February 13 - 16, 1862
"I am going over to attack Fort Donelson tomorrow," Union Gen. Ulysses S. Grant told a newspaper reporter. "Do you know how strong it is?" the reporter asked. "Not exactly," Grant replied, "but I think we can take it. At all events, we can try."
It was this almost casual attitude of Grant's that caused his commander in St. Louis, Gen. Henry W. Halleck, to consider him rash and careless. President Abraham Lincoln, on the other hand, considered Grant's willingness to engage in battle a rare trait not shared by enough of his generals. Lincoln would tell Grant detractors, "I can't spare this man; he fights."
Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River had fallen to Union forces on February 6, 1862, but not before most of the Rebel garrison had retreated to the much stronger Fort Donelson, 12 miles away on the Cumberland River. Even though Halleck advised restraint, on February 11 Grant began the advance overland from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. The four ironclad gunboats, commanded by Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote, that had battered Fort Henry into submission again steamed down the Tennessee to the Ohio River and then up the Cumberland River toward Fort Donelson.
By the afternoon of February 12, Grant's 15,000-man force had arrived at Fort Donelson, formed its lines in a semicircle around the fort, and had begun waiting for the gunboats. The next day, 12,000 federal reinforcements bolstered Grant's forces, and the first of the gunboats arrived and began bombarding the fort. The rest of Foote's flotilla arrived the next morning and at midafternoon steamed toward Donelson with their cannon firing continuously. But Fort Donelson was much more formidable than Fort Henry had been, and the gunboats took a terrible punishment from the fort's guns. The Rebels had placed their cannon on high ground and the plunging fire had soon disabled two of the ironclads and wounded Foote. Recognizing defeat, Foote ordered his gunboats to withdraw.
Grant was in a bind. It suddenly looked like he faced a long siege, since the navy couldn’t win it for him. Worse, he had a green army and he didn’t think he could storm the Fort. Finally, the weather was dreadful, wet formerly and not frosty as well, and the army didn’t have tents. Meanwhile, the Confederates could supply themselves along the river, protected by the Fort. Confederate stupidity bailed Grant out.
The Confederates didn’t think about supplying themselves by water; it was unconventional, and they were cut off by land. They also thought Grant was stronger than he really was, and being continually reinforced. They worried that Foote would turn up with another fleet. In a council of war on the night of February 14, they decided to try and break out.
The plan was to reinforce the left (Pillow) with Buckner’s men from the right. Pillow would lead the attack and clear the road to Charlotte and Nashville. Buckner’s men would keep the road open while the rest of the garrison was evacuated, and everybody would join the main army in central Tennessee. It almost happened. Pillow, with Buckner joining the attack, broke the Union line in late morning. They captured 300 prisoners, about 5,000 rifles, and an artillery battery. Indecision then lost the victory. Pillow was cautious, Buckner bold, and Floyd foolish. After hemming and hawing Floyd ordered his (victorious) men to return to the trenches. Meanwhile Grant returned to the field. He’d been conferring with Foote (wounded, so the conference had to be on the gunboat) and returned in time to rescue the battle.
He ordered his reserve into action, attacking the Fort rather than the victorious Confederate left. The deploying attack was what drew the Confederates back to their trenches, but Buckner’s men didn’t arrive in time. They held the Union to only limited gains, but the Confederate’s main defensive line was broken. They had broken the Union line, but snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Grant also rallied his right, and reoccupied most of the ground lost in the morning, so the day closed with a near-total Union advantage.
One opportunity remained for the Southerners: McClernand hadn’t blocked the river road; a part, perhaps a substantial part, of the Confederate forces could escape. Floyd lacked the strength of will to risk his men, and held another council of war. The decision was to surrender. But Floyd decided that wasn’t good enough for him. He reckoned his own life was at risk if he was taken prisoner (as U.S. Secretary of War he’d made some decisions that helped the seceding states, and he was under indictment) and hopped on the last steamer to Nashville. (He did take about 2,000 Virginia infantry with him.) Gideon Pillow then declared he was too valuable to lose, and Buckner was left to make the actual surrender, although he’d always argued for more fighting. Another man refused to surrender, and Nathan Forrest broke out along the river road with his cavalry regiment and a few infantry. On February 16, 1862, the 12,000-man garrison surrendered. Buckner had enquired about terms and Grant uncompromisingly replied “No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.” Buckner fumed that it was “ungenerous and unchivalrous” but it was warlike. With a demoralized command he had no choice.
Additional Sources:
www.civilwaralbum.com
www.state.tn.us
usa-civil-war.com
www.rugreview.com
www.nps.gov
www.lmunet.edu
www.civilwaralbum.com
www.galwest.com
