Posted on 12/24/2017 8:38:11 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
Qatar and the UK have signed a contract for the provision of 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft for the Qatari Air Force. This deal takes the total number of countries who will operate Typhoon to nine (UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and now Qatar).
The deal marks the conclusion of a significant period of expansion for the Qatari Air Force, which is replacing its 12 old Mirage 2000s with 96 new jets (a mixed fleet of Eurofighter Typhoon, F-15 and Rafale). This is an astonishingly large rate of expansion for a numerically small air force, which already operates a diverse range of equipment sourced from across the planet.
For the Qataris these purchases represent a probably unsustainable level of acquisition. The force they propose to operate will require multiple supply chains, training pipelines and infrastructure to operate. This will pose an enormous challenge to administer, and raises serious questions about the nation’s capacity to deliver, operate and support such a diverse collection of air power.
It is likely that Qatar will need to spend significantly on recruiting overseas personnel on a contract basis for many years to come in order to support the training, maintenance and operation of the three fleets. While the actual flying may be done by Qatari pilots, there are unlikely to be enough engineers and technicians available in Qatar to provide all the associated maintenance.
This in turn will probably cause concern among other Typhoon operating nations as the deep pocketed Qataris beginning to recruit contract workers. In the worst case the need to put in place necessary personnel could lead to shortages of specialists in Western air forces as Qatari offers of higher pay and a good lifestyle tempt experienced personnel to move.
The UK may find itself impacted by this effort to poach staff as part of the agreement to sell Typhoon will see the UK establish a ‘Joint Operations Squadron’ (to be known as 12 Squadron) with the Qatari Air Force to operate the Typhoon.
Such a move will have been seen by the Qataris as an essential means of binding the UK to Qatar’s defence, and also in securing the deal. For the UK it is likely to pose real challenges.
The RAF Typhoon fleet is overstretched, and reportedly there are concerns about the ability to generate extra pilots and ground crew to support the retention of the Tranche 1 in service, a key commitment of the 2015 SDSR. Establishing a new joint unit will place further pressure on the RAF to find manpower and avoid retention problems.
The Qataris may well seek to make offers to RAF personnel, either in the UK or those in Qatar to try and persuade them to join the Qatari Air Force. While such a move would solve Qatar’s manning challenges, it will pose major headaches for the RAF, keen to resolve its own manpower difficulties. A short-term opportunity to bolster prospects of a Typhoon export deal may become a long term challenge for the RAF.
More widely the existence of a joint unit raises a number of unanswered questions about how it will be employed, and the rules of engagement under which it will operate. The MoD has stated that the squadron will be based in the UK, and be used to train pilots and groundcrew. But it is not yet clear if UK personnel will be flying in Qatar, or merely operating in the UK.
The squadron will, according to some reports, provide security during the World Cup in 2022. In the event of a credible air threat, the decision to shoot down a hostile aircraft remains one of the most difficult that can be taken by a nation’s leader.
What is not clear is how the UK and Qatar will work – will they have jointly agreed rules of engagement, and what happens if a UK pilot is ordered to shoot down a target by a Qatari chain of command, which may be in breach of his own national rules of engagement?
There is a significant lack of clarity about this Joint Operations Squadron, and how the UK and Qatar are sharing sovereignty and how the command and control arrangements will work.
Considering the potential challenges were this unit to be required to operate in a crisis, one has to hope London will be able to set out in considerably more detail on how UK personnel will be working with their Qatari counterparts both in the UK and overseas.
The recent set of purchases also highlights how Qatar exemplifies the Gulf approach of using economic power to purchase security. Realistically there is little chance of the Qatari Air Force becoming a self-sustaining and completely combat effective organisation – the diversity of equipment and supply chains, plus the lack of manpower precludes this.
Purchasing equipment from many different countries though can function as an economic weapon. By committing to these purchases, Qatar has now ensured that the US, France and UK all have substantial economic and defence interests at stake in the region – and they are unlikely to want to see domestic jobs put at risk by threats to Qatar.
Whether these nations like it or not, they are now irrevocably committed to supporting Qatari security.
This economic protection comes at a helpful time for Qatar, isolated among the GCC nations and keen to find friends and allies wherever it can. The major spending spree that this year alone has seen significant defence contracts placed highlights that for the Qataris, it is less about a theoretical capability arriving in several years’ time that matters, more the ability to deliver economic deterrence now by binding external nations in to take an interest in Qatari affairs.
While it is extremely unlikely that Qatari actions are going to result in a war with other GCC nations, by ensuring that Qatar is also a client of nations who sell equipment to the GCC means that the West will want to play a mediating role in settling the dispute.
There is likely to be increased diplomatic interest in preventing this problem disrupting exports to the region, and Qatar’s rulers are likely to have calculated that the cost of a fleet of modern fighter aircraft is a price worth paying to keep the West engaged, interested and committed to finding an equitable solution to the problem.
For the West this issue highlights the challenge inherent in defence exports to cash rich, manpower poor states. The potential for huge orders that would keep production lines and support lines open for years to come is an exciting opportunity worth pursuing.
Nevertheless, to win the contract is arguably a Faustian pact – the award comes contingent on support to other political issues that many States may not wish to get involved in. The policy dilemma facing these countries is whether the appeal of jobs and long term economic growth is worth the price of being sucked into international disputes, or whether it is better to stay clear, avoiding political entanglements at the cost of being unlikely to win much business in future.
I don’t believe they are buying the weapons so much for the air force as they are buying the influence of the supplier’s lobbyists. These purchases are a lobbying force multiplier that Qatar obviously feels it needs and is affordable. This begs the question; what are they doing, or about to do, that requires this level of lobby support?
This looks like they are getting ready for the open warfare with Iran that is certain to come in the future.
While working for the QAF may pay well, you will work in a small country surrounded (internally and externally) by openly hostile Muzzes who will only see you as someone that should be killed.
Ain’t enough dough in the world to get me to work there. If it hits the fan, you will be both alone and have nowhere to run or hide.
Qatar funded and supplied ISIS
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