All Against All (On the paleo- vs. neo-conservative debate)

The second major split within modern conservatism involves the Straussians in a rather different way. For over a decade, the clashes between Harry Jaffa and such partisans of the Confederate cause as Willmoore Kendall and M. E. Bradford have marked the forward lines of the North-South controversy. Jaffa has defended the hallowed ground of reason, equality (of natural rights), Abraham Lincoln, and the Union; Bradford has taken his stand on behalf of tradition, inequality, John C. Calhoun, and states' rights.

Recently, new armies have entered the field. The dispute between "paleo-conservatives" and "neo-conservatives" has generated not only smoke and noise but headlines, on account of Pastor Richard John Neuhaus's expulsion by the "paleo-con" Rockford Institute. Aside from that ungentlemanly action, the debate has centered around "global democracy," "secularism," immigration, and charges of envy and religious bigotry. These bitter disagreements occur in the context of two massive facts. One is that, in abstract terms, the paleo-cons and neo-cons agree on far more than they disagree on. Both sides agree that rationalism in politics leads quickly to Jacobinism; that universal truths of the sort expressed in the Declaration of Independence (or in twentieth-century liberalism: they tend to see the two as continuous) are ultimately destructive of authentic, historically rooted human communities; that history or experience is therefore a better guide than reason in political affairs.

Where paleo-cons and neo-cons disagree is over what is to be done. Strongly influenced by the Eastern Straussians (with whom they overlap), the neo-cons take a more or less Tocquevillian approach, reasoning that modern capitalist democracy is here to stay, that despite its anomie it has brought substantial benefits, that incremental improvement of our condition is possible and desirable. Their politics tends therefore to be utilitarian and meliorist but also strongly anti-utopian.

Both paleo- and neo-conservatives put a great deal of reliance on the idea of history (as their names, borrowed so to speak from the theory of evolution, attest). For the latter, it is liberal democracy's very success — the fact that, however uninspiring it may be, it has outlasted its foes — that proves its superiority; indeed, that makes it worthy and capable of propagation to the rest of the world. For the paleos, democracy's success, no matter how expansive, is hollow precisely because it cannot match the glories of traditional societies, especially that of the Old South. Thus the neo-con's cautious historicism shades over into a calculating utilitarianism, while the paleo-con's historicism rejects calculation in favor of a romantic appreciation of passion, the grandeur of the past, personal and national idiosyncrasy.

It is the peculiar nature of this dispute, the fact that the sides have so many premises in common, that helps to account for its second major characteristic: the allegations of nativism and anti-Semitism that color it. In the absence of a clear philosophical difference between the paleos and neos, the obvious ethnic and religious difference between them comes to the fore. That the neo-cons are mostly Jewish, and the paleo-cons emphatically not, is seized upon by both sides in weak moments as the secret explanation of the controversy. Of course, none of the policy questions that are being controverted here (immigration, "global democracy," etc.) can really be reduced to these terms. But the temptation to reduce them will be there so long as better arguments are not forthcoming.

This is particularly the case with the neo-conservatives, who have not responded as well as they should, I think, to the paleo-cons' criticisms. For the real issue is not whether there is room for Jews in a proper American conservatism, but whether, as the paleo-cons define it, there is room for America in conservatism. According to the traditional American understanding proclaimed in the Declaration, all men are created equal, and equally deserve to have their natural rights secured by a just government instituted and operating with the consent of the governed. The first purpose of conservatism would thus be to keep American government just, to make sure that it secures the common good and preserves the rights of its citizens. These rights, deriving from natural right, are based essentially on the citizens' humanity, and have no proper reference to their race, religion, ethnicity, class, or any other secondary or accidental characteristic.

This is not quite the America celebrated by the paleo-cons, who emphasize the regnant inequalities in American life as it has actually been lived. The older traditionalists like Willmoore Kendall were not at home with this America, either, but some of the new or second-generation traditionalists go even further in their rejection of all natural-right arguments. M. E. Bradford is perhaps the best known of these. Whereas most of the older traditionalists (e.g., Kendall, Russell Kirk) saw some harmony — however tenuous — between natural law and tradition or history, Bradford and his followers denounce any appeal to rational, transhistorical principles. To put the difference plainly: whereas Richard M. Weaver traced the decline of the West to William of Occam's attack on universals, Bradford blames our current degeneration on the prevalence of universals in politics and morals.

Other second-generation traditionalists take a different tack. Thomas Fleming, the editor of the Rockford Institute's Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture, understands the natural law not as a law of right reason (as Aquinas did), but as a "law of nature" in the modern scientific nor deterministic sense: he uses sociobiology and anthropology to prove that gender and class differences are natural. Attempting to combine traditional natural law with some version of the philosophy of history, Claes Ryn and Paul Gottfried try in different ways to find a philosophical basis for the role of reason within the historical process.

The real issue here is not whether particular paleo-cons are nativist or anti-Semitic, much less whether particular neo-cons are hypersensitive. Everyone involved in this debate agrees that anti-Semitism is wrong. It is a doctrine without defenders. But this consensus cannot endure if its grounds are allowed to be undermined. Paleo-cons as well as neo-cons have an interest in keeping this consensus and the conservative movement itself intact. The problem is that such vices as anti-Semitism and nativism are a constant temptation whenever virtue goes unexplained and unchampioned. When reason, equality, and natural rights (including the right of religious freedom) are contemned in the name of a monolithic and unrestrained "tradition," the ground for evil has been prepared.

As I say, the neo-conservatives in particular have not been very successful at articulating the larger questions at stake, partly because they have been unwilling to undertake the positive defense of American principles that is required. They need to say in broad daylight why nativism and anti-Semitism — errors with which they charge the paleo-conservative movement — are un-American, hence also unconservative. Such a declaration would invite a reconsideration of some of the principles they have shared half-heartedly with the paleo-cons. After all, the neo-cons have always stopped short of the paleo-cons' and the Old Right's open break with Lincoln and his interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. Yet only Jaffa and the Western Straussians have vigorously contested this attack on Lincoln and the role of equality in the American political tradition. The neo-cons, like the Eastern Straussians with whom they have so much in common, have been content to keep their discontents private, and to hope for the best. But the logic of the debate carries it more and more clearly in the direction of the classic North-South struggle within conservatism. And the border states must eventually choose sides.

No. "Class" is something different from group. Class refers to a social level people are born into, regardless of ability or actions. In America, a politician too blatantly corrupt will be rejected as unworthy to serve. In Europe, corruption and greed in a politician is blandly overlooked because the pol is of a different class than ordinary folk. Pols in France, say, are the aristocracy of France, with all the privileges of the ancien regime's aristocracy.

In a class system of society, people don't move up and down as in America. The divides are rigid

One of the reasons the "Old South" system had to be rooted out of America, in addition to its harboring slavery, was because it was in fact a transplant of the European class model for society. That's why most Southerners, who didn't own slavery, defended the system -- every person in the South "knew his place." There can be comfort in that. A meritocracy produces much more anxiety -- to achieve if you want to be well thought of.

It means you probably shouldn't make universal pronouncements about the inapplicability of rationalism to the political sphere

Are we now equating rationalism with reason? If I'm not mistaken, rationalism is a philosophy which demands the predominance of reason in guiding our affairs - which, as you seem to agree (as you've taken it as the premise for your statement above), is self-contradictory. The contrary position is not that reason has no place, but that it has a diminished place. So therefore, I would correct your statement thus:

"It means you probably shouldn't make universal pronouncements about the applicability of reason to the political sphere"

One of the reasons the "Old South" system had to be rooted out of America, in addition to its harboring slavery, was because it was in fact a transplant of the European class model for society. That's why most Southerners, who didn't own slavery, defended the system -- every person in the South "knew his place." There can be comfort in that. A meritocracy produces much more anxiety -- to achieve if you want to be well thought of.

What was it about the "Old South" system - aside from slavery - that supposedly created such a stratification? I mean, what laws existed that prevented people from advancing based on merit? Did they have socialist government? Did they have an overbearing public sector? Were their policies any less "free market" than in the North?

I usually think of the term "class" as it is used in the formal logic sense. If you instead prefer the use as in "the English upper class", that is fine with me. In that sense, there are social classes in America. I run into this all the time at work. Don't you? But perhaps you don't run into this as often as I, because I work in a factory. Workplaces are highly segregated by class in America. Working class people have blue collar jobs, middle class white collar jobs, and upper class people have (by my standards) very high incomes and net worths. Classes are certainly not as rigid as in England, and there is comparatively more movement between classes in America, certainly. But social class exists in America. And most people stay in the same class as their parents.

I think that's different from what the author was getting at.

Certainly - if you get to define for yourself the philosophy you wish to dismiss, said dismissal will invariably prove shockingly easy ;)

In any case, even reason and experience aren't always enough. Sometimes you just have to go with what you know is right, even if you can't put it into precise terms at a given moment. Ignoring that voice can win you a lifetime membership in the Jacobin Club.

In some areas, but not, I think, in the political sphere. In politics, when you stop listening to the head, the thing that generally speaks up in its place is appetite - consider the modern liberal. Besides, there hasn't been a politician, theorist, or theory yet that deserves leaps of faith. "Trust us - we know what's good for you and yours" is a rather risky place to suspend the use of reason and experience....

I don't agree. Virtually every society has classes and elites, and every self-conscious political movement or party contains the seeds of elite rule. I don't see any especial support among paleos for the idea that politicians are a class that is above all of us and can't be replaced if they do wrong. If anything, they seem to be too hard on politicians, at least in contrast to the neo-cons. It may be that paleo-conservative policies, if applied, won't bring equality, but that's true of other political agendas, including the neo-conservative one.

Quidnunc's idea that the paleocons represent the East Coast elite is wrong. Most of them live between the two coasts and oppose the policies of America's most prominent elites. That was the original impulse behind the emergence of the movement. There is an animus against political and economic elites running throughout all their writings. Some paleos add other views to this, like a sympathy with the Old South, that are objectionable, but the tendency behind the movement has generally been anti-elitist.

The idea that paleos stand against an egalitarian and mobile society is also not proven (and it's also not true that egalitarian societies are always the most mobile and vice versa -- there are stagnant egalitarian and highly mobile inegalitarian societies). One could well argue that a permanent commitment to globalization, unlimited free trade and mass immigration will produce a radically inegalitarian society. One could also argue that the US is less egalitarian now than it was forty or fifty years ago. And one can certainly question whether globalization will benefit most Americans.

But I suspect the problem here is that people are arguing different things. I think Jaffa won his debate with Bradford and Kendall, and don't see very much point in reviving the Confederate view of history now. It was wrong and inadequate and shouldn't be unearthed. Nor do I think Fleming's peddling of sociobiological theories is a worthy endeavor.

But I do think think that the ideas of global human rights and egalitarianism are sometimes used to justify the expansion of government power beyond what is necessary or desirable. Kesler would apparently agree with this, at least in part:

[In] abstract terms, the paleo-cons and neo-cons agree on far more than they disagree on. Both sides agree that rationalism in politics leads quickly to Jacobinism; that universal truths of the sort expressed in the Declaration of Independence (or in twentieth-century liberalism: they tend to see the two as continuous) are ultimately destructive of authentic, historically rooted human communities; that history or experience is therefore a better guide than reason in political affairs.

So it looks to me like there is much room for common ground here that those who want to promote an either/or view ignore. Kesler himself seems to be of two minds. He recognizes the common ground, but wants to minimize it to advance his own faction above the others. He sees that radical ideas may win acceptance in a conservative disguise, but he doesn't always take the problem as seriously as he ought. He's right about the more extreme ideas of some thinkers who define themselves as paleoconservatives, but he's too complacent about the neo-conservative tendency of many of today's prominent conservatives.

How are the universal truths in the Declaration of Independence destructive?

What the post said is that both the Paleo and Neo point of view hold the "We hold these truths to be self evident" declaration destructive. The post did not say that "these truths" were destructive. This is a meaningful difference. Perhaps you meant to ask "How can the Paleos and Neos hold the 'these truths' declaration to be destructive?" That I can answer.

The Neos say that the "these truths" statement is a declaration of faith, a declaration that persons are "endowed by their Creator", that "these truths" is a declaration of belief in God, that is, that human rights rest upon belief in God, in faith in Him, and in essence nothing else. Neos are mostly Athiests and so see this as no basis what so ever for human rights and therefore look for some other basis for human rights.

The Paleos mostly hold that the "these truths" declaration is a Deist corruption of revealed religion. Jefferson was by no means a believing Christian (nor Franklin and others) and many Paleos hold against Jefferson that he was apparently comfortable putting words into the mouth of God. Most Paleos believe nothing good can come of this practice, which in Christianity is a very serious sin indeed.

Certainly - if you get to define for yourself the philosophy you wish to dismiss, said dismissal will invariably prove shockingly easy ;)

Let's get the convo back on track a little. The author wasn't trying to dismiss anything; he was simply describing what neocons and paleocons agree on. It seems pretty clear from the context that he was referring to rationalism of the pure sort. You had imputed to him more than what he was saying, by any natural reading of what he was saying, and I was trying to point that fact out to you.

In politics, when you stop listening to the head, the thing that generally speaks up in its place is appetite - consider the modern liberal. Besides, there hasn't been a politician, theorist, or theory yet that deserves leaps of faith. "Trust us - we know what's good for you and yours" is a rather risky place to suspend the use of reason and experience....

Speaking of "defining for yourself the philosophy you wish to dismiss." Nothing in your paragraph referred to the point I was making. There's no reason to think that the only two choices of anatomical sources of political ideas are the head and the stomach. Nor was I saying that people should listen to a politician who says "Just trust me." (I'm about the last person on this board who'd argue that) My point, very simply, is that when deciding the political issues of the day, people need to consult their own innate sense of morality and ethics - in addition, of course, to consulting reason and experience.

I thought you were clearly drawing a paralletl bewteen "left" and "nihilism/license." Guess not, then. Well, now you really have me confused.

Also, I advocate very little except that one be willing to distinguish between truth and lies.

A direct and forthright answer was all I asked for on what you advocate. You're clearly playing rhetorical semantics, now.

Fine, by "progress" I'll point to abolishing slavery and giving women the right to vote. The rise of capitalism. Whatever you like. Anything "positive" that's come about since the Renaissance.

I'm not the usual "innarticulate" FR poster ("bless them"). Please cut thru the rhetorics. Or not. You had something thought provoking posts and I was curious what you advocate in concrete, real terms. Or else we're forever talking conceptual circles around each other. A caution for over-intellectualizing, if you will.

As per usual, I don't think that we're actually all that far apart, although we seem to be taking our usual circuitous route to discovering that ;)

The author wasn't trying to dismiss anything; he was simply describing what neocons and paleocons agree on. It seems pretty clear from the context that he was referring to rationalism of the pure sort.

And what I'm saying is that he's abused the notion of "rationalism" by either accidentally or purposefully keeping it narrowly defined. Or not - it may seem clear to you, but it's rather opaque what he means by "rationalism" from where I'm sitting. I happen to think of myself as fairly conservative, while also managing to recognize that the notion of "rationalism" encompasses much more than what neos and paleos purportedly agree on. Apparently that puts me out of the running entirely, since now neither neos or paleos will have me as a result, but there you go ;)

Speaking of "defining for yourself the philosophy you wish to dismiss." Nothing in your paragraph referred to the point I was making.

Sure it did - my point was simply that if one is going to listen to that "still, small voice from within" in matters political, it would be wise to know who is speaking.

There's no reason to think that the only two choices of anatomical sources of political ideas are the head and the stomach.

Or, more specifically, what I mean to suggest is that people are remarkably adept at rationalizing the things they want as being in the service of some higher good - hence the suggestion that one should take care to insure that one's sense of ethics is not being perverted by selfish desires. I suppose this will come back around again to our old dispute of whether morality and ethics comes from within or without - if it comes from...elsewhere, then listening to that innate sense is entirely appropriate. If not, then that innate sense is nothing more that reason and experience again, I think - whether in service of good or bad should be examined closely, though.

Nor was I saying that people should listen to a politician who says "Just trust me." (I'm about the last person on this board who'd argue that)

Nor did I intend to intimate that you do. I made that point trusting that you and I would be able to agree on it. Sigh ;)

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