I can't tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it. Russia didn't give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince's vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood.
As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement "in principle" at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version.
These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. They are the amdassador to Japan, who knew their culture best among those involved in the decision; the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country; and less involved at the end but having agreed previously in principle, the army chief of staff, who was the military professional charged with judging what was militarily required.
Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not.
Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, "communist propaganda".
I wrote:
/// And you don’t think that THIS [keeping the wartime Allies united, esp. in regards to Germany] should be a major consideration when resolving a 6-year world war? Astonishing. ///
JasonC wrote:
>>> I can’t tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. <<<
That’s a mighty fine sense of charity you have there. LOL!
>>> The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. <<<
Nonsense!
You’re forgetting that the “Poland Question” and the “German Question” were two very big hot potatoes for the Allies in July-August 1945. Remember the Agreements between the Big 3 at the Potsdam Conference? You’re also forgetting that we were trying our best to make sure that the Soviets did not make a separate peace with the Japanese, and hopefully did not get involved in the Pacific War at all.
>>> Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it [unconditional surrender]. <<<
Rubbish!
You’re forgetting that the Potsdam Declaration (26 July 1945) was in fact a list of conditions for a Japanese surrender. Japan realized that “unconditional surrender” per se was not on the table at least by then. It didn’t mean “undefined surrender.”
The Soviets did not start their invasian of Manchuria until 9 August 1945. Three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. So, according to your argument unconditional surrender was useful to bring about US/Soviet unity until almost the last moment before surrender. That doesn’t look like the “vanity of princes” to me.
Not to mention the fact that, as I discussed in an earlier post, unconditional surrender was held for other reasons, too.
>>> Russia didn’t give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince’s vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood. <<<
A.) All of the diplomatic reasonings you say apply to Nazi Germany apply just as well to Imperial Japan;
B.) What Frank calls the “abolitionist” faction in the US gov’t — Byrnes, Acheson, MacLeish — would have been surprised to hear that we didn’t give a d*mn about the Imperial System (however defined).
>>> As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement “in principle” at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version. <<<
Finally, some names. Actually, Joseph Grew was Acting Secretary of State at the time, not Ambassador. I know about Stimson, but hadn’t heard that George Marshall was a retentionist. Are you sure you aren’t thinking about Adm. Leahy?
>>> These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. <<<
And against them were gov’t officials who were also Not minor players: there was James F. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and (at Potsdam) Secretary of State, former Sec. State Cordell Hull, and various military offlicials depending upon the fortunes at war. It wasn’t just the Good Guys vs. stick-in-the mud Truman.
>>> the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country <<<
You’re forgetting that Stimson was the direct supervisor of General Leslie Groves, who oversaw the Manhattan Project. I know that Stimson abhorred city bombings, but he didn’t resign when XXI Bomber Command was reducing Japanese cities to rubble, did he?
>>> Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not. <<<
I see all three as being moral men in time of war. Given the complexity of the issues and situations, the existence of factions in the US Gov’t, and the difficult decisions that had to be made, to single out Truman as the bad guy is both wrongheaded and meanspirited. It reeks of special pleading.
>>> Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, “communist propaganda”. <<<
You’re right, but those judgements taken out of context and placed in a certain light sure did make good material for Red agitprop (a la Alperovitz and his fellow travellers).