Ill-fated UPS jet was on autopilot seconds before crash

Yahoo ^ | 08/17/13 | Verma Gates

[Yosemitest]

We're combining two different issues that are connected.

How do you "PROVE" the weather was different than the "official recorded weather by a brainless machine" ?

Do you think a government investigator is going to verify that the government made a "BAD DECISION" to replace trained weathermen with an immobile machine?

Then you have to ask,

"Was the weather not being what the official record says it was, a factor in the crash of United Parcel Service Flight 1354 ? "

I say, "Of course it was a factor !"

The pilot was expecting 14-Aug 04:04AM VFR Calm Broken 7,500 10.
When UPS 1354 went below 7,500 feet MSL, he wasn't expecting to see stars above, but was only expecting to see lights below within 10 miles of the airport.
He/She was in an Airbus 300 with some of the latest technology available in its instrument panel.
Did he/she even think to note the Weather Minimums on the LOC RWY 18 Approach Plate?
Weather Minimums for the Localizer Runway 18 Approach are as follows:
Category A or B pilots/aircraft:
1,380 foot ceiling or above, and at least 1 Mile visibility

When using IMTOY Fix Mimimums
1,200 foot ceiling or above, and at least 1 mile visibility

Category C or D pilots/aircraft:
1,380 foot ceiling or above, and at least 2 Mile visibility

When using IMTOY Fix Mimimums
1,200 foot ceiling or above, and at least 1-5/8 mile visibility

FlightAware said visibility was about 6 miles amid mist and a layer of broken clouds at 700 feet above the ground.
Weather Minimums for the Localizer Runway 18 Approach are a greater requirement (ABOVE) than the CEILING Broken Clouds at 700 feet.
That's a BIG RED FLAG!

Do you think a government appointed investigator will give any weight to what "FlightAware" reported?
How much other traffic do you think there was, landing at BHM Airport between midnight and the time that UPS 1354 crashed, that would offer a PIREP that differed from the official report?

Do you think the pilots in UPS 1354 even knew about those Runway Restrictions to RWY 18 and RWY 36, and knew to REVERSE the readings of those restrictions to get the full picture?
If you go back to comment #111 of another thread, under RUNWAY 36 Obstructions: you'll read
" 76 ft. trees, 1736 ft. from runway, 392 ft. left of centerline, 20:1 slope to clear "
Those trees 76 foot above the end of the runway would be 1,736 feet short of the landing threshold of Runway 18, at 392 feet right of centerline, and it takes a 20 to 1 slope to clear them (be 500 foot above them).
Those are probably the trees United Parcel Service Flight 1354 clipped during his approach to Runway 18.

Also on comment #111 of another thread RUNWAY 18 Obstructions: you'll read
"16 ft. gnd, 615 ft. from runway, 26:1 slope to clear"
That's probably the hill or ground obstruction 16 ft high, 615 feet short of landing threshold, and it requires a STEEPER 26 to 1 ratio descent to clear.

NO! You really SHOULD NOT SEPARATE the very dangerous AWOS equipment from the crash of UPS 1354.
They are very connected as a "CONTRIBUTING FACTOR" !

The air traffic controller on duty said
" "he saw what appeared to be a bright spark flash, which he equated to what it would look like if a power line broke,"

The air traffic controller said the plane's landing lights disappeared and there was a bright orange flash, followed by a red glow. "

What are the possibilities that "the bright spark flash" the controller on duty saw, was actually a lightening strike, obstructed by the very low cloud base, striking either the ground, or striking through UPS 1354 to the ground?
Wouldn't that reek havoc with the electrical systems of the AirBus 300?

Yes, it would, and the inferior AWOS is to blame
for the pilots of UPS 1354 not even expecting or preparing for the possibilities of extremely dangerous weather
such as micro-burst in the area, thunderstorms, and low visibility and low ceilings.
Rip out the AWOS from every facility that has it, and replace it with certified weathermen!

But it does NOT excuse the incompetence of the pilots for not being aware of the runway environment.
The pilots ARE RESPONSIBLE!
But the FAA's crappy equipment contributed to the death of those pilots!
But WHY, so some politician could get kick-backs for the AWOS Compnaies for the sell of that inferior equipment?

Source:
The profile is off a little to the west and to the south, because the approach was to Runwy 18 and not the VOR Navaid.

[xone]

Now you are mixing up causal and contributing factors. The wx wasn’t a causal factor a shitty wx reporting system isn’t a causal factor poor tower/ATC instructions that don’t result in a midair colission during IMC aren’t causal factors. Apparent poor crew coordination and ineptitude are, absent new developments. A pilot crashing a functional plane is to blame, always.

[Yosemitest]

Sorry for the double post.
I asked for comment #78 to be removed due to typos, and replaced it with comment #81.
I'll consider this comment to answer comment #81.

"Never said it wasn't contributing, it isn't a causal factor.
As for whether or not the pilots read and intepreted their approach plates correctly
we do know
they didn't go around.
Lightning might be a causal factor,
that is why there are mishap investigations.
The fact that the pilot got a 7500' cig report, and still was IMC well below that,
tells me where the screwup was.
Would better wx reports be better,
of course,
but the failure for this mishap belongs in the cockpit
with the info available."

If it was up to you,

would YOU recommend the REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT of AWOS ?

[xone]

When I’m IMC I want weather from someone observing on the ground that is at my intended point of landing. I have flown around in Japan and Korea, bad places to be IMC. It isn’t that I don’t trust them, I don’t, but the language barrier is sometimes too much for the terminal phase of the flight. The communication piece interferes with the navigation and aviation resposiblity. I know this however, if I was expecting VMC below an overcast and still hadn’t got it at the published mins I’d be going around or diverting.

[Yosemitest]

I really wasn't trying to "mix CASUAL and CONTRIBUTING Factors".
As a matter of fact, I don't recall hearing the term "CASUAL FACTOR" before,

but I've been retired from air traffic control since 2005, and with age comes forgetfulness.

But my primary concern is for the safety of pilots, passengers, and people on the ground.

"Apparent poor crew coordination and ineptitude are, absent new developments [, to blame ].
A pilot crashing a functional plane is to blame,
always."

I don't disagree with you, there.
But how much is due to "crew rest" and "pilot fatigue" ?
After all, according to NTSB reports,

"Their flight duty began Tuesday evening at 9:30 p.m. in Rockford, Ill.
The pair then flew to Peoria, Ill., Louisville, Ky., then headed for Birmingham."

Since UPS 1354 crashed just after (04:47AM BHM time) 05:47AM Eastern Daylight Savings Time,

he/she had been on duty for a little over 8 hours 17 minutes,
and were in the wee hours of the morning,
when a human beings' body is really fighting the "natural desire and NEED to sleep" ?

[xone]

If it was up to you, would YOU recommend the REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT of AWOS ?

Sorry I missed this. If I was still investigating I would probably be more up to speed with this system and have seen a developed pattern. My preference is for human metro guys so I can kill them if they screw me. I fail to see the sense in automating a process in a critical area like this when there are obvious qualified humans. I don't think it makes fiscal sense to replace a metro guy with a very expensive system that still needs a human to calibrate and fix it. Where's the savings?

[xone]

But how much is due to "crew rest" and "pilot fatigue" ?

Like I said why they were screwed up might be interesting. I come from a background when these 'factors' first arose. I always thought they were a little BS. A good pilot wouldn't neglect rest, and shouldn't be flying for pay if he does.

[Yosemitest]

Before I retired, AWOS was to cut manning cost of Weather Personnel,
and to be added to the Air Traffic Controllers' "ADDITIONAL DUTIES" at a lower priority than "Air Traffic Control Responsibilities".
That means that when manning gets short, or things get busy ... or both, ... AWOS works by itself without override and without supervision.
Most controllers hated it at the time, as if they didn't already have enough to do.
Air Traffic Controllers make more decisions in 6 seconds, than a lawyer makes in 6 months, and if the controller gets it wrong, then the lawyers are coming after him!

They say that the "savings" will come in the long run, when there are less cost for retirement expenses.
But HOW MANY WILL DIE to pay for that so-called "savings" ?

[Yosemitest]

So, if you die, because your copilot “isn’t good”, you’re BOTH ... bad pilots ???

[Yosemitest]

". I have flown around in Japan and Korea, bad places to be IMC.
It isn’t that I don’t trust them, I don’t,
but the language barrier is sometimes too much for the terminal phase of the flight.
The communication piece interferes with the navigation and aviation responsibility."

I know very well, with 5 tours in South Korea, both Osan AB and Kunsan AB.
If you've got the time read comment #164 of another thread, particularly "The Kim-Hae Massacre".
But without reading comment #163 of that thread, or ALL OF comment #164 of that thread, it won't make much sense.

[xone]

So, if you die, because your copilot “isn’t good”,

No, if my copilot is a bad one, I'll either have him trained up or he won't fly. If I die it will be because I was a bad pilot that day. If you are going to fly, you have to be your best. If'n some day you aren't that is the day to stay on the ground. If you're going up, do it the right way.

[Yosemitest]

I agree with your logic on that.