I wrote:
/// And you don’t think that THIS [keeping the wartime Allies united, esp. in regards to Germany] should be a major consideration when resolving a 6-year world war? Astonishing. ///
JasonC wrote:
>>> I can’t tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. <<<
That’s a mighty fine sense of charity you have there. LOL!
>>> The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. <<<
Nonsense!
You’re forgetting that the “Poland Question” and the “German Question” were two very big hot potatoes for the Allies in July-August 1945. Remember the Agreements between the Big 3 at the Potsdam Conference? You’re also forgetting that we were trying our best to make sure that the Soviets did not make a separate peace with the Japanese, and hopefully did not get involved in the Pacific War at all.
>>> Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it [unconditional surrender]. <<<
Rubbish!
You’re forgetting that the Potsdam Declaration (26 July 1945) was in fact a list of conditions for a Japanese surrender. Japan realized that “unconditional surrender” per se was not on the table at least by then. It didn’t mean “undefined surrender.”
The Soviets did not start their invasian of Manchuria until 9 August 1945. Three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. So, according to your argument unconditional surrender was useful to bring about US/Soviet unity until almost the last moment before surrender. That doesn’t look like the “vanity of princes” to me.
Not to mention the fact that, as I discussed in an earlier post, unconditional surrender was held for other reasons, too.
>>> Russia didn’t give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince’s vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood. <<<
A.) All of the diplomatic reasonings you say apply to Nazi Germany apply just as well to Imperial Japan;
B.) What Frank calls the “abolitionist” faction in the US gov’t — Byrnes, Acheson, MacLeish — would have been surprised to hear that we didn’t give a d*mn about the Imperial System (however defined).
>>> As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement “in principle” at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version. <<<
Finally, some names. Actually, Joseph Grew was Acting Secretary of State at the time, not Ambassador. I know about Stimson, but hadn’t heard that George Marshall was a retentionist. Are you sure you aren’t thinking about Adm. Leahy?
>>> These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. <<<
And against them were gov’t officials who were also Not minor players: there was James F. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and (at Potsdam) Secretary of State, former Sec. State Cordell Hull, and various military offlicials depending upon the fortunes at war. It wasn’t just the Good Guys vs. stick-in-the mud Truman.
>>> the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country <<<
You’re forgetting that Stimson was the direct supervisor of General Leslie Groves, who oversaw the Manhattan Project. I know that Stimson abhorred city bombings, but he didn’t resign when XXI Bomber Command was reducing Japanese cities to rubble, did he?
>>> Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not. <<<
I see all three as being moral men in time of war. Given the complexity of the issues and situations, the existence of factions in the US Gov’t, and the difficult decisions that had to be made, to single out Truman as the bad guy is both wrongheaded and meanspirited. It reeks of special pleading.
>>> Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, “communist propaganda”. <<<
You’re right, but those judgements taken out of context and placed in a certain light sure did make good material for Red agitprop (a la Alperovitz and his fellow travellers).
On the contrary, the Americans were anxious to secure Stalin's agreement to join the war against Japan, clear back to the previous great power conference.
And Russia declared war after the first bomb because that is when they were ready to attack and in fact attacked, so it was when the Japanese learned of it. But the allies knew of it long before that, they had already secured Russian agreement to enter the war against Japan before the first bomb was dropped. There was no issue of unity left to safeguard, and the point at issue - keep the emperor or not - was not one that divided the allies to begin with.
And no, the role of the unconditional surrender policy was not remotely symmetrical for Japan and for Germany. Germany was fighting a two front war and the allies entered it late, from the Russian's point of view. The unconditional declaration had helped avoid interallied fighting over the efforts each would make to defeat Germany. Germany (and its generals, including those seeking to overthrow Hitler) was continually dreaming of a split between the western allies and Russia to save Germany from final defeat. This was delusional, but there were serious post war tensions brewing between the Russians and the west in Europe. There was nothing comparable in the eastern theater, where everyone saw and knew that the US could finish off Japan without help if necessary and would occupy the place. Stalin wanted to get in at the end to grab territory on the mainland, while the US wanted to minimize its own casualties and welcomed the help.
Nothing to be gained by the unconditionality demand could go farther than active Russian participation in the war. The US had that in its pocket before it dropped the first bomb, and could use it along with its ultimatum, and could make that ultimatum less than unconditional easily. This was clear to all concerned and it is why it was directly advocated by high officials.
Ambassador Grew was acting sec state at the time but had been ambassador to Japan before the war. (Ambassadors retain that title regardless of later job, by the way, it is a rank like general in that respect). He knew their culture and what the emperor meant to their resistence. His advice was perfectly sensible.
Pointing out that others wanted the emperor removed is irrelevant because they lost that debate afterward, in the actual event. MacArthur kept the emperor. There was no US goal being secured by insisting on the ability to remove the emperor, because we didn't in fact remove him.
A peace reached without that unconditionality and also without the atomic bombings would have been less draconian, sure. There were no doubt any number of bloody minded men who would prefer the way it actually happened, regardless of whether the other course would have worked, out of hatred of the Japanese or out of a desire for prestige, or in the belief that really grinding their noses in it was the best way to wring any future resistence out of them. But if the ultimatum before the bomb had offered them a chance to keep the emperor and they had accepted, who the hell cares? It would have saved nearly half a million lives and still ended the war.
It is possible they would have rejected the ultimatum anyway. It is possible they would have rejected it, but caved after the first bomb and before the second. Nobody knows and it is beside the point. What isn't beside the point is the *moral requirement* to *seek peace* without *unnecessary loss of life*, if it can be had without sacrifice of the just political goals of the war. Grinding their noses in it isn't such a just goal, and removing the emperor wasn't one we actually sought. Killing more people just to avoid any need to offer it, was not morally justified.
Stimson and Grew saw this, Truman either did not or more likely didn't give a damn and wanted to look as tough as possible, for the sake of the Russians and for the sake of the electorate. But those are the vanity of the prince and not a legitimate right.