Supreme Court sides with veteran and Texas landowner in separate rulings

The different branches say different things.
For us it was ETS which we referred to offhand as “Escape This S...” among other things.
There’s an official acronym (of course) but you know soldiers, we’ll call it whatever we want and watch brass turn purple as they sperg over it.

“I joined in 1977 and was given entre to the Veterans Educational Assistance Program, which messed over thousands of veterans out of any education benefits at all.”

Similar. 7 years service. I received a VA loan, and that’s it. Used it a 2nd time, cost me 3%, too. I can’t even get a VA card, as I received ZERO VA.

We got boned.

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-888_1b8e.pdf

Rudisill v. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, No. 22–888, April 16, 2024

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SOTOMAYOR , KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRET, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.

[Excerpt, Opinion of the Court]

The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill’s favor. Rudisill earned two separate entitlements to educational benefits, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Focusing on these two separate benefits entitlements—rather than on his periods of service—leads to two relevant observations about the statute. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA “shall pay” a veteran’s benefits. §§3014(a), 3313(a). Second, Congress has plainly delineated certain durational limits on these benefits entitlements; i.e., each program entitles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefits, and both are subject to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. §§3013(a)(1), 3312(a). Rudisill is thus separately entitled to each of two educational benefits, and absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefits. Pp. 8–10.

[Excerpt, Kavanaugh concurring]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE BARRETT joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the post-9/11 education-benefits law entitles James Rudisill, a military veteran, to additional benefits for graduate school. The Court goes on to say that the clarity of the benefits law at issue here means that we need not rely on the veterans canon of statutory interpretation. I again agree. I write separately, however, to note some practical and constitutional questions about the justifications for a benefits-related canon (such as the veterans canon) that favors one particular group over others.
Under the veterans canon, statutes that provide benefits to veterans are to be construed “in the veteran’s favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). The veterans canon is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. A substantive canon is a judicial presumption in favor of or against a particular substantive outcome. Some classic examples include the presumption against retroactivity, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the presumption of mens rea.
Applying a substantive canon, a court may depart from what the court, absent the canon, would have concluded is the best reading of the statutory text.

[Excerpt, Thomas dissenting]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, dis-senting.
Our country rewards those who serve in the Armed Forces with educational benefits. This case involves the ed ucational benefits available under the Montgomery GI Bill and the more recent Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Post-9/11 benefits are more generous than the Montgomery benefits, and veterans are sometimes entitled to benefits under both programs. By statute, however, veterans cannot receive benefits under both programs at the same time. Congress therefore created an election mechanism that allows veterans to switch from Montgomery benefits to Post-9/11 benefits.
Under that mechanism, when a veteran switches to Post-9/11 benefits after using some, but not all, of his Montgomery benefits, the amount of his Post-9/11 benefits is limited to the number of months he had remaining for Montgomery benefits. 38 U. S. C. §3327(d). The question here is whether this limitation applies to James Rudisill, a retired captain in the U. S. Army.
The Court agrees that Rudisill could not use his two sets of benefits concurrently, and that he switched to Post-9/11 benefits when he had some remaining Montgomery bene fits. Ante, at 7, 14. But, it declines to apply the statute’s corresponding limitation on his benefits because Rudisill was separately entitled to Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits due to his multiple periods of service. Ante, at 2. Because this approach conflicts with the statute’s plain text, I respectfully dissent.

"Yes, I thought so. I was lucky and got in under the old GI Bill in 1975. I definitely used it."
I used the GI Bill to pay for tuition to get my doctorate in late 1960-70s. I used it again allowing me to pay a miniscule down payment on a house later in the 1970s. It sure came in handy.

LOL, good for you-I tried investigating using the GI Bill mortgage when my wife and I bought our house in 1988, and...it was utterly inadequate for us at that time.

But I deliberately commuted to a state college so I could make it work under the GI Bill.

My grades weren’t good enough to get into a more prestigious college, but that didn’t slow me down. No student loans, lived at home and commuted, and my education served me well in my profession.