Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History

NY Times ^ | June 29, 2008 | MICHAEL R. GORDON

[neverdem]

WASHINGTON — Soon after American forces toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, Gen. Tommy R. Franks surprised senior Army officers by revamping the Baghdad-based military command.

The decision reflected the assumption by General Franks, the top American commander for the Iraq invasion, that the major fighting was over. But according to an Army history that is to be made public on Monday, the move put the military effort in the hands of a short-staffed headquarters led by a newly promoted three-star general, and was made over the objections of the Army’s vice chief of staff.

“The move was sudden and caught most of the senior commanders in Iraq unaware,” states the history, which adds that the staff for the new headquarters was not initially “configured for the types of responsibilities it received.”

The story of the American occupation of Iraq has been the subject of numerous books, studies and memoirs. But now the Army has waded into the highly charged debate with its own nearly 700-page account: “On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign.”

The unclassified study, the second volume in a continuing history of the Iraq conflict, is as noteworthy for who prepared it as for what it says. In essence, the study is an attempt by the Army to tell the story of one of the most contentious periods in its history to military experts — and to itself.

It adds to a growing body of literature about the problems the United States encountered in Iraq, not all of which has been embraced by Army leaders.

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling of the Army ignited a debate when he wrote a magazine article that criticized American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq...

[goldstategop]

The New York Times has never had a good word to say about the Iraq War. Mistakes were made in its management? Sure. But there were also successes and no one in the MSM bothers to highlight them.

"Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached." - Manuel II Palelologus

[CutePuppy]

L. Paul Bremer III, of State, was the chief of CPA and the "Emperor of Occupation" and Ricardo Sanchez was an "affirmative action" Peter Principle promotion...

And no, "disbanding" the Iraqi Army that had already scattered after quick defeat and, on top of that could not be trusted and was hated by Iraqis was not a mistake - reconstructing it would be taken not as a sign of liberation by Iraqi people, but only the sign that Iraq was under "new management - same as old management".

But it's New york Times re-writing history again, based on stories of "interested persons", same as PBS' recent "documentary" Bush's War... What else is new?

[OKIEDOC]

Good Point.

[LS]

It is interesting that the NY Times never bothered to cite "On Point I," when it came out, which praised OIF as an incredibly efficient and brilliant military operations. I know, because I cited it in my book---was one of the few to do so---and no one paid any attention to "On Point's" conclusions.

[LS]

"disbanding" the Iraqi Army that had already scattered after quick defeat and, on top of that could not be trusted and was hated by Iraqis was not a mistake"

Amen. This is only a NYT/left talking point, because sure as crap you know that if we had NOT disbanded the army, the Left would have been screaming, "Where's the change? This is no different than Saddam!"

[stevem]

The New York Times has never had a good word to say about the Iraq War. Mistakes were made in its management? Sure. But there were also successes and no one in the MSM bothers to highlight them.

I don't know. It's pretty hard to believe any military leaders could make a mistake during a war!

I'd like to compare military success ratios regarding management decisions in the last quarter to those decisions made by senior managers at the NYT.

[Dilbert56]

To me, it looks like the immediate post-war period foundered as the State Dept. and Pentagon disagreed on the approach. The President should have resolved he dispute. In his shoes, I would have gone with the military. The State Dept. can't do anything, they reflexively adore the status quo. That's not useful when a government has been overthrown - there is no stability to preserve. The military may hate operations other than war but they know how to get things done. They seem to be able to accomplish most any mission they're given. They may be the only part of the Federal government that is effective.

For too long our military was left in Iraq w/o a clear mission. We were so busy arguing if we had enough troops we ignored the primary question: "Enough troops to do what?" If the mission is to just be there then yes, we had enough troops.

Ironically, it was when the President went against the generals' recommendations, against the pantywaists in the Iraq Surrender Group, and decided to attack, that the war turned around.

[tobyhill]

If the “occupation” was such a failure then why do we still have troops there?

[RightOnTheLeftCoast]

“A tour of the beaten-up cities six months after victory is a mighty
sobering experience for anyone. ...Friend and foe alike, look you accusingly
in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an
American. They cite the evolution of the word ‘liberation.’...” John Dos
Passos, January 7, 1946

[MinorityRepublican]

Bremer almost singlehandily lost the war in Iraq for us. Thank God President Bush discovered General Petraeus.

[CutePuppy]

Gen. David Petraeus was a standout from his early days in Iraq, when he was tasked with creating, building and training new Iraqi army and police, which was designed to be the real "boots on the ground" force we needed, not the "occupation" force. He said from the start that this would take time to do it right, as these tasks always do. "King David" oft-told joke was asking reporters "Tell me how it ends".

L. Paul Bremer III was a disaster and incompetent freelancer, seemingly coordinating with and accountable to no one.

But, ultimately, every "war of attrition" against partisan tactics of terrorism (as was in Iraq) is always about local intelligence, adapting strategy, "hearts and minds" and will. All of which takes time, not excess of "boots on the ground", especially in the age of A-10s, B-2s, Global Hawks, Predators, Reapers, Special Forces etc.

That is to say, with all the "mistakes", real or imagined or made out of whole cloth, we were never in danger of militarily losing the deliberately (to separate it from GWOT) misnamed "War in Iraq" in Iraq, we could only lose the "War in Iraq" in Washington - by losing the will to win - suffering defeat at the hands of our own politicians with the help of "axis of evil media", concentrated mostly in New York and Hollywood. The closer we were getting to "winning the war in Iraq" on the ground in Iraq, the louder their voices became in US to "withdraw" and "redeploy" and face the de facto defeat, essentially providing a second front in this partisan war.