Posted on 09/28/2001 7:35:27 AM PDT by Thinkin' Gal
Rotem M. Giladi Reuven Merhav
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies
Email: msrmgg@mscc.huji.ac.il
In the Washington Declaration and again in the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace, Israel declared that it respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. Moreover, it undertook to give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines when negotiations on the permanent status will take place. These provisions deal with two different matters: Jordan’s present special role and its “historic role” in holy shrines in Jerusalem. This duality requires inquiry and elucidation. Moreover, the extent of the legal obligation assumed by Israel has to be investigated. The political aspects must also be examined: is it desirable, from Israel’s perspective, that Jordan fulfil any role in these shrines in a future settlement and, if so, what form does the Jordanian role have to take in order to fulfil its functions?
The aim of this paper is to explore Israel’s options with respect to a future Jordanian role in the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem from legal, political and practical perspectives. We will first describe the dynamics taking place in East Jerusalem between Jordan and the autonomous Palestinian Authority established under the Oslo peace process in mid 1994 and its successor elected in 1996, the Palestinian Council. Especially, we will focus on the dynamics in Haram a-Sharif (Temple Mount) compound. This description may reveal what Jordan’s “present special role” in the holy places had been at the relevant time, what it is today and what its prospects are. It may also expose the limits of a future Jordanian role.
The following chapter will present a legal analysis of the obligations undertaken by Israel in the Washington Declaration and again in the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace, concerning a future Jordanian role in the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. This discussion will shed light on the restrictions imposed by international law on future Israeli policy concerning the Jordanian role.
After briefly introducing several political factors relevant to the establishment of a future Jordanian role in Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, we will discuss the merits and demerits – from an Israeli point of view – of a Jordanian role in the holy places in Jerusalem. On this basis we will present the problems and prospects of the Jordanian role and the ramifications for future Israeli policy.
Zionist-Hashemite relations begun before either Jordan or Israel were established.[3] Jordan, as ruler of the West Bank and East Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, has maintained close ties with these territories after it lost them to Israel, including administering the holy places in Jerusalem and the Waqf activities in the city and the West Bank. In 1988, Jordan announced its disengagement from the West Bank.[4] It continued, however, fulfilling its religious functions in the West Bank and Jerusalem.[5]
Late King Hussein siding with Iraq during the Gulf war was a nadir in Jordan’s relations with the West. Jordan had to absorb many of the Palestinians deported from the Gulf States at a huge cost to its economy.[6] The Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991 provided Jordan with the opportunity to resume its strategic partnership with Israel and use Israel’s US connections to save its economy and improve its military.
The PLO was not represented in Conference, due to Israel’s objections. For this reason, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was constituted and took part in the conference.[7] Parallel to the official bilateral talks conducted in Washington between Israel and the two segments of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, however, Israel and the PLO conducted clandestine negotiations in Oslo. It appears that late King Hussein did not know about these talks,[8] which produced the 13 September 1993 Declaration of Principles.[9]
The declaration listed Jerusalem as one of the issues to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians in the permanent status negotiations.[10] It did not prescribe the nature of the permanent status – i.e. it did not require the establishment of a Palestinian State nor did it preclude the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation. Indeed, another issue for the permanent status negotiations is “relations with other neighbors”. Despite the fact that the Palestinian Council was not to have jurisdiction in Jerusalem (or any other permanent status issue),[11] the Declaration of Principles constitutes a clear preference for a Palestinian, rather than a Jordanian, option.
Hussein now had to reduce the harm to Jordanian interests. Through the bilateral Washington talks, Israel and Jordan signed on 14 September 1993 a Common Agenda to peace negotiations.[12] This document, which was completed prior to the Declaration of Principles,[13] did not at all refer to the issue of Jerusalem. On November 2 King Hussein and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were to sign an agreement specifying agreed principles – which did not mention Jordan’s role in the holy places in Jerusalem.[14] By contrast, the 25 July 1994 Washington Declaration included a provision drafted by King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin,[15] which was eventually incorporated – with slight variations – in Article 9 of the Treaty of Peace.[16]
The Palestinians were outraged by the Washington Declaration,[18] arguing it contradicted Israel’s undertaking in the Declaration of Principles to conduct negotiations on the Jerusalem issue with them (to the exclusion of other parties).[19] Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in May 1994,[20] it began struggling with Israel over control of East Jerusalem and over its status. Now the Palestinians initiated another front aimed at minimizing Jordanian physical and political control of East Jerusalem – especially the Haram a-Sharif.
This front resulted in a dynamic process of Palestinian strengthening and consolidation and a corollary Jordanian withdrawal. At the same time, both parties exercise mutual restraint which stems from many mutual co-dependent relationships existing between them. These co-dependencies also lead them, from time to time, to reach temporary agreements reflecting their relative power positions,[21] and which postpone the settlement of their disputes. Examples of these dynamics follow.
With the signing of the Washington Declaration on July 1994, Israel formally invited late King Hussein to pray in al-Aqsa mosque in the Haram a-Sharif; in return, Chairman Arafat argued that it was his exclusive privilege to invite Hussein. This demonstrates the Palestinian interpretation of the Washington Declaration: first, it impairs the Palestinian Authority’s powers (by, allegedly, transferring powers to Jordan). Second and worst, it amounts to a Jordanian recognition of Israel’s sovereignty in East Jerusalem and so harms the chances of the future Palestinian State to establish its capital in the city under the permanent status arrangements.
King Hussein argued, in an interview to Der Spiegel, that Jordan in fact saved the holy places out of Israel’s hands. This PLO could not accomplish. Jordan, according to the King, does not compete with the PLO on the representation of the Palestinian people, nor does it seek to damage the conduct of the permanent status negotiations. The King distinguished between political sovereignty in Jerusalem and the resolution of the problem of the holy places, which is going to be based on “god’s sovereignty”.[22]
In an attempt to appease the Palestinians, former Crown Prince Hassan declared on November 1994 that in the permanent settlement, when full responsibility will be transferred to the Palestinians, Jordan will transfer the responsibility for the holy places to the Palestinian Authority.[23] Attempts at mediating between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, aimed at achieving a comprehensive understanding of principles, failed.
The Palestinian Authority protested to the Secretariat of the Arab League, the Presidency of the Organization of Islamic Countries (hereinafter: “OIC”) and to the United Nations Secretary General. The OIC conference held in Casablanca on December 1994 rejected Jordan’s initiative that the concluding statement back up its custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy places. In order for this initiative to succeed, Hussein was willing to undertake to transfer the authority of this custodianship to the Palestinians upon an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the permanent status.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the hosting country supported the PLO, but it failed to have the conference establish a committee to take from Jordan the responsibility to the holy places until the Palestinian Authority will have jurisdiction in Jerusalem. The concluding statement of the conference, nevertheless, reflected PLO achievements vis-a-vis Jordan: it did not mention Jordan’s role at all.[24] Although decisions of the conference have to be made by consensus (so that Jordan could have at least put the motion to vote) King Hussein left the conference before its conclusion.
An agreement signed between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan at the end of January 1995 emphasizes the Hashemite’s Kingdom support of the Palestinian people represented by the PLO; Jordan’s support of the implementation of Palestinian self-determination and their right to establish an independent State with Jerusalem its capital. It determines, on the other hand, that the Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace assists the other tracks of the peace process.[25] The agreement does not address the question of the holy places, although it recognizes the Palestinian claim for political sovereignty in the city. In the signature ceremony, Hussein said that Jordan will continue to extend its custody over the holy places in order to preserve the city and its Arab and Islamic identity.
On the eve of the May 1996 elections in Israel, a tripartite summit consisting of late King Hussein, President Hosni Mubarak and Chairman Arafat convened in Cairo. The agreement achieved included Jordanian commitment not to conduct negotiations with Israel’s behind Israel’s back; Palestinian undertaking to coordinate its moves with Jordan; Palestinian agreement that Jordan temporarily retains responsibility in the holy places (accepting that Jordan’s abandoning Jerusalem will only serve Israel’s interests); and a Jordanian pledge to recognized Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem, when achieved, and to transfer the holy places to the Palestinians after the establishment a Palestinian State with Jerusalem its capital.
On August 1994 Chairman Arafat sought to replace the Waqf administration officials, traditionally appointed by Jordan, with officials nominated by the Palestinian Authority. Failing to secure Jordan’s consent, he decided unilaterally that the Palestinian Ministry of Awqaf would be in charged of the Waqf administration in both the West Bank and Jerusalem. Jordan responded by enlarging Waqf budgets and appointing more of its trusted loyalists to key positions, arguing that as the Palestinian Authority was legally barred from acting in Jerusalem,departure from [26] its own Jerusalem will only serve Israeli interests.[27]
Since then, the status of Jordan in the Waqf administration has been diminishing. At the end of September 1994, Jordan transferred control of the Waqf administration in the West Bank to Hasan Tahbub, Director of the Palestinian Authority’s Awqaf portfolio, President of the Supreme Muslim Authority – and a past senior Jordanian official.[28]
On October 1994 the Jerusalem Mufti Sulayman al-Jabri, passed away. Jordan appointed the successor, Abd al-Qadir Abidin, as it had done since 1948. Chairman Arafat challenged this appointment by appointing Ikrima Sabri as Mufti, thereby asserting that the Palestinian Authority has the responsibility for the holy places in Jerusalem. The public coming to Abidin’s office was “redirected” by Palestinian Authority security personnel to Sabri’s office. Abidin’s was left with no work to do. Upon Abidin’s recent retirement, Jordan bowed to the inevitable and appointed Abd al-Azim Salhab to the lesser post of Qadi al-Quda (chief Qadi), whose office is located in Amman.[29] Talks between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan resulted in agreement that Jordan would continue to pay the salaries of Waqf functionaries in Jerusalem, whereas the Palestinian Authority will be responsible for religious affairs in the West Bank. Since 1995, the Palestinian Authority indeed finances the activities of most religious institutions in the West Bank.[30]
The struggle over control of the Haram a-Sharif compound and the Waqf administration continued. Many of Jordan’s loyalists turned to the Palestinian Authority’s side. The Authority also took over the Waqf operated educational and social institutions in East Jerusalem.
On October 1996, the Palestinian Council demanded the Treasurer of the Waqf (appointed by Jordan) to step down in favor of an appointee of Chairman Arafat. The demand was backed by the presence of the Palestinian “Task Force 17”. Talks held by the side determined that the Jordanian custody over the Haram a-Sharif will continue and that the Treasurer’s position will remain “Jordanian” pending the permanent status agreement. Jordan, however, will hand in control of the Waqf in the Jerusalem district (comprising East Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank). In practice, this agreement does not stop the Palestinians from further undermining Jordan’s role in the Haram. The two significant positions held by Jordan’s loyalists are the Waqf Treasurer and the Director of Waqf Property. Jordan’s continued long term control of these positions should not be taken for granted.
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Thu Jan 8, 5:46 AM ET
AMMAN (AFP) - Jordan's King Abdullah II has reaffirmed that any plans to set up a Jordanian-Palestinian confederacy must wait until after the establishement of an independent Palestinian state.
"There could be no discussions on this issue until after the creation of an independent Palestinian state and after the Jordanian and Palestinian people decide their desire for setting up such a confederacy," he said reaffirming Jordan's long-standing position.
"If our Palestinian brothers wish to have relations with Jordan in the future, it will be examined then," the king said Thursday.
He spoke Wednesday at a meeting with officers from 14 Arab and other countries who were taking part in a training course at the Royal Jordanian National Defence College.
The monarch also reiterated that Jordan "will never be a substitute country for anyone", dismissing suggestions that have been made frequently by far-right Israeli officials for Jordan to serve as a homeland for Palestinians.
King Abdullah insisted that Jordan's current efforts focused on "developing the economic and social situation and improving living conditions for its citizens."
According to official estimates, around 40 percent of Jordan's population of more than five million people are of Palestinian origin.
In 1988, King Abdullah's father, the late King Hussein, severed administrative relations with the West Bank, which had been under the jurisdiction of the Hashemite kingdom since 1950.
"We are working to support the Palestinian government of (prime minister) Ahmed Qorei because we realise that when the Palestinian government will be strong it will be able to negotiate (with Israel) from a position of strength," the king said.
Note: this topic is from 9/28/2001. Thanks Thinkin' Gal.
I would think most people would realize that the minute a proposed independent West Bank (of which I am completely opposed to) were to come into existence it would have to merge with Jordan either openly or surreptitiously. It would be a total welfare state dependent on others. The only chance it would have is to become a part of the Jordanian economy. I don’t see why Israel would want or allow this. All the promises of land were given in the geographical location that corresponds to the mountains of Israel which G-d says is His. The land currently spoken of as the West Bank.
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