Posted on 08/06/2009 6:01:03 AM PDT by libstripper
On this day 64 years ago, an American B-29 named the Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb over the city of Hiroshima. We know that as many as 80,000 Japanese died instantly. We know the city was pulverized, and we know that an estimated 100,000 additional people died later from radiation poisoning. We also are aware that the Hiroshima bomb, and the Nagasaki bomb dropped three days later, ushered in the atomic era.
At the time of the event, 85% of the American public favored dropping the atomic bombs, according to a Gallup poll (10% disapproved). Over the years, that attitude has changed. By 2005, Gallup found only 57% of Americans thought the bomb was necessary, while 38% disapproved. Most of those polled were born after the event.
(Excerpt) Read more at online.wsj.com ...
>>> No, I haven’t lost historical perspective. I’ve studied the issue with care. <<<
Well, so have I and many others. Join the club, brother!
>>> Anecdotal appeals to authority are hopeless.
At the time, plenty of people saw that the unconditional surrender demand was unreasonable and prolonging the war. <<<
Anonymous appeals to unnamed authorities are pretty hopeless, too. Don’t ya think?
>>> It [unconditional surrender demand] has been issued in order to keep the wartime allies united, especially to prevent any last minute splits in dealing with Germany. <<<
And you don’t think that THIS should be a major consideration when resolving a 6-year world war? Astonishing.
>>> It is ludicruous to pretend Japan was still any threat to the allied powers. <<<
Tell that to the Nationalist Chinese government, one of our allies at the time. The JIA had over a million soldiers in China when “Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima.
>>> It was necessary to finish the war, certainly. That is all. <<<
Finishing a war can be a very tricky thing. Think of the stupidity of Versailles and what lead up to it. The French and the English made a mess of things, don’t ya think?
>>> The Japanese had the delusional hope at the time that the Russians might remain neutral and help them negotiate a peace on terms better than unconditional surrender. That prop was knocked away when the Russians invaded Manchuria, in the same week as the bombings. Loss of that hope, from Russia’s entry, plus an offer to keep the emperor but otherwise surrender unconditionally, might have been accepted. <<<
C’mon, stop regurgitating ol’ commie agitprop by Gar Alperovitz. It’s embarrassing.
In fact, the Japanese military had the delusional hope that they could pull a victory out of the mess they had made of the Pacific War by having a “final battle” between them and us. Kind of a replay of the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, don’t ya know. Luckily, Truman decided to forego their suicidal desire by dropping the A-bombs. Thusly: No Operation DOWNFALL=no “final battle”=lots and lots of US, Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian etc. lives saved.
>>> Justice during war includes the requirement of a good faith willingness to parley in order to end it, if all the political aims of the war can be achieved without further killing. <<<
That’s one heck of a big IF. And as for “parleys,” you have yet to establish that Roosevelt and Truman weren’t acting in good faith with US Allies and the American people when they demanded an unconditional surrender.
Plenty of third parties saw the unconditional surrender demand as prolonging the war to little purpose. Few probably knew its important at the close of the war in Europe for keeping all the allies on the same page instead of bickering with one another or negotiating anything with the Germans, and it was useful in that context. It was superfluous with Japan.
You are correct.
Japan had 72 million people in 1940. Millions of them would’ve died in continued bombing campaigns.
Many more Japanese were killed in the bombing of the other 70 cities by conventional bombing than were killed in the nuclear strikes.
in the war on the terror, the same thing applies; large parts of the population are not “innocent.”
Certainly, Al quida and the Taliban and the Islamic terrorists do not consider any part of the west as
“innocent” hence their attacks are indescriminate
and strike all demographics regardless.
Until the so-called innocents of Islam decry and oppose
the actions of their mad dogs, they are as guilty as
the terrorists.
Sorry. It's all 20/20 hindsight and second guessing, fueled in large part by those who find America at fault for every decision ever made back to the Jamestown settlement. We have the Apologist-in-Chief in the White House right now -- all you're doing is encouraging him.
I can't tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it. Russia didn't give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince's vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood.
As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement "in principle" at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version.
These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. They are the amdassador to Japan, who knew their culture best among those involved in the decision; the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country; and less involved at the end but having agreed previously in principle, the army chief of staff, who was the military professional charged with judging what was militarily required.
Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not.
Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, "communist propaganda".
“If the intentional killing of tens of thousands of civilians does not count as murder, it is hard to maintain with a straight face that the commandment aganst murder actually prohibits anything at all, if you’ve got a “good enough reason.”
Is it “murder” to kill a murderer while he is in the act of murdering yet more victims, in order to prevent their deaths? If you believe so, then you do not understand the difference between “killing” and “murder”.
If you believe not, then up the scale: If you are a member of a political “State”, containing both civilians and armed forces, and another “State” begins using its armed forces to kill your armed forces, kill your civilians, and destroy your property (e.g., crops, which would lead to starvation) ... is it “murder” to respond in kind in order to get them to stop? Or does your sense of morality limit your response to its armed forces members only? If so, that “State” would not long endure.
Finally, is it “murder” to kill the civilians of one State in order to convince them to stop killing the civilians of another State? Or must you limit your responses to only their armed forces?
At the time that the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, approximately 250,000 Chinese civilians were being terminated every month from the actions of the Japanese armed forces. This was from a combination of explosives (artillery and bombs), bullets, individual actions of Japanese soldiers (e.g., the acts described in the “Rape of Nanking”), starvation and disease.
Not only was it right we should have been using some of the ones we have now over the last few decades!!!
Untrue. Part of Truman's decision to drop the bombs was based the horrendous death toll on Okinawa, where 12,000 Americans were killed or missing; over 100,000 Japanese soldiers; and an estimated 100,000 civilians died.
Based on their preparations, Japan would have been much worse.
2005 Insight City Guide Tokyo
>>> They probably also wanted a back rub and a V-8, it is immaterial. <<<
I think that you are in error. This WAS far from being immaterial to them. The Japanese military was far from being blase about their territorial acquisitions during the Pacific War (not to mention Taiwan and Korea). You know, acquisitions paid for with their country’s blood and treasure. You’re also ignoring the important distinction between “the person of the emperor” and “the imperial system.”
After reading historians ranging from Robert Butow to Richard Frank, it’s pretty clear to me that the Showa Emperor and the militarists in Japan were not in agreement amongst themsleves as to what conditions of surrender would be acceptable. Even after the Potsdam Declaration. You are greatly oversimplifying matters.
>>> the US was perfectly willing to scrap any plan to remove said emperor to ensure a more peaceful occupation. <<<
By “the US,” do you mean Asst. Secs. of State Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish? And the majority of US citizens and Congressmen in 1945? You must be joking.
My dad flew B-29's out of Guam. (315th Heavy Bombardment Group, Northwest Field, Guam) We often talked about the necessary evils of war.
He firmly believed, and I agree, that we did what we had to do in order to achieve victory.
Blessings to you, sir!
The emperor accepted unconditional surrender; ergo, he would have accepted conditional surrender that left him nominally in power too. Many of his officers did not accept the first and were willing to use force trying to stop it. Many of them would have accepted the second. Actual control for any of them was out of the question and they knew it, they were going to be slaughtered if they continued to resist and they knew that too. There were just several things they were perfectly willing to die for, and one of them was what they thought of as the honor of their emperor, which the shinto cult raised to a god figure. Which did not have any connotation of actual command, given Japan's past, but did have one as a figurehead that warriors gave lives for.
Regardless of whether the emperor would have accepted such an offer without the bombings, it was the clear duty of the US leadership to offer it before using them, since it did not in fact require the removal of the emperor as a political aim of the war.
By "the US" I do not mean two men you name, I mean General MacArthur and our actual policy during the occupation. You know, what we actually did. We left the emperor to make it easier to rule Japan. If that farsighted policy had been adopted very slightly earlier, it could have been offered before the bombing - as Grew (the ambassador to Japan) and Stimson (secretary of war) both urged at the time. Stimson in particular did not know if it would work, but thought is blatantly obvious that it was worth trying. It might save hundreds of thousands of lives and it would cost nothing whatever.
Truman overruled him. It was an unwarranted and wanton decision. Stimson was right, and Truman was wrong. Morally. And this was clear at the time, it is not hindsight.
I wrote:
/// And you don’t think that THIS [keeping the wartime Allies united, esp. in regards to Germany] should be a major consideration when resolving a 6-year world war? Astonishing. ///
JasonC wrote:
>>> I can’t tell if this is lack of reading comprehension or sheer lying. Charity tells me to assume the former. <<<
That’s a mighty fine sense of charity you have there. LOL!
>>> The principle of unconditional surrender was useful in maintaining the unity of the allies in the endgame *with Germany*, but from May 1945 onward it was *pointless* and the only reason it was being maintained was prestige and a desire to look consistent. <<<
Nonsense!
You’re forgetting that the “Poland Question” and the “German Question” were two very big hot potatoes for the Allies in July-August 1945. Remember the Agreements between the Big 3 at the Potsdam Conference? You’re also forgetting that we were trying our best to make sure that the Soviets did not make a separate peace with the Japanese, and hopefully did not get involved in the Pacific War at all.
>>> Once Russia agreed to attack Manchuria and actually did so, there was nothing whatever left to gain from it [unconditional surrender]. <<<
Rubbish!
You’re forgetting that the Potsdam Declaration (26 July 1945) was in fact a list of conditions for a Japanese surrender. Japan realized that “unconditional surrender” per se was not on the table at least by then. It didn’t mean “undefined surrender.”
The Soviets did not start their invasian of Manchuria until 9 August 1945. Three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. So, according to your argument unconditional surrender was useful to bring about US/Soviet unity until almost the last moment before surrender. That doesn’t look like the “vanity of princes” to me.
Not to mention the fact that, as I discussed in an earlier post, unconditional surrender was held for other reasons, too.
>>> Russia didn’t give a damn about removing the emperor and neither did we - so why insist on it? Because there had been a reason to reject all talks *with Germany* (purely prudential ones, to avoid them playing off levels of effort of the various allies etc). And because the pols wanted to sound high and mighty and consistent. Well, the last is the prince’s vanity and not a legitimate claim, to quote Montesquieu. It was not worth human blood. <<<
A.) All of the diplomatic reasonings you say apply to Nazi Germany apply just as well to Imperial Japan;
B.) What Frank calls the “abolitionist” faction in the US gov’t — Byrnes, Acheson, MacLeish — would have been surprised to hear that we didn’t give a d*mn about the Imperial System (however defined).
>>> As for who advocated a public statement about keeping the emperor at the time, ambassador Grew formally proposed it to Truman while the fighting was still going on on Okinawa. Stimson and Marshall both approved of such a statement “in principle” at that time, but asked for it to be delayed until after the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign. Any decision on it was then punted down the road, first until after Okinawa was won and then until after Potsdam. Grew renewed the proposal right before Potsdam as something to be decided at it. Stimson drafted a proposal for non-unconditionalsurrender as part of the bomb ultimatum. He personally added that specifically including the possibility of keeping the emperor would increase the chances of the ultimatum being accepted. The state department, which did not want to commit yet to the form a postwar Japanese government would take, then watered down his language. Truman personally rejected even that watered down version. <<<
Finally, some names. Actually, Joseph Grew was Acting Secretary of State at the time, not Ambassador. I know about Stimson, but hadn’t heard that George Marshall was a retentionist. Are you sure you aren’t thinking about Adm. Leahy?
>>> These are not minor players and they are not anonymous. <<<
And against them were gov’t officials who were also Not minor players: there was James F. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and (at Potsdam) Secretary of State, former Sec. State Cordell Hull, and various military offlicials depending upon the fortunes at war. It wasn’t just the Good Guys vs. stick-in-the mud Truman.
>>> the secretary of war, the senior professional civilian official directly involved, who was complying fully and scrupulously with the moral code of just war doctrine and striving to minimize unnecessary loss of human life, while securing all the political objectives of his country <<<
You’re forgetting that Stimson was the direct supervisor of General Leslie Groves, who oversaw the Manhattan Project. I know that Stimson abhorred city bombings, but he didn’t resign when XXI Bomber Command was reducing Japanese cities to rubble, did he?
>>> Truman made the call himself, and his was the ultimate authority and responsibility to make that call. But in the whole affair, Grew and Stimson come off as entirely moral men doing what the moral law required of the situation, and Truman does not. <<<
I see all three as being moral men in time of war. Given the complexity of the issues and situations, the existence of factions in the US Gov’t, and the difficult decisions that had to be made, to single out Truman as the bad guy is both wrongheaded and meanspirited. It reeks of special pleading.
>>> Nor is the contemporary personal judgment of the republican secretary of war, “communist propaganda”. <<<
You’re right, but those judgements taken out of context and placed in a certain light sure did make good material for Red agitprop (a la Alperovitz and his fellow travellers).
On the contrary, the Americans were anxious to secure Stalin's agreement to join the war against Japan, clear back to the previous great power conference.
And Russia declared war after the first bomb because that is when they were ready to attack and in fact attacked, so it was when the Japanese learned of it. But the allies knew of it long before that, they had already secured Russian agreement to enter the war against Japan before the first bomb was dropped. There was no issue of unity left to safeguard, and the point at issue - keep the emperor or not - was not one that divided the allies to begin with.
And no, the role of the unconditional surrender policy was not remotely symmetrical for Japan and for Germany. Germany was fighting a two front war and the allies entered it late, from the Russian's point of view. The unconditional declaration had helped avoid interallied fighting over the efforts each would make to defeat Germany. Germany (and its generals, including those seeking to overthrow Hitler) was continually dreaming of a split between the western allies and Russia to save Germany from final defeat. This was delusional, but there were serious post war tensions brewing between the Russians and the west in Europe. There was nothing comparable in the eastern theater, where everyone saw and knew that the US could finish off Japan without help if necessary and would occupy the place. Stalin wanted to get in at the end to grab territory on the mainland, while the US wanted to minimize its own casualties and welcomed the help.
Nothing to be gained by the unconditionality demand could go farther than active Russian participation in the war. The US had that in its pocket before it dropped the first bomb, and could use it along with its ultimatum, and could make that ultimatum less than unconditional easily. This was clear to all concerned and it is why it was directly advocated by high officials.
Ambassador Grew was acting sec state at the time but had been ambassador to Japan before the war. (Ambassadors retain that title regardless of later job, by the way, it is a rank like general in that respect). He knew their culture and what the emperor meant to their resistence. His advice was perfectly sensible.
Pointing out that others wanted the emperor removed is irrelevant because they lost that debate afterward, in the actual event. MacArthur kept the emperor. There was no US goal being secured by insisting on the ability to remove the emperor, because we didn't in fact remove him.
A peace reached without that unconditionality and also without the atomic bombings would have been less draconian, sure. There were no doubt any number of bloody minded men who would prefer the way it actually happened, regardless of whether the other course would have worked, out of hatred of the Japanese or out of a desire for prestige, or in the belief that really grinding their noses in it was the best way to wring any future resistence out of them. But if the ultimatum before the bomb had offered them a chance to keep the emperor and they had accepted, who the hell cares? It would have saved nearly half a million lives and still ended the war.
It is possible they would have rejected the ultimatum anyway. It is possible they would have rejected it, but caved after the first bomb and before the second. Nobody knows and it is beside the point. What isn't beside the point is the *moral requirement* to *seek peace* without *unnecessary loss of life*, if it can be had without sacrifice of the just political goals of the war. Grinding their noses in it isn't such a just goal, and removing the emperor wasn't one we actually sought. Killing more people just to avoid any need to offer it, was not morally justified.
Stimson and Grew saw this, Truman either did not or more likely didn't give a damn and wanted to look as tough as possible, for the sake of the Russians and for the sake of the electorate. But those are the vanity of the prince and not a legitimate right.
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