Posted on 10/25/2010 8:00:44 AM PDT by Publius
Using comparisons to Great Britain and comparisons between the states, Madison lays out his case for defending the size of the House.
1 To the People of the State of New York:
2 The second charge against the House of Representatives is that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.
3 As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
4 It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents.
5 But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.
6 An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects which do not lie within the compass of legislation is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.
7 In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.
8 What are to be the objects of federal legislation?
9 Those which are of most importance and which seem most to require local knowledge are commerce, taxation and the militia.
10 A proper regulation of commerce requires much information as has been elsewhere remarked, but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual state, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.
11 Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce.
12 So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object.
13 As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the state may be necessary.
14 But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the state?
15 Divide the largest state into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district.
16 Besides this source of information, the laws of the state, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide.
17 In every state there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will in many cases leave little more to be done by the federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them in one general act
18 A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole Union without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the states, the more simple objects will be preferred.
19 To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the state codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other state were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation.
20 Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it?
21 The federal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance.
22 The representatives of each state will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the state legislature, where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled and from [which] they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
23 The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia.
24 For however different the rules of discipline may be in different states, they are the same throughout each particular state and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same state.
25 The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.
26 This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single state, but of those among different states.
27 Taking each state by itself, its laws are the same and its interests but little diversified.
28 A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them.
29 Were the interests and affairs of each individual state perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole state might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it.
30 On a comparison of the different states together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.
31 [While] a few representatives, therefore, from each state may bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other states.
32 The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different states will have an assimilating effect.
33 The effect of time on the internal affairs of the states, taken singly, will be just the contrary.
34 At present some of the states are little more than a society of husbandmen.
35 Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
36 These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population and will require on the part of each state a fuller representation.
37 The foresight of the Convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.
38 The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made.
39 The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions.
40 The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to 558.
41 Of this number, one-ninth are elected by 364 persons, and one-half by 5,723.*
42 It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add anything either to the security of the people against the government or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils.
43 On the contrary, it is notorious that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
44 They might, therefore, with great propriety be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation.
45 We will, however, consider them in this light alone and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs.
46 With all these concessions, 279 persons only will be the depository of the safety, interest and happiness of eight millions; that is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of 28,670 constituents in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated.
47 Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable in a very small proportion on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people.
48 Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every 30,000 inhabitants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.
[*] Burgh's “Political Disquisitions”.
Madison’s Critique
The topic once again is the sufficiency of the membership of the House of Representatives. Madison has already addressed the initial number with the frank admission that it is arbitrary and intended to grow once a census accurately gives it a basis to do so (Federalist #55). Opponents have argued that inasmuch as the House is the body intended to be closest to the people, it need be more numerous than one per 30,000 constituents and elected more often than biannually. Madison dealt with the latter point in Federalist #53 and seeks to address the former in this essay.
There are three reasons that Madison deems the planned number sufficient: first, that given the limited purview intended for the federal government, it is well within the capabilities of a “few intelligent men” to grasp; second, that they will be guided within those areas by existing and future state legislation; and third, that a representation by population of a roughly similar nature has been successful in Great Britain, the exemplar of representative government to the theorists of the day.
Madison reminds his readers of what it is that he expects the federal government to do, and what bounds he anticipates for its efforts. The modern reader, accustomed to the tendrils of the federal government creeping into nearly every facet of everyday life, will smile at how restricted even a federalist such as Madison expected them to be.
8 What are to be the objects of federal legislation?
9 Those which are of most importance and which seem most to require local knowledge are commerce, taxation and the militia.
Madison contends that within the field of commerce, the “local” knowledge required of the federal legislator need be no more granular than at state level, due to a general homogeneity within a single state and despite the diversity between the states (10). That same granularity applies to taxation, as well, referring to taxation on the federal level as Madison imagined it: as delineated in the proposed Constitution, these relate principally to “duties” (11), meaning the taxation of imported goods, and “internal collections” (13), whose structuring will be heavily guided by existing state practice (16). The states having done the detailed work, it remains only for the federal government to collect and standardize, not to re-invent (17).
18 A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole Union without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the states, the more simple objects will be preferred.
“The more simple objects” means those showing the least variance among the states, income, by the early 20th Century, being one of them. That such a “skillful individual” might not be a congressman but an unelected federal bureaucrat did not occur to Madison. That what came out of his closet might have given existing local practice no consideration whatever would not have shocked him – the British were fond of such practice, which is one reason there was a War of Independence in the first place – but it likely would have struck Madison as tyranny unbefitting the American citizen.
These same considerations apply to the militia, that is, that variance within the state was a topic a congressman could be expected to be conversant with, and that the issue on the federal level was conformity between the states. That, to Madison, was the proper purview of the federal government, and the House was designed as a compromise between the necessity for detailed knowledge of the states represented, and the number of the representatives intended to bring that knowledge to the capital.
25 The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it.
The reference to time was intended to link this essay to the previous ones in which the two-year terms of representatives were defended on the basis that a certain longevity in office might be an asset with regard to the gathering of this information. Indeed, it will be the charge of a federal Congress to ensure that its members do attempt to encompass the differences between the practices of the various states (30, 31). There is a subtle aroma of parochialism in Madison’s hope that the lesser states will benefit from a federal cross-pollination of knowledge and experience.
34 At present some of the states are little more than a society of husbandmen...
36 These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population and will require on the part of each state a fuller representation.
They will grow in population, at least, if not necessarily in “those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation” (35), and as they do, their representation will be adjusted accordingly (37).
Madison now turns to a defense of the ratio of one representative per every 30,000 people, citing the statistics compiled by Edmund Burke. In Great Britain, the distribution is quite uneven, with certain members of Parliament representing as few as 364 persons, many not living in the districts represented. So with a bit of mathematical prestidigitation Madison arrives at the number of 28,670 citizens per representative, not perhaps entirely accidentally close to the stipulated figure of 30,000 within the proposed Constitution. The argument boils down to “the British can do it, and so can we.” How accurate Madison’s actual description of “it”, however, remains a topic of some uncertainty.
It is also largely irrelevant at this point in history. True to Madison’s calculations in the previous essay, the number of representatives plateaued at what is hoped to be an optimal 435; it is the number of citizens per representative that has had to be adjusted. That number now approaches a figure that would have staggered Madison: one per 700,000. How close the House of Representatives is to the people as a result is a reflection of how far the current federal government has departed from the intentions of its Founders.
Discussion Topic
The size of the House was fixed in 1929 at 435 members because of the physical constraints of the House chamber.
Earlier threads:
FReeper Book Club: The Debate over the Constitution
5 Oct 1787, Centinel #1
6 Oct 1787, James Wilson’s Speech at the State House
8 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #1
9 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #2
18 Oct 1787, Brutus #1
22 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #1
27 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #2
27 Oct 1787, Federalist #1
31 Oct 1787, Federalist #2
3 Nov 1787, Federalist #3
5 Nov 1787, John DeWitt #3
7 Nov 1787, Federalist #4
10 Nov 1787, Federalist #5
14 Nov 1787, Federalist #6
15 Nov 1787, Federalist #7
20 Nov 1787, Federalist #8
21 Nov 1787, Federalist #9
23 Nov 1787, Federalist #10
24 Nov 1787, Federalist #11
27 Nov 1787, Federalist #12
27 Nov 1787, Cato #5
28 Nov 1787, Federalist #13
29 Nov 1787, Brutus #4
30 Nov 1787, Federalist #14
1 Dec 1787, Federalist #15
4 Dec 1787, Federalist #16
5 Dec 1787, Federalist #17
7 Dec 1787, Federalist #18
8 Dec 1787, Federalist #19
11 Dec 1787, Federalist #20
12 Dec 1787, Federalist #21
14 Dec 1787, Federalist #22
18 Dec 1787, Federalist #23
18 Dec 1787, Address of the Pennsylvania Minority
19 Dec 1787, Federalist #24
21 Dec 1787, Federalist #25
22 Dec 1787, Federalist #26
25 Dec 1787, Federalist #27
26 Dec 1787, Federalist #28
27 Dec 1787, Brutus #6
28 Dec 1787, Federalist #30
1 Jan 1788, Federalist #31
3 Jan 1788, Federalist #32
3 Jan 1788, Federalist #33
3 Jan 1788, Cato #7
4 Jan 1788, Federalist #34
5 Jan 1788, Federalist #35
8 Jan 1788, Federalist #36
10 Jan 1788, Federalist #29
11 Jan 1788, Federalist #37
15 Jan 1788, Federalist #38
16 Jan 1788, Federalist #39
18 Jan 1788, Federalist #40
19 Jan 1788, Federalist #41
22 Jan 1788, Federalist #42
23 Jan 1788, Federalist #43
24 Jan 1788, Brutus #10
25 Jan 1788, Federalist #44
26 Jan 1788, Federalist #45
29 Jan 1788, Federalist #46
31 Jan 1788, Brutus #11
1 Feb 1788, Federalist #47
1 Feb 1788, Federalist #48
5 Feb 1788, Federalist #49
5 Feb 1788, Federalist #50
7 Feb 1788, Brutus #12, Part 1
8 Feb 1788, Federalist #51
8 Feb 1788, Federalist #52
12 Feb 1788, Federalist #53
12 Feb 1788, Federalist #54
14 Feb 1788, Brutus #12, Part 2
15 Feb 1788, Federalist #55
But if the ratio were returned to 1 per 30,000, doesn't that mean we'd have a House with 10,000 members? The pensions alone would bankrupt us! (oh, wait, we're already bankrupt...but anyway).
It seems to me that if you accept that 1 per 30000 is a good ratio, or at least close to the range (critics thought it too high!), one must surely admit that 1 per 690,000 is completely ridiculous.
Critics at the time thought the 13 states were too big to form one republic. That republicanism doesn't work over so large an extant. Well, then, what can one say now? It seems to me that our House is a joke compared to what was considered proper republican government at the time.
What gets all the press today is how supposedly deeply divided we are and how entrenched in our views. Granted, it's often an agenda-driven effort as the solution usually seems to be that conservatives need to roll over on their backs and piddle on themselves, and it's especially seen when conservatives are perceived to have an advantage. When liberals are cleaning out the store, such complaints aren't seen so much. But my point being that saying there is an irreconcilable divide is to say we're too diverse to be served by one policy, which either means we ARE too big for one government, or at least that more of the feds power needs to be devolved back to the states.
The truth is that we can't have a House as in touch with the electorate as Madison envisioned, not over this large a population, not at the federal level. What I think it means is that governance is going to have to be shifted down to the state level for that to happen, and unfortunately the momentum over the last 70 years has been very much in the other direction. Personally I'm neither a federalist nor an anti-federalist, I'm a DE-federalist, for nearly the same reasons that Madison and Hamilton were federalists. Making that happen peacefully is going to be the work of generations. I'm not optimistic.
I'd be interested if you could expand on this.
This is my pet beef with the way things are today. The laws are complex, Republican laws and Democrat laws. So complex that regular people can’t understand them. If we can’t understand them then we cannot figure out how they should be. If we cannot figure that out then we cannot figure out who represents our opinion.
Opponents have argued that inasmuch as the House is the body intended to be closest to the people, it need be more numerous than one per 30,000 constituents and elected more often than biannually.
Publius, I suspect their frame of reference is their state governments. Do you know what was a typical citizen to representative ratio in the states? I suspect it was lower. If so then this essay’s whole point would be to get people used to the idea of 30,000:1 based on their current frame of reference.
will in many cases leave little more to be done by the federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them in one general act
What I find interesting is the proposition is that national laws would be mere derivatives of state laws. Today, we know that no to be true. The federal government is NOT merely the wise common opinion of all the states. It has taken on a life of its own. Given Madison’s thoughts about creating a national government, I find this statement to be, at best, inconsistent or, at worse, disingenuous. He knew the national government would be its own animal. Moreover, the category of commerce was explicitly an enumerated power with international scope which must lead to laws not found in any of the thirteen states. So, does the ratio of 30,000:1 make sense in this context? Hmmmm, thinking about it, it does but I find this Federalist to be poorly constructed.
How close the House of Representatives is to the people as a result is a reflection of how far the current federal government has departed from the intentions of its Founders.
Also, I think our Founders did not envision that their system of government could lead to the modern welfare state with it’s singular powerful executive with an army of bureaucrats. The bureaucracy was designed to rule us and make our laws for us, make no mistake. If I’m a shrimper in Louisiana, I depend on a faceless group of self-appointed government experts to keep oil away from my catch.
There are two additional discussion topics that could have been proposed. First how does gerrymandering affect Madison’s arguments and second, the minority-majority law.
I don’t think so. Our representatives are sufficiently aware of who we are and sufficiently drawn from our population with one exception, the over representation of lawyers in congress. The problem is not a lack of awareness. The problem is that their tools for understanding are so limited, polls, and/or they over estimate their ability to lead us in their direction using "words that work". This would not be changed by a different representative ratio.
* Would there be merit in establishing a Virtual Congress on the Internet in which House members would work out of their homes among their constituents and meet via secure server?
I doubt proximity leads to perspicacity.
* Does present teleconferencing technology provide a way for committee meetings and other internal congressional work?
Speaking as someone who works with international teams, I can say with some experience that frequency and regularity leads to a better working relationship than any technology can provide. It’s not the verbal feedback or seeing the representative that counts. It’s the frequency of being able to have a back and forth conversation and clear deliverables for each meeting that makes a difference.
Again, I’d rather have frequent interactions with the representative explaining what he’s done in response to previous discussions. Personally I have not taken the initiative with my representative. I knew his family and see eye to eye with his wife and thought that meant I could pay attention to other things. How wrong I was with Bob Inglis.
Good point. It’s perfectly fine for the states to be deeply divided on domestic issues, if federalism is working. The equal protection clause changed that.
There are difficulties, of course. The existing government mechanisms are likely better to be absorbed by the states than all those bureaucrats - who are people too, I suppose - being cast out into the street. And some of them actually do know their topic, really. I've met a few. More to the point, they'll have to go along with the thing or it will never get off the ground. In preparation certain functions will need to be divested from the Executive, where they're essentially accountable only to the President and in office longer than he, to the Legislative, where at least we can vote their bosses out every two years. The departments of Commerce, Labor, and Education come to mind for starters. As I interpret Articles I and II the Executive has no business in those arenas anyway.
At that point the states step up. Yes, as Madison and Hamilton pointed out, within certain specific areas the multiplicity of state laws will be confusing and detrimental to the image of a single country with a single voice. But only within those areas - outside them, tough. Here I'm thinking of such things as appeal to social reformers eager to seize the center of power in order to universalize their passion of the moment - Prohibition, for one, which had no business ever in the hands of the federal government. Environmental policy, for another. This course will be resisted furiously by those perfectly happy to rule from a high throne, secure in the certainty that theirs is the only correct point of view. That, IMHO, is where the federal system has most been abused.
There are, of course, functions that a federal government really does do better, and defense, import taxation, and the regulation of interstate commerce are a pretty good place to start, just as Madison insisted in this essay. When I say I'm a de-Federalist for the same reasons they were Federalists, that's what I'm trying to express.
This would be silly utopianism on the order of Plato or of Hoppe were it not for the existence of a time-tested plan: the Constitution. It isn't perfect, far from it, but it's the only road I can see that is clear enough to tame the beast and with credibility far in excess of the sort of academic silliness that brought us Marxism. If we want one representative per 30,000 citizens it's going to have to be at the state level because Madison was correct about a House of 10,000 members not working.
There is, of course, the objection that replacing a bloated, unwieldy and arrogant federal government with 50 bloated, unwieldy, and arrogant state governments may not be much of an improvement. To that I'd answer perhaps, but at least they will be more accountable. Perhaps at that point we might consider a similar momentum toward county and municipal government. It is, after all, what both the Federalists and the anti-Federalists were thinking of.
This might be complete nonsense - I haven't really thought it through yet to my own satisfaction. But if we are to reduce the size of federal government and return a level of accountability to the citizen we'd probably better be considering the practical means of doing so. Wishing for it won't get us there, nor will the construction of utopias on a tabula rasa that we'll never see. We have to get from here to there, we can't simply start anew. IMHO, of course.
Now I'll open another beer and really tell you what I think... ;-)
IMHO we should work on returning the federal government to the form set up by our founders by repealing the 16th and 17th amendments and then finding way(s) to address the problem with direct representation you bring up here.
As for taxation, I think we should eliminate the national government's power of direct taxation altogether. The requisition system could have worked if they'd improved it, rather than ditching it in favor of a consolidated mega-republic.
The national government should requisition money from the states. They should only have the power of direct taxation when a state fails to fulfill its obligation. An enforced requisition system would truly give power back to the states.
I STRONGLY disagree with you on the 17th amendment but we have been all over that before so I don’t suppose a rehash is necessary here.
You'll never have limited government under the Constitution so long as Article 3 remains as it is, and so long as you have implied powers, via "necessary and proper", "general welfare", etc.
We need a different system of Constitutional review, and we need expressly delegated powers only. I think another thing that would be nice would be an official glossary, as part of the Constitution. Get in front of the problem. Instead of waiting for the SCOTUS to tell us what certain words and phrases mean, create a glossary of terms that is lengthy and iron-clad. Interpretive statements, if you will.
I grant that at some point, there has to be a final appeal on the meaning of the Constitution. I just think what we have is a proven failure. I'm not sure what a better system would be, but if we don't find one, we're screwed.
Brutus said just leave it to the Legislature, and let the voters deal with them. Not perfect. But would that be worse than what we have? Would the tyranny of the majority be worse than the tyranny of unelected, unnacountable judges? Not sure.
Your disagreement is duly noted. I second the motion to table the argument :-)
How about an amendment that repeals the 17th, AND gives each state legislature the power to a) set the salary of their own senators and b) recall their senators at any time. This would address my main issues with the so-called federalism of the Senate. If they don’t set their pay, and if they don’t have authority over the senators’ job, then what power do they have? They are merely administrative. Give the states the power to set their pay, and to recall them, and THEN you’ll have something resembling federalism.
I would have no problem with that at all but, as I recall, state legislatures HAD the power to recall their senators at any time prior to the advent of the 17th.
The Articles of Confederation specifically provided for recall.
For the most convenient management of the general interests of the united States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.
The subject was debated in Philly; recall was proposed and defeated. The anti-federalists made clear that their understanding of the Constitution was that it prevented recall.
It appears the question re: Sen. Menendez may reach the SCOTUS. My view is that recall is unconstitutional. It was debated and rejected at the Philly convention, whereas it was clearly stated in the Articles of Confederation.
My basic point is that unless you have the ability to fire someone, and set their pay, you have no authority over them. You're a middle manager with some responsibility, but no authority. That is the condition of the states, with or without the 17th.
Oh damn, we were gonna table this :-)
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