Geopolitical Diary: Monday, Sept. 13, 2004

STRATFOR ^ | September 13, 2004

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We are now seeing another upsurge in guerrilla activities in Iraq. Guerrilla offensive activity appeared to be concentrated in the Baghdad area, where heavy mortar attacks occurred Sunday. There were U.S. attacks as well, including one along the Syrian border that was reported to have caused heavy casualties. There also was an attack by a helicopter gunship on a crowd near an abandoned Bradley Fighting Vehicle, in which at least one journalist was killed.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the jihadists in Iraq, claimed responsibility for the attacks. However, combat included fighting near Al Hillah, south of Baghdad in Shiite country. It is unlikely al-Zarqawi's group carried out that attack. It is possible that it was the work of Shia, perhaps remnants of Muqtada al-Sadr's forces. It that were the case, the single most important question of the war would now be on the table: Has a fighting coalition been created between al-Zarqawi's Sunni jihadists and a Shiite faction? If so, and depending on the size of the Shiite force in the coalition, that could change the entire complexion of the war.

It has been about four months since the last upsurge in guerrilla attacks in April, which followed by four months the end of the October-November 2003 Ramadan offensive. We speculated before that there is a cycle in guerrilla offensives. It is not clear why this is a four-month cycle. It might be related to the time needed to recruit and train new fighters. In the two previous offensives, guerrilla forces were decimated. The remnants might have formed a training cadre, and it perhaps takes four months to prepare forces for combat. In the interim, offensive operations die down, and it begins to look as if the guerrillas are finished.

If that is the case, this offensive is actually good news for the United States. Compared to the geographical spread of the Ramadan and April offensives, this is much more concentrated. Put differently, at the moment it appears that al-Zarqawi has sufficient forces for a strong attack in Baghdad. In the rest of the country, it appears that U.S. forces are carrying out the strikes, as if they have intelligence that attacks are pending.

It will be extremely important to see what happens during the rest of this week. During the two previous offensives, the guerrilla tempo of operations intensified in the first few days and then evened out. If that doesn't happen -- if the intensity of this offensive is substantially below that of the last two -- it would indicate a substantial decline in guerrilla strength and be a positive trend for the United States. On the other hand, if the guerrillas can raise the sustained tempo of operations on a broad base to levels seen previously, it would indicate that the United States is not getting control of the situation. Therefore, two vital questions on the table intersect: The first is the strength of al-Zarqawi's forces; the second is the size of the potential Shiite force and the extent to which these forces are prepared to cooperate with Sunnis. There are no bigger questions.

If al-Zarqawi has his way, he will open an offensive that will run well into October. His goal, like Osama bin Laden's, is to be seen as the force that toppled George W. Bush. The assumption among the jihadists is that the American public will turn against Bush if it appears that he has lost control of the situation in Iraq. If Bush falls, al Qaeda's credibility -- and al-Zarqawi's -- will surge in the Islamic world. The U.S. counteroffensive appears to be a spoiling attack: Its success will depend on the quality of intelligence U.S. forces have accumulated.

The next 48 hours will tell us a great deal about this offensive and that, in turn, may tell us a great deal about many other things.

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