How The Hydra-Headed Monster Spread Its Tentacles Despite Musharraf’s denials, it is clear that the nuclear proliferation was not carried out clandestinely by just a few ‘rogue’ scientists
SHEBONTI RAY DADWAL
In November 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi surprised the world by not only pledging to dismantle his unconventional weapons programme, but also invited nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect the facilities. But, it was while combing through Libya’s nuclear weapons infrastructure that the stunned inspectors slowly uncovered the sophisticated network of nuclear suppliers, spanning West Asia, East and South Asia and Africa, with secret bank accounts used by the middlemen from Europe, South Africa, Sri Lanka and other countries spread across the Persian Gulf. As the IAEA director-general Mohammad El Bareidi later said at the World Economic Forum, he was taken aback by the complexity of the illicit trafficking through which Libya had attained the material and blueprints for the nuclear weapons design.
However, what is more important is the discovery that the data and assistance in developing Libya’s uranium enrichment capabilities were supplied by Pakistan, apparently after Colonel Gaddafi’s offer to India to acquire nuclear technology in return for money, oil and business was rejected.
A few months prior to Libya’s declaration to surrender its nuclear programme, the IAEA had also discovered that Iran’s nuclear programme was far more advanced than it was led to believe.
In fact, in the early 1990s, there were reports that the Iranian centrifuges were suspiciously similar to those used by Pakistan in the early phases of its own programme. And given the frequent visits of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the erstwhile head of the eponymous
Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), to Iran during that period, the needle of suspicion was pointed more directly at Islamabad. Recently, Iran has also confessed that it first got help for its uranium enrichment programme in 1987, routed through Dubai by a network of middlemen, at a time when relations with Pakistan were more than friendly. Now the IAEA findings in both Iran and Libya have finally led the agency and the global nuclear community to acknowledge that the epicentre of this trade in nuclear material and know-how is Pakistan.
Calling the scale of the global market in nuclear-related material and equipment “the Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation”, Mr El Bareidi further said that neither IAEI nor the intelligence branches of the big countries had a grip on the extent of the nuclear trafficking that was going on.
Following the IAEA revelations, Islamabad initially tried to deny any official involvement in nuclear proliferation activities. However, as more and more evidence pointed the finger unmistakably towards Islamabad, General Pervez Musharraf declared that this was the work of a few individuals, led by Dr Khan, the motivation supposedly being “greed or ambition”. He also promised that anyone found guilty would be punished.
Dr Khan was placed under house arrest, and another 55 people were arrested for “de-briefing”, although 26 of them were subsequently released. However, given Dr Khan’s stature as the the “father of the Islamic bomb” in Pakistan, it will be difficult for the government to indict him.
Dr Khan had already been convicted in absentia by a Dutch court—though he was later acquitted on a technicality—after it was discovered that he had systematically been stealing blueprints and specifications of the uranium enrichment process from Urenco, a Dutch-German-UK consortium, and the first commercial scale uranium enrichment plant using the gas centrifuge process, where he had worked for a while. Later, in March 2001, he was removed from KRL following American concerns about his nuclear activities.
However, he continued to retain his position as advisor to the prime minister of Pakistan. But what is more surprising is that Washington appears to have not only bought General Musharraf’s line that Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear proliferation was the work of only a few rogue scientists acting on their own but has also declared that it is satisfied with the General’s assurances that such activities were conducted before he had assumed office. No doubt, Pakistan’s status as a frontline state in the US war against terrorism has made it wink at its nuclear activities—and proliferation.
But it is certainly no secret to anyone following Pakistan’s nuclear activities, including US experts, that over the last two decades, Pakistani agents have been procuring nuclear-related technology and sensitive material from European, American and Canadian sources in violation of these countries’ export control regulations to pursue the dream first enunciated by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972 to a small group of top scientists: That Pakistan achieve nuclear capability, not just for its own security, but also to attain leadership in the Islamic world. For a cash-strapped Pakistan, what better way of funding its ambitions than to give a religious spin to its nuclear goal. Hence the programme of producing an “Islamic bomb” was launched.
While Dr Khan provided the necessary data and technology stolen from Urenco, funding came from Libya, Iran and, of course, good friend, Saudi Arabia. It is a well-known fact that members of the Saudi royal family have access to Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment facilities.
Pakistan’s other friend, China, in return for access to the gas centrifuge technology, provided the critical hardware (missiles capable of delivering the weapons) as well as designs for the same. And when in the aftermath of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in the early 1990s, Beijing was forced to be more circumspect, the missile-for-nuclear weapons technology arrangement was continued with North Korea. In fact, while there is no doubt that Pakistan’s Ghauri missile is a knock-off of the North Korean Nodong missile, the deal with Pyongyang was believed to have been sealed in 1993 during a secret visit by the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.
While it is now clear that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was funded by Tripoli, Riyadh and Tehran, and its delivery system was aided and abetted by Beijing and Pyongyang, reports are now surfacing that more Islamic countries, including Egypt, Syria and Algeria too have shown interest in acquiring nuclear technology from Pakistan. Iraq too is believed to have said that middlemen from KRL had offered it nuclear expertise in 1990. Even more alarming are reports that Dr Khan’s associates had visited Kandahar, apparently for quiet talks with Osama bin Laden on nuclear technology.
Given these facts, the claims of General Musharraf that the nuclear trade between Pakistan and other “rogue states” were conducted clandestinely and independently by a few individual scientists are subject to question. There is no doubt that every aspect of the Pakistani nuclear programme is under the army’s control. Therefore, as analysts and kinsmen of the arrested Pakistani scientists have pointed out, no scientist, including Dr Khan, could have removed nuclear material and documents from the country without the knowledge—and consent—of the army.
While India may now feel vindicated that it has been saying for decades that Pakistan is the world’s greatest proliferator, helping at least four other countries to become nuclear weapons powers in a short span of time, it is doubtful whether any punitive action will be taken against Islamabad.
However, given the jihadi seed that has taken deep root within the Pakistani army and leadership, there is a real risk that sensitive nuclear material and technology may fall into jihadi hands—Musharraf’s denials notwithstanding.