Of course Jeff's rebuttal is the child's argument "You Do it too!" (Tu Quoque.)We've been over this before, too.
My reply is NOT "You do it too." My reply is: You are obviously guilty of the thing you accuse me of, and I am obviously not guilty of it.
The case was not even really about citizenship, let alone "natural born" citizenship, or Presidential eligibility.
And Bayard's book was?
That section of his book sure as hell was.
And anyone can see that that is the case.
Here. Here's that section. Only an idiot or a less-than-honest person with a real axe to grind would ever even attempt to claim that that section of Bayard's exposition of our Constitution was about anything other than Presidential eligibility.
Here he goes again... John Marshall commenting on a book? "Big F***ing Deal!" John Marshall at trial commenting on citizenship? "Irrelevant!"
Marshall's quoting of Vattel in The Venus is not irrelevant because it was in a court case. It's irrelevant because it doesn't talk about natural born citizenship or Presidential eligibility. AT ALL.
The quote was not produced for the purpose of talking about natural born citizenship.
The quote was not produced for the purpose of making any point whatsoever about Presidential eligibility.
Marshall's quote of Vattel is an ACCURATE translation, which doesn't use the phrase "natural born citizens."
That phrase was NEVER used in a translation of Vattel until after the Constitution was written.
There is NO HISTORICAL REFERENCE WHATSOEVER to link that passage to the Framers' use of "natural born citizen" in the Constitution.
And the case you refer to made NO REFERENCE AT ALL to either natural born citizenship, or to Presidential eligibility.
All of that is the very DEFINITION of "irrelevant."
Marshall quoting Vattel's definition of citizenship is NOT quoting Vattel to define citizenship? You really are a deluded crank.
No, you're the deluded crank.
As shown by your own quote, Marshall wasn't quoting Vattel for the purpose of defining citizenship. He wasn't placing any particular mark of approval on Vattel's ideas about domestic citizenship.
He was trying to see what Vattel, as a writer on INTERNATIONAL LAW (the Law of Nations) had to say about how much we respect the property of one of our own citizens residing permanently in another country as being the property of one of our citizens, and how much we regard that person as being a participant in that other society with which we were at war.
That's it.
There's no relevance to the definition of citizenship here. That's not what Marshall was ever talking about.
And again, even if Marshall WERE defining domestic citizenship (which he isn't), THE WORDS "NATURAL BORN" NEVER EVEN APPEAR.
So there is no "definition" of "natural born citizenship" here at all.
And you don't have to be a genius to see that. You only have to be able to rad.
Sure Jeff. Sure. You have just given me a club with which to beat you over the head. You will be seeing your own words coming back to haunt you quite a lot.
That's fine by me. Because the more you go on about this, the stupider you look.
It is not necessary that a man should be born in this country, to be a “natural born citizen. It is only requisite he should be a citizen by birth, and that is the case with all the children of citizens who have ever resided in this country, though born in a foreign country. The author is referring to the exception to the NBC requirement regarding those who were living here when the country was founded.
Initially, until the children who were born of citizens had reached 35 yo, there were no Natural Born Citizens, by definition. How could there be? This passage explains that exception.
It essentially restates the idea that being born in country to citizens is what makes you a NBC, just like the exception does. Otherwise, why would it be necessary?
In order to be "born a citizen" in a foreign country, one must claim citizenship through one's parents, and Specifically the father. Bayard states that place of birth is irrelevant to the issue, because foreign birth is a defacto EXCLUSION of native birth. The only legal principle which recognizes citizenship through birth in a foreign land is Jus Sanguinus, yet for some reason, you continue to cite BAYARD as an "authority" on your side. But you are dishonest, and a fool, and we should expect nothing better of you.
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Marshall's quoting of Vattel in The Venus is not irrelevant because it was in a court case. It's irrelevant because it doesn't talk about natural born citizenship or Presidential eligibility.
John Marshall:
"Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says"
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens."
Sure Jeff, Sure.
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Jeff:He wasn't placing any particular mark of approval on Vattel's ideas about domestic citizenship.
John Marshall:
"Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says"
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens."
Jeff:As shown by your own quote, Marshall wasn't quoting Vattel for the purpose of defining citizenship.
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Once again, the best thing I can do to convince people you are a fool is to just let you keep talking.
As shown by your own quote, Marshall wasn't quoting Vattel for the purpose of defining citizenship. He wasn't placing any particular mark of approval on Vattel's ideas about domestic citizenship. You are correct.
He was trying to see what Vattel, as a writer on INTERNATIONAL LAW (the Law of Nations) had to say about how much we respect the property of one of our own citizens residing permanently in another country as being the property of one of our citizens, and how much we regard that person as being a participant in that other society with which we were at war.
Yes, though to be a bit more precise, en route to answering that question Marshall frames a key issue as the domicile of the person. It's in this context that the quote of Vattel is placed:
I entirely concur in so much of the opinion delivered in this case as attaches a hostile character to the property of an American citizen continuing, after the declaration of war, to reside and trade in the country of the enemy, and I subscribe implicitly to the reasoning urged in its support. But from so much of that opinion as subjects to confiscation the property of a citizen shipped before a knowledge of the war, and which disallows the defense founded on an intention to change his domicile and to return to the United States, manifested in a sufficient manner, and within a reasonable time after knowledge of the war, although it be subsequent to the capture, I feel myself compelled to dissent.
So citizenship was not at issue; the person was accepted as being a citizen without discussion. What was at issue was domicile, because the point of international law hinged on that. One has to read the quote in question in view of the issue in the case:
The whole system of decisions applicable to this subject rests on the law of nations as its base. It is therefore of some importance to inquire how far the writers on that law consider the subjects of one power residing within the territory of another, as retaining their original character or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside. Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights." "The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound by their residence to the society, they are subject to the laws of the state while they reside there, and they are obliged to defend it because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the laws or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages."
"The domicile is the habitation fixed in any place with an intention of always staying there. A man does not, then, establish his domicile in any place unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. However, this declaration is no reason why, if he afterwards changes his mind, he may not remove his domicile elsewhere. In this sense, he who stops, even for a long time, in a place for the management of his affairs has only a simple habitation there, but has no domicile."
A domicile, then, in the sense in which this term is used by Vattel, requires not only actual residence in a foreign country, but "an intention of always staying there." Actual residence without this intention amounts to no more than "simple habitation."
Marshall tells us what part of Vattel is significant for him by discussing it after the quote ("A domicile then . . .") Proponents of the "two citizen parent" theory miss this point, being either unfamiliar on how to properly read a case or else being so mesmerized at seeing the words "indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens" they stop reading further.
There's no relevance to the definition of citizenship here. That's not what Marshall was ever talking about.
Again, correct. Dissenting opinions are, by definition, obiter dicta, and even within Marshall's dissent the part from Vattel about "citizen parents" isn't even pertinent to the dissent's point, so it is in that sense doubly irrelevant. That cases like Wong Kim Ark which address the citizenship issue disregard Marshall's dissent in The Venus is easily understood.
The same mistake is made by the Vattel proponents when they appeal to Minor v. Happersett. That case did not present the question of the birth status of a person born in the U.S. to an alien parent(s), so that opinion is irrelevant in any case where that question is actually presented.