'I tracked Iraq's biological weapons'

As speculation grows that the US plans to take action against Saddam Hussein, Terry Taylor, a retired British colonel who became a UN weapons inspector, recalls searching for Iraq's biological weapons.

"We were trying to discover all the sites which had equipment which could be used to support a biological weapons programme, everything from dairy factories upwards. It was like looking for a needle in a haystack.

I was employed mostly on surprise inspections, ones that were rather challenging, ones that perhaps merited a UN commissioner being the chief inspector. This made the Iraqis pay a bit more attention even though they still tried to hide as much as they could.

We also looked for people we thought had the right qualifications and capabilities to make weapons. We didn't know for sure they were involved, but we felt it would be worth calling on them.

The UN special commission's name has been somewhat sullied by allegations that it was involved in spying. But I only knew people dedicated to uncovering weapons of mass destruction.

We had some successes but it took four-and-a-half years to produce enough evidence to force the Iraqis to admit that they did indeed have a biological weapons programme. That just shows how difficult and challenging the task was, the enormous effort the Iraqis took in hiding this programme.

After all, a biological programme is easier to keep out of the eyes of the inspectors than a nuclear or missile one, as you can embed it in civilian facilities.

During each inspection I had a team of Iraqis following my every move - I was photographed, videotaped, sometimes almost having the video pushed in my face. That was not only to record everything but to destabilise me.

I had papers snatched from my hands, I was pushed and shoved. But I tried to be polite and respectful at all times, I tried never to lose my temper.

I kept my eyes and ears open, and if I found something that I knew was important, I couldn't show my reaction until I had my hands on it.

One of our successes was to uncover the main production facility at Hakam, about 60km outside Baghdad, which appeared to be making an additive for animal food and a biological pesticide.

We managed through documentation to prove that they were actually producing anthrax and botulinum toxin, two of the most deadly agents. Much of this work we did outside Iraq - looking at invoices and export documents, talking to the companies that had exported materials to Iraq.

We eventually cracked the case, but sadly by the time the inspectors were effectively thrown out in 1998, there were still important parts of the programme about which we needed to learn more.

We didn't really manage to discover all that we needed to know about the personnel, nor did the Iraqis satisfy us on what they had done with some of the essential materials for the production of such agents.

Now, of course, we have no monitoring system in place so it is extremely worrying.

The Iraqis did lose a lot of valuable equipment and buildings, but they could recreate such facilities elsewhere because they've got the personnel - there was not a lot we could do about that.

During the anthrax scares in the United States last autumn, I was not surprised. I knew that someone would do this eventually, but I wasn't one of those who sprang to an Iraqi connection.

If these attacks had been part of a state programme, far more people would have been affected. They would have used a far more effective weapon than the relatively crude method of delivery through the mail.

Biological weapons have great potency, especially when you take into account the advances in biotechnology over the past 10 years, advances the Iraqis had been exploiting.

I believe there is a sufficient case to do something about Iraq on the weapons of mass destruction basis alone. To do nothing, or to do little, or to attempt to negotiate with the present regime could be more dangerous than trying to do something more dynamic."

I wonder...when we begin our Iraq campaign, what do you think we'll see on our soil in retailiation, if anything? Do you suppose Saddam has dozens or hundreds of 'sleepers' in the US and/or Israel, each with a vial of anthrax or smallpox, and a clever distribution mechanism (an easily-concealed atomizer of some sort, perhaps)?

If we do see such a retaliation, the Dems will use this as fuel for their campaign against President Bush, whining "See, this is what happens when you push him!". And the Republicans should answer right back, "Exactly. That's why we had to hit him NOW."

Thanks for the ping, keri. As the article implies, destroying production facilities is insufficient (although necessary). It's the knowledge of how to turn easily-obtained biological agents into weapons of mass destruction that is most dangerous, and you can't put that knowledge back into the bottle again.

The focus must be on the scientists and technicians who understand weaponization processes and are capable of realizing them, and, for the long term, the destruction of research facilities in which new weaponization methods are developed. (This is in addition to the destruction of production facilities, since that is basically of short-term benefit).

However, none of these things is fool-proof. Ultimately, the only solution is the threat of certain and severe retaliation. This depends on intelligence, on being able to deduce the party responsible for any attack. Without that, there is no threat of retaliation.

The other component of this threat is having the will to carry through on such retaliation; that we have the will to do so must be obvious to everybody in advance.

It follows that we must do two things in response to the anthrax mailings:

First, we must demonstrate our ability to identify its source -- by publicly and convincingly identifying it. (Without this, an Achilles' heel will have been revealed that will tempt others into thinking that they can carry out such an attack incognito, and never getting caught.)
Secondly, once the power behind the anthrax is identified, we must retaliate. There can be no question that the retaliation has been carried out by the United States; it cannot be done completely behind the scenes. (It's insufficient, for instance, to foment a coup against Saddam Hussein surreptitiously, leaving the world with the impression that the Iraqi opposition rose up and overthrew him. This would leave our will to carry out deterrence in doubt.)

The upcoming engagement is not merely about stopping Saddam Hussein. Its purpose goes beyond that; it is to demonstrate to any others who may be tempted that this method of attacking us will lead to certain destruction.

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