Posted on 05/30/2010 1:38:45 PM PDT by James C. Bennett
NEW DELHI: The horrific Air India Express crash in Mangalore on May 22 that killed 158 people could have possibly been averted had the expat commander heeded his Indian co-pilot's advice. Records of the conversation between the pilots and ATC has shown that co-pilot H S Ahluwalia more than once urged Captain Zlatko Glusica not to land and instead go around.
Importantly, Ahluwalia's warning had come well before the aircraft had descended below decision height - the critical level at or before which a final decision on whether to land or go around is to be taken - said highly placed sources. Ahluwalia, who was based in Mangalore and had landed there 66 times, voiced his concern when the aircraft was about 800 feet high, they added.
"Ahluwalia warned at least twice against landing and urged his commander to go around. He had probably realized the aircraft was either too fast or too high on approach - indicating unstable approach - and would not be able to stop safely on the table-top Mangalore runway. In such situations, going around is a standard operating procedure which enables the aircraft to land safely in second attempt," said a source at ATC. The aircraft (IX 812) was coming from Dubai.
But the warning went in vain and the aircraft did not go around. It landed, only to crash and fall off the cliff from this table-top runway. The latest revelation only confirms Ahluwalia's excellent knowledge of the local runway condition. The co-pilot lived in the city. He was due for commandership later in May.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has guidelines for cockpit resource management (CRM) that makes it mandatory for commanders to listen to their comparatively less experienced co-pilots as they may also have something valid to say. According to industry sources, CRM training is very strong in Jet Airways, where Ahluwalia had served earlier. "This is the backbone of Jet and this training would have made Ahluwalia call out very strongly," said sources.
Authorities are now pinning their hopes on details from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (black box) to know what exactly transpired inside the cockpit in the final moments. More importantly, they now want to know what made Ahluwalia give the warning for a go-around and why the commander did still went ahead to land. But the CVR and black box have got substantially damaged and may have to be sent to the manufacturer (Boeing) in US for decoding.
The Boeing 737-800 touched down after overshooting 2,000 feet of the 8,000-feet-long runway. The second error followed seconds later.
Sources said preliminary probe is indicating that the crew realized they may not be able to stop in the remaining airstrip and attempted to take off again. But it was too late by then. A Boeing 737-800 can stop in 4,500-5,000 feet. The Mangalore runway is 8,000 feet long and even if the pilots had overshot the touchdown point by 2,000 feet, there was enough length left to stop.
"Initial observations reveal the pilots may have attempted to take off again," a source said.
Meanwhile, the aviation ministry has decided to extend Mangalore runway's length by 1,000 feet.
Sort reinforces the “old or the bold” theory.
Just to be clear, the term “decision height” has to do with instrument approaches, NOT whether or not to abandon the approach, go around, and take another stab at it.
Simply put, if the crew doesn’t have visual contact with the runway itself or the approach lighting system, they are forbidden by the regs to descend lower than what is specified on the instrument approach chart.
They could’ve elected to abandon the landing at any point while they were still flying. Airplanes do “touch and goes” all the time in training.
Even on table-top runways which are basically built atop flattened hills?
You would think a pilot would yield the yoke to a co-pilot who has made a dangerous landing 66 times. To compound the matter, he disregards the warnings of the voice of experience. Many died for his foolhardy pride.
Malcom Gladwell's Tipping Point has a great chapter on this issue.
Unless the co-pilot has been determined to be completely incompetent or incapacitated, if he says “go around”, you go around. All that costs is a little extra fuel.
I have flown a bit with Indian Airlines, and while some of the airports have been dicey, the pilots have always seemed capable. I can’t imagine why this captain chose to ignore his co-pilot.
And, IIRC, they were executing an instrument approach, but a VOR approach, not an ILS. So they had no vertical guidance except knowing what the minimum descent altitude was for the approach. They hit that, they can’t see the runway, they go around, period.
}:-)4
There’s old pilots and bold pilots, but no old, bold pilots.
The pilot was British (Russian-born), the co-pilot was Indian. Thanks for the link. I believe someone else had suggested the same to me here. I’ll find myself a copy soon.
Thanks for adding that clarification. I was wondering what the author was talking about with his reference to “decision height.” I had thought the same thing regarding touch & goes.
I saw an earlier report that said the Captain was Serbian. Was that report wrong?
They had a term for flight into terrain from WWII I believe and it’s called target fixation. The Captain might have been so fixated on landing the aircraft he wasn’t listening.
From WiKi, with citations on link:
“The crew consisted of two flight and four cabin members commanded by Captain Zlatko Glušica, and first officer H.S. Ahluwalia.
Glušica, a British and Serbian national with over 10,000 hours of flying and over 7,500 hours of command experience, and Ahluwalia (a former employee of Jet Airways who joined Air India in April 2009), were killed.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_India_Express_Flight_812
You don’t think that could really happen do you? I had two “I think I just might give up flying” days in a row last week.
“Even on table-top runways which are basically built atop flattened hills?”
Yep. All the decision height does is keep the plane out of harm’s way IF the crew does not have sufficient visual contact with the airport to land the plane.
From the other comments here, it sounds like the captain was fixated on landing the plane, in spite of it being too high, too fast, or both. And for some reason, he wasn’t accepting any situational input from his copilot.
Sad.
Thanks for the details. I appreciate it.
We in the flying community call that "get-there-itis". Killed a lot of people over the years. Of course commercial carriers are under a great deal of pressure (much of that coming from the flying public) to be "on time/on schedule". Go-arounds cost time and money...if you magically make it you are a hero...but when you don't....
Very sad, and true.
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