Posted on 08/19/2017 8:37:40 AM PDT by Oatka
The commanding officer, executive officer and command master chief took the hit. Pretty appropriate considering the incompetence. I wonder what happened to the OOD that was in charge on the bridge.
I suspect that the Wan Hai was the focus on the bridge of the Fitzgerald at the time and that the Crystal went undetected, or was possibly even confused with the Wan Hai, resulting in the collision.
I wonder if the bridge was "under-manned" at the time? Or didn't have enough competent staff on duty at the time?
I guess Captain Obvious is alive and well and serving in the JAG Corps
In the press release where the three officers are relieved, the Navy is not taking blame.
“””The Navy formally attributed blame to both vessels. “The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision,” Seventh Fleet said.”””
“”Why was the Fitz darkened?”””
In the case of the USS Fitzgerald it appears the officers and crew totally failed. And it also appears the Navy brass is covering up the negligence.
Its hard to know whether the captain is to blame as an outsider looking in. I know from my brother who is the second and a ships pilot in the merchant marine. that both the military and civilian navies of the world have as policy that when there is a collision or major incident with a ship the captain is removed permanently from command of a ship never to command again. there is no such thing as a second chance.
The reason being that the ships in question are worth 10 million and up. both governments and private owners feel even if the captain was sleeping in his bunk and the second was in charge during the incident the captain has failed in the training of the crew. my brother told me that every captain he has worked for (as second he has had 3 captains)he has been instructed to make sure that he wakes the captain up if they are asleep when something not in the norm of operating the ship comes up.
My brother also told me usually when there is an accident it is the second or one of the others fault because the captain hardly ever is piloting the ship because he is to busy with the paperwork. My brother has had several opportunities to become a captain but he does not want to become a paper shuffler he loves being the ships pilot.
Seventh Fleet Announces USS Fitzgerald Accountability Determinations
The report said they had their navigation lights on. Darkened meant they had no other deck lights on. In certain circumstances deck lights will make it more difficult to see other traffic. I don’t know why they would run without AIS on for a peacetime run.
“”In certain circumstances deck lights will make it more difficult to see other traffic.””
As reported on FR:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3578300/posts
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3578326/posts
Yes...that was a different ship, the Edmund Fitzgerald.
The legend lives on from the Chippewa on down
of the big lake they called “Gitche Gumee.”
The lake, it is said, never gives up her dead
when the skies of November turn gloomy.
With a load of iron ore twenty-six thousand tons more
than the Edmund Fitzgerald weighed empty,
that good ship and true was a bone to be chewed
when the “Gales of November” came early.
The ship was the pride of the American side
coming back from some mill in Wisconsin.
As the big freighters go, it was bigger than most
with a crew and good captain well seasoned,
concluding some terms with a couple of steel firms
when they left fully loaded for Cleveland.
And later that night when the ship’s bell rang,
could it be the north wind they’d been feelin’?
The wind in the wires made a tattle-tale sound
and a wave broke over the railing.
And ev’ry man knew, as the captain did too
‘twas the witch of November come stealin’.
The dawn came late and the breakfast had to wait
when the Gales of November came slashin’.
When afternoon came it was freezin’ rain
in the face of a hurricane west wind.
When suppertime came the old cook came on deck
Sayin’ “Fellas, it’s too rough t’feed ya.”
At seven P.M. a main hatchway caved in; he said,
(**2010 lyric change: At 7 p.m., it grew dark, it was then he said,)
“Fellas, it’s bin good t’know ya!”
The captain wired in he had water comin’ in
and the good ship and crew was in peril.
And later that night when ‘is lights went outta sight
came the wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald.
Does any one know where the love of God goes
when the waves turn the minutes to hours?
The searchers all say they’d have made Whitefish Bay
if they’d put fifteen more miles behind ‘er.
They might have split up or they might have capsized;
they may have broke deep and took water.
And all that remains is the faces and the names
of the wives and the sons and the daughters.
Lake Huron rolls, Superior sings
in the rooms of her ice-water mansion.
Old Michigan steams like a young man’s dreams;
the islands and bays are for sportsmen.
And farther below Lake Ontario
takes in what Lake Erie can send her,
And the iron boats go as the mariners all know
with the Gales of November remembered.
In a musty old hall in Detroit they prayed,
in the “Maritime Sailors’ Cathedral.”
The church bell chimed ‘til it rang twenty-nine times
for each man on the Edmund Fitzgerald.
The legend lives on from the Chippewa on down
of the big lake they call “Gitche Gumee.”
“Superior,” they said, “never gives up her dead
when the gales of November come early!”
I don't have any specifics for this instance. However, when you run darkened, you can see other ship's navigation lights much better. If you have any lights other than the nav lights, your eyes become accustomed to the brighter lights, and you can't see didly on the open sea.
It would be interesting to read the Captain’s Night Orders, and to know the command climate regarding calling the Captain if there is any doubt or confusion among the Bridge or CIC Watch teams.
The best Commanding Officers would patiently and good naturedly (”If there is any doubt, there is no doubt - CALL ME.”) endure a significant number of “false alarms” (and the provide the appropriate positive training afterwards), to ensure they would always be called in a timely manner when it really did matter.
In the case of the worst Commanding Officers, the Watch teams would do anything to avoid having to call the Commanding Officer.
I also wonder to what extent the Officers of the Deck and Conning Officers had been allowed to really “drive” the ship and she what the Fitzgerald could during periods of daylight, good weather, and on the open seas. Did they have a real feel of how the ship handles, or had every order they ever issued to the helm and lee helm been tightly scripted to ensure “zero defects.”
You really don’t know what you and your crew can do with a ship, airplane, or vehicle, until you are given the opportunity to scare yourself (just a little, and with competent supervision close at hand).
Enjoyed is probably not the word, but being able to talk sailor talk again about my nineteen months in the Western Pacific was nice.
When serving on an LST homeported in Yokosuka, we didn’t set Special Sea and Anchor Detail until close to the time the ship made the turn to port to enter the harbor. In 1970 Tokyo Wan did not have regulated channels you could enter on a chart. Therefore standing a four hour watch left you pretty much exhausted.
At the close of an availability we did our sea trials in the shipping channel, and with the regular watch after setting Special Sea and Anchor Detail for crossing three lines of intense traffic. I remember having the watch one time when at end of travel on one course the CO directed me to head back on the opposite course when the way was clear. My JOOD checked the radar for ships closing, I went to both wings of the bridge to confirm the situation, and turned 180 degrees. We had a new OX, who was impressed by the maneuver and how tightly we turned. At the time, there were a couple hundred ships within five miles of us.
I suppose I stood at least twenty bridge watches both day and night in the area of the collision. I was always moving from port to starboard wing of the bridge and checking ship relative bearings using the gyrocompass repeaters. My junior officer of the deck might be at the radar repeater in the armored bridge area. We had few comforting electrics.
Timeline: USS Fitzgerald Collision https://news.usni.org/2017/08/18/timeline-uss-fitzgerald-collision
Document: Investigation into the Deaths of 7 Sailors Aboard USS Fitzgerald https://news.usni.org/2017/08/17/document-investigation-deaths-7-sailors-aboard-uss-fitzgerald
Fitzgerald: There But for the Grace of God Go I https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/fitzgerald-there-grace-god-go-i
A ship designated as USS is a military ship. The Edmund Fitzgerald was a merchant ship.
You run at darkened ship so other ships see only your navigation lights, which give important information about your aspect (which gives an idea of your course) and what you might be doing (fishing, towing, etc.)
>>If I recall correctly the Wan Hai 266 was 2 miles to the starboard of the ACX Crystal and on a parallel course.<<
They were running parallel and about two miles apart on a 70 degree heading, but the Wan Hai was on the port side of the Crystal according to graphs of the traffic.
About ten minutes before the collision, the captain of the Crystal later reported that his watch had detected the Fitzgerald 40 degrees to port of his bow and three nautical miles distant. That’s in the Reuter’s report issued shortly after the accident.
My speculation is that if those numbers are correct, the Fitzgerald would have been situated almost directly on the course of the Wan Hai and around two miles away from the Wan Hai. The new information is that the Fitzgerald was (originally anyway) on a 230 degree course which would have put it headed almost directly toward the Wan Hai. (250 degrees would be a direct course.)
I suspect the OOD of the Fitzgerald, upon realizing how close the Wan Hai was, maneuvered out of its way and (clearly, given the accident) onto the course of the Crystal. If he, and the watch, were focused on the Wan Hai, they might have confused any message regarding another approaching ship (the Crystal) with the one they were in the process of avoiding (the Wan Hai). All speculation of course, but it fits the facts thus far, presuming they’re true.
In addition, given the proximity of the Wan Hai and the Fitzgerald, it’s possible that the OOD was also distracted by the question of whether or not to wake the captain. Maybe someone else with knowledge of procedure can comment on that possibility? I’m no navy guy, nor even a boater.
Sorry about that. I meant to say the Wan Hai 266 was on the port side of the ACX Crystal.
According to what we now know, the ACX Crystal flashed a warning light at the Fitzgerald 10 minutes before the collision.
Based upon the damage to both ships it appears the ACX Crystal made a sharp starboard turn in the final minutes while the Fitzgerald made a sharp port turn in the final minutes.
For the time being they get desk jobs until they can be separated from the service or court martialed. They have to do something, the military is not like the cops and puts you on paid administrative leave.
“”At the time, there were a couple hundred ships within five miles of us.””
The USS Fitzgerald left Yokosuka Naval Base in the morning of June 16 and then sat at anchor or whatever until 2300 that evening when they left to go out to sea.
So my question is: Did a new bridge crew come on watch at midnight, one hour after leaving? Or did the bridge crew come on duty at 2300 when they departed some location near the naval base?
What would be the typical procedure?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.