The first steps to save Bastogne were taken on 18 December, when Middleton dispatched the recently arrived Combat Command B to the northeast, east, and southeast of the town with orders to hold their positions at all cost. Such action indicated to the Germans that Bastogne would not be surrendered. In the week that followed, the Germans squeezed the perimeter around Bastogne tighter and tighter, but it did not break.
Throughout the defensive sector, McAuliffe organized the 101st and its attachments into regimental task forces. Each had its proportional share of artillery, tanks, antitank, and antiair forces. Thus, light infantry received supplemental firepower in their defense. With the exception of artillery, the Germans were similarly organized. Their artillery was kept primarily in general support.
On 19 December, small German infantry-armor forces, both with and without artillery support, infiltrated under cover of bad weather. German action also included night fighting with tanks. The Americans resisted strongly in all sectors, defending outlying villages and road intersections. By nightfall, XLVII Corps had been contained along the line Noville-Bizory-Neffe. The inadequate road network; old, brokendown and overloaded German vehicles; and the American artillery around Bastogne were slowing the German advance. With pressure from Heeresgruppe to push beyond Bastogne, Fifth Panzer Army and XLVII Corps decided that the Panzer Lehr Division should take Bastogne on the twentieth while the other forces continued their westward advance.
On 20 and 21 December, the same pattern of small-unit infiltration continued, with some gains accruing to the Germans. The villages of Noville and Bizory were finally taken, but an attack against Marvie was repulsed. Bastogne continued to be a matter of concern to XLVII Corps. But it was believed on the twentieth that, with advances continuing north and south of the town, Bastogne would soon be encircled and that the 26th Volksgrenadier Division following the panzer divisions could capture it. Indeed, the town was surrounded on the twenty-first, but the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was not strong enough to take it. Though surrounded, the 101st was not cut off. The division still maintained communication with VIII Corps and knew an American relief column was pushing toward them as German advances along the entire Western Front were diminishing. The Fifth Panzer Army refused to authorize sufficient additional forces to take Bastogne and to keep the faltering offensive alive. But the 26th Volksgrenadier Division still had the mission, with some help from the Panzer Lehr Division. On the evening of 21 December, Manteuffel and Luettwitz composed the now famous surrender note that, after being delivered to the 101st on 22 December, received McAuliffe's more famous reply: "Nuts."
In addition to the note on 22 December, there were continuous probes along the entire perimeter. Only two German attacks of any significance occurred, however, and both were no larger than company size. On 23 December, probes continued to the west and southeast, but the weather had cleared and American airpower was beginning to take its toll of German forces and equipment. Aerial resupply also began that day, bringing the 101st badly needed supplies and sending American morale soaring.
The Germans were becoming desperate. The XLVII Corps was informed that the 9th Panzer Division and 15th Panzergrenadier Division would come under corps control on 24 December, and the 3d Panzergrenadier Division would arrive later. Heeresgruppe still insisted on Bastogne being taken in conjunction with the advance to the Meuse, but with Fifth Panzer Army now on the defensive almost everywhere and the possibility of advancing to the Meuse River becoming slimmer each day, Army Chief of Staff General Wagener felt "the initiative seemed to have passed to the enemy."
The situation on 24 and 25 December revived Luettwitz' hope that his corps could take Bastogne. Reinforcements now promised by Fifth Panzer Army were essential for this success. During the night of 24 December, German combined arms and infantry attacks by pessimistic commanders and uninspired soldiers were uncoordinated and failed. On the twenty-fifth, the ring around Bastogne was tightened as a result of regimental-size attacks, but again, they were uncoordinated. The American advantage of interior lines clearly served to complicate German attempts to coordinate their efforts. That evening, XLVII Corps, apprehensive about the American relief column pushing through, requested reinforcements and wanted to call off the attacks. The German Fifth Army, appreciating the situation but powerless to act, could only offer sympathy and a promise to look for more reinforcements.
On 26 December, German forces again attacked with battalion-size infantry and armor teams. Striking American combined arms teams arrayed in depth, the Germans were again unsuccessful. Other units, forming for attack in assembly areas, were attacked by American artillery and dispersed. At 1600 that afternoon, American tanks broke through the 2d Panzer and 26th Volksgrenadier Divisions and linked up with the 101st. All hope for German success had died. The XLVII Corps had no forces available to eliminate this penetration, and the Fifth Panzer Army's offer of the Führer Begleit Brigade was too little and too late. Light German probing attacks continued on the 27th and 28th, but the XLVII Panzer Corps' defensive inclinations were more predominant. The 101st had held Bastogne and seriously retarded the German Ardennes offensive. In action from 18 through 27 December, the 101st and its attachments had suffered 115 officer and 1,933 enlisted casualties. They had killed 7,000 Germans, captured 697 prisoners, and destroyed approximately 200 armored vehicles.
Hi Sam..about the Ardenne's offensive.
Have read a few comments by German writers and participants concerning order of battle movement.
The Germans had excellent firepower at their disposal..ammuntion supplies were adequate aswell.
Yet they became static around some of the towns and open fields.
why they did not bypass and press on ..with the weather helping keep U.S. air support down is anyones guess.
have you come accross any reports concerning a breakdown in command structure with the Germans.
Did Hitler start to obsess over places like Bastonge ...like Stalingrad?