No, it makes complete sense. Because a president’s ineligibility affects every voter, there is not a unique injury to one voter - military or civilian. (And in this particular case, the injury is mere conjecture because Kerchner isn’t active military.) So the scope of the issue then falls under the political question doctrine. All such issues should be addressed by the legislative branch. Congress could hold hearings to investigate or even remove the president.
The Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs are frustrated by a perception that Congress has failed to act on this issue. The Court takes no position on whether or not Congress failed to act. They essentially tell the plaintiffs that if they are not satisfied with how the legislative branch has handled this matter, then the remedy to their frustration is to vote the b@st@rds out!
(FR attorneys: If I’ve incorrectly described how this issue falls under the political question doctrine, please correct me.)
You're making an excuse and not following what the judges are saying in this decision, who called the plaintiffs ability to sue "unique." You don't need to make excuses for the judges. The rational behind their decision is infirm.
So the scope of the issue then falls under the political question doctrine.
The Supreme Court has accepted cases that fall under the political doctrine question. If it is motivated to take such a case, it can usually justify a reason for doing so. In this case, the court is not dismissing the case over political question doctrine, so much as they trying to claim that the greivance is too general or abstract for a petitioner to claim standing. IIUC, political doctrine questions aren't about standing.
All such issues should be addressed by the legislative branch. Congress could hold hearings to investigate or even remove the president.
If this is so, then the remedy isn't solely based on the plaintiffs votes as the decision states. This is an entirely different remedy altogether and is NOT specified in this decision. But, from a legal standpoint, it doesn't ring true. A remedy for repealing law exists within the legislative branch, yet courts have never had a problem with declaring laws to be invalid. So for this court to suggest it is powerless to provide a remedy is complete and abject nonsense. They certainly have no problem in other situations with telling the legislative branch it has done too much or not enough.
The Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs are frustrated by a perception that Congress has failed to act on this issue. The Court takes no position on whether or not Congress failed to act.
Neither did I. Not sure what your point is.
They essentially tell the plaintiffs that if they are not satisfied with how the legislative branch has handled this matter, then the remedy to their frustration is to vote the b@st@rds out!
This same 'remedy' would exist for overturning unconstitutional laws, yet the courts have no problem stepping in to do it themselves. It's a poor excuse for this court not to do more when it obviously could. Second, this so-called unique, but generalized grievance needs a one-time only action to resolve the practical question ... it's not just a political question as there is a concrete and particularized situation of a person holding office who may or may not be Constitutionally eligible to do so. Either his appointment and election is validated or invalidated he is removed from office. There are no other necessary remedies nor would there be an onslaught of continous, so-called frivolous, but generalized lawsuits against the defendant after the situation is resolved. It doesn't create a situation where every president will be removed from office because someone doesn't like him or her.
In one sense, the court's inaction does have an impact on the political-question doctrine, because the court's inaction serves to validate the usurper's occupation of the White House. Again, the reasoning of the court is poor and more than a little bizarre.
You’re not wrong except that this case was dismissed for lack of standing, not based on the political question doctrine. Standing is more or less what you described here, though.
Standing and the political question doctrine are two separate doctrines governing the justiciability of cases before federal courts. They come from two different Constitutional principles: the standing doctrine comes from the “cases and controversies” language of Art. III, s. 2, while the political question doctrine comes primarily from separation of powers. Some of the confusion comes from the fact that separation of powers also forms part of the justification for the standing doctrine, as evidenced by the language in this opinion (which quoted another standing case).
Political question doctrine is kind of a catch-all used to refrain from hearing cases the court sees as inappropriate for judicial remedy, even when the parties have standing and the case is otherwise justiciable. It did not need to be invoked here because, in this case, the plaintiffs clearly lacked standing under any reasonable definition of the term.
I know this post is a few days old, but I figured it’s worth addressing the difference between these two easily confused doctrines.
Where does the Constitution ever give Congress the authority to interpret the meaning of “natural born US citizen”?
Where does the Constitution ever give Congress the authority to determine eligibility of PRESIDENTIAL (not legislative) candidates?
Where does the Constitution ever give Congress the authority to determine that a president-elect has “failed to qualify” by Jan 20th and thus give the presidential powers to the vice-president elect instead?
If the Constitution does not specifically give that authority, power, and responsibility to one of the other branches, then they CANNOT claim the “political question” reason to refuse to hear the case.