Miller and Layton were charged with a felony. The prosecution sought from the Supreme Court a reversal so that Miller and Layton could be tried. If your understanding of Miller is correct, then why did the Supreme Court not tell the lower court to convict if the defendants are not a militia?
Why don't you descibe what actions you think the lower court was obligated to take, given the meaning you ascribe to the Miller decision?
Try to remember that the description you give must outline what evidence can be used to convict Miller or Layton at trial. That was the basis of the appeal from the prosecution. The District Court judge, in his original dismissal felt fully justified by application of the Second Amendment. What modification to that understanding did the Supreme Court mandate be applied to the trial of Miller and Layton? What circumstances would result in an acquittal of Miller and Layton? From a precedential standpoint, what evidence would result in an acquittal of anybody else charged with violating NFA 34?
Assume today, that an otherwise law-abiding citizen is charged under NFA 34 for possessing an M16 without a tax stamp. What would be required for conviction under your understanding of the Miller decision?
Yes, and we agree the U.S. Supreme Court told him he was wrong to dismiss the case. The District Court judge thought that all weapons for all citizens were protected by the second amendment and they're not. It turns out that the Supreme Court is looking for weapons that have a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia".
Now, if you're the District Court judge, your decision reversed and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, what are you thinking? Are you really thinking that the U.S. Supreme Court is saying that the second amendment protects Militia-type weapons for individual citizens but NOT non-Militia type weapons for citizens? Does that make sense to you? Isn't that just the opposite of what you would think?
You're saying the U.S. Supreme Court is ruling that a citizen can own and use a machine gun, but not a handgun? (I have a lower court ruling somewhere that concluded a handgun is not a Militia-type weapon.) Do you see what I'm saying?
"Why don't you descibe what actions you think the lower court was obligated to take, given the meaning you ascribe to the Miller decision?"
Well, if I was that District Court judge, I'd now be thinking along Militia lines, given that slap-in-the-face reversal of my dismissal. I would hold a separate hearing and call experts to determine if Mr. Miller's weapon bore some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, as instructed by the U.S. Supreme Court. If it did not, then I would proceed with Mr. Miller's trial. Mr. Miller can always plead with his jury in his trial and hope they think it's a Militia-type weapon and acquit on that basis.
If Mr. Miller's weapon did bear some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, then it's decision time. The second amendment protects a Militia-type weapon from infringement, but does the second amendment protect an individual citizen's right to keep and bear it or not? If I, as the District Court judge, believe it protects an individual citizen's right to keep and bear Militia-type weapons, I dismiss the case (again).
If I do not believe it protects an individual citizen's right to keep and bear Militia-type weapons, then I declare that Mr. Miller lacks standing to use the second amendment in his defense and proceed with the case. Again, Mr. Miller can plead with his jury in his trial and hope for an acquittal.
If I were to simply go with the odds, I believe the court would rule that this otherwise law-abiding citizen lacks standing to use the second amendment in his defense.
The DC Circuit might rule differently. Or they might say a $200 tax stamp is not an infringement. Or they might say that taxing an M16 is a reasonable regulation as long as an AR-15 is left untaxed.