China: Five triggers for a Chinese attack on Taiwan

Asia Times ^ | 08/21/04 | Lawrence E Grinter

[TigerLikesRooster]

SPEAKING FREELY

Five triggers for a Chinese attack on Taiwan

By Lawrence E Grinter

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With the re-election of Chen Shui-bian as president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, continuing trends toward Taiwan's de jure independence and this summer's military exercises by China, the United States and Taiwan, it seems useful to review China's stated or implied "trigger" events for a People's Liberation Army (PLA) attack against the democratically governed nation of Taiwan.

Beginning with former president Jiang Zemin's Eight Points proposal in December 1995, and amplified in subsequent statements, China's leadership has stated or implied five events that they say would cause them to use force against Taiwan. Throughout these pronouncements, Chinese authorities have continued to publicly treat Taiwan as an internal Chinese province, although the Republic of China has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Each of China's five conflict triggers lends itself to Beijing's particular interpretation. However, it is probable that the Chinese leadership's internal definitions of when and how Taiwan might be crossing a "red line" is fluid and under debate within the CCP Standing Committee and Central Military Commission. The five trigger events are:

1) A declaration of independence
Taiwan is de facto independent and has been since the sovereign ROC government took over administration of the island in 1947. The Republic of China government, established by Sun Yat-sen on the mainland in 1912, was a founding member of the United Nations and a formal security treaty ally of the United States between 1954 and 1979. Provided the PRC has no plans to attack Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian has twice formally promised not to declare de jure independence. So what might constitute for Beijing the threshold of Taiwan's de jure independence? Evidently not the recognition of the Taiwan government by 26 other sovereign governments. Nor Taipei's recent use of referenda or a proposed constitutional revision that speak about sovereignty. I assume President Chen's forthcoming constitutional proposals also will be carefully crafted. So, short of an explicit formal independence declaration by the president of Taiwan, Beijing faces the dilemma of having to live with Taiwanese measures that come right up to, but stop just short of a formal declaration.

2) A military alliance by Taiwan with a foreign power
When the United States dropped its recognition of the Republic of China in January 1979, the US-ROC bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty also ended. In its place came US commitments under the Congressional Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, pledging Washington to make available to Taiwan necessary defensive equipment. Since 1979 Taiwan has purchased billions of dollars of weapons and equipment from the United States and Mirage 2000 jet fighters from France. Evidently, for Beijing, these weapons purchases, related training and resupply pipelines have not constituted a "military alliance". But what if Taipei votes for the money to purchase new theater missile defense or Aegis fire-control systems? There seems to be very little Beijing can do about it. What seems to most disturb Beijing is potential new US-ROC technological cooperation that could deflect or negate China's growing offensive threats against Taiwan.

3) Internal turmoil in Taiwan
Taiwan is a democracy with a robust political system and an essentially wide-open media. Beijing has no choice but to live with this. So, just what might constitute sufficient "turmoil" in the Republic of China for the People's Republic of China to mount an attack? Interestingly, demonstrations last spring in Hong Kong against Beijing's proposed internal security provisions saw nearly 500,000 Hong Kong citizens take to the streets, and Beijing did very little about it. Nor did Beijing intervene following the apparent assassination attempt on President Chen and Vice President Annette Lu one day before the election of March 20 in Taiwan.

So what is Beijing's definition of "turmoil"? Clear examples of that took place in Beijing in May and June 1989, when nearly a million Chinese citizens demonstrated in Tiananmen Square, demanding democracy, and Deng Xiaoping finally ordered in the PLA to drive them back. And in 1999, when Chinese internal security forces squelched 10,000 Chinese citizens (belonging to the Falungong) in Beijing. Given the offshore distances, Beijing would seem to have a high "turmoil" threshold regarding Taiwan. However, one can assume that PRC security services have thousands of agents inside Taiwan, agents trained in instigating "turmoil". Presumably Taiwan authorities are prepared for such actions.

4) Possession of weapons of mass destruction
The Chinese government has operationally deployed about 450 nuclear weapons. By summer 2004, the PLA had pointed nearly 600 short-range ballistic missiles (M-9s and M-11s) at Taiwan. By contrast, Taiwan has never operationalized a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), and threatens no one. Taiwan signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988, and ROC nuclear reactors are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full safeguard inspections. Since then, no evidence has surfaced from Beijing, Washington or Taipei about any ROC WMD. From Beijing's viewpoint, what would constitute WMD in Taiwan? Biological, chemical, nuclear radiological materials? Unassembled or operationalized? Offensive or defensive? Information warfare capabilities? ROC missiles capable of retaliating against a PRC attack? What if Chinese agents placed WMD materials inside Taiwan, and Beijing announced their "discovery" to the world? How would Taiwan disprove such WMD?

5) Unwillingness to negotiate on the basis of 'one China'
Former president Jiang Zemin stated this war trigger in December 1999. Over the past five years, Taipei has made hundreds of offers to meet with PRC representatives in open or closed discussions on unification matters with no prior conditions. President Chen reiterated his offer after his May 20 re-election. However, Beijing has stonewalled all of Taipei's offers. One wonders what else the ROC can do to appear reasonable in Beijing's eyes, short of capitulation.

Of China's five war "triggers", the three that President Hu Jintao's government is currently emphasizing are a formal independence declaration, emergence of technology to defeat a PRC attack and lack of progress in negotiations. With no Taiwanese WMD in the picture, the Chen government being cautious on independence declaration rhetoric and continuing to make negotiation offers to Beijing, it seems to be the US-ROC defensive arms purchase that is most worrying Beijing. Once again, China faces the dissonance between its stated policies, or "triggers", and the changing power realities across the Taiwan Strait and in Washington.

Lawrence Grinter is professor of Asian Studies, Air War College, United States. The views expressed here are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Air Force or the US government.

[TigerLikesRooster]

Ping!

[dennisw]

China wants Taiwan because of it's great wealth. Capture Taiwan and China's GDP increases by 33%. Plus many of China's crony capitalists will force their into Taiwanese hi tech companies (compulsory joint ownership)

[ken5050]

Well, they have to get to Taiwan before Hong Kong collapses...question for ya..can you see PRC doing anythig BEFORE the 2008 Olympics?..Woudl they risk jepardizing the Games?..Or, perhaps, is it the ultimate "maskirova"..they'd launch they attack, as the Opening Ceremonies begin? The'd have , what 100,000+ hostages, er "guests"..

Jeff..I pinged you..here's the plot for your next novel.

[Pearls Before Swine]

Capture Taiwan and China's GDP increases by 33%.

Only if it isn't blown to smithereens in the process. Also, aren't many of Taiwan's businessmen involved with mainland manufacturing already, thereby bringing wealth, to China, if not to the military/business clique?

Boy, talk about a military/industrial complex--China really has it in spades!

[genghis]

a fascinating new book
"the pentagon's new map"
thomas barnett
makes the opposite claim- that china will not invade taiwan because of the impact on world trade. China is a huge trading nation and trading nations don't invade.
Demographics suggests when a large percentage of males have no wives chances of invasion increase.
I can see both sides.

[ASA Vet]

Would an offer of US statehood be a trigger?

[sukhoi-30mki]

The author leaves out 2 or even 3 indirectly related triggers-

1.A big outbreak of anti-party protests & violence in provinces like Xinjiang(Muslim dominated) & Tibet or even in the mainland may throw Beijing offguard and present a tempting opportunity for Taiwan to declare independence & force China to attack in order to preserve unity(given that Taiwan is an emotive uniting factor on the mainland).

2.Big Regional flareups with Indonesia or Vietnam over the Spratleys,with Japan over any crisis in North Korea or with India(in the event of an Indo-Pak war) may also make Beijing to try & subvert attention by launching a swift war on Taiwan.

3.The event of the US getting "tied down" in North Korea or Iran is yet another window of opportunity for China given the likelyhood that the US population won't be interested in another war,this time with a nuclear power.

[Boundless]

You forgot:

0. Election of John F. Kerry,
assuring the PRC a free hand in
trashing Taiwan.

[risk]

A people's army has no rival!

[hedgetrimmer]

Not just that. For China to gain regional superiourity, control of Taiwan means control of a major shipping lane.

If they control Taiwain, and the Spratleys, they can pretty much control any goods shipped from the Indian Ocean up to Korea and Japan.

They are just forward thinking for hegemony,thats all.

[Jeff Head]

I believe there are only two triggers at this point:

1. Is China prepared economically to cut us loose?
2. Does China believe it can handle our carriers?

When they feel they can answer these two questions to themsleves in the affirmative...they will act. And it probably will be after they get us embroiled more heavily in the Middle East and after N. Korea is taken off its leash and attacks the South.

In the end...they will miscalculate and be brought down...but it will take a lot of blood and loss to do it.

IMHO, the only way we can avoid a major conflict is to act now, like Reagan did with the Soviets, and maginalize, stop funding, and isolate them...so their totalitarian system can bankrupt itself. That will be extremely hard and painful to do at this point...but not as hard or painful as the alternative IMHO.

[Jeff Head]

Exactly right. This has much more to do with their overall forward thinking plans of hegemony than with just contolling Taiwan.

See my post 12.

[sukhoi-30mki]

To stop funding the Communists & bankrupting them is indeed a good idea-but is it possible??The Europeans were wholeheartedly involved in bleeding the Soviets,but now the EU (including the UK) see China as a money minting have & have pretty much given up on Taiwan.The Soviets had the PRC as a not so friendly neighbour(& Western ally)- but Russia needs Chinese arms purchases to survive & will only sacrifice it's relationship with China to help the US once it itself feels directly threatened.

& While due credit must be given to Reagan,the economic (& to a lesser extent political) collapse of the Soviet Union started in the late 60s to 70s,Reagan just accelerated the process.China on the other hand has a booming economy(a fact which only certain Freepers don't want to believe)-most nations,including the US would'nt want to go to war with the biggest market in the world.

[sukhoi-30mki]

To stop funding the Communists & bankrupting them is indeed a good idea-but is it possible??The Europeans were wholeheartedly involved in bleeding the Soviets,but now the EU (including the UK) see China as a money minting have & have pretty much given up on Taiwan.The Soviets had the PRC as a not so friendly neighbour(& Western ally)- but Russia needs Chinese arms purchases to survive & will only sacrifice it's relationship with China to help the US once it itself feels directly threatened.

& While due credit must be given to Reagan,the economic (& to a lesser extent political) collapse of the Soviet Union started in the late 60s to 70s,Reagan just accelerated the process.China on the other hand has a booming economy(a fact which only certain Freepers don't want to believe)-most nations,including the US would'nt want to go to war with the biggest market in the world.

[Jeff Head]

If any one person can be pointed to for the major responsibility of the fall of the Soviet bloc, it has to be Reagan. Clearly, he adminstered the coup and there were a lot of other factors in play too.

As to the PRC, I am afraid that unless we find a way to economically cease the funding of the red Chinese...we will be fighting a major conflict against them some day...and not too far in the future.

[Squantos]

Well put....excellant thread thus far. Thanks for the ping Jeff !

Stay safe !

[Fishing-guy]

Another option in defeating the communists is to help in creating a large well-educated middle class in China. At a critial level, they will want and demand democracy.

This was origionally a plan of Republic of China to retake mainland, but don't if it is still their plan?

[SunkenCiv]

Beijing has stonewalled all of Taipei's offers

Taiwan should keep making the offers, but never agree to anything in any talks that actually come about. China's not interested in anything except capitulation. It's already been nearly 60 years. In another 40 or 50 years world support for China's nonsense will be at an end, and China's population will be roughly half what it is today. There will be no living memory of Mao, and very likely the single party state apparatus will have drifted even further out of relevance.

[sukhoi-30mki]

The attitudes of any middle class is primarily related to its economic condition.The middle classes in France during the 1780s,in Poland in 80s & the Indian Freedom struggle all faced severe economic discrimination along with political & social problems.If China has the middle class it has now,it is due to the economic reforms of the 1980s & the subsequent boom.An excellent parallel to present day China is Germany before the 2nd world war-Hitler was the most popular leader even when the war was going downhill & it was proven beyond doubt that he was ruthless megalomaniac.The reason for this support was the massive employment the German economy generated in the 1930s (consequental increase in living standards) & his tagline of Germans being the Master race & Aryan Pride.

In short,while political factors are important,economic conditions are the prime deciding factors of any middle class action & it is acknowledged that most folks on the mainland feel proud to be Chinese now.