Posted on 11/21/2004 11:45:29 AM PST by TapTheSource
China Rapidly Modernizes for War With U.S.
Alexandr Nemets Tuesday, Aug. 10, 2004
During the last several months, there have been numerous hints in the Chinese and Taiwanese media indicating that war is more likely than believed here in the West.
Some strategists suggest that the 2008 Olympics scheduled for Beijing constitute a key benchmark, after which a war may be possible. However, it is clear that both nations are preparing for a conflict in the near term, and that 2008 may not be as pivotal as some experts believe.
In fact, China’s media have been repeating the mantra in their news reports that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing to gain a victory in this “internal military conflict in a high-tech environment.”
Chinese war planners have studied carefully the recent U.S.-Iraq War, a war that demonstrated to PLA strategists that U.S. military might is derived from its technological superiority.
China’s military experts conducted similar studies after America’s first Gulf War. One military study written by two Chinese colonels entitled “Unrestricted Warfare” suggested that China could not compete with America’s technological prowess.
Instead, China had to develop “asymmetrical” warfare to defeat the U.S. in any conflict.
Interestingly, “Unrestricted Warfare” became an instant best seller in China after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. In the 1998 book, the Chinese colonels suggested that a successful bombing by Osama bin Laden of the World Trade Center would be an example of this new “unrestricted warfare” concept.
Apparently, China feels much better positioned after the recent Iraq War and wants to challenge the U.S. on a technological level.
Almost instantly after the Iraq War, in May 2003, China’s President and Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao declared at the party’s Politburo meeting the necessity of “active support of national defense and modernization of the army.”
Hu emphasized the need for further integrating information technology (IT) into the PLA and mobilizing China’s entire scientific and technological potential for PLA’s needs.
As a result, the PLA’s modernization in these areas has accelerated significantly.
Since the second half of 2003, the PLA has been engaged in the latest stage of its RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs – program, which was officially announced by the chairman of China Central Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, in his speech on Sept. 1, 2003.
He emphasized that that PLA should transform itself into a “smaller and much smarter science- and technology-based army.”
Jiang defined the major tasks of new PLA reform as follows:
Reducing PLA’s ranks, primarily ground forces, by 200,000.
Maximizing IT and other advanced technologies – including nanotechnologies, space technologies, electromagnetic weapons, etc.
Improving the educational and qualitative training of PLA servicemen.
Transforming the PLA into an “army of one” that is comparatively smaller and of very high quality, similar to the U.S. Army.
Acquiring the most advanced weaponry.
The Russia Connection
During 2003 and 2004, Russia – jointly with Belarus and Ukraine – has been a major source of advanced weapons for the PLA.
According to official figures from Russia’s weapons export state monopoly, Rosoboronexport, Russia’s total weapons export in 2003 approached $5.7 billion, making Russia the second largest arms exporter after the U.S. (Please note that China is arguably the leading arms exporter in quantity of arms transported, as its weaponry is considerably less expensive than that of the U.S.)
China has purchased 38 percent of Russian arms exports, or around $2.2 billion.
If one takes into account the weapons deliveries from Belarus and Ukraine to China, along with “double use” nuclear and space technologies supplied by Russia to China, then Chinese real arms imports from greater Russia would, in my estimation, be $4 billion.
Clearly, Russia and her allies have been a huge factor supporting the PLA in its rapid modernization and planned confrontation with the U.S.
3-Pronged Strategy
The PLA has been following its “three-way policy” of advanced weapons acquisition.
This three-pronged strategy calls for China to gain technologically advanced weaponry through (1) imports, (2) joint (Chinese-foreign) weapons R&D, and (3) independent weapons R&D within China.
The details of this mechanism were given in the article “China’s military affairs in 2003,” published by the Taiwanese journal Zhonggong yanjiu (China Communism Research) in February 2004.
According to Taiwanese experts, though weapons import and joint R&D still play the major role in PLA modernization, the role of “independent R&D” has been increasing gradually.
Appointed in March 2003, new Chinese Defense Minister (former chief of Defense Ministry’s Armament Division) Col.-Gen. Cao Gangchuan was personally in charge of this work.
He has tried to decrease China’s dependence on Russian arms and increase the share of advanced weapons imports from Germany, France and Israel.
China also is engaged in joint weapons R&D projects with EU and NATO countries, including R&D of mid-range air-to-air missiles and highly precise satellite positioning (Galileo project).
The Air Force
China believes that in a conflict with Taiwan, air dominance will be key to a quick victory.
The PLA has been beefing up its PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and aircraft troops of the PLA Navy (PLAN).
Reportedly, by the end of February 2004, the PLAAF purchased from Russia 76 SU-30 MKK fighters belonging to the advanced “4 plus” generation.
PLAN air troops obtained 24 even more advanced SU-30 MKK fighters.
There is no data regarding future deliveries of the “finished” SU-30 from Russia to China; however, the Chinese aircraft industry is more or less capable now of producing the SU-30 as well as other fighters belonging to the fourth generation, or close to this level.
Dramatic modernization of China’s First Aviation Industry Corp., or AVIC-1, from 2001 to 2004, is of principal importance here (the data in this account are given in the above-mentioned article in the Zhonggong yanjiu journal).
Four major companies are developing China’s jet-manufacturing capability. Interestingly, each of these companies recently underwent radical modernization and upgrading, including advanced equipment obtained from Europe’s Airbus, claiming the help is for “cooperation in passenger aircraft production.”
Shenyang Aircraft Corp. continued, in the past year, to produce SU-27 SK (J-11) heavy fighters from Russian kits at a rate of at least 25 units annually, and the share of Chinese-made components surpassed 70 percent.
The same company now prepares SU-30 MKK (J-11A) fighters for manufacturing.
In the frame of “independent R&D” within China, the Chengdu Aircraft Corp. has mastered the serial production of medium J-10 fighters and FC-1 light fighters. These planes reportedly can match the U.S. F-16 fighter.
Here are some other developments in China’s air wing:
Guizhou Aircraft Corp. developed the advanced Shanying fighter-trainer, while Xian Aircraft Corp. mostly finished developing the new generation of FBC-1 (JH-7) long-range fighter-bomber, which became known as JH-7A.
Other enterprises, belonging to AVIC-1, mastered production of KAB-500 guided bombs and several kinds of air-to-air and air-to ground missiles.
By the end of 2003, the new generation of Flying Leopard, i.e., JH-7A, was being tested. This fighter-bomber’s weapons include new air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles of beyond-vision range, guided bombs, etc. This aircraft is adapted for anti-radar reconnaissance, effective low-altitude strikes against large naval vessels, and general strikes of ground-based and naval targets.
By the end of 2004, as a result of supply from Russia and increased fighter production at AVIC-1 subsidiaries, the number of advanced fighters of various kinds in PLAN air troops and the PLAAF – including SU-27 (J-11), SU-30 (J-11A), J-10, FC-1, Shanying, FBC-1 (JH-7) and JH-7A – could surpass an estimated 400 units. The Sea Component
China also sees its navy as critical in any successful assault on Taiwan.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has numerous Chinese-Russian projects under way this year and next, including:
Purchase of two Russian Sovremenny destroyers, equipped with improved ship-to-ship supersonic cruise missiles (SSM) Sunburn 3M80MBE of 240 km range. Initially, Sunburn had a range of 160 km. However, in 2001-2003, Raduga Design Bureau in Dubna (about 150 km north of Moscow) designed, under PLAN’s orders, a much more lethal version of SSM.
Very probably, serial production of new SSM would be mastered in China, so it would be installed on two Sovremenny destroyers, purchased by PLAN in 1999-2000, on Chinese-built Luhu- and Luhai-class destroyers as well as Jiangwei-class frigates. According to media reports in the Hong Kong and Taiwan media, two new Sovremenny destroyers could be transferred to PLAN before the end of 2005.
Purchase of eight Kilo submarines, equipped by “super-advanced” 3M54E (CLUB-S) submarine-launched anti-ship missiles. In 2003, China already obtained 50 missiles of this kind, which would greatly improve PLAN’s striking capacity. China intends to organize production of these missiles. They probably also could be used on Chinese-built conventional submarines of the Song class.
New Kilo submarines could enter PLAN service in 2005 or the first half of 2006. (Information regarding destroyers and conventional submarines was repeated in several articles in Zhonggong yanjiu in January 2003 through February 2004 and in multiple media reports from Hong Kong during the same period.)
Construction of “093 project” nuclear attack submarines and the “094 project” strategic nuclear submarine, using Russian plans and technology, at Huludao (a port city in northeast Liaoning province) military shipbuilding plant. By the end of 2005, PLAN would have in its service at least two “093 project” and at least one “094 project” nuclear submarines. Reportedly, Russia had to make significant improvements in design and weapons of these submarines, in accordance with Chinese customers’ requirements.
Along with Russian contracts is the construction of a new generation of destroyers, frigates and conventional submarines at modernized shipbuilding plants in Dalian, Shanghai, Qingdao and Wuhan cities. An upgraded PLA could be capable pf establishing sea control around Taiwan in 2008.
Aso important is the fact that both the PLAAF and PLAN would be equipped, by 2008, with perfect military information technology systems, more precisely by C4ISR (command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) systems, which would make the use of the listed weapon systems much more effective.
ping!
The cheapest solution would be rapid nuclearization of Taiwan, coupled with advanced rocketry in 2500 miles range.
the question seems to be not IF but WHEN China will seize Taiwan (part of China acccording to Chinese mantra).
Who will be next? North Korea? Mongolia? Unruly border provinces with India?
I have been keeping up with this for about five years, and have noticed everything the Chinese are doing is geared toward the offensive. Both Japan and Vietnam have noticed this also.
A war with China would be a good thing IMO. We could cancel our national debt with them for little more than the price of bombing their 'fleets' into oblivion..
The more China can work according to their own schedule, the more we have to worry about.
Thanks tons.
This fleshes out my own rough layman's analysis considerably.
But my rough personal outline was as this article depicts.
Just massive boycott of all Chinese stuff (which has quality problems all of its own) would be a good step.
Agreed, what many people seem to overlook is that without trade with the US, China is nothing. The Chinese economy, and therefore their military, relies on trade, mostly with the US.
"Who will be next? North Korea? Mongolia? Unruly border provinces with India?"
Let's not forget Japan.
Heritage Foundation Web Memo:
China’s New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance
by John J. Tkacik, Jr.
WebMemo #533
July 13, 2004
As Chinese warships and naval survey vessels ply Japanese waters hoping to stake their claim to potentially gas-rich seabeds, the United States is sending mixed signals to Japan on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ambiguity in Washington may undermine Japanese confidence in the alliance—in itself, a major strategic goal for Beijing. Washington must now publicly support Japan, our most important ally in Asia, if it hopes to deter China from further adventurism in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
Provocative Behavior
On Tuesday, July 6, Japanese antisubmarine aircraft spotted a Chinese naval survey vessel, the Nandiao 411, well within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Chinese foreign ministry declined to comment on the incursion, saying it had not received any report of naval survey activities.
On July 13, Japanese coast guard cutters discovered a Chinese civilian research vessel, the Xiangyanghong 9, within the EEZ and engaged in survey operations for which it had not sought, much less obtained, Japanese government permission—a possible violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[1] Japanese aircraft ordered the vessel to leave the area, but the Chinese ship refused to respond.
Even more ominously, on July 14, a Chinese naval vessel overtook a Japanese resource exploration ship inside the EEZ, forcing it to alter its route to avoid a collision.[2]
The Chinese navy has made a habit of traversing Japanese waters for the past two years, and Chinese ships and submarines have been particularly assertive in the past year. In January, the Japanese government declassified a report that Chinese naval vessels had entered the EEZ six times during 2003 “to survey subsea routes for Chinese submarines to enter the Pacific.” These incursions include two violations of Japan’s territorial waters by Ming class submarines in the vicinity of Kagoshima at the southern tip of Kyushu. So far this year, Japan’s Self Defense Forces have documented at least twelve violations of the EEZ, including three separate incursions northwest of the Senkaku Islands in May alone.
Alarmed by China’s presence in Japanese waters, Tokyo will soon dispatch a civilian survey vessel—looking for natural gas—to the area near the Senkaku Islands (which China calls “Diaoyutai”) to assert its own EEZ rights. Beijing’s foreign ministry protested this news, claiming that the EEZ is “disputed.” It warned Tokyo not to take "any action that may imperil China's interest and complicate the current situation."
The Chinese navy’s sudden assertiveness—indeed aggressiveness—in Japanese waters is a test of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Washington must be careful not to confront this challenge with its traditional studied ambiguity. Ambiguous support for an ally against China’s increasingly provocative territorial encroachments will encourage China to become more aggressive not just in Japanese waters, but also in the South China Sea and, of course, the Taiwan Strait.
China Has No Claim
The status of the Senkakus is clear. Japan first claimed the uninhabited and unclaimed islets in question in 1895 to use their rocky outcroppings for maritime navigation aids. From that time through the end of World War II, they were administered as part of Japan’s Okinawa prefecture. Upon the Japanese surrender, the United States administered the islets under a military occupation authority. In 1972, when the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese administration, the Senkakus were included in the reversion. There is, accordingly, no doubt that the United States has always regarded the islands as Japanese.
China and Taiwan have expressed interest in the islands since only 1968, when a United Nations Economic Commission for Asia report suggested there may be petroleum deposits in the seabed near the islets. (No petroleum or gas deposits have since been detected in the area.) On June 11, 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan formally claimed the islands. After the United States returned the islands to Japan in the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, China lodged a formal protest with the U.S. government. Eager not to alienate Beijing just as President Nixon was beginning his opening to China, the U.S. State Department announced that the Reversion Agreement “did not affect the sovereignty” over disputed islands.
As recently as March 2004, the State Department accepted China’s claims over the Senkakus as being equally valid as Japan’s title. Still, in a stance known affectionately in Japan as the “Armitage Doctrine,” U.S. officials have said that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers “all territories under the administration of Japan” and there is no question that, as a matter of law—under the Reversion Agreement, the alliance treaty, and the terms of the U.S. military occupation of the Ryukyu island chain—that the Senkakus are indeed “under the administration of Japan.” As such, any hostile activities against the islands would trigger the treaty.
In this context, China's forays into the Senkakus seem designed to probe where the bedrock of the U.S.-Japan alliance begins—or if it is there at all. Of course, Chinese survey vessels are also mapping the ocean bottom for the benefit of the country’s rapidly expanding submarine fleet.
Steps for the Administration
State clearly that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
The United States cannot expect to avoid a showdown with China and Japan over the islands by continuing to tell China that it “takes no position on the matter of sovereignty over the Senkakus.” This only encourages China to force a confrontation with Japan over the islets, which will either draw the United States into the fray on Japan’s side or risk the collapse of the U.S.-Japan alliance—an event China devoutly hopes to see.
The Administration must state firmly and publicly not only that the Senkakus are covered under the alliance and that the United States will support Japan’s claim as a matter of law, but also that the United States sees a prima facie case supporting Japan’s claims to sovereignty over the islands. While this would irritate Beijing, it would also be a clear message that the United States plans to remain a Pacific power and that Beijing’s aggressive territorial claims are counterproductive. Any continued confrontations in the area would be ample evidence of Beijing’s broader ambitions in Asia. Better to know now, than later. Either way, the United States must stand firmly and unequivocally with Japan.
Assist the Japanese Self Defense Forces in monitoring Chinese incursions.
While China’s naval forays into Japan’s EEZ are perfectly legal under international law, Chinese oil and natural gas surveys are not. U.S. Naval forces should join Japanese forces in actively monitoring Chinese maritime operations in Japanese waters, as a demonstration of alliance strength and to dissuade China from believing testing the EEZ boundaries is cost-free.
The United States should view with alarm China’s increasing aggressiveness in the Western Pacific and its continuing challenges to long-established maritime boundaries. The seabeds that China now claims have been under Japanese sovereignty for over a century. The United States has, over past years, reportedly reassured Japan that the territorial waters China now claims—and the islands they encompass—fall within the ambit of Japanese administration and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The United States should make this point firmly and thereby confront China’s provocations with clarity instead of ambiguity.
John Tkacik, Jr., is Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
[1]Article 56 of the UNCLOS limits such coastal state jurisdiction to “exploring…the natural resources” of the EEZ. Articles 95 and 96 assert complete immunity on the high seas—and, under Article 58, in EEZs—for warships and ships “used only on government, non-commercial service.” For the full text and overview, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of December 10, 1982.
[2] “Jiefangjun zai Donghai Dujie Riben Tansuochuan” [PLA intercepts Japanese exploration ship in the East China Sea], New York, World Journal in Chinese, July 14, 2004, P. A8, cites a Keizai Shimbun wire service report from Tokyo.
Link:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm533.cfm?renderforprint=1
Remember how quickly Japan was able to turn things around, and they were in a more backwards situation that China is now.
You'd have to drag a lot of freepers kicking and screaming from Wal-Mart.
Keep shopping at Wal-mart folks, the PLA needs the money to build the weapons it plans to use to kill your kids.
"Just massive boycott of all Chinese stuff (which has quality problems all of its own) would be a good step."
Agreed, but how do we get people to pay attention?
If the Iranians can buy Nuclear weapons plans from the Paks... so can the Tiawanese.
Oh well! At least we will learn the true meaning of the terms; peace, love, equality, tolerance, the big tent, room at the table, racism, discussion, dialogue, debate, sympathy and all the other words and phrases bandied about.
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