Airbus 330 center console Are not the instrument cluster in the top right Backup analog instruments ????
>>...recommending mandatory training for all pilots to help them fly planes manually...<<
If ever I had a “WTF” moment, this would be it.
As an ex instructor/fighter type, I find it unbelievable that ANY pilot would get themselves into this situation.
When airspeed indicator malfunctions are suspected, one always reverts to pitch and power control.
The French produce as quality a pilot as anyone - so what went wrong here?
Pilots are trained to ignore their senses and to pay attention to their instruments and what happened here was that the instruments FAILED. Air France, Airbus, and the French government are trying to pass this off as pilot error instead of dealing with the fact that their airplanes are not safe and that their instruments on those planes cannot be trusted.
HF calls it extreme pilot error back in May based on preliminary data!
HF
“were insufficiently trained in flying manually”
So whose fault is that?
Not the pilots.
Ping to something that will make you look twice, maybe even three times.
Pilot error my ass. Flying by wire and the closest thing to reality is bum instrument readings. Design flaw all the way. By the time it was decided to disregard instruments and fly by the seat of their pants by nosing the plane down to gain airspeed and foil over the wings again they were to low and into the drink they went.
Captain took a long enough time to wake from his nap and make his way back to the cabin, what’s up with that?
Were the names of the pilots ever published? This reads like catastrophic pilot error and only eclipsed by deliberate sabotage.
The Airbus reflects the Euro-mentality of elite central planning. In this case, the central planner is embodied in the flight control computers, where the pilot doesn’t manipulate flight controls directly. Instead, his control inputs are mere suggestions to the computer which exercises veto power over any control input that it considers will cause it to violate the design envelope.
Tellingly, when the computer is in charge, that condition is called “normal law”. When the pilots take the extraordinary steps to override the computer’s nanny, that is called “alternate law.” I kid you not.
Do not these names reflect a certain world view and mindset?
“...never informed the passengers that anything was wrong before they plunged into the sea ...”
Oh yeah that would be such help , this is your captain speaking we are all panicing here but enjoy the peanuts
Reading through the article, and the Airbus history, my bet is that the pilots were fighting the Airbus computer. And the Airbus did not even whisper, “what are you doing Dave?”
Airbus, contrary to popular belief, is not a bad airframe. That -330 and -340 series are so automatic with back up and independent instruments that it is hard to fathom what happened here. At the same time French pilots are as good as any around. I don’t know what to think..
Airbus 330 center console Are not the instrument cluster in the top right Backup analog instruments ????
Sounds like equipment malfunction. However, not being a pilot I still have to ask were there no visual cues? Did the storm block the flight crew from seeing the plane was falling?
And they were flying 200 passengers trans-Atlantic?
That's nuts!
Was there no sensation of ‘falling’ during those 4+ minutes? Even a fast controlled descent feels a bit like falling and also the ears ‘pop.’
Coming up through the ranks as I have you HAVE to manually learn hands on control. Did these so-called pilots learn in a full motion simulator that was all electronic and then set loose on the public? Air France should be sued back to the Wright brothers. Didn’t recognize a stall???? Good Grief! A Turkish airline pilot pulled the same stunt years ago leaving some island in the Caribbean. A Boeing 757 - rammed the power levers full on and still was going down.
I would like to offer my comments and perspective with regard to the Air France Flight 447 accident. I have been a A-330 captain since 2003 and have over 4500 hours in the aircraft. While many A-320 pilots undoubtedly have more series time, I believe this probably makes me one of the most experienced A330 pilots in the world.
When asked how I like the aircraft, I tell people that there is likely no easier airplane to take over an ocean, and that the systems design and presentation is superb. That said, the automation is more complex and less intuitive than necessary, and the pilot-aircraft interface is unlike that of a conventional aircraft. Most important with regard to this accident is the fly-by-wire sidestick control. The sidestick itself has a very limited range of motion, making inadvertent over-control very easy. Of even greater significance, the stick itself provides no "feel" feedback to the pilot. That is, unlike a conventional aircraft, the pilot does not get a sense through pressure of how much input is being sent to the control surfaces. The most important advice I give to pilots new to the Airbus is to treat the aircraft not as an airplane, but as a video game. If you wait for the sidestick to tell you what you are doing, you will never get an answer.
Taking into consideration that Air France 447 was at FL 350 (where the safe speed envelope is relatively narrow), that they were in the weather at night with no visible horizon, and that they were likely experiencing at least moderate turbulence, it does not surprise me in the least that the pilots lost control of the aircraft shortly after the autopilot and autothrust disconnected.
Let's keep in mind that these are not ideal conditions for maintaining controlled flight manually, especially when faced with a sudden onslaught of warning messages, loss of autofllght, confusing airspeed indications, and reversion to "alternate law" flight control, in which certain flight envelope protections are lost.
A very bad Airbus design feature is thrust levers that do not move while in autothrust. They are instead set in a detent which would equal climb trust in manual mode. If the pilots did not reset the thrust levers to equal the last cruise power setting, they likely eventually ended up in climb power, making it difficult to reset the proper cruise power setting and adding to what was likely already a great deal of confusion.
But the real problem probably occurred immediately after the pilot flying grabbed the sidestick and took over manually. Unfortunately, airline pilots rarely practice hand-flying at high altitude, and almost never do so without autothrust engaged. As a result, we forget that the aircraft is very sensitive to control inputs at high altitude, and overcontrol is the usual result. Because the Airbus sidestick provides no feedback "feel" to the pilot, this problem is dramatically compounded in this aircraft.
I believe the Air France pilot grabbed the sidestick, made an immediate input (because as pilots, that's what we tend to do), and quickly became quite confused as to what the aircraft was truly doing. This confusion likely was exacerbated by fixating on airspeed indications that made no sense while trying to find a power setting with no airspeed guidance.
When transitioning from autopilot to manual control at altitude in the Airbus, the most important thing to do at first is nothing. Don't move a thing, and then when you do, gently take hold of the sidestick and make very small inputs, concentrating on the flight director (which, in altitude hold, should still have been providing good guidance). Of course, this is much easier said than done with bells and whistles going off all over the place, moderate turbulence and a bunch of thunderstorms in the area. As I said before, treat it like a video game.
So why did the Air France pilot find himself at the limits of sidestick travel, and then just stay there, maintaining a control input that simply could not logically be correct? When things go really bad and we are under intense pressure, it is human nature to revert to what we know from previous experience. Remember, the Airbus flies like no other aircraft in that the sidestick provides no feedback to the pilot. It is a video game, not an airplane.
I believe the Air France pilot unintentionally fell back on all of his previous flying experience, in which aircraft controls "talked" to him when he moved them. Distracted by many confusing inputs, he instinctively expected to be able to control the aircraft by "feel" while dividing his attention to address other matters. I've seen it happen in the simulator, and in an Airbus this is a sure way to lose control of the aircraft and is possibly the most dangerous aspect of Airbus design philosophy.
One last note: Airbus pilots often claim that the aircraft "can not be stalled." When the flight controls are in "normal law" this is a reasonably true statement. However, in "alternate law," as was the case here, stall protection can be lost. If we ever practiced this in the simulator, I don't remember it.
Lest anyone think I am blaming the Air France pilots for this accident, let me be clear. Despite all of my experience in the aircraft, I am not the least bit certain that I would have been able to maintain control under the same circumstances. I do feel certain that were you to spring this scenario on pilots in a simulator without warning less than half of them would have a successful outcome. Safely flying the 320, 330 and 340-series Airbus requires something of a non-pilot mindset.