http://www.etherit.co.uk/month/7/29.htm
August 29th, 1945 (WEDNESDAY)
HONG KONG: The British fleet arrives to reclaim the colony for Britain.
CHINA: Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek meet at Chungking for talks to try to avert civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists.
SINGAPORE: Japanese troops in southeast Asia, numbering about 740,000, surrender in Singapore to British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia. General ITAGAKI Seishiro, Commander of the 7th Area Army, signs the document for the Japanese.
JAPAN: In the Kurile Islands, Soviet forces occupy Etorofu Island. The Japanese garrisons on Halmahera and Morotai Islands surrender. The first Allied prisoners in Japan are liberated by USN forces.
The USN’s Task Group 30.6 commanded by Commodore Rodger W. Simpson arrives in Tokyo Bay to undertake emergency evacuation of Allied POWs in waterfront areas. Accompanying Commodore Simpson was Commander Harold E. Stassen, USNR, Flag Secretary to Commander, Third Fleet, Admiral William F. Halsey.
Guided by TBM Avengers from the light aircraft carrier USS Cowpens (CVL-25) and taken to the scene in LCVPs from the high speed transport USS Gosselin (APD-126), Commodore Simpson carries out his orders. The appearance of the LCVPs off the camp at Omori (the first liberated) triggers “an indescribable scene of jubilation and emotion” by the former captives, some of whom swim out to the approaching landing craft. Many of the POWs, suffering from malnutrition and other health problems, required immediate medical care and the hospital ship USS Benevolence (AH-13) is stationed nearby to receive them. Their treatment as POWs was described as an “inquisitional form of barbarism.”
The battleship USS Missouri anchors in Tokyo Bay.
Off Japan, the USN submarine Segundo (SS-398) encounters Japanese submarine HIJMS I-401 off the northeast coast of Honshu, and “after considerable negotiation,” places prize crew on board.
EAST INDIES: The Japanese garrisons on Halmahera and Morotai Islands in the Netherlands East Indies surrender.
U.S.A.: Secret Army and Navy reports of official enquiries into the raid on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 are made public. The blame is placed on a lack of preparedness, confusion and a breakdown of inter-service coordination. Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Harold R. Stark are criticized. President Harry S. Truman objects to the findings on Hull and Marshall.
A little background here on the confusion of surrender for General Wainwright:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_32.htm
General Wainwright’s Orders
Unlike General King, who had been forced to violate his instructions and keep from his superior any knowledge of his decision to surrender the Luzon Force, Wainwright was able to make his decision unhindered by restrictions from higher headquarters. He had not always had this freedom of action. Until 9 April he had been bound, as had General MacArthur before him, by President Roosevelt’s order “to fight as long as there remains any possibility of resistance.”1 On that day, the day of General King’s surrender, the President modified this order and gave General Wainwright full authority to act on his own judgment.
The decision to change Wainwright’s instructions had been initiated in Washington just before the surrender of Bataan. Alerted by reports from MacArthur and Wainwright, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, acting in Marshall’s absence, had informed the President on 8 April (Washington time) that the situation on Bataan was extremely serious and the collapse of its defense imminent. Reminding President Roosevelt of his instructions to MacArthur, “issued at a time when it appeared necessary to make very clear . . . the nature of the defense expected,” McNarney suggested that the President might wish now to modify these instructions. “It is possible,” he wrote, “that in the literal execution of these orders General Wainwright may be tempted to carry them through to an illogical extreme. I think there should be no doubt that his resolution and sense of duty will preclude any untoward or precipitous action, but on the other hand, it is possible that greater latitude in the final decision should be allowed him.”2
President Roosevelt accepted McNarney’s suggestion readily, and that same day, 8 April-the 9th, Philippine time-approved the text of a message for Wainwright modifying his earlier instructions. Explaining that he was changing his orders “because of the state to which your forces have been reduced by circumstances over which you have had no control,” the President told Wainwright that he was free to make “any decision affecting the future of the Bataan garrison.” “I . . . have every confidence,” the President wrote, “that whatever decision you may sooner or later be forced to make will be dictated only by the best interests of your country and your magnificent troops.”3
Roosevelt’s message to Wainwright was not sent directly to Corregidor but went instead to General MacArthur in Australia with instructions that it be forwarded to Corregidor if he, MacArthur, concurred “both as to substance and timing.”4 The message reached MacArthur at about the same time as Wainwright’s dispatch carrying the news that Bataan had surrendered. Since, in his view, “the action taken on Bataan anticipated the authority conveyed in the message,” he saw no need to change Wainwright’s instructions.5 In effect, this was a “non-concurrence” of the President’s message to Wainwright, which remained on his desk.
But the progress of events had already invalidated MacArthur’s decision. The President, on hearing news of the surrender of Bataan and before receiving MacArthur’s reply, apparently decided that Wainwright needed assurance of support immediately and he sent him the text of his message, including the instructions given MacArthur, from whom, he explained, no reply had yet been received. “Whatever decision you have made,” Roosevelt told Wainwright, “has been dictated by the best interests of your troops and of the country.” He then went on to express the hope that Wainwright would be able to hold Corregidor, but assured him “of complete freedom of action” and “full confidence” in any decision he might be forced to make.6
General Wainwright received the message on 10 April and sent an immediate acknowledgment expressing his understanding of the change in instructions as well as “heartfelt gratitude” for the President’s confidence in his judgment. At the same time, he informed MacArthur of the President’s message to him and of his reply.7
Wainwright waited in vain for a response from MacArthur. Although his new orders had come directly from the President, he was aware that initially they had been sent to his immediate superior for approval. That approval had never been given, and Wainwright was understandably anxious to have it. On 13 April, therefore, he raised the subject again in a message to MacArthur. The President, he reminded MacArthur, had stated in his original dispatch that it was to be forwarded if he, MacArthur, concurred. Since he had not yet heard from MacArthur on the subject, Wainwright wrote, he could not avoid the conclusion that MacArthur did not approve of the new orders. The President, Wainwright asserted, “appears to leave to my discretion the decision which I must ultimately make. ... If I am not correct in this assumption I hope you will so advise me.”8
General MacArthur’s reply left no doubt that he considered Wainwright free now to make his own decisions. He explained why he had not transmitted the original dispatch, and then went on to say that the President’s later message “came direct to you . . . and now gives you complete authority to use your own judgment.”9 MacArthur’s reply put an end to the correspondence on Wainwright’s instructions. The final decision was his, and three weeks later, when he decided to surrender, he did so entirely on his own responsibility.