Posted on 07/25/2011 10:12:35 AM PDT by EnjoyingLife
The far one is an F-15.
Perhaps I am biased towards the lowly infantryman?
I get goosebumps when I see a young man (or woman) on the ground with everything they need on thier backs, a gritty determination on their faces and the ability to take and hold ground, knowing they fight for one another as a primary motivation.
I see the pilot and aircrew the same way. They simply wear a different rucksack-one that propels them at Mach 2.5 and 80,000 feet if need be. Still is the man over the machine.
While airpower is certainly a necessity for overcoming enemy centers of gravity, along with artillery, armor, etc it still remains that the “dog-faced” Soldier/Marine is the one who owns the ground (or not).
Forgive my decided prejudice towards the lowly grunt. I know the expereince well; that said, I always smile when I see a military aircraft (attack, transport or lift) overhead-made my life much easier-got me there & back, took me to the doc when I was bleeding, pounded the enemy when I could not overcome them with fire and maneuver and engaged targets well beyond my weapons ability-at my direction.
God Bless all our servicemen*
* denotes both sexes, according to common rules of grammar and usage. My daughter is proud to be an “Airman”.
No wonder. You’re a pilot. Explains everything.
Stalking is creepy and immature. I suggest you stop.
The article states:
Airpower may now, in some situations and under certain circumstances, be the primary fire with ground forces serving as supporting fire. This is a radical departure from traditional thought, but a departure which is long overdue. Airpower was first viewed as a primary fire by an Italian airpower theorist, Giulio Douhet. Starting in 1917, Douhet envisioned massed air attacks that would destroy an army and terrorize a nation into submission. With today's technology and weaponry, destroying an enemy with airpower is now a reality, and as far as terrorizing a nation, if not for the Law of Armed Conflict rightfully prohibiting indiscriminate attacks on civilians, this objective could be easily met.
Essentially, Douhet suggested that airpower could be a primary fire that would be key to a successful war effort. It took nearly seventy years before he was proved correct by the role airpower played in Gulf War I. In Gulf War I, airpower was the predominant force that ensured a quick and decisive victory. While airpower was not the sole reason for our
success, it was the first time in history that airpower truly functioned as it's own independent maneuver force, as a primary fire, with ground-based fires performing a supporting role. Airpower dominated the battlefield and ensured the ground campaign was virtually unopposed in any organized fashion. While it may be argued that airpower did not win Gulf War I, it certainly would have made things a lot more difficult if it had not performed well its strategic and operational mission.
Generally speaking, old school military leaders are in a box when it comes to thinking about airpower. For those of the old school, the success of airpower is measured by how many soldiers, tanks, trucks and artillery pieces were destroyed, which misses the point of airpower altogether. It is the effect we are looking for, not the body count. Indeed, why would killing thousands of enemy soldiers be a measure of success in war? Especially if we can remove a few select personnel and achieve the desired effect. This applies to the targeting of enemy armored assets as well. Why would we expend massive resources to destroy thousands of tanks if we can achieve the same effect by dropping a few bridges here and there, thereby isolating an armored division and removing it from the fight.
The effect of strategic targeting in air campaign planning can be best seen by contrasting two major Vietnam War air campaigns. In the Vietnam War, airpower was ineffective when limited to blowing up shrubbery and suspected truck parks (Operation Rolling Thunder). Contrast this with the stunning effect airpower had when it was employed against North Vietnam's strategic targets, such as senior military leadership, command and control nodes, infrastructure, key manufacturing, lines of communication and logistics depots (Operations Linebacker I, II). Therefore, we can look towards the Vietnam experience as early proof that airpower, when properly applied, can achieve exceptional success on its own.
For many military planners and strategic thinkers, this lesson was clear. Use airpower correctly and victory may be achieved quickly, efficiently and with minimal damage and reduced loss of life for both sides. Indeed, the Gulf War I air campaign planners used the lessons of Vietnam to help produce an historic air campaign plan that for the first time ever, resulted in a war where airpower was the primary fire and landpower played a supporting role. This air campaign plan was called “Instant Thunder,” a direct reference to the failed tactical air campaign of Vietnam, “Rolling Thunder.” Unfortunately, some of the old school ignored the strategic airpower lessons of Vietnam and Gulf War I.
During the air campaign in Kosovo, Gen Clark, the combatant commander, gave his staff a specific number of targets to hit, but to what end? What was the desired effect? What was the strategic aim envisioned? Gen Clark didn't want to be bothered, all he cared about was the number of targets on the hit-list, not the effect. If he was concerned about the effect, he was old school in that he expected “body counts” to be a measure of the effectiveness of airpower. By doing this, he was ignoring what makes airpower truly effective.
By stating his desire for a specific number of targets, Gen Clark demonstrated his ignorance about what makes airpower powerful, ignored the lessons of history, and abandoned his role in translating political objectives into strategic guidance. His responsibility as the combatant commander was to provide strategic guidance to the component commanders, and then let the component commanders devise a plan to achieve his strategic aims. This is called “strategy-to-task-to-target.” Strategy-to-task-to-target is a planning concept that ensures only essential targets are hit. Each target nominated must be able to trace its lineage to a specific task, and that task must support achievement of a strategic aim. Therefore, when General Clark asked for an arbitrary number of targets to destroy, he invalidated the whole concept of strategy-to-task-to-target. He got his target list, but it was a waste of men, material and effort. Basically, it was only through brute force and the threat of ground invasion that we achieved victory in Kosovo. It was ugly, inefficient, and it proved General Clark was not a visionary. He was a member of ‘the old school.’
What does all this discussion about strategic aims really mean? Simply stated, it means that with insightful intelligence, precise targeting, and the ability of airpower to accurately deliver all sorts of weapons effects, we now have a new weapon in our quiver. Now when the time comes to shoot, we have the airpower arrow from which to choose. It is just as lethal, if not more so in some cases, than any other military instrument. Selecting which weapon to use is like deciding on which golf club to use. One doesn't use a putter for driving, just as one wouldn't use a horse for strategic strikes well behind enemy lines. With the impressive ability of airpower, combined with exceptional intelligence and targeting, we now have a full golf bag. We can now break par.
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