Replies

Lets be aware of those who want us to rush into war.

Take a look at history re 4 August 1964.

LBJ’s duplicity got us into a land war in SE Asia and split this country apart.

LBJ’s duplicity cost a lot of lives and left thousands of brave soldiers, Marines, Air Force and Sailors mentally harmed for life.

http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-02/truth-about-tonkin

On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats attacked the USS Maddox (DD-731) while the destroyer was in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is no doubting that fact.

But what happened in the Gulf during the late hours of 4 August—and the consequential actions taken by U.S. officials in Washington—has been seemingly cloaked in confusion and mystery ever since that night.

Over the next three hours, the two ships repeatedly maneuvered at high speeds to evade perceived enemy boat attacks. The destroyers reported automatic-weapons fire; more than 20 torpedo attacks; sightings of torpedo wakes, enemy cockpit lights, and searchlight illumination; and numerous radar and surface contacts. By the time the destroyers broke off their “counterattack,” they had fired 249 5-inch shells, 123 3-inch shells, and four or five depth charges.

Commander Stockdale was again in the action, this time alone. When his wingman’s aircraft developed trouble, Stockdale got permission to launch solo from the Ticonderoga . He arrived overhead at 2135. For more than 90 minutes, he made runs parallel to the ships’ course and at low altitude (below 2,000 feet) looking for the enemy vessels. He reported later, “I had the best seat in the house to watch that event and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there . . . there was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”

Captain Herrick also began to have doubts about the attack. As the battle continued, he realized the “attacks” were actually the results of “overeager sonar operators” and poor equipment performance. The Turner Joy had not detected any torpedoes during the entire encounter, and Herrick determined that the Maddox ‘s operators were probably hearing the ship’s propellers reflecting off her rudder during sharp turns. 12 The destroyer’s main gun director was never able to lock onto any targets because, as the operator surmised, the radar was detecting the stormy sea’s wave tops.

By 0127 on 5 August, hours after the “attacks” had occurred, Herrick had queried his crew and reviewed the preceding hours’ events. He sent a flash (highest priority) message to Honolulu, which was received in Washington at 1327 on 4 August, declaring his doubts: “Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by MADDOX. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.”