacefully.

Whether that can be done or not is, of course, another question. There is a disposition noticeable in the Berlin press to consider the issue only postponed.

At best, indeed, the incidents of the past week can be regarded only as the first round in the match that has begun between Germany’s urge – perhaps need – for expansion to the east and Anglo-French determination that that urge - or need – shall not be realized by intolerable methods or in a manner so flagrantly illegal as to cause risk of a general war.

One of the most satisfactory features of the joint diplomatic action by the British and the French this week is that neither government has tried to push the other. The British took the initiative. On their side the French have played ball by constantly advising moderation and liberalism in Prague. Both countries have shown that they want peace and that their new alliance cannot be construed as a threat to any one.

Czechoslovakia was born on Oct. 28, 1918. Today, less than twenty years later, Czechoslovakia is the burning problem of Europe.

Here are some of the facts connected with the present controversy raging between Czechoslovakia on the one hand and its Sudeten German minority and the great power behind that minority – Hitler’s Germany – on the other.

Founding of Czechoslovakia. On Oct. 28, 1918, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire was collapsing, the Czechoslovak National Committee in Prague proclaimed itself a government. Czechoslovaks look upon the date as the birthday of their State. Czechoslovakia was officially set up by three treaties; the treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919; the treaty with Austria signed at Saint Germain-en-Laye on Sept. 10, 1919, and the treaty with Hungary signed at the Trianon on June 4, 1920.

Population and Minorities. According to the last official census (1930) the population of the country is 14,729,536. Thirty-three per cent of the inhabitants of the country belong to ethnological minorities. Here is a break-down of the racial groups:

---------------Inhabitants---P. C. of Population

Czechoslovak----- 9,688,943----- 66.92
German-------------- 3,231,718----- 22.32
Hungarian--------- 692,121----- 4.78
Ruthenian--------- 549,043----- 3.79
Jewish--------------- 186,474----- 1.29
Polish--------------- 81,741----- 0.56
Miscellaneous----- 49,465----- 0.34
Foreign residents- 250,031

Czechoslovakia’s great problem is the Sudeten German minority, which is seeking autonomy within Czechoslovakia or annexation to Germany. The Sudeten Germans derive their name from the Sudeten Mountain regions of Bohemia, which they inhabit. The Sudeten Germans are concentrated mainly in the horseshoe-shaped fringe of land along the German frontier. The areas in which they predominate extend in some cases sixty miles inland and at one point to within twenty miles of Prague. In some of these frontier areas the Sudeten Germans constitute from 80 to 100 per cent of the population; in other areas from 50 to 80 per cent.

Virtually 90 per cent of the Sudeten Germans are followers of Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German party. Henlein is a Nazi in everything but name. He has demanded autonomy for the Sudeten area; many observers believe that his ultimate goal is to unite the region with the Third Reich.

Importance of Sudeten region. The Sudeten areas are of great strategic and economic importance to Czechoslovakia. The present Czechoslovak-German frontier follows, in the main a natural mountain boundary. Czechoslovakia’s fortifications are located in these mountains. The loss of the Sudeten area would weaken considerably the entire defense system of the nation.

Economically the Sudeten area contains some of the most important mining and industrial regions of Czechoslovakia. Transfer of these districts to Germany would be a great loss for the economic system of the country.

History. Czechs and Germans alike claim to have been the original inhabitants of the Sudeten area. Germans insist that Germanic tribes inhabited the region before the great migration of Slavs into Central Europe in the fifth and sixth centuries A. D. The Czechs claim that Slavic princes were the original rulers of the land.

German historians admit that German farmers and colonists entered Bohemia at the invitation of the Slav princes and settled in the present Sudeten areas. There was an early hatred among the Germans and Czechs. In his book, “The Migration Towards the East – The Great Colonial Deed of the German People in the Middle Ages,” Karl Hampe, the German historian, quotes a fourteenth century observer – the Abbe Ludolf of Sagan – as saying that it was already possible to talk of “the old and all-too-deeply rooted hatred between those who speak German and those who speak Czech.”

Hampe declares that through developments up to the middle of the fifteenth century Bohemia became administratively “a purely Czech State structure.” The Germans remained in Bohemia, he writes, as “a strong minority.”

Bohemia lost its power and fell under the sway of the German Habsburgs. During the last half of the nineteenth century, however, Czech intellectuals brought about a national revival. When the World War broke out in 1914 this movement, under the leadership of the late Thomas G. Masaryk, first President of Czechoslovakia; Eduard Benes, the present President of Czechoslovakia, and Milan Stefanik, gained in momentum. The Allied Powers included the liberation of the Czecho-Slovaks among their war aims.

When the Czechs proclaimed their State in 1918, the Germans of the Sudeten regions stood aloof; they demanded autonomy or annexation by Germany. Their pleas were not granted.

At the Paris Conference. At the Peace Conference, however, the future of these Germans was a problem of discussion. The Czechs used two arguments in claiming their present borders – the “historic,” so far as the Sudeten areas were concerned, and the “ethnographic,” or the right of self-determination for the country as a whole. In demanding the inclusion of the Sudeten Germans in their new State they emphasized the “historic” argument – that, in general, the old boundary of the Kingdom of Bohemia should become the new frontier. They used the “ethnographic” argument in demanding the inclusion in their State of Czechs and Slovaks living in the former territory of Austria-Hungary.

In allowing the Czechs the “historic” argument in connection with the Sudeten regions, while refusing the right of self-determination to the Germans, the Peace Conference kept in mind, aside from the historical frontier, the demands of strategy and economics. It has often been alleged that military men on the side of the allied powers insisted upon the mountain boundary for Czechoslovakia so that the nation might serve as an eastern bulwark against Germany.

The Czechs themselves played with the idea of giving some of the Sudeten areas to Germany. In this book, “The Making of a State,” published in 1927, the late President Masaryk wrote:

“A Czech proposal, which was taken into consideration at the Peace Conference, was once made to cede a part of German Bohemia to Germany. Yet, on mature reflection, many political men with whom I discussed it recognized that the discontinuity of important sections of our German territory, no less than economic interests, told in favor of our historic right; and, at the Peace Conference, these considerations prevailed.”

Outlook. Such are some of the important factors involved in the present struggle between the Czechoslovaks and the Germans. History, however, is not the only shadow over their relations. Domestic and foreign problems complicate the situation.

Within Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans claim they have suffered many injustices in economic, social and political life at the hands of the dominant Czechoslovaks. President Benes of Czechoslovakia admits some of these charges, but insists that his country has been more liberal than any other in the treatment of minority groups; that the Germans themselves, through their failure to cooperate with the new State and through their attitude of superiority over the Slavic Czechoslovaks, are partially responsible for the present crisis.

In the attempt to settle the controversy the Czechoslovaks have prepared a new statute of government. Although its terms are not yet known it is believed that, under the statute, the minorities of Czechoslovakia will become equal partners in the State. The question now is: will the new statute satisfy Konrad Henlein and, what is more important, the man in the background Adolf Hitler?

Poland, it was made clear, would unreservedly fulfill her obligations toward France under the Franco-Polish alliance in case France was the victim of unprovoked attacks. However, Poland could not permit herself to be drawn into a conflict in which France became involved in consequence of her alliances with other States – Czechoslovakia or Russia.

Curiously enough satisfaction over Poland’s attitude in the recent crisis was expressed by both sides: Germany was reassured by Poland’s neutrality, while the French and British came to the conclusion that Poland would not add to the difficulties in the Czechoslovak situation.

The “fence sitting” policies of Colonel Josef Beck, Foreign Minister, again have been vindicated and he is determined to go on. Friendly relations with Germany, he thinks are of greater importance than the praises of pro-French sections of the British press. Keeping Russia out of Central Europe is considered more advantageous to Poland than keeping the Sudeten Germans in the Czechoslovak republic. Above all, this sphinx-like policy, however unwelcome to some States, helps to preserve peace. As long as a large question mark hangs over Poland’s name on the map of troubled Central and Eastern Europe, no power will risk a decisive move there. It also is all to Poland’s advantage that she is perhaps the only major European power unable to say positively now whom she would fight in the next war. She is in no hurry to name her enemy.

In the popular feeling the choice seems made. When it became known here that Britain took a definite stand last week-end and ranged with France, there was no doubt left to the man in the street that his country would join the Western powers against Germany.

Without ever admitting it, Polish diplomacy follows Britain closely and tries to play in Eastern Europe the British policy of “balance of power.”

However, it is held here to be definitely wrong to consider Britain committed to encirclement policies. The crisis created by the recent British representations in Berlin will soon pass, it is believed, and London will try again to come to terms with Germany.

This whole thing came from the Sunday Times news magazine. I think it is useful for those of us whose knowledge of European history is not all it could be.

I wish I knew how to say "tab" in html. My charts come out looking unlike the originals.

Appeasement rested on the the notion that Hitler would be ashamed to take more if he were given what he initially demanded.

Like a cerebral geek on the playground who thinks that gives the bully his lunch money without a fight, that he will win a moral triumph if the bully hits him anyway.

Only when he gets pummeled does he find that everyone considers him to be a spineless fool, and that everyone else already knew that the bully was a bully. Worst of all, the bully treats his capitulation with contempt.

Fascinating post, thanks very much. (What error, by the way?)

With hindsight, we can chuckle at the desire of the Allies to see the possibility of peace and coexistence when in fact there was absolutely none. Germany had spent years preparing and planning for war. Her moves on the ground, her diplomacy, and even her public pronouncements made it clear. But the will of the Allies was to interpret events as they wished them to be. It prevented them from seeing what today seems obvious: Germany, politically, had no other way to go than war, and would use every opportunity to get to that one goal.

The very idea of "Middle East peace process," of Mrs. Pelosi crawling to Damascus, of Carter babbling with terrorists, of Bambi talking about negotiating with Ahma-dinnerjacket—these are all silly, futile gestures that will make us less prepared for the major shooting war ahead.

Like Hitler, the jihadists dependent on Iran have nowhere else to go. There is no point in doing anything but putting assets in place in preparation for taking them out, while girding our populace for what is inevitable. If we are forceful enough now, we may be able to keep Russia and China out of it for the present.

But the will of the Allies was to interpret events as they wished them to be.

I think that describes a permanent aspect of the human condition. For politicians, anyway. Although the current failure of over half the populace to recognize the radical Islamic threat to Western Civ may be a new extreme in that sort of blindness.

(What error, by the way?)

Petronski believes that "real time" can only ever mean "right now." Therefore my titles containing "Real Time + 70 Years," and my tagline, are erroneous.

May 30, 1938 update

This is related to yesterday's offering. On May 30 Hitler signed a revised version of Case Green, the plan to take over Czechoslovakia. One of the changes was to replace the opening - "It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia in the near future," with "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." Jodl's diary entry for the day included the following: "The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the oinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet because most certainly the Western powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

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