Adjusting on the Road to Victory

Washington Post ^ | 04/13/03 | Peter Baker, Rick Atkinson and Thomas E. Ricks

[Pokey78]

Miscues, Confusion, Unexpected Successes Shaped Invasion Plan

BAGHDAD, April 12 -- It was the low point of the war for the two generals.

On March 27, outside the city of Najaf, Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, commander of the U.S. Army's V Corps, met with Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division. As they sat on gray folding chairs in the desert wasteland, the war seemed to be in dismal shape.

The critical crossroads city of Nasiriyah had degenerated into a shooting gallery for U.S. convoys. An Army maintenance unit was ambushed on an overextended supply line. In just one day, 36 U.S. soldiers and Marines were killed, taken prisoner, or missing. That night, the first deep strike by AH-64D Apache attack helicopters was beaten back by small-arms fire that downed one chopper and riddled another 33 with bullets. Then a harsh sandstorm swept in, grounding U.S. helicopters, jamming some weapons, bringing most operations to a halt, and demoralizing the troops. And they had not yet engaged the Iraqi Republican Guard, which they expected would greet them with chemical weapons.

Wallace, wearing cotton cavalry gloves and Wiley-X sunglasses, said in an interview after the meeting with Petraeus that, in light of the damage sustained by the Apaches earlier in the week, it was not clear how they could be used in Iraq. He added, "We're dealing with a country in which everybody has a weapon, and when they fire them all into the air at the same time, it's tough."

Just 13 days later, Baghdad fell.

[Pokey78]

Let the revisions of history begin.

Much easier and truthful to say "We kicked ass".

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[thatdewd]

I suspected Baghdad Bob was writing for the Washington Bleep, now I'm convinced of it.

[dinok]

The guys in the front lines kicked ass...as usual.

To the Washington Compost this maybe a political question, but from a military point of view, this plan had weaknesses and people payed for them with their lives.

Bottom line, trucks and light vehicles don't win battles. Battles are won by "overwealming fire power". The proponents of the "go cheap and light" doctrine were proven wrong.

To me this is not a political issue...

[thoughtomator]

It was a low point for the media, in truth. But they have since established an even lower standard.

[Mike Darancette]

Let the revisions of history begin.

The writers of the Washington Post are now busily reverse engineering history proving that their headquarters are firmly embedded in their hindquarters.

[x1stcav]

When I first worked my way into the piece my blood started to boil and my eyeballs started to bleed. By the end of it, I felt it was somewhat balanced.

I can't attribute the glumness that they attribute to the ground commanders after the end of the first week. If they had read any after action reports about the A Shau in '69 they should have been prepared. If they knew anything about the resupply efforts up QL19 in II Corps, they would have written off the casualties to the supports units and inconsequential. I can't beleive they were that unnerved.

In the end, the author have confirmed what I think we all expected. That is that the focus, determination, and courage of this administration is without equal. Especially, W. He heard all sides, made up his mind that nothing essentially mitigated against the success of the plan, and counseled his field commanders against listening to their own fears.

What a damned leader!

PS: Won my bets with several old jarhead friends as to which service (not counting SOF) would make it into Baghdad first.

[x1stcav]

'I can't attribute the glumness that they attribute to the ground commanders after the end of the first week.'

Should have read 'I can't accept the glumness...'

[DougF]

Good grief! Early on it was apparent to me that we had some key initiatives that were going to be difficult to achieve: (1) secure the oil fields, (2) minimize damage to infrastructure e.g. bridges, (3) minimize the possibility of the use of WMD.

I believe that when we struck the first bldg where Sadam and others were expected to be, we saw a window of opportunity - if we moved quickly enough we could achieve many of these goals while the Command & Control were not in a position to respond. It appears that we were right.

The idea that anyone would look at a military operation, and think that it was in anyway significant that, for a few days, some troops were down to a meal a day, is patently absurd! THIS IS WAR!! I am guessing that at Normandy this would have been considered 5 star accomodations.

We took a brilliant, calculated risk, and the results have proved stunning. And I have yet to hear of anyone that died from starvation or lack of water.

Give me a break...

[WOSG]

I dont see how 1000 sorties of precision air power and CAS against a country without any air force could ever be construed as "go cheap and light". Then again, JDAMs are cheap, arent they ... heavy, powerful, precision and cheap??!? "this plan had weaknesses and people payed for them with their lives." I dont think any plan to tackle this brutal regime could be guaranteed to do the job in less than 100 lives and 3 weeks.

The whole operation was a HUGE SUCCESS. What learnings there are, are 90% or more "what went right" examples. oil fields, bridges, and lack of urban collateral damage are big three "what didnt go wrong examples".

[WOSG]

dittos on that.