Arguing the Case for Southern Secession

Lew Rockwell ^ | 12/20/01 | Reviewed by Joseph R. Stromberg

[shuckmaster]

Some reviewers have had a hard time with the present book. They imagine that there is a single historical thesis therein, one subject to definitive proof or refutation. In this, I believe they are mistaken. Instead, what we have here is a multifaceted critique of what must be the most central event in American history.

This is not Mr. Adams’s first book. His For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization (1999) lives up to its title and underscores the importance of a matter frequently ignored by conventional historians. Taxation and other fiscal matters certainly play a major role in Adams’s reconstruction of the War for Southern Independence.

Those who long for the simple morality play in which Father Abraham saved the Union (always capitalized) and emancipated the slaves out of his vision and kindness have complained that Adams has ignored slavery as a cause of the war. That is incorrect. Slavery and the racial issue connected with it are present; they do not, however, have the causal stage all to themselves.

In chapter one, Adams sets the American war over secession in a global context by instancing other conflicts of similar type. He plants here the first seeds of doubt that political separation is inherently immoral. Chapter two deals with Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s successful gamble to have the Confederacy “start” the war. Here one learns that the Fort was primarily a customs house – a nice bit of symbolism, especially since the South paid roughly four times as much in tariffs as the North did.

Given that, Lincoln was very concerned about his tariff revenues in the absence of the Southern states. After Fort Sumter, the (Northern) President unconstitutionally established a blockade of Southern ports on his own motion. Soon, Lincoln had robbed Maryland of self-government and was making other inroads on civil liberty – his idea of preserving the Constitution via his self-invented presidential “war powers” (of which there is not a word in the actual document).

In chapter four, Adams unfolds his revenue-based theory of the war. The shift from a pro-peace to a pro-war position by the New York press and key business interests coincided exactly with their realization that the Confederacy’s low tariffs would draw trade away from the North, especially in view of the far higher Northern tariff just instituted. There is an important point here. It did not automatically follow that secession as such had to mean war. But peace foretold the end of continental mercantilism, tariffs, internal improvements, and railroad subsidies – a program that meant more than life to a powerful Northern political coalition. That coalition, of which Lincoln was the head, wanted war for a complex of material, political, and ideological reasons.

Adams also looks at what might well be called Northern war crimes. Here he can cite any number of pro-Lincoln historians, who file such things under grim necessity. Along the way, the author has time to make justified fun of Lincoln’s official theory that he was dealing with a mere “rebellion” rather than with the decision of political majorities in eleven states.

Other chapters treat the so-called Copperheads, the “treason trial” of Jefferson Davis (which never took place, quite possibly because the unionist case could not have survived a fair trial), a comparative view of emancipation, and the problems of Reconstruction. The author’s deconstruction of the Gettysburg Address will shock Lincoln idolators. Adams underlines the gloomy pseudo-religious fatalism with which Lincoln salved his conscience in his later speeches. This supports M. E. Bradford’s division of Lincoln’s career into Whig, “artificial Puritan,” and practical “Cromwellian” phases – the last item pertaining to total war.

To address seriously the issues presented by Adams requires a serious imaginative effort, especially for those who never before heard such claims about the Constitution, about the war, or about Lincoln. Ernest Renan famously wrote that for Frenchmen to constitute a nation, they must remember certain things and were “obliged already to have forgotten” certain others. Adams focuses on those things which Northerners, at least, have long since forgotten.

What Adams’ book – with or without a single, central thesis – does, is to reveal that in 1860 and early 1861 many Americans, north and south, doubted the existence of any federal power to coerce a state and considered peaceful separation a real possibility. In the late 1790s, The Federalist Papers, for example, laughed down the notion that the federal government could coerce states in their corporate, political capacity. For much of the nineteenth century Americans saw the union as a practical arrangement instrumental to other values. That vision vanished in the killing and destruction of Mr. Lincoln’s war. Americans paid a rather high price for making a means into an end.

[Mudboy Slim]

"Union of Commonwealths? First time I've ever heard it referred to as that."

That's what happens when you live in the Commonwealth of Virginia fer 30 years...LOL!!

"Regardless, the right doesn't exist. Arbitrary secession is not Constitutional. The Supreme Court ruled on that in 1869."

LOL...unfortunately, this was not the first--or last--time the SCOTUS ruled UN-Constitutionally.

"Happy Holidays back at you. I guess I assumed that y'all didn't celebrate Christmas what with Santa being a Yankee and all. He does live at the NORTH pole you know."

LOL...I've got nothin' against Yankees except fer the fact that they stole Jason Giambi from my A's...after stealing Reggie Jackson, Catfish Hunter, Ricky Henderson, etal. ...SHEEEESH, now I'm gettin MAD!!

FReegards...MUD

[Cleburne]

Yup. Though had he been put in the right places rather than be held back by the stupid Confederate government officials, things could have turned out far differently. For example, if Davis had unleashed Forrest on Sherman's supply lines in the spring and summer of 1864, Sherman would have been forced to call off his attack on Atlanta, thus giving the Confederacy a valuable victory and saving an extremely improtant city. Indeed, Forrest was allowed in the fall of 64 to attack Federal supply lines in Tennessee, and did massive amounts of damage (upwards of 12,000,000 dollars), but by then Sherman was well beyond Atlanta and was no longer dependent on his supply lines from Tennessee. The Confederate government was often guilty of working against its own army, appointing inept generals disliekd by their men but loved by the enemy. For example, Patrick Cleburne (who proposed to free the slaves!), a division commander at the time of his famous proposal, was passed up when a corp slot came up, most likely becuase several politicians in Richmond were ruffled up at him. However, much of the Army of Tennessee was not only supported him, but also his proposal (even the army's commander was perhaps partial to it-he declined to condenm it, and while he did not voice support-out of fear for losing his position no doubt-it is likely he supported it). However, the Union was perhaps even worse at selecting inept generals-greatly to the Confederacy's advantage. Many a general in the Union army was in his high position because of politics. Many good generals got sidestepped and sent to some obscure departement. Of course the North won in the end (I think because of vastly superior numbers-Grant finially defeated Lee only when Lee was outnumbered 20 to 1!), but thanks to their use of inept generals, many good men died needlessly.

[Mudboy Slim]

"...how could Nathan Bedford Forrest have founded a fraternity in the 1850's. He was an uneducated man who never went to school but made his fortune through hard work and common sense."

In didn't study my Sigma Chi history very well, but I've got the book back at the MudCave...I'll get back to you on the particulars to that story. Until you mentioned it, I couldn't remember Forrest's first name and I'm not even sure about the date the fraternity was started...but I can find out.

FReegards...MUD

[WhiskeyPapa]

If it was left up to the Sheeple, I believe that could have--and would have--occurred; however, the North's Effete Elite did not want a low-tariff competitor to the South and the South's Effete Elite did not want to give up their cushy lifestyle that would have gone away had slavery been abolished.

You can't show such a thing by appealing to the record

"The most succinct, compelling and balanced picture of the antebellum political economy is contained in McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom." The statistical portrait describes more than regional differences. The direction and momentum of those statistics show a fragile and severely distorted slave-based economy that is crusing towards an implosion, with or without the impetus of the ACW and reconstruction.

Population? "Three times as many people born in slave states had migrated to free states as vice versa...seven-eighths of the immigrants from abroad settled in the North, where jobs were plentiful and cometition from slave-based labor nonexistant. " McPherson, P. 91

Infrastructure? "In 1840, the South had possessed 44 percent of the country's railroad mileage, but by 1850 the more rapid pace of Northern construction had droppped the South's share to 26 percent." McPherson, p. 91.

Industrial capacity? By 1850, "With 42 percent of the population, slave states possessed only 18 percent of the country's manufacturing capacity, a decline of twenty percent from 1840. Most alarming, nearly half this industrial capacity was located in four border states, whose commitment to southern rights was shaky." McPherson p. 91

"Using three per capita indices--railroad mileage, cotton textile production and pig iron production [two econometric historians] found that the south ranked just behind the north in railroads, but ahead of every other country. In textile production the South ranked sxth and in pig iron eighth. But the railroad index...is specious, for railroads connect places as well as people. By an index that combines population and square miles of territory, the South's railroad capacity was not only less than half the North's, but also less than that of several European countries in 1860.

Combining the two measures of industrial capacity [textiles and pig iron]...the South produced only one-nineteenth as much per capita as Britain, one-seventh as much as Belgium, one-fifth as much as the North and one-fourth as much as Sweden..."

An industrial Eden whose slave economy should have been exported to the plains states? "The per capita output of the principal southern food crops actually declined in the 1850's, and this agricultural society was headed toward the status of a food deficit region." McPherson p. 100

McPherson's summary of the statistics: "...like Alice in Wonderland, the faster the South ran, the farther behind it seemed to fall." The South's decades--long struggle to recover from its colonial economic status as an exported of commodity raw materials and an importer of capital manufactured goods is a consequence of the severe distortions of a slave based economy and society."

In point of fact, the south was a drag on the country as a whole.

Oh wait.

I've heard people put forward the Hunley as an example of CSA technical prowess. That's great. Until you remember that 22 men died in the Hunley in order to kill 5 on the Housatanic.

The whole CSA wasa a bad joke.

Walt

[Mudboy Slim]

That's the other reason I avoid these North vs. South threads like the Plague...it turns out that's all you end up doing...LOL!! I've got to get going now, but I'll read yer rather long response and reply when I get back to a computer.

FReegards...MUD

[Non-Sequitur]

But then you would get into the issue of productivity and supervision. If your one slave needs an overseer to make sure that the work is done and the worker doesn't run away then that adds to your cost. How productive is the slave? It the free man is 50% again as productive then your cost per unit of work also decreases. No, slavery wasn't the most efficient form of business. The south depended on it because it was there, the slaves formed a large part of their personal wealth, and there was no other alternative in the form of free labor willing to do work that was seen as slave work. They were pretty much stuck with it.

[Cleburne]

Not sure about other matters of industry, but railroad building was moving forward in ernest until 1861 in the South. There were men surveying the iron deposits around (what would be) Birmingham, Al, before the outbreak of the war. Industry was slowly catching in the South-you must remember that much of the Southern states were wilderness wastes until the turn of the 20th century, sparsely settled and rugged. The rise of industry in the South-which was occuring I think-would have caused slave-holders to move deeper into the minority. Would it have stamped out slavery for good? Who can tell. I do think that the North made a misake-a grievous mistake-in forceably ending slavery with war and Reconstruction. And grievously hath we answered it.

[Non-Sequitur]

For example, if Davis had unleashed Forrest on Sherman's supply lines in the spring and summer of 1864, Sherman would have been forced to call off his attack on Atlanta...

You badly over state Forrest's effectiveness. In the first place his force was never big enough to pose a threat. When Sherman went south towards Atlanta with 130,000 men he left a like number behind to guard his supply lines. And during the Atlanta campaign Forrest WAS running around Tennessee and Alabama. Never caused Sherman to miss a beat. And look at Hood's last campaign. While Sherman was on his way to the sea Hood was running around Tennessee with his entire army. When questioned about the dangers Sherman said, "If Hood wants to go to the Ohio I will give him the rations. My business is down south." Sorry, Forrest was a thorn in the side of the Union advance but was never a threat to derail it.

[Cleburne]

No, Durning the Atlanta Campaign Forrest was engaged in defending Mississippi from several waves of Northern invasions. Began with Sooy Smith in Febuary, then Sturgis (I believe-at Brices Cross Roads), then two invasions by A. Smith, the first which ended at Tupelo, the second when Forrest raided Memphis and nearly caught General Hurlbut (don't you envy his last name?), which drew the large invasion force out of Mississippi and back to Tennessee. Atlanta fell on September 2, 1864, after the Battle of Jonesboro. Forrest did not embark on his raid into North Alabama until September 16, and by then it was to late to save Atlanta. As far as the debacle in Tennessee with Hood: as wild as it seems when you consider the odds, Hood had a fine chance to destroy the Union forces at Spring Hill. Cleburne's Division alongside Brown made great headway into the Union lines, and had not the chain of command been fouled up (I blame Hood as he was in the end the comanding general), Cleburne and Brown's Division would have cut Schofield's army in two and commenced to destroy it, as Schofield could not have been accused of much good sense. He disobeyed orders from Thomas (a fine genreral-from Virginia!), and nearly saw his army disapear. But Hood bungled things even worse, with help of course, and would destroy his army, both materially and in morale, the next day at Franklin.

[exmarine]

The slave-owner figures may be correct, or they may not be. I do not doubt that slavery played a big role in the Civil War, but it was not the only reason. The causes of the Civil War are much more complex than simply saying, "Slavery did it."

[exmarine]

as wild as it seems when you consider the odds, Hood had a fine chance to destroy the Union forces at Spring Hill.

This is a stretch. Almost all historians are unanimous that Hood was a good division commander but a terrible army commander. He was reckless and rash. Storming those defenses in Tennessee was stupid and it got Cleburne killed! Notice that Forrest was not stupid enough to charge them. Didn't this guy learn anything about frontal assaults in all of his experience?

[KLT]

LOL...I've got nothin' against Yankees except fer the fact that they stole Jason Giambi from my A's...after stealing Reggie Jackson, Catfish Hunter, Ricky Henderson, etal. ...SHEEEESH, now I'm gettin MAD!!

We are a bunch of scoundrels aren't we MUD?

[Cleburne]

You also overestimate Sherman's prowess as a military man. He was not the grand soldier so often depicted. It took him a very long time (considering the odds were so heavily stacked in his favor) to pound south to Atlanta, taking heavy casualties at several very bloody engagements such as Picket's Mill, Reseca, Kenesaw Mountain, etc. Of course, like Grant to the north, he suceeded by simply moving his much larger force around the flanks of the Confederate army. In his previous actions in which he commanded smaller forces, he had a very poor record-my favorite of which was at Tunnel Hill during the Battle of Missionary Ridge. Patrick Cleburne trounced his massively superior forces, and Sherman, no doubt incised that the day had been carried by other Union troops so excellently, prepared a whopper of a report in which he presented several boldfaced lies to explain his defeat at the hands of one division and an Irishman. His record at Shiloh (had it not been for Breckinridges reenforcements-which Grant and Sherman incredibly spurned after the battle!-the Union army would have collapsed) and Chickasaw Bluff, where he threw his command agaisnt one of the best defensive positions in the South-and failed miserably- are telling. He simply was not the military genius he is made out as. His burning of Georgia certainly didn't endear him either:)

[exmarine]

Regardless of what you thought you were fighting for, the men who started the rebellion had an agenda of their own. And that agenda was the defense of slavery. Their agenda was your agenda.

Again, you paint a partial picture. If you want to be a complete historian, you have to be fair. The south was fighting against INVADERS - who was the invader? In addition, many were defending their homes against marauding federal cavalry ("kill calvary" - remember that?).

[Cleburne]

Well, that was my point! Hood had the golden chance to wipe out Schofield-who may have been a worse commander than Hood-but Hood squandered it. The only reason Hood had the opportunity was Schofield's own stupidity. In fact, Cleburne's Division broke through Schofields' lines at Franklin, and the Union line was only held because a fiery little fellow name Opdyke (sp?) disregarded orders and moved in to support the flailing Union line, thus stopping Cleburne's men and effectively finishing the Army of Tennessee as a fighting force. And Forrest's attack was unable to break through for an excellent reason-his men had no ammuntion left! He repeatedly asked for more ammunition but was denied by Hood. Had it not been for Forrest's desperate rear-guard action after Nashville, the whole Army of Tennessee would have ceased to exist in one blow. Wilson, commanding the Federal calvary, was good, but was not quite equal to Forrest.

[Cleburne]

The Confederacy would have been over in a matter of months without its army, the members of which were almost overwhelmngly driven by an urge to drive out the invaders. Now, I believe the North should not have issued a call for arms and escalate to war as it did, but rather work things out peacefully, with some concesions to the South such as Sumter. We can argue all day whether this was possible; I think it was, but perhaps it wasn't. At any rate war passions ran high and the North and South paid dear for it in blood.

[exmarine]

Forrest was a brilliant calvary commander. Hood's attack at Franklin was stupid - it was a miracle they came as close as they did. In the process, Cleburne was killed - the best division commander in the southern army. Hood and all others who refused to discard the frontal assault doctrine were bad leaders. That is precisely why the best generals of the Civil War used maneuver warfare: Lee, Jackson, Forrest, Sherman. Note that Sherman just kept going around Johnston's army on the way to Atlanta? That is what Hood should have done at Franklin - go around. Their mistake was not putting Forrest in charge of the entire army at that point. He was the best commander they had at that time, although I believe Taylor could also have done a good job because, unlike Hood, he learned from his experiences.

[Just another Joe]

The south depended on it because it was there, the slaves formed a large part of their personal wealth, and there was no other alternative in the form of free labor willing to do work that was seen as slave work. They were pretty much stuck with it.

Exactly!
Number one, you take away the slaves and (A) has no money to buy said machine.
Number two, it still takes someone to run the machine.
Number three, machines don't make themselves.

It's still a matter of the econmical results of slavery, not the slavery itself.
I go back to my giant sloth in a cage example.

[WhiskeyPapa]

The Confederacy would have been over in a matter of months without its army, the members of which were almost overwhelmngly driven by an urge to drive out the invaders.

Which urge waned pretty quicky and the Richmond government had to resort to conscription in April, 1862--because there was little enthusiasm for re-elistment.

Walt

[Djarum]

bump for states' rights