Posted on 03/04/2010 7:56:50 AM PST by Publius
John Jay had been battle tested in the diplomatic offices and salons of Paris and Madrid, and had navigated the infant Republic through the shoals of French, Spanish and British intrigue. More than anyone else, he understood the duplicity behind the smiles and kind words from European powers, both friendly and not so friendly. He knew precisely what the Great Powers of Europe were up to. He was nobody’s fool.
In this essay, Jay explores the dangers of one foreign policy versus thirteen separate foreign policies.
1 To the People of the State of New York:
2 It is not a new observation that the people of any country – if, like the Americans, intelligent and well informed – seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
3 That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
4 The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
5 Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.
6 The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.
7 At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.
8 As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed.
9 Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.
10 The number of wars which have happened, or will happen, in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them.
11 If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by Disunited America, for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
12 The just causes of war for the most part arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.
13 America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime and therefore able to annoy and injure us.
14 She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain and Britain, and with respect to the two latter has in addition the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
15 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies.
16 Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it, for although town or country or other contracted influence may place men in state assemblies or senates or courts of justice or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, especially as it will have the widest field for choice and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the states.
17 Hence it will result that the administration, the political counsels and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious than those of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations as well as more safe with respect to us.
18 Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties as well as the laws of nations will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner; whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen states or in three or four confederacies will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them.
19 The wisdom of the Convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to, one national government cannot be too much commended.
20 Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice, but those temptations, not reaching the other states, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless and good faith and justice be preserved.
21 The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
22 Because even if the governing party in a state should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may and commonly do result from circumstances peculiar to the state and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated or to punish the aggressors.
23 But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
24 So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the people.
25 As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
26 Because such [violence is] more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two states than of the Union.
27 Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual states who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
28 The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some states and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers.
29 The bordering states, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely by direct violence to excite war with these nations, and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
30 But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.
31 They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending state.
32 The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses.
33 The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
34 Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a state or confederacy of little consideration or power.
35 In the year 1685 the state of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him.
36 He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France to ask his pardon and receive his terms.
37 They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.
38 Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?
Jay’s Critique
This is a very short piece, confined to a single subject.
7 At present I mean only to consider [the matter of safety] as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.
At this point in Jay’s lengthy career, foreign policy was his most noted area of expertise; indeed, except for Franklin, he was pre-eminent in the field, having served as the Confederation Congress’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the five years preceding the Federalist Papers. Thus his word on the matter must have carried considerable weight. Having negotiated with several foreign nations already, he has an eye for potential sources of friction.
13 America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime and therefore able to annoy and injure us.
14 She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain and Britain, and with respect to the two latter has in addition the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
The last phrase is an allusion to the presence of Spanish claims in the south, and British in the north and west of the new nation, both of which would in time produce armed conflicts.
15 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies.
There is, of course, the obvious point that it is far less likely for foreign governments to play one regional government off against another than it is to split a unified federal government.
20 Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice, but those temptations, not reaching the other states, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless.
But Jay’s argument takes an interesting turn first.
16 Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it, for although town or country or other contracted influence may place men in state assemblies or senates or courts of justice or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, especially as it will have the widest field for choice and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the states.
17 Hence it will result that the administration, the political counsels and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious than those of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations as well as more safe with respect to us.
In short, inasmuch as it offers a wider arena, the federal government will attract superior talent. It is a point unlikely to be attractive to the prickly state governments of the time; indeed, the reader has already encountered the objection of Samuel Bryan in Centinel #1 that it would likely lead to an aristocracy, a ruling class remote from the citizens. This at best would be a two-edged sword.
The reader comes to Jay’s speculation – for that is all that it is – that a unified federal government will be less likely to embark in needless wars with the sundry Native American tribes.
27 Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual states who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
It is not apparent whether Jay was ascribing the lack of such wars to the centralization of the existing federal government – which is, after all, the issue at hand – or to its weakness. In any case, the implication is that a strong federal government will be less likely to be swayed by local circumstances into an inappropriate response, and yet strong enough to respond in places where local governments could not. There are, however, disadvantages to the remoteness of a central federal government alluded to by Jay in the previous piece – and unacknowledged in this one – that would also become apparent in the coming century.
There would be, for example, a local commander who vociferously opposed the decision made by the federal government to relocate certain tribes to reservation areas that made little sense to anyone actually on the scene. In fact, this commander would travel back to Washington DC to testify against such policies, nearly costing him his command for insubordination, and in the end losing his life attempting to enforce policies he detested. His name was George Armstrong Custer.
Jay could hardly have foreseen the specifics, but the principles were certainly not difficult to anticipate. The subsequent history of the federal government with respect to treaties with Native Americans would be a sorry one indeed and remains a point of political sensitivity to this day. Would a decentralized set of governments, more aware of local conditions, have done any better? In any case, one cannot cede Jay this particular point, but the advantages of negotiating, whether with foreign or native nations, on the basis of a single united front, are not to be denied. Jay leaves the reader with a cautionary tale.
35 In the year 1685 the state of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him.
36 He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France to ask his pardon and receive his terms.
37 They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.
38 Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?
The warning is clear. Power is respected, it is the only thing that is respected between nations, and a single unified federal government speaking for the United States would possess a credibility and a potential menace that smaller regional, or even state, governments could not match. Jay knew from personal experience that such a credibility, such a menace, was necessary to preserve the peace in a world that could be most predatory toward the weak.
The resolve and unity of the new nation was to be tested, and soon, first by the Barbary states and then the British. Jay himself would be instrumental in putting off the latter test for nearly twenty years, but in the end it would come. When it did, despite the occupation and burning of the new nation’s capital, the British would find themselves engaged by one nation, not thirteen. It would prove barely enough.
Discussion Topics
Before the Civil War dealt a death blow to Jacksonian federalism, the anti-Federalists formed the base of Jefferson's Republican Party and Jackson's Democratic Party. After the Civil War, the Jeffersonian impulse formed the basis of the Progressive Movement.
Following World War II, Goldwater brought the heirs of the anti-Federalists and Jeffersonians into the modern Republican Party, and Reagan brought them to power -- for a while. Today the heirs of John DeWitt and Jefferson reside in the Tea Party movement.
The anti-Federalists are still among us, but in a different form.
But of course, once the Constitution was ratified, antifederalism (federalism) was a lost cause, as we have seen. I don’t really like Jefferson’s name attached to antifederalism. While the antifederalists were resisting big government consolidation, Jefferson was out of the country taking Madison’s word for everything. Madison, once his great plan was hatched, immediately began scurrying around, scheming with Jefferson against Washington and Hamilton, who were only doing what any antifederalist could have told them (and did) would happen. By then it was too late, and they both come off looking like fools.
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