US Threat Perceptions and Security Concerns

Today many foreign policy experts are reassessing the threats to American security in the post 9-11 world. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon brought America’s attention to terrorism, but threats originating from rouge regimes and traditional states still remain. This paper will show that global terrorism is the greatest short-term threat to US security, but that it is not the only threat. Rouge regimes also pose a serious threat to American security. And in the long-term, the most dangerous threat to US security is any technology or event that would neutralize nuclear deterrence between the US and other nuclear powers.

In 1775, the thirteen British colonies in America began an armed rebellion against their British homeland and the King of England. After eight long and bloody years, the war was over, and the Americans stood victorious against the greatest military power in the world. But America, at the end of the eighteenth century, was in many ways similar to a modern third world country. The American founding fathers were cognizant of their country’s weakness. America was not strong enough to engage the European powers. In his farewell speech, President Washington wrote, “Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.” (George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796). President Washington’s words became the first pillar of American security, a vigilant aloofness from European power politics. The second pillar of American security was based on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The oceans – America’s Great Wall – made it hard for European powers to project their power in the Western hemisphere, as the Revolutionary War had proven. But in order to ensure the oceanic defenses, America’s security depended on the complete geo-political independence of the entire Western Hemisphere from outside intrusion (A European power with a foothold in Mexico or Canada could overpower the US). The Monroe Doctrine stated, “It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord” (President Monroe, The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823).

We must remember that neither Washington nor Monroe preached isolationism, their ideas were merely the result of a rational assessment of the security environment. But by the middle of the 20th century, time began to chip away at the pillars of America’s security. The change is well documented in the famed Brookings Institution paper – published in 1945 – entitled A Security Policy for Postwar America. The US government quickly classified the document. Melvyn P. Leffler writes, “They concluded that it was essential to prevent any one power or coalition of powers from gaining control of Eurasia. The United States would not be able to withstand attack from an adversary who had subdued the whole of Europe and Eurasia” (Melvyn P. Leffler, The Cold War, p. 23). The advent of the military-industrial complex was changing America’s threat perceptions. At one time America may have been able to survive an attack from a united Europe, but by the 1940s the modern military might of Eurasia would overwhelm the US military. America had entered World War II only after it was directly attacked, but by the end of World War II, America began to realize that it could not simply pull out of Europe at the end of the war. The Soviet Union – the greatest threat to American security once the Axis Powers were defeated – could easily gobble up the European continent, and then Russia would pose the same threat to America that Germany had been before it was defeated. The Marshal Plan – a massive economic aid package designed to rebuild the European economies and keep them outside of communist expansion – was a telling example of how far America had strayed from Washington’s warning against entangling European alliances. Instead of endangering America, entangling alliances with Europe became necessary to maintain US security. But just as Washington’s advice in 1796 had been a product of its time, this new policy was simply a rational response to a changing security environment. The second pillar of American security crumbled with the invention and deployment of nuclear missiles in the USSR. America’s oceans could no longer protect the country from foreign threats. But a new Great Wall was constructed – radically different than the first – placing American security in the hands of a rational madness… nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence was not as reassuring as the oceanic defenses of the past – but it worked – not a single nuclear exchange occurred during the Cold War. But we have now entered a third era of American security. Today a nuclear (or biological or chemical) attack cannot be prevented by nuclear deterrence in every instance. Unlike in the past, a new Great Wall has not been constructed to protect America from a new threat… terrorists using WMD.

Today the theory of nuclear deterrence is facing new challenges that did not exist during the bipolar era of the Cold War, and many theorists are arguing over its future. Among these arguments is the question of whether or not nuclear proliferation to other states is good or bad for the international system. This debate is especially important for deciding how America should assess threats in this new era of security concerns. But first there is a need to understand the basic theory of nuclear deterrence that is so fundamental to America’s security. Kenneth N. Waltz writes, “In contrast to dissuasion by defense, dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but because the expected reaction of the opponent may result in one’s own severe punishment” (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 5). The theory of deterrence became especially important after the advent of nuclear weapons. Waltz writes, “In a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated” (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 9). In essence, Waltz is arguing that no rational actor would start a war with such a great risk for so little a reward. And because the consequences are so clear, nuclear actors do not need to be rational, they only need to have simple commonsense.

In the most abstract terms, nuclear deterrence exists when three criteria are met. First, a country must not have already preempted a nuclear capable country. Second, a country must have second-strike capability. Third, a country must have a firm command and control over the nuclear arsenal (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 50). During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was closely associated with mutual assured destruction (MAD). In this case, America and the USSR had the capability to utterly destroy each other, multiple times over. In this case nuclear war was inconceivable. A recent example of nuclear deterrence in action occurred between India and Pakistan. The Economist Magazine reports, “In December 2001…. it looked to much of the world as though the two nuclear powers were at the brink of war…. In fact, senior Indians politicians now admit in private, war was never seriously contemplated” (The Economist, Getting Warmer, May 10-16th 2003, p. 11).

Because of the high cost of a nuclear war, Waltz argues that the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries is desirable, because otherwise vulnerable countries will feel secure and become less dangerous. (The rational school of international relations teaches that states attempt to maximize their security, and the possession of nuclear deterrence may serve to convince their leaders that their security is maximized).

It is true that the theory of deterrence has worked perfectly with traditional states such as the US, Russia, or China, but it is unclear if the spread of nuclear arsenals to countries like North Korea or Iran will improve US security. Waltz is not worried however, he writes, “Idi Amin and Muammar el-Qaddafi, rulers of Uganda and Libya…were favorite examples of the kinds of rulers who supposedly could not be trusted to manage nuclear weapons responsibly” (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 13). If history repeats itself in North Korea and Iran, American security will be maintained.

But not everyone agrees with this assessment. Scott D. Sagan provides a counterpoint to Waltz, by explaining that nuclear deterrence will not work with rouge regimes the way it worked with the US or the old USSR. He argues that militaries have certain organizational biases that make nuclear war (or nuclear accidents) more likely, and he worries that future nuclear powers may be dominated by the military. He makes a convincing case, citing instances during the Cold War when the US military supported a nuclear war with the USSR, believing that war was inevitable and it was best to start the war before the USSR built an even more powerful nuclear arsenal (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 58). Waltz argues that even one nuclear missile launched at a city is enough to deter a nuclear exchange (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 9). But history shows that this was not the case for many military officers in the US and the USSR. During the Cold War, President Eisenhower had the final word on nuclear deployment, but some rouge regimes lack civilian leadership. Even more worrisome, some poor nuclear capable countries may not attempt to build a second strike capability – a prerequisite for nuclear deterrence – which would make the military even more pessimistic and likely to perceive a nuclear exchange as a conservative and preventive measure (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 63-72). After reviewing the differing ideas about nuclear deterrence, perhaps it should be concluded that it is wise to apply neither Sagan nor Waltz’s theory dogmatically to every situation.

Shortly after September 11th, the often-repeated mantra was “Everything has changed.” But experts had been warning for years that terrorism was a threat. The popular author Tom Clancy had even written a book about a terrorist that flew an airliner into the White House. On February 26, 1993 the World Trade Center was damaged by a 1,500 pound bomb explosion that killed six people and wounded more than a thousand. On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by terrorists off the coast of Aden in Yemen. Clearly September 11th did not usher in a new era of radical Islamic terrorism directed at America, it simply indicated a reality that already existed. It is understandable for politicians and the public to react to the deaths of more than twenty-seven hundred citizens and foreign nationals lost on September 11th, by focusing on the threat of terrorism. But the public is not alone in its threat assessment; terrorism has been clearly stated as the primary threat to US security, in the country’s official national security documents. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America declares, “The gravest danger our Nation faces at the crossroads of radicalism and technology” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. ii).

The reason for this is simple; terrorists with nuclear weapons cannot be deterred by the US (or any other nuclear capable country). The nuclear arsenals built up during the Cold War are ineffective, because terrorists do not rule cities or militaries that can be retaliated against. The fundamental reason that kept the US and the USSR from launching nukes at each other was the knowledge that their opponent could destroy just as many cities and military targets during nuclear exchange. But if a terrorist organization detonates a bomb in downtown Manhattan, how can the US respond? The US cannot launch a nuclear missile at the terrorist’s capital, because terrorists do not have capitals.

It is clear that America is most vulnerable in cases where it is unable to deter a threat by nuclear means. America is primarily concerned with terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. After all, even if Chinese soldiers entered America and detonated themselves as suicide bombers inside a shopping mall, the American response would not be to launch nuclear missiles at Beijing, even though China has cities to attack (although the option would certainly be a factor in any incident between nuclear sates). In the case of September 11th, non-nuclear means killed a great number of people and utterly destroyed an international economic center. The US response was to attack Afghanistan, a country that was lending aid to Al Qaeda. Because September 11th was not a nuclear attack, the US would not be expected to respond with a nuclear strike. But attaching a state to a terrorist organization was effective in allowing the US to use its military in its response to September 11th (when directly attacking Al Qaeda would be impossible), and to dissuade other states from working with terrorist organizations, which is important when addressing rouge regimes. Remember that the deaths caused by four jet airliners cannot come close to the destruction that would ensue if one nuclear bomb were used in New York by Al Qaeda. In fact, the greatest damage caused to America in strategic terms was economic. The same could not be said about a terrorist attack in which weapons of mass destruction are used.

Kenneth N. Waltz has written that the possibility of even one nuclear bomb detonated in a city can deter a country’s leader from using nuclear weapons (Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 9). This same principle should lead us to believe that the US leadership is extremely worried about terrorism, and will do everything it can to stop it. The first task is to be ever vigilant in tracking down terrorist cells throughout the world. The National Security Strategy states, “Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 5).

The other response to terrorism is diplomatic. Carl von Clausewitz is remembered for his often-repeated quote, “War is politics by other means.” In this light, we may ask, “What do the terrorists want?” One of the diplomatic actions America recently took was to announce the reduction of US forces from Saudi Arabia – one of the reasons Osama bin Laden has given for his hatred of America (Warren P. Strobel, Knight Ridder Newspapers, U.S. likely to reduce presence in Saudi Arabia after war in Iraq, Feb. 21, 2003). If Clausewitz is right, it may be assumed that political concessions can be given in order to bring an end to terrorist attacks. Certainly concessions like the one previously mentioned are worth considering. But believing that the type of terrorism directed at America can be totally stopped by political concessions may be greatly misguided. The best proponent of this idea – Lee Harris – believes that Islamic terrorism may be a form of a fantasy ideology. He writes that commentators from both the left and right have mistakenly assumed, “An act of violence on the magnitude of 9-11 can only have been intended to further some kind of political objective. What this political objective might be, or whether it is worthwhile — these are all secondary considerations; but surely people do not commit such acts unless they are trying to achieve some kind of recognizably political purpose” (Lee Harris, Policy Review, Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology). Harris cites the historical example of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia before World War II, in which the entire invasion was rationally idiotic, but was nonetheless carried out because Ethiopia served as “…a prop in the fantasy pageant of the new Italian Empire — that and nothing else” (Ibid). Harris writes, “The conquest was not the means to an end, as in Clausewitzian war; it was an end in itself” (Ibid). Harris believes that America is likewise a prop in Al Qaeda’s fantasy, “The terror attack of 9-11 was not designed to make us alter our policy, but was crafted for its effect on the terrorists themselves: It was a spectacular piece of theater” (Ibid). Harris continues, “As the purpose of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia was to prove to the Italians themselves that they were conquerors, so the purpose of 9-11 was not to create terror in the minds of the American people but to prove to the Arabs that Islamic purity, as interpreted by radical Islam, could triumph” (Ibid).

It must be concluded that terrorism may not only be immune to nuclear deterrence, but also to basic Clausewitzian assumptions. It is little wonder that terrorism is deemed by the American public, politicians, and government as the number one threat to US security.

With all of this being said, America must not concentrate on the threat of terrorism to the point where it becomes oblivious to other threats. Another category of threats – rouge regimes – straddle a blurry line between terrorism and traditional states. These regimes pose two distinct threats to America. The first is direct, in the form of a nuclear attack. In this case, rouge regimes are little different than traditional states. The second threat is far more dangerous; it is the danger of nuclear capable rouge regimes proliferating WMD to non-state terrorist organizations. North Korea and Iran are two examples of rouge regimes. Both have condemned America and prophesized its destruction. And even more importantly, both have a certain degree of unpredictability that traditional states typically lack.

North Korea’s unpredictability is well illustrated by North Korean leader Kim il Jong II’s threats to turn his geo-political region into a “sea of flame,” and statements that he could “torch” New York. On the other hand, in a news article written March 8 2003, the threats to America become a more clear. Kim Myong-chol said, "If American forces carry out a pre-emptive strike on the Yongbyon facility, North Korea will immediately target, carry the war to the US mainland," he said, adding that New York, Washington and Chicago would be "aflame" (Shane Green, We'll put a torch to New York, Herald Correspondent in Tokyo, March 8 2003). As Waltz would expect, North Korean threats are in relation to a preemptive strike launched against them, and is meant to remind the US that they are a nuclear power.

However, it can be argued that North Korea’s Dear Leader is not rational. While this is probably correct, in the case of nuclear deterrence, it can be argued that only commonsense is needed (as Waltz asserts in showing the clear and obvious consequences for nuclear war). In other words, even an idiot understands the impact of nuclear war. Dr. Jerrold Post – a former CIA psychologist, and Lee Chung Min – a South Korean expert – both believe that while North Korea’s leader is not crazy, he does know what he’s doing (Mark Simkin, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Dear Leader" the key to North Korea standoff, February 2, 2003). And this is far from reassuring, because North Korea can proliferate WMD to global terrorist organizations.

The CIA’s The World Factbook 2002 reports that the country has “…one of the world's most centrally planned and isolated economies, faces desperate economic conditions. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and spare parts shortages. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel. Despite a good harvest in 2001, the nation faces its ninth year of food shortages” (CIA, The World Factbook, 2002, North Korea). The report continues by noting, “Large-scale military spending eats up resources needed for investment and civilian consumption” (Ibid). The combination of North Korea’s acute need for capital plus an obsession for military technology may prove to be a deadly mix for American security. In desperate need of funds, North Korea has resorted to selling arms on the open (or black) market. In December 2002, a ship carrying twelve Scuds from North Korea was caught in the Indian Ocean destined for Yemen. This was far from an isolated case; North Korea has a history of such activity.

At a certain point in the not so distant future, North Korea will have created enough nuclear warheads to build an effective nuclear deterrence, what will then happen? Judging from its economic situation, and the arms deals it has arranged in the past, it is not inconceivable that North Korea will attempt to sell nuclear weapons. At this point arguments showing that a nuclear North Korea is not a threat to US security will breakdown. While it may be true that Kim Yong is not rational, it has been shown that commonsense is all that is needed to stop a leader from starting a nuclear conflict. So perhaps we can decide that a direct preemptive nuclear strike conducted by North Korea against the US is unlikely. But selling nuclear weapons, and thinking through all of the various outcomes that may arise after making the transaction in return for desperately needed capital, is a situation where commonsense does not apply. We cannot so easily dismiss the second threat that North Korea poses to US security… nuclear proliferation. If nuclear arms are sold, what will the buyer do with them? Will North Korea be caught before the sale is made? What if they nuclear warheads are used by a terrorist organization against the US? And what if the US knows where the nuclear warheads came from, will they launch a nuclear strike in retaliation. And what if the nuclear warheads are never used? Or if they are used, would the US be willing to launch a nuclear strike against North Korea, when doing so would cause more nuclear bombs to explode in American cities (because North Korea would respond to what they would claim to be a preemptive strike), when North Korea did not physically launch the warheads, but only sold them? These questions are not answered by commonsense. In fact, they may not even be answered by the most rational minds on the planet. But one thing is clear, nuclear deterrence – even with the common sense criteria – may not apply to North Korean nuclear proliferation.

In response to the argument that North Korea is likely to proliferate WMD to terrorist organizations, it can be convincingly argued that North Korea acquired nuclear weapons only for the purpose of ensuring its security against US aggression, with no thought of proliferating to terrorists. But after remembering North Korea’s history of weapons proliferation and its acute poverty, it can just as easily be argued that gaining nuclear deterrence has made it more likely it will continue to proliferate, because it is now even safer than before against US aggression – even if proliferation was not the root cause for North Korea’s nuclear program.

Because North Korea already possesses long-range missiles that may be able to deliver nuclear warheads to the west coast of the United States, and America does not have a workable missile defense (and it would have to work 100% of the time in order for a preemptive strike against North Korea to even be considered), the US has its hands tied. The best it can do is attempt to place diplomatic pressure on North Korea in conjunction with the other regional powers, especially China, and to attempt to intercept every arms deal in order to catch any WMD transactions. The final – and perhaps equally important policy – is to convince North Korea that America will respond with nuclear warheads if it gives terrorists WMD that are then used against America. This would place both the direct nuclear threat, and the proliferation threat, in the context of nuclear deterrence.

Iran is another rouge regime that has been gaining attention in recent weeks. Iran has one key difference distinguishing it from North Korea… Iran probably does not yet possess nuclear weapons. This same fundamental difference was important in determining how the Bush administration handled North Korea and Iraq. America can use its conventional military against non-nuclear states with awesome results. So when addressing the possibility of American intervention against non-nuclear states, the question is not can America, but should America? Iran currently has a democratic movement hoping to topple the fundamentalist Islamic regime that currently rules Iran. Certainly the best-case scenario would be to have a domestic revolution in which a democratic movement holding moderate views of America overthrew the Iranian government. But if this does not take place, America must decide if it is willing to have another North Korea to deal with in the war on terrorism.

Iran is as hostile toward America as North Korea, and with close connections to Hezbollah, it would have many opportunities to pass along nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. The wrinkle in this assessment that a nuclear Iran would be similar to North Korea is that while North Korea is a communist country, Iran is ruled by Islamic fundamentalists, who believe (or appear to believe) that the afterlife can be gained in martyrdom against America. In this case, forecasts based on rational actors or even commonsense will not necessarily predict Iranian behavior. For Islamic radicals, commonsense may tell them that attaining afterlife is worth a nuclear holocaust. But on the other hand, it is not Osama bin Laden who straps explosive belts to his chest, but the minions under his control. And perhaps the Iranian leaders are the same way, willing to sacrifice their people’s lives, but not their own. It is hard to say. The most feasible policy option is to exert pressure on Iran, by reminding Iran about what happened to Iraq. By doing so America may be able to gain real diplomatic concessions, including Iranian promises to not go nuclear and to have regular inspections, in return for American ambivalence.

The best hope is with the student uprisings taking place in Iran. The Iranian people are very patriotic, and even though they despise their government, in the advent of an American invasion, they would probably support the government against the US military. However, many Iranians want American help, even if it is only moral support. The challenge for the US is to support the Iranians in every way possible short of offending their nationalism, while also refraining from stringing the Iranians out ala the Shia uprising in Iraq after the Gulf War. There will be many factors in play, but the situation is very hopeful. The Iranians have been demonstrating against their tyrannical government in the cause of freedom, at great risk to their lives. The overthrow of the Iranian regime would greatly increase American security. Seldom have American interests and ideals been so closely aligned in one event, in which those in need of freedom have shown a willingness to risk their lives for it, and instead of depending on American military might to free them, they refuse it. We should give what aid and support we can to this proud and ancient people. It serves our interests, and the interests of liberty.

At the heart of the decision making process for how to deal with Iran and North Korea (and other rouge regimes) rests the question of whether or not nuclear proliferation is good or bad for American security. There are well-reasoned arguments on both sides, but one thing is absolutely clear. Nuclear proliferation is incredibly dangerous to American security if these regimes proceed to proliferate WMD to terrorists that cannot be deterred by American nuclear missiles.

It is in the context of traditional state threats that America is most secure, because America’s Great Wall of nuclear deterrence is still effective. Both Russia and China are strong nuclear powers that can deter American nuclear power, and more importantly for our purposes, these states are also deterred by American nuclear power. The recent Iraq War has displayed American conventional military superiority; neither Russia nor China can match it. Both countries’ responses to the Iraq War were completely rational; they emphasized their nuclear deterrent. A May 18, 2003 NewsMax article, reported, “Russia will ‘launch’ a mock nuclear attack against the U.S. and Britain during military exercises over the next week” (NewsMax Wires, Russia Preparing for Nuclear Attacks on U.S, Britain, Sunday, May 18, 2003). The article went on to note, “If the mock strikes were real, they would kill 125 million Americans in the first three days of such an attack, with tens of millions more casualties in the weeks after” (Ibid). This is MAD at its worst, and thus its finest. China also took note of American success in the Iraq War, but its response is slightly different. First, it is in a better economic situation than Russia. Second, it considers America a greater security threat than Russia considers America a threat. This has led to China’s policy of stepping up conventional military funding, in order to match American power in regional disputes. But China’s conventional military is still inferior to the American military, so nuclear deterrence is still the most important aspect of the American-Chinese strategic relationship (Jon Dougherty, WND, China steps up preparation for U.S. conflict, April 8, 2003). Another Chinese response to American conventional superiority is a focus on cyber-warfare. A WND story by Jon Dougherty reports, “The Chinese military is preparing to launch new ‘exploratory’ cyber-attacks against U.S. defense and civilian computer networks and systems as part of Beijing's continuing efforts to level the playing field against the American military” (Jon Dougherty, WorldNetDaily, Beijing preparing new cyber-attacks, May 31, 2002).

While addressing the threats originating from Russia or China, it should be kept in mind that terrorists can terrorize, but only states can conquer. This is why the long-term threat perception of America must always be cognizant of other great powers. While political leaders and military officers may hope for the best, they must always prepare for the worst. This is why America must prepare for the worst-case scenario – however far off – in which nuclear deterrence is neutralized. This may be why ballistic missile defense is supported in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. ii). This policy could be dangerous, and it may even destabilize the international system – but within the narrow rubric of rational actors attempting to maximize their security – it makes perfect sense. Especially when there is the risk that another country may possess the technology first. Despite criticism from many experts that constructing a workable missile defense is impossible, Henry Kissinger has written that he is convinced the prospects of a workable missile defense are good. He observed, “This view of America’s potential is obviously shared by Russia and China, as is shown by their persistent opposition to any American missile defense system” (Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, p. 65). Another reason for believing that MAD is not necessarily a fact of nature is psychological in nature. Would democratic and liberal countries actually respond to a nuclear blast from a communist country – whose population has no control over the actions of its government – by retaliating in kind? But perhaps the most likely threat to America from traditional states such as Russia or China is the possibility of a nuclear accident. In this case, missile defense could save the world from a nuclear exchange, and a global holocaust, if one or two ballistic missiles were accidentally launched at the US (Ibid). We do know that the threat posed by Russia, China, or any other powerful nuclear country is not as likely as the threat of terrorism, but it is still extremely dangerous.

It is best to assess the threats to American security through the lens of nuclear deterrence. The most immediate threat to American security is obviously terrorism. It is the only threat that can bypass nuclear deterrence with impunity, and it cannot even be certain that terrorists desire specific political goals that can be granted in order to satisfy the grievances of global terrorism. The next most pressing danger to American security is the possibility that a rouge regime could sell a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization – once again circumventing American deterrence. And the greatest long-term threat to American security is the neutralization of American nuclear deterrence by a strong nuclear power with superior technology or strategy. And if history teaches us anything, it is that even “sure things” like nuclear deterrence may be rendered obsolete with the passage of time. Castles, the Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line, and even the Atlantic and Pacific oceans have been bypassed by superior military strategy and technology. It was not so long ago that the German war machine was gathering momentum in the early weeks of World War II, preparing to invade France. History tells us that France never had the slightest suspicion that the Germans might simply march around the Maginot Line, and enter France through the Ardennes Forest. This simple oversight proved disastrous. Today, American policy makers must continue to react to an ever-changing security environment, so that the United States of America does not fall prey to the same complacent dull wittedness that betrayed the French in 1940.

George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm

President Monroe, The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/monroe.htm

Melvyn P. Leffler, Edited by Klaus Larres and Ann Lane, The Cold War, Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 23

Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., p. 5, 9, 13, 50

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. ii, 5

Warren P. Strobel, Knight Ridder Newspapers, U.S. likely to reduce presence in Saudi Arabia after war in Iraq, Feb. 21, 2003 http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/warren_p_strobel/5235275.htm

Lee Harris, Policy Review, Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology http://www.policyreview.org/AUG02/harris_print.html

Shane Green, The Sydney Morning Herald, We'll put a torch to New York, March 8, 2003 http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/07/1046826533281.html

Mark Simkin, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Dear Leader" the key to North Korea standoff, February 2, 2003 http://www.abc.net.au/pm/s784891.htm

CIA, The World Factbook, 2002, North Korea http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html

NewsMax Wires, Russia Preparing for Nuclear Attacks on U.S, Britain, Sunday, May 18, 2003 http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/5/16/102442.shtml

Jon Dougherty, WorldNetDaily, Beijing preparing new cyber-attacks, May 31, 2002 http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=27800

Jon Dougherty, WND, China steps up preparation for U.S. conflict, April 8, 2003 http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=31931

Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, Simon and Schuster, 2001, p. 65

I wonder if he had an editor for this? Engrossing read but it grated to see "rouge regime" so often. (sponsored by Max Factor?) I think he meant rogue.

Rouge Regimes: North Korea, Iran

It's really hard to take people seriously, when they can't do their job. I'm not a proofreader, but then i don't get paid to be one either. What's wrong with people these days?

Great Read!, You post some great thought provoking articles LL

Much appreciated & FReegards,

MJY

We should have nuked them all on 9/12/2001.

Failing that, we should announce--loudly--what will happen to Mecca and Medina should another atrocity be committed against our civilian population--and mean it.

--Boris

Can someone help me w/this?.....If it's been reported for the last 25 years that a highschool student can build a nuclear bomb in their kitchen w/instructions off the internet, THEN why is it that everyone keeps saying that these countries DON'T yet have nuclear weapons? Geesh, can't they for nickels and dimes pick up the parts and even some rouge (ha, just kidding), roque uranium? These countries have had decades to save up the money or steal it or whatever, and if they can't just out-and-out BUY one, then certainly they can piece a few together - fuel is everywhere. It can't be that hard. 'splain me, please.

You are right......it can be annoying. These weblog editors probably do double and triple duty to keep their sites afloat. Good article overall, tho.

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