Posted on 02/12/2017 4:26:47 PM PST by janetjanet998
Edited on 02/12/2017 9:33:58 PM PST by Admin Moderator. [history]
The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.
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Flawed Maintenance Repairs Propagated and Increased the Spillway Degradation
In 2009, DWR Spillway repair bids and line item documentation, prepared by DWR engineering, noted that 240 linear feet of drains were identified to be repaired [7][11]. A 2007 photograph reveals that one section of the spillway drains (10 drains spaced 20 feet apart servicing 18,250 square feet of spillway drainage area) were non-functional revealed by the sidewall drain non- operation (Fig. B.4).
After the 2009 contract repairs, the same drain section remained non-functional as evidenced in a 2013 photograph (Reference [17] Figs. 1 and 14). 2017 photographs reveal that 1,780 linear feet of slab drains that service 36,500 square feet of spillway drainage area were non-functional (Fig. B.2). Despite the DWR drain repair identification of 240 linear feet, the drains were not repaired.
Inspections by the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) should have identified such a severe non-functional drainage condition in the spillway. As the non-functioning drain state is observable from the sidewall drain & water seepage patterns, a visual inspection would have discovered this issue. The cited evidence documents that this non-functional drain state was not recognized nor repaired for close to 10 years (Nov 2007 to Jan 2017).
Had DSOD, or FERC properly recognized this issue, an investigation would have revealed the source of the widespread ‘clogging’ of the drains and remedial action could have been initiated. This Failure of Inspection from multiple agencies, and for nearly a decade, is perhaps one of the greatest failures in the critical process of insuring the safety and integrity of the spillway.
In summary:
1. DSOD, and FERC failed to recognize the significant problem of two non- functional sidewall drains which serviced 36,500 square feet of under-slab drainage for a span of 9 years 3 months.
2. DWR engineering noted 240 linear feet of drain line were to be repaired in 2009 [11]. In 2013 the drains remained non-functional (Reference [17] Fig. 14). DWR Maintenance and Engineering failed to address this issue.
3. Evidence identifies that Maintenance repairs of "deep void" filling (forming Large Concrete Slab blocks), with up to 9+ feet deep voids under the spillway, would have clogged the open ends of "dropped" drains [17] (Reference [17], Figs. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10).
4. Seepage Evidence in 2013 identifies that water flow submarines below the large void block concrete filled non-functional drain area (left side view Ref [17], Fig. 14) and the seepage re-appears immediately downslope.
5. Evidence DWR failed to notify FERC on the issue of "deep void" filling repairs. Dam owners are required to notify FERC of any serious Potential Failure Modes (PFM's) [18].
6. The second non-functional drainage area is directly upslope to the blowout failure initiation location (Fig. B.5). This condition would combine a large volume of non-captured under-slab flow to the next set of downslope drains. A higher volume of pressurized water flow increases the scouring erosion of weak foundation material identified in the blowout failure region. From the evidence of the "clogging" of injection of large "void filling" from Reference [17], the same process of deep erosion (and potential injecting induced "clogging") could render drains inoperable by either "dropping" drain pipe or "clogging" to where they are unable to service flows.
The DWR Oroville Dam Spillway Incident Forensic Investigation Team recognized "plugging" or "collapse" of drains; from May 5, 2017 Memorandum [9] – items:
1. "11. Plugging or collapse of drains or collector pipes, including potential plugging by tree roots."
2. "12. Flow into the foundation that exceeded the capacity of the drain pipes, including flows from areas adjacent to the chute."
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Main Report link - clip above from Appendix B:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
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Loss of Anchorage
The loss of the spillway foundation integrity caused a significant structural integrity degradation of slab anchorage in the spillway anchor bars. DWR engineers had not considered the design consequences that would result in the high volume of pressurized water flow under the spillway slabs. Using the experimental data generated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Fig. B.13), a single drain system (10 drains spaced 20 feet apart) with a simple example of one seam per slab (0.125 effective seam width, 1/2 inch offset, 90 feet per second flow rate) could yield up to 55 cubic feet per second of total sub-slab water flow.
This example flow rate would scour the full length of a 200 foot (18,250 square feet) slab array of eight slabs plus the sidewall slab area. As anchor bars were intended to be emplaced in the "worst foundation available”; DWR Field Engineers restricted contractors from excavating to competent rock; and DWR Final Geology Report Spec 65-09 illustrated the poor quality highly erodible foundation "wide seam area" (Fig. B.21); a significant penetrating pressurized sub-slab water flow in highly erodible foundation material, over time, would render the anchorage resistance to a dangerously degraded structural retention state.
In summary:
1. Three 40 feet by 50 feet slabs, with a combined 60 anchor bars, failed in the initial blowout failure. The fourth slab, to the left, was partially anchored on a section of "more competent rock" and it survived the initial blowout (Fig. B.10). This evidences the severe lack of structural integrity of the anchorage of the slabs as the image reveals the anchor bars were emplaced in highly weathered rock (poor) foundation material (light to brown color).
2. Non-functional drainage increased a sub-slab scouring erosion flow at the blowout failure slabs. The increased sub-slab scouring erosion on highly erodible material (noted in DWR Final Geology Report Spec 65-09 Fig. B.21) would have seriously degraded the anchorage strength in eroding at/near/around the anchor bar grout holes.
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Main Report link - clip above from Appendix B:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
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Physical Root Cause Failure Analysis
The Physical Root Cause Failure Analysis of initiating blowout sequence of the Spillway is summarized in the following:
1. Fig. B.8. Initial failure "hole" defect initiation point of the Initial Blowout Failure Area of slabs along this extensively repaired spillway seam. Hole dimension measured with forensic high resolution photographs to be near 7.9 feet along the seam by 14 inches downslope from the seam. White lines denote the drain line cracks in the slab surface. The depth of the "hole" is inferred to be three inches deep to the upper layer of rebar - as evidenced in prior concrete spalling spontaneous defect occurrences revealed in Fig. B.6. This depth was also noted by the DWR Board of Consultants Memorandum No. 2 (depth to rebar layer), page 8 [3].
2. Fig. B.10. Initiating Failure Hole location reveals a deep seam of highly erodible foundation material that is many feet deeper than the grouted 5 foot deep slab anchor bars. Angle of seam inferred by dashed line. Image reveals the nature of why the "hole" location and that full 178 foot wide seam area was a structural problem area. The upslope "soil-like" foundation material is in a transition zone of more competent rock (downslope from the dashed line). Thus the "communicating" slab forces through the load transfer bars would have experienced a differential in structural integrity or stability.
3. Fig. B.11. Blowout Failure slabs located at a transition zone of higher integrity anchorage stability slabs verses slabs emplaced on poor anchorage stability based slabs above "soil-like" erodible foundation material. Net foundation structural anchorage "differential" placed forces on problem area seam as evidenced by the extensive concrete repairs along this full 178 foot wide seam area.
4. Fig. B.21. DWR Official Final Geology Report Spec 65-09 denotes the foundation geology of the subgrade quality of foundation material that the invert concrete chute was constructed upon. The Seam (marked as a series of "S"'s) follows the dashed line seam in Fig. B.10. This drawing reveals the same foundation structural integrity transition region of the quality of the foundation material as in the blowout failure erosion images in Fig. B.10 and Fig. B.11.
5. Fig. B.20. DWR Final Construction Report FCR 65-09. Critical Design Flaw linked to blowout failure. DWR reveals that the spillway foundation will include anchor bars emplaced in "clay seams". This evidences that DWR was allowing the slab design to have anchor bars to function from the "worst foundation available". This would include poor foundation materials such areas of clay and areas of soil-like highly erodible extensively weathered rock. The blowout failure area reveals this type of material (poor foundation materials). This evidences the non-ability of the anchor bars to maintain the integrity of anchorage in these clay and soil-like foundation materials. These materials are highly erodible in subsurface slab water flow. Scouring erosion would remove these seams of materials rendering a significant loss of pounds per square inch in anchorage strength of the anchor bars.
6. Figs. B.14 and B.15. Extensive corrosion of rebar at slab drain line cracks weakened the slab into a severely degraded structural condition (little to no remaining tensile strength. Reference "Slab Structural Degradation from Rebar Corrosion at Cracks".
7. Fig. B.10. "Loss of Anchorage". Evidence of little to no ground anchorage at the blow out failure area involving 60+ anchor bars in 3 main blowout failure slabs.
8. Figs. B.8 and B.7. Multi-slab long drain line slab fracture 5.3 feet from the originating failure "hole". Construction Design Flaw of emplacing drains within the slab, thus "thinning" the slab thickness resulted in chronic slab cracking over drain lines for the entire 3000+ feet of the spillway. Three rows of slab wide drain line cracks were in the initial blowout failure slab where the failure "hole" was identified. The first drain line crack "row" was 5.3 feet from the slab "hole".
9. Stagnation Pressure in combination with hydrostatic forces fractured the slab from the seam "hole" to the nearest slab drain line downslope. Pressure force analysis: A high velocity flow near 90 feet per second, at 54,500 cubic feet per second, produces extreme uplift forces from a small offset in the slab joint alignment from Stagnation Pressure. Whether the slab alignment is offset positive or negative, these extreme forces at the high velocity flow are significant and could easily fracture a highly structurally weakened slab. Reference - U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Stagnation Pressure Mean Uplift Pressure Plot [14], with an Initiating Failure point referenced to a flow velocity at or near 90 feet per second (near Station 33+00). A half-inch offset of an upslope slab joint induces an 86.3 feet of water in uplift pressure underneath the slab. This translates to 37.4 pounds per square inch in uplift given an amount of flow to some drainage. Applying this force to a 40 foot long seam would yield uplift pressures of 53.8 tons in a simple example square footage affecting a 40 foot x 6 inch under-slab area (note: effective seam gap of 0.125 inches).
10. This First major fracture blowout failure started with the sudden collapse and/or lifting of a 5.3 foot section of the slab. This created a large hole for the high velocity 90 feet per second, 54,500 cubic feet per second, flow to penetrate under the next 20 foot slab section - along the next drain line crack - of the slab and fracturing and lifting away of the slab. The next section was to the to this next cracked drain line region, then the remaining section to the downslope seam.
11. The extreme hydraulic turbulent forces and erosion development, generated from this initial slab blowout, developed laterally and downslope in continuing to fracture and lift away adjacent slabs. The initial blowout failure dimensions, of affected slabs, determined by the strength of the anchor bars from the foundation material. Poor foundation material resulted in full lifting-removal of 9 slabs with the partial destruction of 4 additional slabs.
12. Subsequent spillway operation of higher volume flows continued the lateral, upslope and downslope destruction of the spillway.
= = end report clip
Main Report link - clip above from Appendix B:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0Bz1I1mIutSEnbFJuVUJZWWNNVlU
Rock-solid evidence right there. Built on a foundation of clay and weak rock. All to save the cost of concrete fill.
Hi Meyer, the revelation of the "debate" with the DWR Field Engineer and the Contractor is amazing, and the fact that this was specifically documented in the Final DWR Construction Report too.
This would reveal that the Field Engineer felt strongly about his position, even though this went completely against the smart engineering specification of using a power excavator as the "test gauge" insuring the excavation was to strong rock.
I suspect the DWR Field Engineer represented a larger group of engineering decision/thought that the clay foundation ("worst foundation available") was deemed acceptable as there were anchor bar tests performed in clay seams (to the 30,000 psi derived anchorage per bar).
Because of this, contractors - following the spec - could be viewed as seeking to get more construction revenue in back filling the soil areas with concrete.
Somewhere, this "new path" of building upon clay and intensely weathered rock (soil like), was decided going against the original specifications to power excavate to solid/strong rock. I can see financial playing a part (saving $'s), I can see faster schedules playing a part (easier/faster)... but it is not explained who and why the original designers specifications were deemed something that they "knew better" about (i.e changing the design to something different introducing a critical design flaw).
You never, ever compromise a design to a weaker integrity without fully consulting with the original engineers. The times I've seen these scenarios develop is in the "politics of engineering judgement" where people are "bypassed" or someone quietly "overrides" prior decisions.
Saving money, time, schedule, etc. can be a powerful motivator leading to this exact outcome - a series of decisions & non-considered consequences - leading to a catastrophic design combination "waiting to occur".
There is no escaping that this non-backfilling of concrete had to have been widely known in the spillway construction as Inspection crews are part of the process. Thus it wouldn't be limited to a single Field Engineer determining the "consensus".
Also, they knew about the deteriorating conditions over time, but chose band-aids, instead of a fix. Completely replacing the spillway in and around the problem area would have cost a fraction of what we taxpayers are facing now.
It all boils down to money, and the priorities of the leftist-de-jour in charge of the state. Brown, and some before him, chose to fund a useless train to nowhere at a HUGE cost (not to mention welfare and protection for millions of ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS), rather than take care of a crumbling infrastructure that affects millions of taxpaying Californians.
It makes one wonder what other significant structures in the state are in need of significant repairs or replacement.
Oroville Dam: After 10 years of delays on relicensing, 16 groups want more time
By Risa Johnson, Chico Enterprise Record |
PUBLISHED: July 21, 2017 at 7:04 am | UPDATED: July 21, 2017 at 7:06 am
Oroville – More groups have signed on to an effort to delay the relicensing of the Oroville Dam project.
The Oroville Chamber of Commerce now has 16 entities that have signed its letter requesting the relicensing — already put off for 10 years — be further delayed because of the uncertainties following the Oroville Dam crisis. The office of Rep. Doug LaMalfa, R-Richvale, has also issued a letter requesting a delay.
The state Department of Water Resources needs approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to continue operating the Oroville project.
Sandy Linville, CEO and president of the Chamber of Commerce and leader of the Oroville Strong! campaign, said she was surprised the city of Oroville was not included in the list. She asked the council at the July 11 meeting to consider signing but it did not, deciding the best course of action would be to leave it to individual council members to sign as opposed to the group. Not all had signed as of Thursday, but the deadline for signatures is July 26, Linville said.
However, the council was in agreement that the relicensing should be put on hold at least until the final report comes out in the fall from the forensic team, the independent group analyzing what went wrong with the spillway in the first place.
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An Unconventional New Captain for California’s Water Agency
Grant Davis of the Sonoma County Water Agency talks about being tapped to be the director of the California Department of Water Resources. He brings an environmentalist background to a job long dominated by engineers.
Written by Matt Weiser
Published on Jul. 24, 2017
California Gov. Jerry Brown last week appointed Grant Davis as director of the state’s Department of Water Resources. Davis, 54, general manager of the Sonoma County Water Agency, brings an unusual resume to the job.
With a degree in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, he had never worked for a water utility until joining the Sonoma County agency in 2007 as assistant general manager. Previously, he spent a decade as executive director of The Bay Institute in Novato. The non-profit environmental group is a leading critic of WaterFix, Brown’s $17 billion proposal to build two gigantic water diversion tunnels under the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.
The controversial tunnels would be built and operated by the DWR, so Davis will have direct oversight of the project. Given his background in environmental advocacy, will he take the project in a new direction?
In other arenas, Davis’s priorities are very much in line with the governor’s. At the Sonoma County agency, he has been a leader in water conservation and recycling, diligent groundwater management and greenhouse gas reduction. He has also pushed for reforms to conventional reservoir operating rules to respond to weather events.
Davis assumes the DWR director’s job on Aug. 1, and Water Deeply recently talked to him about his plans.
Water Deeply: Why do you think you were chosen for this job?
Grant Davis will assume the role of director of California’s Department of Water Resources on August 1. (Photo Courtesy Sonoma County Water Agency)
Grant Davis: I’ve yet to determine exactly why [laughing]. But I do believe it’s the fact that I have a combination of a strong background on Bay-Delta watershed issues as head of The Bay Institute, and I’ve been working on the federal level for many years with members of Congress. And now running a wholesale water agency, the largest in Northern California.
That combination, I think, is what the governor was wanting to bring into this particular transition period. It is a rather unique perspective, one that makes me particularly aware of different stakeholder points of view and probably capable of bringing out the best in different regions on how to approach a sustainable water supply and protect our vital public resources.
Water Deeply: What do you plan to bring to the job?
Davis: First and foremost, I’m going to be coming in brand new and I’m looking forward to meeting with the key staff and hearing a bit more about the institutional frameworks inside DWR. It’s a large agency with a very broad scope – along the lines of the work I do on a smaller scale at Sonoma County: flood control, water supply, habitat.
So really, I think the governor is looking for somebody with a particular ability to take a fresh look at where we are currently in this type of transition, and be a steady, capable manager and be looking for opportunities.
But I will just tell you, on the practical side, we have an infrastructure that is in need of new investment. One of my first priorities is to get up to Oroville Dam and make sure we get the spillway back in operation by Nov. 1 and ready for the winter.
I’m very excited about forecast-informed reservoir operations. We’ve been meeting in D.C. with the director of the National Weather Service and a whole team at NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] and the Office of Atmospheric Research to better understand our extreme weather events, which are atmospheric rivers. There’s not enough support to understand the dynamics at play. We have been leading a $19 million effort called Advanced Quantitative Precipitation Information, funded by DWR: a series of five radars throughout the Bay Area aimed at where atmospheric rivers come in – at the 5,000-feet level – instead of the 10,000-feet level where most forecast radars are aimed.
In our own case, I’m using my existing reservoir, Lake Mendocino, as an example. Back in 2012, the Army Corps of Engineers had to release about 20,000 acre-feet of water because of a rule curve that’s rather dated. And we didn’t get another drop of water, realistically, for another year. That’s half the water we were delivering in a given year, and it put us in a whole world of hurt. I did not have enough water to protect fish below Lake Mendocino. Had we had better forecasting and a rule curve that was a bit more adaptable based on current conditions, that could have been avoided.
Water Deeply: What’s wrong with California water, in your opinion?
Davis: I’m not going to say there’s anything wrong with California water. It’s become very clear we have to secure our water supply and we have to use the best available science to do that. We have to look at how habitat needs require a certain amount of water supply, and we have to look at recapture and recharge.
There’s so much we have at our disposal. We have some of the brightest engineers, the smartest academics. I’m confident we’re going to come up with pathways that will secure our water supply and protect our environment.
This is a time when we need to be smart and efficient. Number One, I want to secure our water supply for future generations. That’s critical. We must put every drop of water to its highest beneficial use to secure our water supply. Obviously, what’s in play is the California Water Action Plan and the WaterFix, and I will be deeply involved in that effort, supporting the governor’s position.
Water Deeply: What is your position on the Delta tunnels (WaterFix) project?
Davis: The governor supports the WaterFix. I’m going to support the WaterFix, but with a caveat – and that is, we have a long way to go. There is a lot of work we have to do on a comprehensive water fix. Most notably, you have to get folks who are going to be the beneficiaries to agree to fund that. I am looking, like I did at The Bay Institute, for a comprehensive view that is going to both protect and restore the San Francisco Bay Delta and secure the water supply for future generations. It’s a true commitment to balancing those competing interests.
It may be one of those opportunities to come in with a fresh pair of eyes and participate in a very longstanding effort to protect the Delta and provide additional water supply. The Bay Institute has been noted for bringing science and technological capability to the table on behalf of the environmental community. I plan on bringing that point of view into the equation to help ensure we come up with a sustainable solution.
Water Deeply: You’ve been a big advocate for water conservation programs. Will that continue at DWR?
Davis: Yes, there’s more that can be done. We have to incentivize it.
I believe, because I’ve lived and breathed it, there are programs that can be enacted at the local level that can combine to meet our state objectives. I just happen to subscribe to the point of view that the most reliable source of water is water you already have – and being more efficient with that before you go to the expense of building additional supply.
But at the same time, it may not be enough to meet growing needs. I’m looking at every tool in the toolbox to manage the water we need in California. We are managing through extremes, and that’s getting more and more difficult.
Water Deeply: You’ve been very involved in water recycling. How will this interest transfer over to DWR?
Davis: I’m a huge fan of making sure you have broad support for recycled water. That requires state and federal dollars, leveraging on local dollars, to put these projects into place. It’s very reliable, drought-proof water.
In my own case at Sonoma County Water Agency, we’ve had a strong relationship with the agricultural community. We ended up building an 8-mile pipeline from one of our treatment plants and bringing a reliable supply of tertiary-treated water to wineries that were over-reliant on groundwater. I think there’s more of those to come with additional support from local and state resources.
This news article reveals tensions between DWR pushing hard for relicensing while Civic leaders want answers.
= = Article clips: OROVILLE, Calif. - After an oftentimes testy exchange with representatives of the Department of Water Resources, the Oroville Recreation Advisory Committee (ORAC) voted 7-2 with two abstentions to approve a motion to request an indefinite delay of the relicensing of the Oroville Dam with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which will decide the agreement at a later date.
Committee members wanted to know details of why the spillway failed and why Oroville hasn't received, they contend, benefits due the city from the previous agreement.
. .
In addition, a new report by a U.C. Berkeley research group says that green spots on the dam itself could suggest leaking.
"Don't lie to us and tell us it rained or it just came about or we should ignore it," said Bill Connelly, Butte County supervisor of District 1 and a member of ORAC. "Give us a real scientific and open explanation."
The DWR says the dam was never at risk, remains sound and that seepage is normal for any dam of this type.
"But it's not normal seepage," countered Connelly. "It's a dam and it has water coming out of it."
"We need a scientifically-proven theory and explanation," he said.
= = end clips More at link http://www.krcrtv.com/news/local/butte/oroville-civic-leaders-request-delay-in-relicensing-of-oroville-dam/591055144
Same ORAC relicensing discussion/voting meeting, but this article (reporter) provides additional verbal interchanges.
=== Article clips: (emphasis mine) "With many unknowns following the spillway crisis — like what caused it in the first place – some signatories of the settlement agreement are having cold feet about DWR continuing to operate the dam, leaving the organization on the defensive. Things got a little heated Friday as DWR tried to convince the Oroville Recreation Advisory Committee, or ORAC, to not request a delay in the relicensing of the Oroville Dam."
. .
With many unknowns following the spillway crisis — like what caused it in the first place – some signatories of the settlement agreement are having cold feet about DWR continuing to operate the dam, leaving the organization on the defensive. Things got a little heated Friday as DWR tried to convince the Oroville Recreation Advisory Committee, or ORAC, to not request a delay in the relicensing of the Oroville Dam.
. .
“You’re all afraid people might wake up and say ‘Wow, we got the short end of this stick,’” Connelly said.
At that point, Anna West, a public relations person contracted by DWR and facilitator of the meeting, asked committee members to lower their voices and not interrupt each other.
= = end clips more at link:
http://www.orovillemr.com/article/NB/20170721/NEWS/170729931
Perhaps some of the people at that meeting have been following this thread...
Free Republic is referenced (and credited) in CCRM's report, including a number of posting references. So, yes, the "following" or the "influence" of engineering discussion on this thread may be being discussed in certain circles.
I believe DWR's mis-steps have been in treating a potentially serious issue without a serious and honest investigation & discussion (open) with the public. It makes matters worse when the subject is trivialized or different answers are given on different town hall meetings ("natural spring" April 27, then "rain falls..then grass grows" at the next town hall). These answers fall apart in (1) explain how the water gets to a higher elevation and a great distance away from the left abutment (if natural spring) or (2) the absence of "erosion channels" above, to the side, and all around the Zone3 face (if rainfall).
DWR may be "tipping" their hand on the next "new" answer from this July 21 meeting. DWR reps said "seepage is normal for any dam of this type".
=== Article clip: "Paradise >> A letter asking to delay relicensing of Oroville Dam to the Department of Water Resources has gained two more signees."
"The Butte County Board of Supervisors voted Tuesday to be included. The town of Paradise will be signing the letter as well."
"In a letter to the Oroville Recreation Advisory Committee, Paradise Mayor Scott Lotter said, “Even after repairs have been completed, and infrastructure rebuilt, the safety of the dam and the lake itself remain in question for many who would choose to recreate on Lake Oroville.”
= = end clip more at link:
List of groups asking for a delay to date: "Relicensing delay request letter to FERC, spearheaded by the Oroville Chamber of Commerce - signatories: Paradise, Butte supervisors, the cities of Biggs, Gridley, Marysville, Wheatland and Yuba City; Feather River Recreation and Parks District; Oroville Association of Realtors; Sutter County Board of Supervisors; Live Oak Chamber of Commerce; Yuba-Sutter Chamber of Commerce; Yuba Sutter Economic Development Corporation; Yuba-Sutter Realtors Association; Sacramento Valley Landowners Association; American Whitewater; River Partners; Friends of the River; California Sportfishing Protection Alliance; Citizens for Fair and Equitable Recreation; Oroville Rotary Club; Oroville Downtown Business Association and the Oroville Recreation Advisory Committee."
Butte supervisors, Paradise support letter delaying Oroville Dam relicensing (article): http://www.orovillemr.com/article/NB/20170725/NEWS/170729850
Actually, I think that Professor Bea has been following this thread. He's confirmed a lot of what ER333 and others have pointed out here. As ER noted, he released his findings just before the meeting so the people had something to back up their concerns and assertions.
Maybe ER333 is Prof. Bea? In the Conservatory with the wrench?
Bureaucratic bungling on Oroville Dam bodes ill for future California projects
By Dan Walters
July 26, 2017 12:01 AM
Slowly – but surely – we are learning that the near-catastrophic failure of Oroville Dam’s main spillway wasn’t truly caused by weather, even though the state claims that in seeking federal aid for repairs.
Rather, it resulted from poor engineering and construction when the nation’s highest dam was rising more than a half-century ago as the centerpiece of the State Water Project, and poor maintenance since its completion.
The latest evidence is a huge report by a team of engineering experts, headed by Robert Bea and Tony Johnson of the University of California’s Center for Catastrophic Risk Management.
It concluded that the dam’s fundamental flaws were compounded by decades of neglect by the state Department of Water Resources (DWR) and the Division of Safety of Dams (DSOD).
“The gated spillway was managed to failure by DWR and DSOD,” the damning – no pun intended – report declared.
One of the most abysmal failures cited was “the recently exposed existence of DSOD inspection reports dating back to 1989. For reasons yet to be fully determined, identified deficiencies were either ignored, treated as low priority, not acted upon or a combination thereof.”
The 124-page report added that “complacency, lack of industry standard level maintenance, and possibly pressure from internal DWR management and external State Water Contractors’ representatives to hold down maintenance costs were key contributors.”
Read more here: http://www.fresnobee.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/political-notebook/article163498393.html#storylink=cpy
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There is another report within the main report (as a contributed reference report by former DWR talent) that reveals another dimension to the workings of DWR & certain external contracting outfits (GEI & HDR). I'll have to peruse the main report to get this reference report link (and summary sections posted).
What could be a further headache for DWR is that there seems to be a favoritism of big $ contracts being sent to these contracting outfits. The same outfits that indicate a pattern of top DWR/DSOD officials retiring to go to work for, with a boost in salary + contract benefits.
Smile :-) I would choose Colonel Mustard in the Study with a Rope.
(btw - Prof Bea does have a login name - he posted some time back just after the first report came out).
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