>>> No, I haven’t lost historical perspective. I’ve studied the issue with care. <<<
Well, so have I and many others. Join the club, brother!
>>> Anecdotal appeals to authority are hopeless.
At the time, plenty of people saw that the unconditional surrender demand was unreasonable and prolonging the war. <<<
Anonymous appeals to unnamed authorities are pretty hopeless, too. Don’t ya think?
>>> It [unconditional surrender demand] has been issued in order to keep the wartime allies united, especially to prevent any last minute splits in dealing with Germany. <<<
And you don’t think that THIS should be a major consideration when resolving a 6-year world war? Astonishing.
>>> It is ludicruous to pretend Japan was still any threat to the allied powers. <<<
Tell that to the Nationalist Chinese government, one of our allies at the time. The JIA had over a million soldiers in China when “Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima.
>>> It was necessary to finish the war, certainly. That is all. <<<
Finishing a war can be a very tricky thing. Think of the stupidity of Versailles and what lead up to it. The French and the English made a mess of things, don’t ya think?
>>> The Japanese had the delusional hope at the time that the Russians might remain neutral and help them negotiate a peace on terms better than unconditional surrender. That prop was knocked away when the Russians invaded Manchuria, in the same week as the bombings. Loss of that hope, from Russia’s entry, plus an offer to keep the emperor but otherwise surrender unconditionally, might have been accepted. <<<
C’mon, stop regurgitating ol’ commie agitprop by Gar Alperovitz. It’s embarrassing.
In fact, the Japanese military had the delusional hope that they could pull a victory out of the mess they had made of the Pacific War by having a “final battle” between them and us. Kind of a replay of the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, don’t ya know. Luckily, Truman decided to forego their suicidal desire by dropping the A-bombs. Thusly: No Operation DOWNFALL=no “final battle”=lots and lots of US, Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian etc. lives saved.
>>> Justice during war includes the requirement of a good faith willingness to parley in order to end it, if all the political aims of the war can be achieved without further killing. <<<
That’s one heck of a big IF. And as for “parleys,” you have yet to establish that Roosevelt and Truman weren’t acting in good faith with US Allies and the American people when they demanded an unconditional surrender.
I can't tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it. Russia didn't give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince's vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood.
As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement "in principle" at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version.
These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. They are the amdassador to Japan, who knew their culture best among those involved in the decision; the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country; and less involved at the end but having agreed previously in principle, the army chief of staff, who was the military professional charged with judging what was militarily required.
Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not.
Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, "communist propaganda".