Why We Didn't Remove Saddam

he end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.

The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

Nope. Bush Senior's plan was perfect. The Kurds later fought a pitched battle and would have defeated Iraq, were it not for one thing: Bill Clinton. Bill Clinton failed to give them critical air support at a critical moment. Bill Clinton most likely dropped the ball with the Kurds in other ways as well.

As I recall, there was an Oval Office meeting where Powell argued and won against the others that it would be inhumane for us to continue the war. Bush finally agreed and let them sign a peace agreement the next day or so. There was an article on this meeting which contained a transcript. Does anyone remember the article or can post a link?

Excuse me, but the people of the United States were led to believe, by President George Bush I, that the military forces of Iraq were to be destroyed to the extent that they would no longer threaten anybody except by self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

The war did not "wind down." Instead, its halt and ceace-fire were ordered by President Bush, stopping the allies from seizing much, much more of the Iraq military forces.

We had anticipated an Easter No-Fly Zone, a Western No-Fly Zone, and containment of Saddam Hussein into a Baghdad canton.

Bush stopped all this.

The Time story leaves much unstated about Bush's fear of losing political capital by being portrayed as a "war monger" at home; thus leaving Saddam a sanctuary.

Is why some people Didn't Vote for George Bush; not merely because of "the economy" or "no new taxes."

Herein lies the setup for the next war. Taking Baghdad would have been a mistake..for the reasons they mentioned and for the loss of American life that probably would of ensued in the bunker-hunker and occupation. However, not permitting those that were willing to take Iraq to do so was a HUGE mistake, and they do not exactly reveal their role in that (like the redefinition of "no-fly-zone" to not include helicopters).

It does reveal that when you form a coalition to be honorable you must agree to the wishes of the coalition.(which meant the Arab states got to end the war when they wanted, and probably had a large say in how things were to be after that), and that this is a mistake if you want to guarantee total victory.

Hopefully this is a mistake that the 'W' administration will not make. Ask them to come along, but make sure they understand we will decide the ending to this story. Especially, when the resources used are ours. That is, of course, an ugly Self-Centered-American view. It also wins wars.

Is why some people Didn't Vote for George Bush; not merely because of "the economy" or "no new taxes."

I agree with the other things you said, but I don't think the war 'mistake' is what cost him the election. However, I do believe he could of come out more popular had he ended things differently.

I think "read my lips", coupled by the liberal media at their orgasmic zenith of influence in bed with Clinton had more to play on this. Of course, the idiots that voted for Clinton deserve some of the credit as well, sighting that character doesn't matter, but, as they say, they had good intentions. ;>

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect.

They were hopeful but misled by allies. The key point was in 1991 it was felt Saddam was in a box. They thought he'd stay in that box and maybe even fall from internal decay. His 10 years of defiance of UN resolutions and his continued WMD program disabused that notion, but our policiy didnt likewise evolve.

What comes across perfectly clearly is how much was wasted in the 8 years of the Clinton administration ... we intervened hither and yon from Haiti to Kosovo, where our strategic interests were *not* involved, but we declined to resolve key problems like Saddam ... and Osama ... when we should have. In particular, the USA rattled sabres and fired off missiles in 1998, but effectively did nothing to *really* stop Saddam. we didnt rally UN support for decisive action, we let the UN inspection program die without forcing the issue like Bush is doing now, we didnt insist on positive outcome, and we didnt back our words with sincere intent, including the option of focring Regime Change on Iraq. Instead we had a President - Clinton - who didnt say what he meant and cared for political expediency over national security. Instead we reaped a whirlwind.

Thankfully, we have G.W. Bush at the helm now. Saddam's days are _ finally - numbered.

Clinton won because we had never been exposed to such a pure, evil, lying, corrupt, brilliant politician who would say or do anything to get elected. He got away with it. The Big Lie came to the US, and it worked.

Even Rush took a long time before he could actually accuse this man of being a liar. We all were stunned and incredulous that this could happen.

We lost our virginity the hard way. But now we are the wiser.

I agree with the other things you said, but I don't think the war 'mistake' is what cost him the election.

It cost him my vote. I didn't like that he broke the tax pledge, but I would have held my nose and voted for him, had he not done this, too. (No, I didn't vote for Clinton -- but I don't regret my third party vote that year, either.)

This article is, imho, nothing but a weak-kneed apologia. Even so, I would accept this excuse, if they had added one more paragraph:

"Regardless of the decisions we made a decade ago, all thinking people must recognize that circumstances have changed. The United States now has no choice but to take quick, effective action, and it is time for all Americans to rally around the Commander in Chief."

It is disappointing for Scowcroft to have been second guessing the current Administration on this issue, these past for weeks. It is incomprehensible that Dubya's own father should omit any sign of support for the current policy.

We didn't remove Saddam in 1991 because he had WMD. Nobody has ever taken down a regime armed with WMD, for obvious reasons. Now, Saddam's WMD can reach the US, not just Israel, but the provocation -- his destruction of the WTC and attempted destruction of the Capitol -- is too great to let pass. Which puts us in a pretty pickle, doesn't it?

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.