Army shakeups clear path for Rumsfeld's vision

WASHINGTON — The shakeup came suddenly. Late Friday, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White abruptly resigned without explanation after a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz.

White's departure and the coming retirements of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki and Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Keane will clear the way for Rumsfeld to install his own handpicked Army leaders and put his stamp on the Army's force structure, doctrine and training.

Pentagon officials told Knight Ridder that Rumsfeld plans to offer the Army chief of staff job to Gen. Tommy Franks, the tall Texan who commands U.S. Central Command and led coalition forces to swift victory in Iraq. If Franks accepts the job, Rumsfeld would replace him at Central Command with Army Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, Franks' highly regarded, Arabic-speaking deputy.

The officials said Rumsfeld has not yet asked Franks if he would accept the chief of staff job.

From the day he arrived in the Pentagon, Rumsfeld has been at war with the Army's top generals — veterans of combat in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Mogadishu, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and with some of the top leadership of the other services, as well. Navy Secretary Gordon England has left to become deputy secretary of homeland security, and Air Force secretary James Roche has also had a number of bruising encounters with Rumsfeld, who Pentagon officials said has a habit of publicly ridiculing those who disagree with him.

Rumsfeld's relations with White, a retired Army brigadier general who had a second career as an executive in now-bankrupt Enron Corp., were strained last year when Rumsfeld decreed that the Army's $11 billion Crusader artillery system would be killed, and White and other Army leaders were accused of lobbying Congress to overturn their boss's decision.

Relations between Rumsfeld and the Army became even frostier in late February, when senators pressed Shinseki at a hearing to estimate how many soldiers he thought it would take to secure the peace in postwar Iraq. Shinseki reluctantly testified that he thought it might require "several hundred thousand," based on his experience as commander of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz publicly called that estimate grossly exaggerated.

When White was asked about Shinseki's estimates, he cited the general's experience in such matters. Published reports at the time said Rumsfeld wanted to fire White on the spot for supporting the Army chief of staff.

Rumsfeld and his spokeswoman, Victoria Clarke, could not be reached for comment.

Rumsfeld has made it plain that he considers the Army's senior leaders cold war dinosaurs unable to adapt to a 21st Century environment and thinks the Army is too big, too heavy and too slow to respond to rapid developments abroad.

Nearly two years ago, the defense secretary's civilian aides tried to table a plan to take two more divisions and a corps out of the Army, which already had been reduced to 480,000 soldiers by a decade of manpower cuts. Shinseki successfully argued that it would be foolish to take the Army below 400,000 men and women, even as he continued to promote transforming the Army into a lighter, more agile force.

Senior military officials said that Shinseki began remaking the Army a year before the Bush administration took office. He ordered the creation of six rapidly deployable brigades equipped with the Stryker wheeled fighting vehicle. At the time, the Stryker wasn't even on the drawing boards. The Army streamlined its acquisition process and fielded the first Strykers for testing in just over two years.

One retired Army general charged that Rumsfeld and his aides "have made the Army a second-class citizen, denigrating its chief in public and ignoring the counsel of uniformed leadership."

The general, who asked that he not be identified, said he feared that Rumsfeld, once he has appointed his own selections to Army leadership posts, will renew his attempt to take the Army down by two or possibly even four divisions, along with similar cuts in the Army National Guard.

Another retired Army general said, "I fear that we will dismantle the Army based on ideology and then, 10 years from now, lose a war against the North Koreans or someone else who can fight." He also spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Rumsfeld and his civilian aides believe that Afghanistan and Iraq are the models for all future conflicts: The Air Force and Special Operations forces can defeat the enemy with rapid action and precision munitions, leaving the Army to police and secure the ground. In this view, there's little or no need for heavy M1 Abrams tanks, heavy artillery and other forces that are hard to transport quickly.

"He would move the Army away from war fighting," one retired general said. "His is clearly a vision of transformation that ignores the lessons of history."

The Air Force and the Marine Corps, the general added, also have tried to marginalize Army leaders and persuade Rumsfeld that the Army is now a supporting service and no longer the centerpiece of land warfare.

Both active duty and retired officers also charge that Rumsfeld has imposed an unprecedented degree of civilian control over the military services' selection of flag officers, generals and admirals. Military officials said Rumsfeld has demanded that all the services send up the names of at least two or three candidates for every promotion to three- and four-star rank and all nominations to the Joint Staff. The candidates are personally interviewed by a Rumsfeld staffer and by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Marine Gen. Peter Pace.

Secretaries of defense traditionally have had the prerogative to nominate four-star generals and admirals, but have left the selection of one-, two- and three-star officers to each service's normal selection and promotion procedures.

"This is an incredibly dangerous politicizing of the flag officers," one retired general said. "It's Rumsfeld's way or the highway, but what if he is wrong?"

White House officials privately said Rumsfeld isn't loved there, either. They cite his arrogance and propensity for saying whatever he thinks in public. But one well-placed official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Rumsfeld's poll numbers were "too high to get rid of him now." With an approval rating of 71 percent, Rumsfeld's numbers are better than President Bush's.

Retired and serving general officers, not just those in the Army, say that not since Robert S. McNamara was secretary of defense has there been so determined an effort to isolate and marginalize the military's uniformed leaders. McNamara took the United States into the quagmire that was the Vietnam War over the objection of some of his top generals.

The selection of a successor to Shinseki as Army chief of staff has been up in the air for months. Eighteen months ago, Rumsfeld's office leaked word that the Army vice chief, Shinseki's deputy, Keane, had been chosen to succeed Shinseki. It was said that Rumsfeld hoped that by making Shinseki a lame duck long before his four-year term was due to expire, he would force Shinseki to resign. Shinseki, a West Point graduate who has served 38 years on active duty and lost a foot in Vietnam, didn't budge.

Now that Shinseki's term is ending, Rumsfeld's office has leaked word that Keane would not be taking the top job.

Military officials told Knight Ridder that Rumsfeld has considered only two of the 11 serving four-star Army generals, Franks and Forces Command commander Gen. Larry Ellis, to succeed Shinseki. Lt. Gen. Richard Cody, now the Army deputy chief for operations, has been mentioned as a replacement for Keane in the vice chief's job.

Here's the text of the report. Unfortunately I can't post the pictures.

LIGHT ARMOR FOR FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS A Report by Stanley C. Crist "The Army expects the IBCT to provide…a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans’ missions to a major theater war." GAO Report – May 2002 To equip its early-entry force, the Army has selected the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). However, many individuals have questioned the wisdom of this decision, and expressed the opinion that the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) is a more capable and cost-effective vehicle for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). In 2001, Congress mandated a "side-by-side" test of the IAV and M113A3 to determine which is the better choice. Army leadership maintained that such a test would squander financial resources without revealing anything new. This study will review publicly available information to determine if indeed sufficient data already exists to make a rational decision in this matter. On 12 September 2002, Army Test and Evaluation Command began a 16-day field test of the Stryker and M113A3. Since the Army News Service reported that the test will be conducted primarily on roads – a condition that favors wheeled vehicles like the Stryker – this report has been prepared to show aspects of both vehicle types that may not be covered in the formal comparison. Ten variants of the IAV are planned, but this study focuses on three: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), the Mortar Carrier (MC), and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). The Stryker ICV, MC, and MGS will be compared to the M113A3 APC, M1064A3 Mortar Carrier, M8 Armored Gun System (AGS), and the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL), which is a "stretched" version of the M113A3. The MTVL has not been included in the Army’s evaluation, which is unfortunate as it provides mobility equal to that of the heavy force’s M1A2 tanks and M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles. The M113A3 delivers mobility comparable to that of the Abrams and Bradley, while use of the Stryker – according to the GAO report (GAO-02-442) – might impede an infantry or armored division’s ability to achieve its full combat capabilities. As can be seen herein, wheeled vehicles like the Stryker "stryke out" when it comes to the mobility required for the full spectrum of terrain, climate, and types of operations in which the Army has participated in the past, and can be expected to engage in the future. INFANTRY CARRIERS – CHARACTERISTICS The Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, but no additional personnel. Soldiers in Millennium Challenge 2002 reported there is insufficient room to put on protective clothing and equipment, or to wear the fighting load. Also, the cramped space made it difficult to access ammunition and load their individual weapons. The M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, and up to 2 additional personnel. The M113A3 has more room for personnel, and stowage space for supplies than does Stryker, despite being almost six feet shorter. The Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, and up to 4 additional personnel. The MTVL has considerably more room for personnel, and stowage space for supplies than does Stryker, despite being three feet shorter. The M113A3 and MTVL can be produced by conversion of older M113s, at much lower cost than the expensive Stryker ICV. Using the M113A3 or MTVL would have multiple benefits – lower cost, utilization of surplus vehicle inventory, and providing an infantry vehicle better suited to employment over the entire spectrum of military operations. MORTAR CARRIERS – CHARACTERISTICS The Stryker Mortar Carrier is armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 60 mortar rounds. The mortar can only be fired from the ground -- not from the vehicle -- thereby increasing the risk from counter-mortar fires. The M1064A3 Mortar Carrier is armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 69 mortar rounds. Since the mortar can be fired from the vehicle, "shoot-and-scoot" tactics can be employed to minimize the risk from counter-mortar fires. The MTVL Mortar Carrier would be armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 88 mortar rounds. Since the mortar can be fired from the vehicle, "shoot-and-scoot" tactics can be employed to minimize the risk from counter-mortar fires. Due to their ability to stow a greater number of mortar rounds, the M1064A3 and MTVL mortar carriers can deliver indirect fire support for a more prolonged period than the Stryker MC, as well as providing greater survivability for the crewmen. MOBILE GUN SYSTEMS – CHARACTERISTICS The Stryker Mobile Gun System is armed with a 105mm M68 cannon, fed from an autoloader with 18 ready rounds. Maximum rate of fire is 10 rounds per minute. The M8 Armored Gun System is armed with a 105mm XM35 cannon, fed from an autoloader with 21 ready rounds, plus 9 more rounds in hull stowage. Maximum rate of fire is 12 rounds per minute. The M8 AGS and its bolt-on, anti-RPG armor are fully developed, type classified, and ready for production, whereas the Stryker MGS and anti-RPG armor require continued development. Because its autoloader cycles faster than that of the Stryker MGS, the M8 AGS can engage multiple targets more quickly. Also, since it carries more main gun ammunition than the Stryker, the M8 can remain in action for a longer period. More critically, the Stryker MGS is too tall and heavy for transport by C-130 aircraft. STRATEGIC MOBILITY – C-17 TRANSPORTABILITY The USAF C-17 can transport 2 fully combat loaded Strykers, so to deploy a 319-vehicle Stryker Brigade Combat Team will require 160 C-17 sorties. The USAF C-17 can transport 4 fully combat loaded MTVLs, so to deploy a 319-vehicle MTVL Brigade Combat Team will require 82 C-17 sorties.* The USAF C-17 can transport 5 fully combat loaded M113A3s, so to deploy a 319-vehicle M113A3 Brigade Combat Team will require 68 C-17 sorties.* *Assumes use of the M8 AGS for the Mobile Gun System, and M193 Fox for the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle). Since the primary reason for the Brigade Combat Team concept is to deploy maximum combat power in the minimum time frame, the Stryker is a poor choice. The C-17 can transport twice as many MTVLs, and more than twice as many M113A3s, for a much more efficient and effective use of this limited-availability airlift resource. In addition, unit integrity of the infantry platoons is superior with the MTVL and M113A3, since all four of a platoon’s vehicles – together with assigned personnel – can be transported on one aircraft. STRATEGIC MOBILITY – C-130 TRANSPORTABILITY Due to its oversize dimensions, the Stryker ICV requires a waiver of USAF safety rules for transport by C-130. This waiver allows no more than 4 men to accompany the ICV, so the rest of the infantry squad will have to travel another aircraft. The heavy vehicle weight severely restricts the quantity of fuel and ammunition that can be stowed in the ICV during transport, so it will not be fully combat ready when it rolls out of the aircraft. A minimum of 13 C-130s are needed to transport the 12 ICVs, 24 vehicle crewmen, and 108 infantrymen in a Stryker company, plus the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. The MTVL and M113A3 are small enough for transport by C-130 with no need of a waiver, so the vehicle crew and the entire 9-man infantry squad can accompany the vehicle. The light vehicle weight maximizes the amount of fuel and ammunition that can be stowed in the MTVL and M113A3, so they will be fully combat ready when they roll out of the aircraft. 12 C-130s can transport the 12 vehicles, 24 vehicle crewmen, and 108 infantrymen in an MTVL or M113A3 company, plus the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. Delivery of Stryker vehicles by C-130 is also an inefficient use of airlift. Depending on the flight distance involved, 13 or more C-130 sorties will be required to transport only a dozen Stryker ICVs and personnel. STRATEGIC MOBILITY – PARACHUTE DELIVERY The M8, M113A3, M1064A3, and MTVL can be airdropped onto the battlefield, thereby providing enhanced strategic mobility. This option does not exist with the Stryker, which is too big for parachute delivery from C-130 aircraft. TACTICAL MOBILITY – MUD With a tow cable attached to its front end, an eight-wheeled USMC LAV-25 is pulled from the Croatian mud where it had been hopelessly mired. Note the nose up angle, indicating that each pair of tires has dug deeper into the mud than the preceding pair. The LAV-25 is an earlier generation in the vehicle family that evolved into the Stryker, and shares the same basic flaws regarding cross-country mobility. A tracked M113 wades deep into a Bosnian mud pit in order to tow out a wheeled vehicle that became stuck. Mud ordinarily poses little problem for tracked vehicles. A Stryker Mobile Gun System drives through soft sand. Note that – like the USMC LAV stuck in mud – each pair of tires is digging deeper into the sand than the preceding pair. In soft ground, these eight-wheel drive vehicles are always trying to crawl out of the ruts that they are in the process of digging. Tracks distribute a vehicle’s weight evenly over the surface. This enables deep, soft sand to be traversed with ease, in areas that a wheeled vehicle would find impassable. TACTICAL MOBILITY – SNOW Wheeled vehicles, like this USMC LAV-25, require the use of snow chains in order to operate effectively in snow. This is another group of items for which stowage space is required, and the time needed for installation and removal of snow chains can potentially slow the pace of winter operations. Tracked vehicles like the M113 can operate quite effectively in snow-covered terrain, without the need for traction-enhancing devices. TACTICAL MOBILITY – BATTLEFIELD OBSTACLES Tracked vehicles can easily climb over automobiles and other obstacles that cannot be surmounted by wheeled armor. This capability is very useful in any scenario, and its lack can result in mission failure. TACTICAL MOBILITY – TIRE VULNERABILITY Tires are very vulnerable to damage from gunfire, battlefield debris, and sharp rocks. In the 30 January 1991 battle for Khafji, the first coalition attack was stopped when Iraqi small arms fire flattened the tires of the Saudi wheeled armor. Four weeks later, the Marine assault on Kuwait Airport was also brought to a halt when the tires of several LAV-25s were shredded as a result of running over artillery fragments. More recently, the Stryker company that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 had to replace 13 tires during the 96-hour NTC rotation! How many more tires would have required replacement if the OPFOR had been shooting bullets instead of MILES lasers? "Run-flat" tires are not a solution – if you have to limp into a fight, you might not be able to crawl out! Tracks don’t have to be changed after every battle.

Crud let me try that again.LIGHT ARMOR FOR FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

A Report by
Stanley C. Crist

"The Army expects the IBCT to provide…a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans’ missions to a major theater war."

GAO Report – May 2002

To equip its early-entry force, the Army has selected the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). However, many individuals have questioned the wisdom of this decision, and expressed the opinion that the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) is a more capable and cost-effective vehicle for the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).

In 2001, Congress mandated a "side-by-side" test of the IAV and M113A3 to determine which is the better choice. Army leadership maintained that such a test would squander financial resources without revealing anything new. This study will review publicly available information to determine if indeed sufficient data already exists to make a rational decision in this matter.

On 12 September 2002, Army Test and Evaluation Command began a 16-day field test of the Stryker and M113A3. Since the Army News Service reported that the test will be conducted primarily on roads – a condition that favors wheeled vehicles like the Stryker – this report has been prepared to show aspects of both vehicle types that may not be covered in the formal comparison.

Ten variants of the IAV are planned, but this study focuses on three: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), the Mortar Carrier (MC), and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). The Stryker ICV, MC, and MGS will be compared to the M113A3 APC, M1064A3 Mortar Carrier, M8 Armored Gun System (AGS), and the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL), which is a "stretched" version of the M113A3.

The MTVL has not been included in the Army’s evaluation, which is unfortunate as it provides mobility equal to that of the heavy force’s M1A2 tanks and M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles. The M113A3 delivers mobility comparable to that of the Abrams and Bradley, while use of the Stryker – according to the GAO report (GAO-02-442) – might impede an infantry or armored division’s ability to achieve its full combat capabilities.

As can be seen herein, wheeled vehicles like the Stryker "stryke out" when it comes to the mobility required for the full spectrum of terrain, climate, and types of operations in which the Army has participated in the past, and can be expected to engage in the future.

INFANTRY CARRIERS – CHARACTERISTICS

The Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, but no additional personnel. Soldiers in Millennium Challenge 2002 reported there is insufficient room to put on protective clothing and equipment, or to wear the fighting load. Also, the cramped space made it difficult to access ammunition and load their individual weapons.

The M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, and up to 2 additional personnel. The M113A3 has more room for personnel, and stowage space for supplies than does Stryker, despite being almost six feet shorter.

The Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light has sufficient internal space to carry a standard 9-man infantry squad, and up to 4 additional personnel. The MTVL has considerably more room for personnel, and stowage space for supplies than does Stryker, despite being three feet shorter.

The M113A3 and MTVL can be produced by conversion of older M113s, at much lower cost than the expensive Stryker ICV. Using the M113A3 or MTVL would have multiple benefits – lower cost, utilization of surplus vehicle inventory, and providing an infantry vehicle better suited to employment over the entire spectrum of military operations.

MORTAR CARRIERS – CHARACTERISTICS

The Stryker Mortar Carrier is armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 60 mortar rounds. The mortar can only be fired from the ground -- not from the vehicle -- thereby increasing the risk from counter-mortar fires.

The M1064A3 Mortar Carrier is armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 69 mortar rounds. Since the mortar can be fired from the vehicle, "shoot-and-scoot" tactics can be employed to minimize the risk from counter-mortar fires.

The MTVL Mortar Carrier would be armed with a 120mm M121 mortar, with stowage for 88 mortar rounds. Since the mortar can be fired from the vehicle, "shoot-and-scoot" tactics can be employed to minimize the risk from counter-mortar fires.

Due to their ability to stow a greater number of mortar rounds, the M1064A3 and MTVL mortar carriers can deliver indirect fire support for a more prolonged period than the Stryker MC, as well as providing greater survivability for the crewmen.

MOBILE GUN SYSTEMS – CHARACTERISTICS

The Stryker Mobile Gun System is armed with a 105mm M68 cannon, fed from an autoloader with 18 ready rounds. Maximum rate of fire is 10 rounds per minute.

The M8 Armored Gun System is armed with a 105mm XM35 cannon, fed from an autoloader with 21 ready rounds, plus 9 more rounds in hull stowage. Maximum rate of fire is 12 rounds per minute.

The M8 AGS and its bolt-on, anti-RPG armor are fully developed, type classified, and ready for production, whereas the Stryker MGS and anti-RPG armor require continued development. Because its autoloader cycles faster than that of the Stryker MGS, the M8 AGS can engage multiple targets more quickly. Also, since it carries more main gun ammunition than the Stryker, the M8 can remain in action for a longer period. More critically, the Stryker MGS is too tall and heavy for transport by C-130 aircraft.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY – C-17 TRANSPORTABILITY

The USAF C-17 can transport 2 fully combat loaded Strykers, so to deploy a 319-vehicle Stryker Brigade Combat Team will require 160 C-17 sorties.

The USAF C-17 can transport 4 fully combat loaded MTVLs, so to deploy a 319-vehicle MTVL Brigade Combat Team will require 82 C-17 sorties.*

The USAF C-17 can transport 5 fully combat loaded M113A3s, so to deploy a 319-vehicle M113A3 Brigade Combat Team will require 68 C-17 sorties.*

*Assumes use of the M8 AGS for the Mobile Gun System, and M193 Fox for the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle).

Since the primary reason for the Brigade Combat Team concept is to deploy maximum combat power in the minimum time frame, the Stryker is a poor choice. The C-17 can transport twice as many MTVLs, and more than twice as many M113A3s, for a much more efficient and effective use of this limited-availability airlift resource. In addition, unit integrity of the infantry platoons is superior with the MTVL and M113A3, since all four of a platoon’s vehicles – together with assigned personnel – can be transported on one aircraft.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY – C-130 TRANSPORTABILITY

Due to its oversize dimensions, the Stryker ICV requires a waiver of USAF safety rules for transport by C-130. This waiver allows no more than 4 men to accompany the ICV, so the rest of the infantry squad will have to travel another aircraft. The heavy vehicle weight severely restricts the quantity of fuel and ammunition that can be stowed in the ICV during transport, so it will not be fully combat ready when it rolls out of the aircraft. A minimum of 13 C-130s are needed to transport the 12 ICVs, 24 vehicle crewmen, and 108 infantrymen in a Stryker company, plus the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies.

The MTVL and M113A3 are small enough for transport by C-130 with no need of a waiver, so the vehicle crew and the entire 9-man infantry squad can accompany the vehicle. The light vehicle weight maximizes the amount of fuel and ammunition that can be stowed in the MTVL and M113A3, so they will be fully combat ready when they roll out of the aircraft. 12 C-130s can transport the 12 vehicles, 24 vehicle crewmen, and 108 infantrymen in an MTVL or M113A3 company, plus the fuel, ammunition, and other supplies.

Delivery of Stryker vehicles by C-130 is also an inefficient use of airlift. Depending on the flight distance involved, 13 or more C-130 sorties will be required to transport only a dozen Stryker ICVs and personnel.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY – PARACHUTE DELIVERY

The M8, M113A3, M1064A3, and MTVL can be airdropped onto the battlefield, thereby providing enhanced strategic mobility. This option does not exist with the Stryker, which is too big for parachute delivery from C-130 aircraft.

TACTICAL MOBILITY – MUD

With a tow cable attached to its front end, an eight-wheeled USMC LAV-25 is pulled from the Croatian mud where it had been hopelessly mired. Note the nose up angle, indicating that each pair of tires has dug deeper into the mud than the preceding pair. The LAV-25 is an earlier generation in the vehicle family that evolved into the Stryker, and shares the same basic flaws regarding cross-country mobility.

A tracked M113 wades deep into a Bosnian mud pit in order to tow out a wheeled vehicle that became stuck. Mud ordinarily poses little problem for tracked vehicles.

A Stryker Mobile Gun System drives through soft sand. Note that – like the USMC LAV stuck in mud – each pair of tires is digging deeper into the sand than the preceding pair. In soft ground, these eight-wheel drive vehicles are always trying to crawl out of the ruts that they are in the process of digging.

Tracks distribute a vehicle’s weight evenly over the surface. This enables deep, soft sand to be traversed with ease, in areas that a wheeled vehicle would find impassable.

TACTICAL MOBILITY – SNOW

Wheeled vehicles, like this USMC LAV-25, require the use of snow chains in order to operate effectively in snow. This is another group of items for which stowage space is required, and the time needed for installation and removal of snow chains can potentially slow the pace of winter operations.

Tracked vehicles like the M113 can operate quite effectively in snow-covered terrain, without the need for traction-enhancing devices.

TACTICAL MOBILITY – BATTLEFIELD OBSTACLES

Tracked vehicles can easily climb over automobiles and other obstacles that cannot be surmounted by wheeled armor. This capability is very useful in any scenario, and its lack can result in mission failure.

TACTICAL MOBILITY – TIRE VULNERABILITY

Tires are very vulnerable to damage from gunfire, battlefield debris, and sharp rocks. In the 30 January 1991 battle for Khafji, the first coalition attack was stopped when Iraqi small arms fire flattened the tires of the Saudi wheeled armor. Four weeks later, the Marine assault on Kuwait Airport was also brought to a halt when the tires of several LAV-25s were shredded as a result of running over artillery fragments.

More recently, the Stryker company that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 had to replace 13 tires during the 96-hour NTC rotation! How many more tires would have required replacement if the OPFOR had been shooting bullets instead of MILES lasers? "Run-flat" tires are not a solution – if you have to limp into a fight, you might not be able to crawl out! Tracks don’t have to be changed after every battle.

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