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“Susan Rice involvement in 1998 and today. All the same people. This time the lies are to protect Obama.

“Pickering is a friend of Susan Rice and Biden said he was investigating the security problems at Benghazi.

“Joe Biden indicated that Thomas Pickering was investigating Benghazi. Pickering is a FRIEND OF Ambassador Rice http://is.gd/pepRAv

“Sound familiar? Berger’s reply: “We’ll evaluate this after the election.” Election day came and went. http://is.gd/xQVJDd

“Ambassador Rice; Susan Rice and her cronies, who were hell-bent on destroying the Sudan”:

April 29, 2003 8:45 A.M.
The Clinton Intel Record
Deeper failures revealed.

By Mansoor Ijaz

(Excerpted)

The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization to Saddam Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration’s case that dismantling Iraq’s Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism’s dynamic duo. But closing that case may reopen a Pandora’s box for ex-Clinton administration officials who still believe their policy prescriptions protected U.S. national interests against the growing threat of terrorism during the past decade.

The London Telegraph’s weekend revelations raise deeply disturbing questions about the extent and magnitude to which President Clinton, his national-security adviser Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger, and senior terrorism and State Department officials —

including Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa, Susan Rice — politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in making critical national-security decisions,

and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the months leading up to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

Analysis of documents found in the rubble of Iraq’s intelligence headquarters show that contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi military and intelligence officials sought out al Qaeda leaders, not the other way around, and ultimately met with bin Laden on at least two occasions. They also show that channels of communication between al Qaeda and Iraq were created much earlier and were wider ranging in scope than previously thought.

The timing of the meetings sheds important new light on how grave the Clinton administration’s intelligence failures may have been.

On February 19, 1998, about six months prior to the attacks in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, Iraqi intelligence officials set in motion a plan to bring a senior and trusted bin Laden aide to Baghdad from Khartoum. One of the key Mukhabarat intelligence documents shows that a recommendation was made for “…the deputy director general to bring the [bin Laden] envoy to Iraq because we may find in this envoy a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden.” The meetings took place in March 1998.

[snip]

OCTOBER 27, 1996. In a confidential memorandum ... to Sandy Berger to follow up on the August 1996 meeting he and Susan Rice (then a National Security Council official) had called me to the White House for to discuss U.S.-Sudan relations, I recounted events of my first meeting with the new Sudanese intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Gutbi al-Mahdi, just days earlier — a meeting whose consequence even I did not fully grasp at the time:

[snip]

OCTOBER 1, 1997. As the reengagement policy was taking shape, Rice, the incoming Assistant Secretary for East Africa, informally confronted the same foreign-service officers who had recommended returning diplomats to Sudan to Albright and vowed that the new policy directive would not stand. On October 1, State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin sheepishly announced an abrupt reversal of the September 28 Albright decision. Rice was confirmed by the Senate on October 9, 1997. To this day, neither Berger nor Albright nor Rice have explained to the American people why a deliberative decision of the U.S. government, made through interagency review, was overturned in such a cavalier fashion by a narrow clique of Clinton advisers when Sudan’s April offer to cooperate on terrorism issues had been made unconditionally.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1997 and DECEMBER 5, 1997. On the very day Rice was delivering testimony for her Senate confirmation, Sudan’s ambassador to the U.S., Mahdi Ibrahim, met with David Williams, special agent in charge of the FBI’s Middle East and North Africa Department.

[snip]

Future circumstances was code, as I found out later from career officials at State involved in the discussions at the time, for a point at which the politicizing that had come to characterize Clinton administration terrorism policies would end.

Blockages created by State’s East Africa department under Rice, and by Berger at the National Security Council, remained as both vehemently argued against allowing FBI delegations to visit Khartoum under any circumstances.

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed six weeks later. Cruise-missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan, based on faulty and inaccurate intelligence, followed and ignited the fires burning inside radical Islam’s criminal core.

As we now know, planning for the September 11 attacks on America began soon thereafter.