The Next Korean War Using the military is an option. Here's how it can be done.

http://www.opinionjournal.com ^ | Monday, August 4, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT | JAMES WOOLSEY AND THOMAS G. MCINERNEY

[BCrago66]

The White House had a shape-of-the-table announcement last week: North Korea would participate in six-sided talks with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. This was welcome but it changes nothing fundamental. Kim Jong Il has clearly demonstrated his capacity for falsehood in multilateral as well as bilateral forums. The bigger, and much worse, news is the overall course of events this summer.

[risk]

All good points. I don't think that anti-war sentiment was significant in our decision to stop at the 38th parallel. It didn't take the (non-existent) protest of the soldiers' parents to convince the civilian control over the military, which knew about all the issues you raise, realize that it was the better part of valor.

Maybe you would agree, or have some clarifications to add to this: I think maybe that the allied mistakes that led to the Korean war happened at Yalta and in our decision not to support the Koumingdong. Stalin hadn't been adequately warned at Yalta before WWII was over as to how the allies would react if he engaged in Soviet imperialism. Chang Kaishek's rout emboldened the communists everywhere. We had appeased the Russians at the Elbe, and we had embarassed them in the Berlin airlift. And North Korea was ripe for the picking due to its wholesale domination by Kim Il Sung's dictatorship.

Prelude to the Korean War: Setting the Stage

[The Pheonix]

yes, I agree with your excellent analysis of the Allied failure at Yalta, and the failure to support the KMT . that's absolutely a big factor when Stalin decided to iniate the Korean War. He took it as a sign of American weakness ??????

[RANGERAIRBORNE]

OK, I hope you are correct- but I have spent quite a few years in that part of the world, and I do not see the Japanese people being supportive of such a use the JSDF.

Also, there is a political/historical problem, in that the Koreans have not forgotten completely the horrors of the long Japanese occupation. I wouldn't think that North or South would like to see Japanese soldiers there again.

[risk]

You may well be right. I think we have to be careful about rearming Japan -- there are a few nutcases there still. But we need stronger allies in the Pacific.

[Mamzelle]

re: This isn't something we can do without South Korean approval, and obviously there's no enthusiasm among South Koreans for risking their own well-being to serve the security interests of a patron they no longer appreciate. )))

People keep underestimating the Skorean military--it is substantial. All it'd take would be a few nukes to achieve complete parity with NK, and China is likely aware of that. I do not believe they (SK) need the US as much as writers here believe. What they do need is some *will*...

[risk]

The south Koreans I know are all for flower power.

[nravoter]

Human scum / bloodsucker bump.

[lepton]

Sure, we could eventually take out the artillery, but when? And after how many rounds would have been fired?

.................North Korea.South Korea.U. S.
Active personnel...1,080,000.....550,000.37,500
Reserves.............600,000.....600,000....n/a
Battle tanks...........3,500.......2,280....116
Fighting vehicles......2,500.......2,480....126
Artillery.............10,000.......6,387.....45
Air defense guns......11,000.........270....n/a
Combat aircraft..........594.........470....100
Attack helicopters........24.........150....n/a
Combat ships.............159.........169....n/a

U.S. Forces, Korea / Combined Forces Command Combined Ground Component Command (GCC)

US Forces, Korea (USFK) is the joint headquarters through which US combat forces would be sent to the CFC's fighting components - the Ground, Air, Naval and Combined Marine Forces Component Commands. Major USFK Elements include the Eighth US Army, US Air Forces Korea (Seventh Air Force) and US Naval Forces Korea. USFK includes more than 85 active installations in the Republic of Korea and has about 37,500 US military personnel assigned in Korea. Major U.S. units in the ROK include the Eighth U.S. Army and Seventh Air Force.

Principal equipment in EUSA includes 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, e.g., Patriot, and 70 AH-64 helicopters. EUSA has the capability to perform required tasks under various circumstances using this equipment.

US Air Forces Korea possesses approximately 100 aircraft: advanced fighters, e.g., 70 F-16s, 20 A-10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligence-collecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. With this highly modern equipment, US Air Forces Korea has sufficient capability to launch all-weather attacks and to conduct air support operations under all circumstances. In the event the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command augment them, the capability of USFK will substantially increase both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Analysts: U.S. pullback from DMZ not likely to undercut deterrence

South Korea has the misfortune of a capital that sits within range of hostile weaponry. Less than 40 miles separate Seoul from North Korean missile and artillery units stacked just north of the DMZ.

"Seoul is within range of 130 mm guns and 170 mm long-range self-propelled guns," Dunnigan said. "But the biggest killer would be long-range rockets, mainly the 240 mm ones."

M-1978 / M1989 (KOKSAN) 170mm self propelled (SP) gun

estimated at "40,000 m" to "over 50km"
24 miles / 40 km = extended range full-bore hollow-base (ERFBHB)
30 miles / 50 km = extended range full-bore base-bleed (ERFBBB)
35 miles / 60 km = rocket assisted projectile (RAP)

According to one report, a South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm "could fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs." The number of Koksan guns is not publicly reported, but it is reliably reported that North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s. Large caliber self propelled artillery pieces typically have a sustained rate of fire of between four and eight rounds per minute. This suggests a total rate of fire of artillery alone of between 2,000 and 4,000 rounds per minute. The DPRK's two hundred 240mm MRLs fire either 12 or 22 rounds, providing a maximum single salvo of no more than 4,400 rounds.

240MM ROCKET LAUNCHER M-1985 240MM ROCKET LAUNCHER M-1991

These launchers can fire a first strike of many thousands of missiles and return in a few minutes to protected caves or to alternate firing positions. The MRLs move out from underground facilities (UGFs), fire from preplanned firing positions, and return to the UGFs. Examination of the available data on the UGF sites suggests that a number of possible “exit and return” methods for the MRLs may be possible. In this case, the launchers move directly from the firing points to the UGFs. This procedure makes it difficult to target the launchers, because once they fire it only takes 75 seconds to return to their UGFs. The MRLs can fire their complete set of rockets in 44 seconds. Data from the Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Project Office indicates that the crew then needs two minutes to lower the launcher, raise the stabilizing pads, and quickly return to the UGF. This gives a total exposure time of 164 seconds. However, it is possible that the MRLs could displace faster than the JSPD case or that they might take longer. [SOURCE]

Range estimate is only 35k though.

I wonder what the training level is on this, and how many of the sites are known and pre-targetted. Unfortunately, if the above information is correct, we only have 45-60 major artillery pieces, so nearly all would have to be done via air-power.

This is a set battlefield, so likely North Korea has a well-established and diverse comunications grid in place - though also likely we know precisely where the overwhelming majority of their fixed artillery pieces sit - especially the ones in deployed position. They have quite a number of mobile ones, but I wonder if they are very functional if they have been training to shoot-and-move.

[Filibuster_60]

Hindsight is always 20/20. We know for a fact that stopping Hitler would've been easier in '36 than in '39. But that doesn't mean it would've been easy in absolute terms - quite the contrary, attacking him when just about everyone in the West wanted to preserve peace could have been catastrophic. Democracies don't fight unless first attacked, because living in a constant state of warfare undermines the freedoms they take for granted. Only when it becomes crystal-clear that further inaction will result in something far more terrible do free societies swing into action with full vigor. When our vital interests aren't so clearly at stake, like during Vietnam, our military is compelled to fight battles without solid public support, we're made to question whether the loss of life is really worth it, and that's how we can lose. Right now, despite its nukes, NK probably doesn't constitute as big a threat in most American minds to warrant the option of last resort.

[rmlew]

We don't need artillary to take out the North Korean Artillary. (Although a few MLRS systems would be nice.)
Our first generation of brilliant weapons would do nicely.
Imagine the following scenario.
24 Super Hornets are launched from a carrier, each carrier 4 JSOW's. The JSOW's are lanched 80 miles from the DMZ. 12 open up over a specific target box (gotta love GPS) droping 145 smart submunitions. Each of these submunitions targets an individual artillry piecem muntions depot, or light vehicle with a combined effects warhead. 8 JSOW-B's open up to carry 24 anti-tank guided munitions. The remaining 4 JSOW-C's hit barracks.
At the same time Navy planes carrying the stealthy JASSM's hit command and control facilities and radar facilities. The entire attack would take under 15 minutes from the launch point 80 miles over the ocean.
F-16's carrying HARM's take out the surviving radar stations whose crews are foolish enough to turn on their units in an uncoordinated manner.
A-10's carrying Maveriks and cluster bombs take out the rest.

American B-2's could take out the WMD's and major structures. A few dozen Tomahawk missles, launched ahead of the Navy fighters would hit the North Korean missle facilities and airfields.

After an hour or day of total shock and awe, American radio broadcasts messages urging surrender to the North Korean troops and leaders.
I don't think that the shattered military and starving populace would choose to die for Kim Jong-Il.

[lepton]

We don't need artillary to take out the North Korean Artillary. (Although a few MLRS systems would be nice.)

When I began looking the information up for my post, I started with the idea that putting down scatterable mines and sub-munitions over the whole of the area that the artillery would come from would be doable. It may well be. There is no question that we would be able to bring a great deal of firepower to bear. The problem with relying wholly on the submunitions is that anything sheltered or unexposed will survive, and be capable of then firing. The MRLSs that the North Koreans have can move out, fire their dozen or two dozen rockets, and move back under cover for reloading within three minutes. To take these out requires singular munitions addressed against them.

The counter side of this is that many of N Koreas hardened facilities are 20km or so behind the DMZ, and further, the mountains limit the types of guns and rockets that can actually strike Seoul.

In a general strike, one has the potential of facing 8,000 large caliber artillery rounds hitting the northern part of a city of 10,000,000, in a predesignated fire pattern, in the first minute. One has a lot of loose ends to sweep up very rapidly. This really isn't a military attack, but rather a terror one against civilians.

[Diddle E. Squat]

bump

[thoughtomator]

Japan is #4 in the world in defense spending... after the USA, Saudi Arabia (!), and Russia.

[thoughtomator]

We also need to consider whether NK actually has the resources to use much of its armed forces. Are all those artillery gunners trained? Where is NK going to get the oil to run 3000 tanks? How many of those million men in the army are well fed enough to properly aim and shoot a rifle? All we really know of North Korea is that it is falling apart and desperate for resources... nations without resources can't fight wars.

IMO if there is a Korean War II, the most NK will be able to do without Chinese help is give SK a bloody nose, briefly, before NK ceases to exist and the entire peninsula is reunited under the SK government (and perhaps given the worst humanitarian situation in human history to clean up).

[lepton]

I would expect the North Korean soldiers to be able to load their weapons, trot them out of the shelters, and fire them off - which should make a mess out of northern Seoul. After that, it gets dicey. Fixed bunkers should work fine, but maneuver would likely have a rough time for larger units.

The problem isn't the long part of the war. The problem is the first ten to fifteen minutes after the attack order is given. The North Koreans don't have to GO anywhere to strike targets. And after they have done so, if it is not they who have struck first without provocation (rhetorical or real) what will be the politics in South Korea and the U.S.?

[ought-six]

"I never served; I hope we get some military Freepers on this thread to access whether the strategy above sounds plausible."

U.S. Air Force vet here, 1970-1974, Air Force Intelligence (USAFSS). To answer your questions: Yes, it is plausible. However, I would like to have some domestic (i.e., in-country N. Korea) help from N. Korea elements who can be "turned". That will be necessary to neutralize the lunatic dwarf at the outset, which will precipitate an early collapse and defeat of the N. Korean military.

[RANGERAIRBORNE]

Multiple tours in Korea, including with Special Forces (advising and training South Korean forces, and pursuing NK infiltrators).

Do not underestimate the enemy- the NK Army is well-trained and well-fed. While they do not have the logistical support necessary for a long war, we are not TALKING about a "long war". The problems for us arise in the first few hours of the next war (that is, civilian and military casualties that will horrify the world- and could cause "regime change" in South Korea, as well as here at home).

There is not the slightest doubt who would "win" this war (even if the Chinese came in). The question is whether we are willing to take these casualties.

I'm pretty sure that we are not.

[1COUNTER-MORTER-68]

ping

[1COUNTER-MORTER-68]

Some Things Never Change,,
All Roads Lead To Rome,,,,{{{{{{{{ KLANG }}}}}}}}

[1COUNTER-MORTER-68]

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