Posted on 07/11/2014 10:51:02 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
Undermanned and overworked crews can’t keep Littoral Combat Ships running
Did you ever work a job that required two people, but your stingy employer insisted that one was enough? Then you understand the problem with the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship.
One of the LCS’s supposed advantages is its much smaller crew compared to other vessels. Where a Navy frigate might have 200 sailors, the frigate-size LCS has just 40—although, to be fair, two different 40-person crews take turns running the ship.
LCS is a jack-of-all-trades warship that can carry different modules for various missions—anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare or mine-hunting.
The idea was that automation would enable fewer sailors to operate the $400-million LCS for all these missions. This saves on manpower costs as well as on precious shipboard space for crew accommodations.
But a new Government Accountability Office report proves what any Burger King worker already knows—cutting your workforce by 80 percent without also decreasing its workload … isn’t always a great idea.
When the GAO studied USS Freedom’s recent 10-month deployment to Singapore, the auditors found that crews worked too hard. “Freedom crews averaged about six hours of sleep per day compared to the Navy standard of eight hours,” the GAO stated.
“Some key departments, such as engineering and operations, averaged even fewer.”
And this happened despite the Navy temporarily adding 10 extra sailors to the crew and sending contractors aboard.
Missing sleep isn’t exactly a new problem for Navy sailors. But the sailing branch has workload standards for a reason. “Crew members told us that their sleep hours decreased significantly during major equipment casualties, particularly those affecting the ship’s diesel generators and other engineering systems,” the GAO explained.
Warships naturally have to periodically return to port for replenishment and repair. But with its small crew and limited on-board maintenance capability, the LCS is particularly dependent on shore-based support. If something needs to be fixed, the LCS either returns to port or maintenance teams—supplied by private defense contractors—fly out to the ship.
During the Singapore deployment, Freedom had to report to port for five days of preventative maintenance every 25 days, plus two weeks of intensive maintenance every four months.
The result was that the Freedom spent lots of time on the sideline. Ships of the Seventh Fleet—the Navy’s Pacific force—typically spend about 20 percent of their time in port. Freedom spent 58 percent of her tour docked in Singapore.
Mechanical problems were so common that the Freedom lost 55 days at sea, which in turn limited the amount of useful data that the Navy could collect about how reliable the LCS is in the first place.
Nor was Freedom the only problem ship. Another LCS, USS Independence, spent eight months of 2013 in dock or in maintenance.
The Navy wants at least 24 LCS. But critics worry that the vessel is too fragile and too expensive. Freedom’s maintenance issues suggest that such a small crew can’t maintain the ship, let alone cope with emergencies. And one wonders how many contractors would be eager to fly out to fix an LCS in the middle of a combat zone.
The Navy might want to sleep on this. Even if the LCS’ sailors can’t.
We are agreed.
Do I win a prize? ;^)
A submariner told me that our sub strategy has always been the opposite of this. Said the Ruskies (back in the day) were trying to automate more and have fewer men, that the US realized that thinking was critical to operating a nuke sub, so they had more men on board relatively speaking. They said the “more human brains” strategy worked far better, since you’re dealing with complex equipment and potentially complex situations.
Now we’re going completely in the opposite direction ???
My tech background tells me the reasoning is simple: vendors who sell hardware are always trying to get you to buy more expensive hardware. Way more than you need, features you don’t need, complexity that winds up being more expensive, etc., etc.
The revolving door is so pervasive, and lately political corruption and ties with socialist elite financiers is so out in the open, that FedGov seems to think that any wacky idea they embark on will be largely unreported and thus unchallenged by Congress or anyone else.
It’s like the spending at NSA for data storage to store every email, phone call, etc.
Do you know how computer FAST hardware depreciates in value - and becomes completely obsolete ?
Buying that much storage is doomed to looking like a ridiculously old-fashioned computer museum within a decade.
But it’s the sheeple’s money, and the vendors are inviting us to all those parties and what not, so...
Somehow, the Simplest Tool Theory has been forgotten. “The simplest tool that’ll get the job done is always the best tool”. They’re pretty much 180 out of phase.
I am working at Electric Boat. I am assigned to the massive engineering pooled hired to design the OHIO Class replacement project. I specifically work in propulsion plant fluids. I am one of 2 former submarine sailors in that department. I was both an operator and an officer.
My first assignment was to perform a complex study regarding the manning of the engineering department. The OHIO class had 4 more watching stations in the engineeroom than the new VIRGINIA Class submarines. In the initial concept phase the Navy wanted to take it a step further, and only have 1 person in maneuvering and an officer, and only 2 people in the spaces, as opposed to the 6 in the VIRGINIA.
The operator in maneuvering, said he felt like he was playing “whack a mole”, when we introduced him to the prototype under a casualty situation. The operators in the spaces were completely overwhelmed to do the initial response to fire/flooding/steam leak drill. In short the proposed watch team was inadequate, and the Navy elected to keep the same as VIRGINIA.
I will take this a step further. I had to estimate the work hours of the engineer department sailors, and confirm the Navy’s proposed engineering crew size would not work anymore per person than the OHIO class. I spent over a year and half collecting data. I sent 3 surveys with every preventive maintenance item for their equipment, time spent paint and cleaning, and time for corrective maintenance. As it turns out the proposed crew size will have fewers hours spent on maintenance due to the efficiency of the system.
With this, the Navy, at least on this project took a large consideration about their crew size, and their ability to effectively meeting the engineering department duties.
The minesweeper instrument on my project got moved to the LCS so they could add another mission to the ship’s capability. But the instrument weighed 1,000 pounds and was helicopter towed by a MH-53. To move it they had to tow it with the much smaller LCS’ MH-60. Towing with the 60 meant the helicopter had to go so slow that if there was a problem they’d drop in the drink before recovery. So, they regularly towed it faster which put them at the edge of their stress level. The pilots regularly guillotined the $150k tow cables and lost the multi-million dollar package thereby requiring a $300k deep dive recovery. So, the political decision to move the mission to a ship it was unsuited for led to the Navy losing a potentially good minesweeping device. Pure politics.
I have to wonder what other mission were moved to the LCS for which it is also unsuited. For example, Hezbollah has Chinese made, Iranian supplied anti-ship missiles it fires from shore. They have hit five Israeli patrol boats resulting in loss of life. The Israeli boats are MUCH smaller and harder to hit.
Also, a single mine would destroy the LCS’s very light hull. I think this is another idea-fart from a planner who spent his career at a desk.
Thank you for your service, sir, and that info.
Good to know that something appears to have worked out.
Based on my software experience as a programmer, I get what you’re saying.
I can’t stand when there are “shortcuts” made for the wrong reasons when we’re spending so much money already and we know in advance that we need to handle battle conditions as the norm.
I’m very skeptical of the whole idea of transforming to littoral and backing away from blue water, since transforming back, if need be, can not be done at a moment’s notice. And, IMHO, the military needs to be ready on a moment’s notice.
IMHO, the whole littoral thing is aimed at making our military useful to financial elites who influence our gov’t at the highest levels in their manipulations of revolutions, covert ops in undeclared wars, etc.
Invariably when you focus on something other than your real job, your real job has a way of popping up when you least expect it, and then you’re not prepared.
Use Gearings instead of Fletchers, the 2250s had longer legs and greater firepower with the same engineering plant and a slightly larger hull.
LCS stands for Little Crappy Ships.
What do you think of the idea of just building additional San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships, capable of fielding a variety of manned and unmanned vessels and mission packages? The ships could sit further out at sea, out of range of shore-based anti-ship missiles, while being able to haul and support larger vessels for close littoral work.
And when not needed for LCS-type tasks, the ships would be available in case we again needed amphibious capability again.
“What do you think of the idea of just building additional San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships, “
You’re thinking like somebody who is paying for it rather than somebody who wants a promotion. Nobody along the chain would get promotions or good effectiveness ratings by suggesting we re-apply an existing cheaper solution. But a new class of ships and lots and lots of contract money which can be leveraged to political advantage, now there’s a reason for a totally new design. Plus, the LCS was touted as the new eNavy that would make everything so much cheaper and so much more useful than those crew-intensive old heavy blue water ships.
Little crappy ship is FLAMMABLE and built to kill Americans.
No surprise actually since the Pentagon
now works for, and reports to, and protects,
al Qaeda OVER THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
It’s not just you.
Regards,
LOL!
I hate to think what would happen if it was badly damaged by something...like a direct hit. Who would keep it afloat?
In polite terms, CF is a cluster failure. :=)
The overweight problem for LCS-1 remains unsolved and LCS-2 still has corrosion control problems. Both ships were designed to do 45+ knots, but someone at NavSea forgot that anti-ship cruise missiles got a minimum of Mach 0.8 or faster. Good luck outrunning one of them and surviving. LCS crewing is so small they do not have damage control ability. As far as I can see, the LCS is a $400 million target.
Yep, but it was the wrong answer.
Looks like the Disco Volante. Where’s Largo?
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