Posted on 02/20/2019 10:16:32 AM PST by NRx
WASHINGTON — Siding with a small time drug offender in Indiana whose $42,000 Land Rover was seized by law enforcement officials, the Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that the Constitution places limits on civil forfeiture laws that allow states and localities to take and keep private property used to commit crimes.
Civil forfeiture is a popular way to raise revenue, and its use has been the subject of widespread criticism across the political spectrum.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment, which bars “excessive fines,” limits the ability of the federal government to seize property. On Wednesday, the court ruled that the clause also applies to the states.
Previously, the Supreme Court had never squarely addressed that question. It had addressed the status of the Excessive Fines Clause, but only in the context of the federal government. The court had, however, previously ruled that most protections under the Bill of Rights apply to the states — or were incorporated against them, in the legal jargon — under the 14th Amendment, one of the post-Civil War amendments.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for eight justices, said the question was an easy one. “The historical and logical case for concluding that the 14th Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is overwhelming,” she wrote.
(Excerpt) Read more at nytimes.com ...
RBG comments are the only reason the NYT printed this article.
Syllabus TIMBS v. INDIANA CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA No. 17–1091. Argued November 28, 2018—Decided February 20, 2019
Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a con-trolled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. At the time of Timbs’s arrest, the police seized a Land Rover SUV Timbs had pur-chased for $42,000 with money he received from an insurance policy when his father died. The State sought civil forfeiture of Timbs’s ve-hicle, charging that the SUV had been used to transport heroin. Ob-serving that Timbs had recently purchased the vehicle for more thanfour times the maximum $10,000 monetary fine assessable againsthim for his drug conviction, the trial court denied the State’s request.The vehicle’s forfeiture, the court determined, would be grossly dis-proportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s offense, and therefore uncon-stitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, but the Indiana SupremeCourt reversed, holding that the Excessive Fines Clause constrains only federal action and is inapplicable to state impositions.
Held: The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorpo-rated protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Pp. 2–9.(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates and renders applicable to the States Bill of Rights protections “fun-damental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 767 (alterations omitted). If a Bill of Rights protection is incorpo-rated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires. Pp. 2–3.(b) The prohibition embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause carriesforward protections found in sources from Magna Carta to the Eng-lish Bill of Rights to state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. Protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history for good reason: Such fines undermine other liberties. They can be used, e.g., to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies. They can also be employed,not in service of penal purposes, but as a source of revenue. The his-torical and logical case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amend-ment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is indeed overwhelm-ing. Pp. 3–7.(c) Indiana argues that the Clause does not apply to its use of civil in rem forfeitures, but this Court held in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, that such forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive. Indiana cannot prevail un-less the Court overrules Austin or holds that, in light of Austin, the Excessive Fines Clause is not incorporated because its application to civil in rem forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted. The first argument, overturning Austin, is not properly before thisCourt. The Indiana Supreme Court held only that the Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to the States. The court did not address the Clause’s application to civil in rem forfeitures, nor did the State ask it to do so. Timbs thus sought this Court’s review only of thequestion whether the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Indiana attempted to reformulate the ques-tion to ask whether the Clause restricted States’ use of civil in rem forfeitures and argued on the merits that Austin was wrongly decid-ed. Respondents’ “right, . . . to restate the questions presented,” how-ever, “does not give them the power to expand [those] questions,” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 279, n. 10 (emphasis deleted), particularly where the proposed reformulationwould lead the Court to address a question neither pressed nor passed upon below, cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7. The second argument, that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures, misapprehends the nature of the incorporation inquiry. In considering whether theFourteenth Amendment incorporates a Bill of Rights protection, this Court asks whether the right guaranteed—not each and every par-ticular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted. To suggest otherwise is inconsistent with the approach taken in cases concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. ___, ___. The Ex-cessive Fines Clause is thus incorporated regardless of whether ap-plication of the Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted. Pp. 7–9. 84 N. E. 3d 1179, vacated and remanded. GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 3 Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) Syllabus C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KA-VANAUGH, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Jeff Sessions is deeply saddened, or will be if he wakes up from his nap.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1091_5536.pdf
It was 9-0
Thomas wrote his own concurring opinion
The DemonRATs in Richmond long for those days.
Don't forget many slave owners and merchants were Black. today they're called civil rights leaders and community organizers.
The biggest power grab since Marbury V Madison.
My parents bought 9 acres in Kennebunkport almost 35 years ago with a plan. They built a small ranch on it and wanted to sell 7 acres to fund their retirement when they reached 65. At 63 a lobsterman illegally started a lobster processing plant next door. They fought the town but they gave him an exclusion. In the meantime my dad put the land on the market and but he was told it was now classified as wetlands. Some dink from the town came out in late March and saw standing water so the bottom line is my parents can not sell the land and lost more than half their retirement, even after having paid all the top tier taxes on the property year after year.
The Supreme Court has not had many 9-0 decisions in its history. This is a good one.
I say take the temptation to misuse or just downright abuse of this law away from the LEO community while we still can. I'm not against civil asset forfeiture but for a more meaningful and fair way to apply its use. Perhaps use the proceeds to help the many victims of crime at most all levels of government.
On a side note, I didn't read which Justice did not vote in this case, ie an 8-0 ruling. I did however notice that the NY Times went way overboard in playing up RBG's opinions on this very subject but stopped just short of saying that she voted in this case. Interesting wordsmith.
I’ve heard this complaint before, that Marbury vs Madison was wrongly decided. Haven’t researched it much but from what little I did judicial review was well established under English common law. Why do you think it was wrongly decided and what is the purpose of the Supreme Court if not judicial review?
Spot on!
Is there any way they can appeal the classification? Perhaps have an independent professional examine the property to see if the dink from the town is right.
I would also wonder if the dink from the town is friends or related to the lobsterman, who might not want a house next to his plant.
RBG read the decision aloud from the bench.
The case was heard last fall before RBG had her latest cancer treated.
This decision has absolutely nothing at all to do with eminent domain law.
And that there is why the NYT printed that out today.
Also it is dated 9/20/2019
Thomas Jefferson’s opinion of Marbury v Madison
http://landmarkcases.org/en/Page/284/Thomas_Jeffersons_Reaction
Sorry about posting only the link but I am on a portable device.
And that pesky 4th Amendment doesn't seem to get in their way either.
ll of the justices voted. The majority opinion was 8-0. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion.
Good.
I’m glad to see the court can still find things it’s unanimously agrees are government abuses.
RBG comments are the only reason the NYT printed this article.
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