Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2003 11:34:28 -0800
I asked him to check whether the temperature units are really F. I think they should be C.
The NASA boys are "backpedaling" on the original theory of debris impact .... I think they are trying build a case to protect their asses for running with faulty thermal analysis. By the way that analysis was done by Boeing ..... now, I'm sure your saying to yourself ... "hey Bill, that's your guys" ..... well Lou in a way yes, and more important NO!
Let me tell you why .... remember, I'm not on the Shuttle Program anymore ... and remember there is a reason for that .... here it is ... That guy you see on TV .. Ron Dittemore, NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager, got together (about 3 years ago) with the new (at that time) Boeing Program Manager, Mike Mott. Dittemore basically directed Mott to have Boeing's Program Management and Design Center move from California (Huntington Beach, formally Downey) to Houston. Mott being new to the Program and not wanting to piss off his counterpart (Dittemore), took off and directed all of us that our jobs would be moving to Houston within the next 2 years. Well, any of us that had been on the Program for the last 20 years and traveled to Houston frequently, knew that we didn't want to move to Houston permanently. We tried to convince the Mott's and the Dittemore's that this move would destroy the engineering skills base that had been built up over the last 20 years. This all fell on deft ears, Dittemore and Mott went on with their plan. Well, as a result Lou, out of the 1200 highly skilled Shuttle engineering personnel that had been working on the Program over the last 20 years, only 11% of those people actually moved to Houston..... Most of the people that stayed were what used to be the Program Management Office (my office) and the highly skilled sub-system managers/engineers .... including the complete debris assessment and thermal analysis team. So Lou, what I'm saying is .... after launch, there was a thermal analysis done, but it was done by a group of Boeing thermal analysis engineers that had just been recently hired (within the last year) by our Boeing Houston Shuttle Program Office (also new guys). This group of thermal analysis engineers were from either other Boeing Programs or "off the street". This was their first opportunity for this type of a Real Time debris assessment and thermal analysis since being put on the Shuttle Program. Here are some of the details "they" came up with ..... assuming a debris of 30" x 7" striking the orbiter at Mach 3.6 resulting in tile damage and re-entry skin (aluminum) temperatures of approx. 420 deg.F peak. This temperature was stated as "peak" and short in duration, resulting in a "potential" for localized wing structural damage, but NOT catastrophic. Well, as we know now Lou, that analysis was flawed ....
After the accident, (Tuesday, I believe), my old office (at Huntington Beach) assembled the original debris assessment and thermal analysis team that have been disbursed throughout Southern California at other Boeing Facilities, now working other Programs. They received the same criteria the Houston guys had the day of launch, did their independent analysis (like they had for the last 20 years) and they came up with peak temperatures exceeding 620 deg. F for a most of the re-entry phase. As you know Lou .... aluminum flows at a much lower temp that 620 deg. F.
Getting back to what I said earlier about NASA "backpedaling" ........ if you look into what said above, Dittemore (NASA) ran with flawed thermal analysis that was done by a group of Boeing engineers (Houston) with little or no experience on real time Space Shuttle Thermal Analysis. These Boeing engineers were "in place" at Houston as a result directly because he (Dittemore) and Mott (Boeing) directed the Boeing Design Center and Program Office move to Houston. He and NASA and Boeing Management are doing whatever they can to redirect attention away from that thermal analysis that was done by the inexperienced thermal engineers rather than the guys that would have normally done it, but were no longer on the Program as a result of Dittemore's mandate to move Boeing's Design Center.
When I left the Program last July, along with most of the experienced Shuttle engineering base, most of us felt the Program was heading in a direction to have another "accident" ... but, we never thought it would happen this soon after we all left the Program.