Scott Speicher, Prisoner of War

The likelihood of his survival from the shoot down is related to how he was shot down. Indeed, the circumstances of the shoot down are the first of many controversial issues that have surrounded the Speicher story from the very beginning. Initially the government's position was that he had been downed by a surface-to-air missile. Granted, many SAMs were launched in the general vicinity during the time of the mission. But in the exact area where Speicher was hit, U.S. intelligence was reporting no missile batteries, particularly of the type that would have reached up to Speicher's altitude near 30,000 feet. Then why would the government choose to report it as a SAM kill?

In the minutes leading up to the shoot down, other pilots in the strike group, perhaps Speicher himself, obtained radar contact on an Iraqi fighter closing the group. One American pilot maneuvered for and acquired a weapons solution on the enemy fighter. In accordance with U. S. rules of engagement then in effect, this pilot requested clearance to fire from the AWACS command and control, while the two opposing fighters were approaching each other at better than Mach 2. At such speeds and with the particular geometry of this intercept, the weapons-launch window was open for only seconds. The clearance to fire was never given, the launch window closed, and the Iraqi fighter got away. Those most familiar with the engagement are convinced that this Iraqi fighter went from hunted to hunter, and moments later downed Speicher's aircraft with an air-to-air missile.

Could Speicher have survived a missile kill on his aircraft? The warhead on an air-to-air missile is generally smaller than that on a SAM, especially a large, longer range SAM. So an air-to-air kill is generally more survivable for the pilot. Further, the F/A-18 is equipped with an excellent ejection seat with an 85 to 90 percent survival rate overall.

Could it be that in the confusion of the first night's battle, with Speicher's fate unclear, someone in the chain of command was embarrassed by the failure of U.S. command and control in this engagement? Was it more convenient to declare this a SAM kill to avoid the scrutiny of the failure of airborne command and control? Were the rules of engagement inadequate? Was there an inter-service problem with the Air Force AWACS failing to give a Navy fighter clearance to fire?

If those questions are uncomfortable to ponder, consider this: In the hours following the battle, was it more convenient to declare Speicher KIA rather than deal with the embarrassment of having one of our fighter pilots in Iraqi custody after being on the losing end of an air-to-air engagement? Why did the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff go on national television and pronounce Speicher killed only hours after the engagement and without any definitive proof? Maybe it was simply an innocent faux pas rather than something more sinister, but since it has not been explained, all these questions cannot be discounted.

Mistakes Were Made
Extending the logic of the simple-mistake theory, it is relatively easy to deduce the ineptitude of the decision making that followed. As we have seen time and time again in bureaucratic Washington, once you make a mistake, you never admit it. Instead you try to control subsequent events that will make your error look less unwise. Central Command, in charge of the Gulf War, never launched a combat search-and-rescue mission for Speicher despite having a robust combat search and rescue force in theater, armed and ready. Its primary mission was to retrieve downed aviators under combat conditions. One may imagine the discussion at CENTCOM on whether to launch the combat search and rescue or not: "SECDEF said he was KIA, so why go look for him? We never got a distress call from the pilot's survival radio. We don't know the exact location of the wreckage." These points were probably all considered and led to the decision not to launch the mission. But they are all problematic.

First, SECDEF said on national television that Speicher had been killed. But this actually was not a formal declaration of status. In fact, Speicher was listed as MIA a few days later. It wasn't until May 1991 that he was declared killed in action. It is true that Speicher did not make a radio call and that such radio communication is very important to the success of a search and rescue mission. Some speculate that Speicher lost his survival radio in the ejection. Others say that he was too badly injured to operate the radio, or that the radio had failed. The point is that radio communication is not absolutely essential in finding a downed pilot, especially in barren terrain with good visibility, and especially if the SAR forces know where to look. There is evidence that Speicher created a visual signal in the desert for use by search-and-rescue forces, although it is likely that CENTCOM never assigned any reconnaissance forces or requested national assets to look for Speicher's wreckage. Which leads to the last point.

Within 24 hours of the shoot down, pilots on the Saratoga calculated exactly where they had seen Speicher's fireball by comparing notes and reviewing data from aircraft and voice recorders. This information was relayed up the chain of command. Years later, when the wreckage was actually located, it was in the precise spot they had identified.

Speicher’s Status
At the conclusion of hostilities, after a spectacular American victory, the U. S. conducted a prisoner exchange with Iraq. Was Speicher's name not on the list of those to be returned? If he was missing in action, might not there be a possibility he was captured? Even if he were suspected dead, what would have been the downside of demanding him back, just in case we were wrong? Perhaps the U.S. was reluctant to be forceful in its demand for Speicher's release because it was confused regarding his status, and well aware that Saddam, too, saw SECDEF's declaration on television. Americans aren't the only ones who watch CNN. Further, there was no motivation for Saddam to release Speicher, given the weakness of U.S. demands.

In 1994, the U. S. government again had the opportunity to send in a covert mission, this time to examine the wreckage of Speicher's aircraft found by a friendly Arab military officer. Again, the military leadership determined it was too risky, in the words of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili, to retrieve "old bones." Was Shali, a highly decorated and respected soldier, getting marching orders from someone higher in the administration? Surely this decision to not launch a covert mission was inconsistent with his military background. Did he really consider it too risky? In remote territory in the middle of Iraq under airspace controlled by the U. S. led coalition? Instead the U. S. opted to utilize diplomatic channels, tipping its hand to the Iraqis and effectively destroying the opportunity to evaluate an undisturbed crash site. Still, there was enough evidence conclusively to determine that Speicher indeed ejected from his stricken aircraft and probably survived.

After examining the physical evidence, nothing indicated that Speicher was dead. The findings were exposed in a 1995 New York Times article, which in turn spawned the interest of CBS News. The ensuing 60 Minutes II piece, first run in May 2000, finally gave Speicher's fate national attention. Inside the Pentagon, lower-ranking officers and former officers continued to ask difficult questions, effectively keeping the issue alive, in spite of the leadership's seeming preference to have it just go away. Credible reports of eyewitnesses to Speicher's incarceration in Baghdad were coming to light. A few members of Congress, led by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, began to exert pressure on the administration. Finally, on the tenth anniversary of Speicher's shoot down, the government relented and changed his status back to MIA. It is unfortunate that this action was initiated by the media and Speicher's contemporaries and not by the military leadership. In fact, it is probably fair to say that without these external stimuli, Speicher would still be KIA. As would the issue.

Thinking Like a Madman
Today, the issue again is on the front burner, thanks this time to several newspaper articles. In January 2002 the Virginian Pilot ran a six-part series. These were followed by articles just last week in the Washington Times and the Chicago Tribune that report credible eyewitness accounts of Speicher being alive as recently as September 2001 when he was reportedly moved to a military facility following the 9/11 attacks. These eyewitness accounts were reported as being corroborated by British and Dutch intelligence sources. Still, many are convinced that all the growing evidence lacks veracity, that if Speicher somehow had survived, Saddam would have done away with him by now. But from Saddam's perspective, why kill him?

Saddam might think: Is he not worth more alive than dead? He is my trophy. An American pilot even more valuable than my Kuwaiti, Iranian, and Israeli trophies that I have been keeping from wars much longer ago than the "mother of all wars." I will keep him alive until I find the best use for him. If I can make him break, he will be worth even more.

For Americans, it is difficult to think like an Iraqi, much less a clever madman like Saddam. But it is clear that Saddam strategizes in terms of centuries. Some Iraq experts are convinced that Saddam fancies himself a modern-day Nebuchadnezzar reliving the glory days of ancient Babylon. A mere eleven years is nothing in that context.

From January 1991 until early last year, U. S. leadership consistently let Scott Speicher down. In fact they broke their contract with Speicher and with every American war fighter who may fall into enemy hands in any future conflict. In the minds of those who fight our nation's battles and who live and die by the Code of Conduct, who in fact are required to uphold the Code of Conduct, those decisions broke a sacred trust. The incredible success of the American armed forces throughout our history has been due in large measure to the quality and character of its individual soldiers and their fervent belief in leadership. A most important aspect of that trust is that they will not be left behind, an essential element of the Code of Conduct.

We have left Scott Speicher behind. Many who now wear or once wore the uniform are ashamed that he may have been abandoned in an Iraqi prison for eleven years. Alone. With no indication that his country was doing anything to get him back. Under such conditions, it is difficult to imagine anyone being able to maintain his physical and mental health. Fortunately, those who know Scott Speicher best know that if anybody could do it, it would be he. When he left the ship on January 16, 1991, he was strong, fit, and vigorous. He was smart and knew his job, in the airplane, as well as in survival, evasion and POW situations. Most importantly, he had strong faith — in his comrades, in his family, in God. And faith in the United States of America.

It is time to renew our obligation to Scott Speicher and all our armed forces. September 11 and the war on terrorism may have provided the impetus and the opportunity. While the administration formulates its Iraq policy in the context of this global war, Speicher's return should be an integral part of it. If Scott himself could be a part of that strategy session he, in his humility, would probably say, don't risk the bigger objective for just me. But Scott Speicher in many ways represents that objective — the U. S. government's contract with its soldiers, and its citizens.

Cmdr. Robert E.Stumpf, USN (Ret.), ... served as a carrier air-wing strike leader throughout Desert Storm and commanded a Fleet F/A-18 Squadron and the Blue Angels.

Old U.S. satellite imagery of the crash site reportedly shows Speicher's ejection seat located on the ground several miles away and the canopy also separated from the rest of the wreckage

I thought I'd highlight that word, because there is an interesting issue here.

The resolution needed to ID an ejection seat is on the order of a few INCHES; any system that can generate this resolution is going to have a field of view rougly akin to that of a soda straw; searching several miles around the crash site would take MONTHS of satellite passes. The NRO would not spend scarce satellite time searching a several-mile radius around a downed aircraft with high-resolution sensors, given the high-priority taskings that those sensors DO have on a daily basis.

This story has been making the rounds for several years, and it keeps getting embellished every time, and the sources turn out to be the same folks who were engaged in spreading mythical reports of live POW sightings in Vietnam. Many of these folks falsely claimed Vietnam service and awards for heroism, and are profiled in Burkett's excellent study, Stolen Valor.

Contemporary accounts (i.e., from 1991) indicate that Speicher's aircraft took a forward aspect direct hit from a missile with a very large warhead (it is believed to be an AA-6 Acrid). The odds of Speicher having survived such a missile hit are nil.

I thought I would highlight a few of your comments because they inspire questions.

The NRO would not spend scarce satellite time searching a several-mile radius around a downed aircraft with high-resolution sensors, given the high-priority taskings that those sensors DO have on a daily basis.

It is disheartening that you "speak" with such authority on this subject. It is apparent however that your expertise in this sophisticated area may of only been technical and thankfully not in the decision making loop. What higher priority is there when searching for human life?

This story has been making the rounds for several years, and it keeps getting embellished every time, and the sources turn out to be the same folks who were engaged in spreading mythical reports of live POW sightings in Vietnam.

I am interested please state your source for uh, this embellishment. Surfacing is an understatement. Further Captain Stumpf was there...and he is a man of the highest personal integrity and proven valor....and you will never see his name in Burkett's. Apples and handgrenades here sir. BDA not even in the same universe.

Contemporary accounts...

...and those would be? You must do better research here. There are numerous sources studying this subject. An elementary internet search will yield you much valid/verifiable information. It is not the policy of President's (even poor ones) to base decisions (KIA to MIA) international policy (potential conflict on IRAQ) on here-say and vague theory. Lastly:

...(it is believed to be an AA-6 Acrid). The odds of Speicher having survived such a missile hit are nil. Believed by whom? Which theory? So the statistical science you applied to arrive at a nil set is based on what?

Read the article.

I thought I would highlight a few of your comments because they inspire questions.

The NRO would not spend scarce satellite time searching a several-mile radius around a downed aircraft with high-resolution sensors, given the high-priority taskings that those sensors DO have on a daily basis.

It is disheartening that you "speak" with such authority on this subject. It is apparent however that your expertise in this sophisticated area may of only been technical and thankfully not in the decision making loop. What higher priority is there when searching for human life?

How about measuring and evaluating the primary intelligence targets for said satellites, such as Iraqi nuclear weapons labs, biological warfare labs, and similar facilities? You know, the things that could kill thousands or millions of Americans? Nice to know you'd drop everything and divert the entire US intelligence community to find ONE possibly alive aviator. What about the others out there doing the E&E? Are they SOL?

I am pointing out that this part of the story simply does not make sense. It would take many months to find just the ejection seat (and most of the time, the target would have been obscured by the lousy weather, lengthening the search), assuming that the spy satellites in question had NO other tasking whatsoever in the theater--or outside (as the out-of-theater tasks are influenced by the satellite's orbit). You would prefer to blind America's intelligence network on the basis of rumor and hearsay.

I am interested please state your source for uh, this embellishment. Surfacing is an understatement. Further Captain Stumpf was there...and he is a man of the highest personal integrity and proven valor....and you will never see his name in Burkett's. Apples and handgrenades here sir. BDA not even in the same universe.

I first heard of this story in 1995 when Scott Barnes (author of BOHICA, a BS book claiming that Barnes had been part of a POW recovery effort sabotaged by the CIA, and mentioned prominently in Burkett's book) was on the local third-rate overnight talk show. At the time, I believed Barnes; after reading Stolen Valor, I realized he's a fraud. Stumpf may have personal doubts, but he has to wrestle with his own after-action report.

Contemporary accounts...

...and those would be?

Captain Stumpf's initial report, Norman Friedman's Desert Victory, and Trainor's The General's War. All of these were primary source material, or are drawn from same.

You must do better research here.

I have. You obviously haven't.

There are numerous sources studying this subject.

And I have reviewed them. The reliable ones (i.e., primary source material and those who have worked from same)

An elementary internet search will yield you much valid/verifiable information.

And a great deal of BS from the usual suspects, looking to keep their gravy trains going until they retire. The task of separating that data out is daunting in the extreme. However, I've already done that.

It is not the policy of President's (even poor ones) to base decisions (KIA to MIA) international policy (potential conflict on IRAQ) on here-say and vague theory.

But it would be Clinton's policy to leave Dubya a mess like that out of sheer spite.

Lastly:

...(it is believed to be an AA-6 Acrid). The odds of Speicher having survived such a missile hit are nil.

Believed by whom?

General Trainor, USMC (Retired), in The General's War.

Which theory? So the statistical science you applied to arrive at a nil set is based on what?

May I suggest a simple experiment to validate this assessment?

Attach a thirty-kilogram charge of plastic explosive, surrounded by hardened steel lumps, to the windshield of your friend's car. Have said friend sit in the driver's seat in flight gear. Detonate charge. Let me know if you need to schedule a closed-casket funeral.

Read the article.

I have. Repeating the same BS is NOT the same as proving the validity of same.

I would like to rebut the passage, "I am pointing out that this part of the story simply does not make sense. It would take many months to find just the ejection seat (and most of the time, the target would have been obscured by the lousy weather, lengthening the search),".

Very well, good sir.

I have spent nearly 10 years in the Middle East and there are very RARE occasions where the weather would prohibit satellite imagery.

And one of those periods was during January and February of 1991, which just happened to be right in the midst of Operation Desert Storm. IIRC, it was the worst winter in the Mideast in over two decades, and actually lengthened the war about about two or three weeks (by delaying the air campaign).

Any search for Speicher couldn't get going until AFTER the weather cleared up. But I am supposed to believe that we spent billions of dollars of satellite time hunting for an ejection seat that no one had any reason to believe was there.

Although we appear to (agree to) disagree, I would like to return that I was in-Kingdom during the entire Desert Shield/Storm campaign. My particular duties kept me busy in the Control Tower Base (Rotunda) at King Khalid International Airport outside of Riyadh as well as at various Royal Saudi Air Force installations around the Kingdom. I had a ring-side seat in the Riyadh GCA (Ground-Control Approach) facility the night we transitioned from sheild to storm. Although the details of specific weather patterns during the period you address escape me, it is feasible that weather could have been an issue during that particular mission window. I am certainly no expert on Satellite imaging resources but simply state that if there is a _chance_ that Lt. Cmdr. Speicher is incarcerated in or about Baghdad we should pursue verification and release immediately. I concur with Cmdr. Stumpf in that our government frequently fails to apply appropriate logic to our Middle Eastern operations. For an insight into how Mr. Hussein may be viewing this, I suggest a read of "The Assyrian" by Nicholas Guild. If, as Cmdr. Stumpf suggests, Saddam Hussein has visions of restoring the glory of Babylon, his thought processes will be so alien to most of our "learned scholars" in the state department, that they will be rendered impotent and potentially dangerous.

Oh boy! Phone home. Grown a little cynical haven't we? Oh well.

Make your point and at the least answer my questions..?..at the very least stay on issue. Satellite Imagery. No! Accountability. YES.

Before you do though and before you put forth more "Iraqui-like" diplomatic, arm-chair, way out there arguments go here:

For the return of Scott Speicher

There is some background info in there which may help. Put it in there just for you...You may also want to review "The Special Report of the Committee on Intel, United States Senate, January 6, 1999 to December 15, 2000"...para III.A.18 and do a little extra reading.

I have the deepest admiration and respect for General Trainor. But he is/was wrong (the facts have since proven that out)and he was where during this incident and was what MOS while he was in the Corps? Admiral Arthur had a different opinion?...as we all do. I would be happy to construct your hypothetical "has to do with what I do not know" experiment for you...but I stay away from those kind of toys now that I am retired and have no need whatsoever to play.

Apologize for my crass remarks, but I have little tolerance for those who do not understand the special bond of the warrior (ich overused word) ethic...the allegiance that men (who do the kind of brave-invoking National Policy things CDR Speicher do/did at the FRONT...looking the bad guys in the eyes...putting steal in their bellies) have for each other; yet try and psuedo-sophisticate something extremely sacred from words they read in books. That may not be fair as it is apparent that yours and my experience and orientations wrt service and how one goes about it.. is quite different.

That said, please know that I respect your opinion...please just make one.

Oh boy! Phone home. Grown a little cynical haven't we? Oh well.

I get tired of hearing the same charlatans start up anew and get instant credibility with some folks.

Make your point and at the least answer my questions..?..at the very least stay on issue. Satellite Imagery. No! Accountability. YES.

When one piece of the story is BS, the odds favor MORE pieces being BS. When it's being hawked by the likes of Scott Barnes, the BS content is almost certainly to be 100%.

Before you do though and before you put forth more "Iraqui-like" diplomatic, arm-chair, way out there arguments go here:

The link you provided doesn't work.

There is some background info in there which may help. Put it in there just for you...You may also want to review "The Special Report of the Committee on Intel, United States Senate, January 6, 1999 to December 15, 2000"...para III.A.18 and do a little extra reading.

I have the deepest admiration and respect for General Trainor.

This is interesting, considering how you trash him immediately afterward.

But he is/was wrong (the facts have since proven that out)and he was where during this incident and was what MOS while he was in the Corps?

Would you mind explaining (a) where he was or is wrong in his report of this incident, (b) what his whereabouts during this incident have to do with the validity of the research he performed on primary source materials, and (c) what his MOS in the USMC to do with the validity of the research he performed on primary source materials?

Admiral Arthur had a different opinion?

He wasn't there, either. He may have been "closer" to the scene of the events on 17/18 January, 1991, but he wasn't there.

...as we all do. I would be happy to construct your hypothetical "has to do with what I do not know" experiment for you...but I stay away from those kind of toys now that I am retired and have no need whatsoever to play.

The accounts, written by the participants at the time (including CDR Stumpf), indicate that Speicher's aircraft took a frontal-aspect direct hit from a missile with a very healthy warhead, and that indicates that he probably did NOT make it out. (Friedman, working from Stumpf's report, estimated that Speicher was "head-down," lining up a HARM shot, and thus did not even see the threat, let alone attempt to evade it.)

Apologize for my crass remarks, but I have little tolerance for those who do not understand the special bond of the warrior (ich overused word) ethic...the allegiance that men (who do the kind of brave-invoking National Policy things CDR Speicher do/did at the FRONT...looking the bad guys in the eyes...putting steal in their bellies) have for each other; yet try and psuedo-sophisticate something extremely sacred from words they read in books.

Spare me the platitudes, because I've been there, done that, and wore the t-shirt. I don't let arm-waving over "the special bond of the warrior" turn off my critical thinking. This story started making the rounds in the POW/MIA community in 1995, and the same BS artists who were sponging off of the League of Families during the 1975-1990 period were the ones sounding the clarion call on this case. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.

That said, please know that I respect your opinion...please just make one.

Absent a LOT of evidence from more reliable sources, I'd have to conclude that LCDR Speicher died on the night of 17/18 January, 1991, over Iraq. A very sad day for America.

Finally.

I get tired of hearing the same charlatans....

Been called a lot of things, but charlatan is a first. Bravo, how did you know I give originality points? And for all we both know, I could be a security guard at the same Iraqi embassy that I have accused you of running. "Charlatan" ...sounds like a good replacement name for the Redskins...the Washington Charlatans...wonder if that name would offend anyone...I digress.

When one piece of the story is BS, the odds favor MORE pieces being BS. When it's being hawked by the likes of Scott Barnes, the BS content is almost certainly to be 100%.

Get past Mr. Barnes. Get over him. Spike's misfortune has been studied and reviewed extensively now. Credible people, multiple honorable men have weighed into this affair (does credibility and trust really dilute critical thinking?).... and most have concluded correctly that due to the failure of military and civilian "leadership" there is reasonable doubt as to what actually did happen. Good men made poor decisions at the time... Which, gee whiz, brings us to the issue. Thank the good Lord that creative, careful, tireless thinkers pursue and INVESTIGATE all insinuations, allegations, evidence and even the most minute details in pursuit of the truth...especially when there is doubt... and yes minutia can sometimes be looked at as BS...but if its BS, but its credible, it ain't BS. The facts and opinions as they were once thought have changed; the progression of time has, and this is a news flash, cleared up some of the fog....and thus applying your own logic leads to the only real conclusion...that no one is entirely sure of what happened.

The link you provided doesn't work.

Too little time with software...and computers please try again...but you will more than likely get "hung up somewhere "...because you don't bring any passion to the argument...and you fail to see the importance of hope...your analysis is not weighing anything new...its stuck...oops I digressed again and maybe unfairly? try this :

For the Return of Scott Speicher

Don't forget to review this; you italicized it but made no comment to it? There is some background info in there which may help. Put it in there just for you...You may also want to review "The Special Report of the Committee on Intel, United States Senate, January 6, 1999 to December 15, 2000"...para III.A.18 and do a little extra reading.

This is interesting, considering how you trash him immediately afterward.

Not agreeing with is not trashing! The General has always been enjoyably controversial.

Would you mind explaining (a) where he was or is wrong in his report of this incident, (b) what his whereabouts during this incident have to do with the validity of the research he performed on primary source materials, and (c) what his MOS in the USMC to do with the validity of the research he performed on primary source materials?

Okay…when you answer my questions…cheesy huh? Lets just say for now…that I think the General’s book was a lofty piece…dealing with the big picture, the strategic planning that yielded particular military and political results…. and for one better information now disagrees with General’s theory…repeat theory on what type of warhead downed Spike’s Hornet. The GW was published in ’94 or ’95 wasn’t it?

He wasn't there, either. He may have been "closer" to the scene of the events on 17/18 January 1991, but he wasn't there.

True. But he was directly involved.

The accounts, written by the participants at the time (including CDR Stumpf), indicate that Speicher's aircraft took a frontal-aspect direct hit from a missile with a very healthy warhead, and that indicates that he probably did NOT make it out. (Friedman, working from Stumpf's report, estimated that Speicher was "head-down," lining up a HARM shot, and thus did not even see the threat, let alone attempt to evade it.)

Possibly…but an ejection theory and an intact flight suit with no….?

Spare me the platitudes, because I've been there, done that, and wore the t-shirt. I don't let arm-waving over "the special bond of the warrior" ….

Thanks for telling me, I would of never guessed.

…turn off my critical thinking. This story started making the rounds in the POW/MIA community in 1995, and the same BS artists who were sponging off of the League of Families during the 1975-1990 period were the ones sounding the clarion call on this case. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.

Maybe you have confused critical with cynical…. and if those BS artists are right…ooops just read below and Scott is dead…sorry. Who is sponging off the LOA here? Big huge shame on you here if you are fooled thrice.

Absent a LOT of evidence from more reliable sources; I'd have to conclude that LCDR Speicher died on the night of 17/18 January 1991, over Iraq. A very sad day for America.

Whew. Okay then! A conclusion with some emotion. Negative Emotion…but emotion nonetheless…that despicable critical thinker’s handicapper. Can’t stop reading that first sentence preceding your conclusion….”Absent….he’s dead.” You surprise me.

Well as for me, even though you didn’t ask…ahhh what’s the use, you have drawn your conclusion and something tells me that even if CDR Speicher did make it thru this and sat next to you at church, you would still be more apt to believe he was Elvis….besides hope and trust have muddled my discretionary ability …no conclusion here. Just want the government to give me a “reliable one.”

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How a Navy pilot wound up listed as killed in action during the Gulf War and why he may still be alive.